Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Game

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2007-2-13 03:52:00 上传

Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Game
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<br></P><FONT face=dcr10 size=1>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies,</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>how neutrally stable strategies can be upset in a process of mutation and selection.</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>While neutral stability excludes that mutants have a selective advantage themselves, it</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>does not rule out the possibility that mutants that are neutral can enter a population</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. This will be called an indirect</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>invasion and the central results show that, for high enough continuation probability,</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>there is no strategy that is robust against indirect invasions. Such stepping stone paths</FONT></P>
<P align=left><FONT size=3>out of equilibrium generally exist both in the direction of more and in the direction of</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=3>less cooperation.</FONT></P></FONT>

[此贴子已经被作者于2007-3-2 2:55:28编辑过]

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关键词：Strategies Evolution Repeated Strateg repeat themselves advantage dilemma repeated general

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