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[hide] <p>Handbook of Public Economics<br/>Volume 1<br/>Edited by: Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein<br/>Editors'' Introduction - Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein<br/>Chapters<br/>1. A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine - R.A. Musgrave<br/>2. The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation - Alan J. Auerbach<br/>3. Public Sector Pricing - Dieter Bös<br/>4. Taxes and Labor Supply - Jerry A. Hausman<br/>5. The Effects of Taxation on Savings and Risk Taking - Agnar Sandmo<br/>6. Tax Policy in Open Economies - Avinash Dixit<br/>7. Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and Equity - Harvey S. Rosen<br/>8. The Taxation of Natural Resources - Terry Heaps and John F. Helliwell<br/>Volume 2<br/>Chapters<br/>9. Theory of Public Goods - William H. Oakland<br/>10. Incentives and the Allocation of Public Goods - Jean-Jacques Laffont<br/>11. The Economics of the Local Public Sector - Daniel L. Rubinfeld<br/>12. Markets, Governments, and the "New" Political Economy - Robert P. Inman<br/>13. Income Maintenance and Social Insurance - A.B. Atkinson<br/>14. The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis - Jean Dréze and Nicholas Stern<br/>15. Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics - Joseph E. Stiglitz<br/>16. Tax Incidence - Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Lawrence H. Summers<br/>Volume 3<br/>Editors'' Introduction to Volume 3 - Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein<br/>The Transformation of Public Economics Research: 1970-2000 - Martin Feldstein<br/>Part 1 - Capital Income Taxation<br/>Chapters<br/>17. Taxation, Risk Taking and Household Portfolio Behavior - James M. Poterba<br/>18. Taxation and Saving - B. Douglas Bernheim<br/>19. Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy - Alan J. Auerbach<br/>20. Tax Policy and Business Investment - Kevin A. Hassett and R. Glenn Hubbard<br/>Part 2 - Theory of Taxation<br/>Chapters<br/>21. Taxation and Economic Efficiency - Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines Jr.<br/>22. Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration - Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki<br/>23. Environmental Taxation and Regulation - A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulder<br/>Part 3 - Theory of Government<br/>Chapters<br/>24. Political Economics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini<br/>25. Economic Analysis of the Law - Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell<br/>Volume 4<br/>Editors'' Introduction to Volume 4 - Alan J. Auerbach and and Michael D. Intriligator<br/>Editors'' Introduction - Alan J. Auerbach<br/>Part 4 - Fiscal Incidence<br/>Chapters<br/>26. Tax Incidence - Don Fullerton, Gilbert E. Metcalf<br/>27. Generational Policy - Laurence J. Kotlikoff<br/>Part 5 - Intergovernmental Relations<br/>Chapters<br/>28. International Taxation - Roger H. Gordon and James R. Hines Jr.<br/>29. Local Public Goods and Clubs - Suzanne Scotchmer<br/>Part 6 - Public Expenditure Programs<br/>Chapters<br/>30. Publicly Provided Education - Eric A. Hanushek<br/>31. Health Care and the Public Sector - David M. Cutler<br/>32. Social Security - Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey B. Liebman<br/>Part 7 - Labor Market Effects<br/>Chapters<br/>33. Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance - Alan B. Krueger and Bruce D. Meyer<br/>34. Welfare Programs and Labor Supply - Robert A. M</p><p>Chapter 24 Political Economics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini</p><p> </p><p>Abstract: <br/>Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs, which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics, as we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions: we model some styilized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision. </p><p><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=157590">http://ssrn.com/abstract=157590</a></p><p>Chapter 25 Economic Analysis of the Law - Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell</p><p><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=150860">http://ssrn.com/abstract=150860</a></p><p>This is a survey of the field of economic analysis of law, focusing on the work of economists. The survey covers the three central areas of civil law - liability for accidents (tort law), property law, and contracts - as well as the litigation process and public enforcement of law. </p><p> </p><p>待续...</p>[/hide]
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