<P>Oligopoly Pricing<BR><B>Old Ideas and New Tools</B><BR><a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/default.asp?aid=450" target="_blank" >Xavier Vives</A><BR><BR>The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.<BR><BR>Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.<BR></P>
<P>
120171.pdf
(12.77 MB, 需要: 50 个论坛币)
<BR></P>
<P>超级经典，最新的产业组织流行研究生教材，完全从super modular games出发阐释寡头垄断和竞争问题。作者Xavier Vives是《欧洲经济协会会刊》（Journal of European Economics Association）主编，Fellow of Econometric Society，是世界闻名的博弈论和产业组织研究专家。</P>
发帖
雷达卡
京公网安备 11010802022788号
