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英文文献：Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly-混合寡头垄断下消费者合作社的最优薪酬结构
英文文献作者：Michael Kopel,Marco A. Marini
英文文献摘要：
The main aim of this paper is to derive properties of an optimal compensation scheme for consumer cooperatives (Coops) in situations of strategic interaction with profitmaximizing firms (PMFs). Our model provides a reason why Coops are less prone than PMFs to pay variable bonuses to their managers. We show that this occurs under price competition when in equilibrium the Coop prefers to pay a straight salary to its manager whereas the profit-maximizing rival adopts a variable, high-powered incentive scheme. The main rationale is that, due to consumers’ preferences, a Coop is per se highly expansionary in term of output and, therefore, does not need to provide strong strategic incentives to their managers to expand output aggressively by undercutting its rival.
本文的主要目的是推导出消费者合作社在与利润最大化企业战略互动的情况下的最优补偿方案的性质。我们的模型提供了一个原因，说明为什么合作社比PMFs更不容易向管理者支付可变奖金。在价格竞争的均衡条件下，当利润最大化的竞争对手采取可变的、高动力的激励机制时，合作社更愿意直接向管理者支付工资。其主要原因是，由于消费者的偏好，Coop本身在产量方面具有高度扩张性，因此，不需要向其管理者提供强大的战略激励，以通过削弱竞争对手来大力扩大产量。
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