Litigation risk and abnormal accruals
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relation between auditor litigation risk and abnormal accruals over the
1989-2007 time period. We address potential endogeneity in prior studies by jointly modeling abnormal
accruals and litigation risk in a simultaneous equation system. Our findings suggest that client-specific
litigation risk affects auditor incentives to acquiesce to client demands for earnings management, i.e., the
higher the risk of auditor litigation, the greater the auditor’s restraining influence on the abnormal accruals
reported by the client. We also find evidence that abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of auditor
litigation. We also document that the 1995 Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) lowered the
client-specific risk of auditor litigation. Litigation reform remains a topic of ongoing interest. Our findings
contribute to a better understanding of the effects of litigation reform (and related changes in legal
exposure) on auditor incentives and earnings management.


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