发帖
雷达卡
根据主办单位设定之议题，本来是针对「我国目前学术评鉴对于各学门的正面与负面冲击」。不过，就经济学门而言，所要谈论的，恐怕不只是学术评鉴「单向」的对经济学门学术发展的影响冲击；而是二者之间「双向」彼此之间的相互影响。
诚如研讨会规划书所提到的，研讨会之举办，旨在针对以「量化经济学逻辑」为基础之学术评鉴模式，是否适用人文社会科学；因此，始作俑者，既是经济学门，故就经济学门而言，值得探讨的，首先应是所谓「量化经济学逻辑」之内涵，或其在经济学门之学术发展所代表的意义。换言之，在运用「量化经济学逻辑」，或奉之为学术评鉴之「圭臬」前，应该检视或反省的，应是经济学门本身的学术发展或其学术成就。由经济学的发展历程，可以清楚的反映，正是这种「量化经济学逻辑」的学术检验，导致经济学的危机与破产。
其次，要检验的是经济学门的学术传承系统，由此，可以掌握为何今日的经济学长成这般模样，为何其一再被宣称陷入「危机」，甚至被宣告「破产」，但却依然故我，处变不惊，甚至仍能不断扩张其版图，而怡然自得。
最后为对「学术评鉴」之评析；本文将指出：学术评鉴系以「反科学」的态度，以「伪科学」的方法，对科学研究的评价。
本篇论文诉求之对象，就如同Eichner编辑”Why Economics is not yet a Science”所企求者：“…that the essays in this collection are directed primarily at those outside economics – even though it is hoped that minds within the profession, especially younger ones, are still open to persuasion. One audience is the lay public. It is this group which suffers the most from economics in its present form, not just in terms of the resources consumed in supporting those who hold teaching and research positions in the field but also in terms of the damage done by there not being a better understanding of how the economy works. The even more important audience, however, is the broader community of scientists. It is this group which most directly threatened when ideas falsely masquerade as science, and it is this group which must respond accordingly.” (Eichner, 1983a, pp. xiii-xiv；黑体字为作者所加，以后之引注亦同。)
一、什么是学术评鉴？为什么要学术评鉴？
在进入正题之前，对什么是学术评鉴，以及为什么作学术评鉴，先予厘清。由于学术评鉴目的的「神圣性」（sacred），要提出这样的问题，必需要有毫不汗颜（shameless）的勇气。不过，也因为其目的的「神圣性」，对其手段的「合适性」，往往讳莫如深。因此，更应该坚持科学的精神，在「不疑之处有疑」；以「纯真」的态度，「打破沙锅问到底」。
如果根据「不说也知道」的常识性定义：学术评鉴就是运用一套「标准化的科学标准」去评比学术工作者（以下简称学者）的研究成果[2]；学术评鉴只是手段，其目的系透过学者间的「比较」，产生「相互竞争」，并以「红萝卜和棍子」为诱因，「驱使」学者，不敢懈怠，奋力从事研究工作，以提升学者之人力资源的生产「效率」，促进学术发展。
说穿了，这是根据所谓「市场经济逻辑」，是新古典经济主义的「基本教义」；经由方法论或科学哲学的「检验」，新古典经济理论系一种市场经济主义，系一种「唯市场经济」的意识形态；所以，正如新古典经济理论的主要代言人之一Robbins(1981, p.1) 所言，其呼应F. Hayek之建议，主张应将经济学还原为枢机主教（Archbishop）Whately所称的「交易学」（the Science of Catallactics or the Science of Exchange），或如Boulding (1969, p.4)之定义：
“Economics specializes in the study of that part of the total social system which is organized through exchange and which deals with exchangeable. This to my mind is a better definition of economics than those which define it as relating to scarcity or allocation, …”
一方面，其将学术商品化（commoditization）；即学术成果系市场贩卖之商品[3]，所以有其同构型。另方面，是将学者劳动市场化；即学者虽不是「按时计酬」，却是「按件计酬」。故只要学术「市场」能够形成，则其目标自然「心想事成」：
”The paradigm of orthodox econmics takes its lead from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Orhtodox economists recognize that, …. It is nonethemess based on a great truth, the self-regulating nature of the market, which marks the book as the initial achievement in economics.” （Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983, p. 22）
“Neoclassical economics, the reigning school, marries the assumptions of the classical invisible hand – the principle of a self-regulating economy - …” (Kuttner, 1985, p. 74)
这样的诠释，应该能深获经济学者的「心」，只不过，这只是经济学ABC的运用，完全难登深奥的学术殿堂。至对「非」经济学者而言，则犹如杜鹃窝之语言，难以理解。因此，对杜鹃窝外99.99 ％的「非」经济学者而言，有必要了解杜鹃窝里的世界，到底长得什么样。
二、由经济学门是否已是一门「科学」谈起
“Why Economics is not yet an Evolutionary Science” 这是Thorstein Veblen在十九世纪末（1898）所提出的疑问（Eichner, 1983c, p. 205），但八十余年后，当经济学门的学术发展已经「定于一尊」，有「主流」（mainstream）学派之形成，惟其「科学」的「地位」（status），却亦被动摇，而其主流学派亦受到来自「异端」的挑战，仿佛回到宗教改革前夕；只是讽刺的是，这次代表 “orthodoxy” 的一方，却是标榜理性主义的新古典经济学派：
“Neoclassical economic analysis grows out of the Enlightenment mentality, which substituted a scientific natural order for a metaphysical one.”(Kuttner, 1985, p. 76)
（一）橘逾淮为枳：经济学与逻辑实证论（logical positivism）[4]
约在二十世纪初期，逻辑实证论的兴起[5]，先后将哲学、伦理学、宗教排除于「科学」之列；社会学、人类学、以及政治经济学亦感受到压力（Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983, p. 17）。逻辑实证论主要系设定判定科学或非科学的「一般性」准则，政治经济学为了赢得科学的荣显，以便在由自然科学掌舵的学术圈，占有一席之地，乃依循逻辑实证论的科学准则发展；除了强调客观、理性、价值中立、精准、与逻辑的严谨之外，同时，政治经济学（political economy）亦改称为经济学（economics）。为了迎合前述之要求，在理论的建构，其大量运用数理模型，并自诩为「纯理论」（pure theory）。另在实证的操作方面，则着眼于数量之相关性的检验，以精准的系数逃避具解释能力之因果律的探究。
“The development of economics in the twentieth century has also been influenced by the increased use of quantitative methods. While contributors to The Trend（Rexford G. Tugwell (ed.), The Trend of Economics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924） stressed the need for a more empirical economics, they also warned readers to avoid becoming blind to economic reality through the relentless pursuit of rigor. Unfortunately, conventional economics – which has long sought to model itself after the ‘hard’ sciences – found the attraction to mathematical techniques and modes of expression irresistible. In a discipline where formalism is not a secondary feature but often “a central programmatic aim,” we should not be surprised to find neoclassicialism in a dominant position – for there is no question that this approach permits a high degree of mathematization. (Whalen, 1996, p.4)
“I conclude this section by quoting from John Maynard Keynes (1036, p. 298): “Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are merely concoctions as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols.” (Blatt, 1983, p. 173)
惟这种发展情势，的确不仅让经济学得以赢得「科学」的头衔，似乎能够与自然科学并驾齐驱，更在社会科学的领域，享有「女皇」的封号，造就经济学的帝国版图。但是，正如Swaney and Premus (1983, p. 42)所指出者：
“Apparently, formalism’s general failure in economics (as science, but not as a storyteller) is the result of attempts to apply logical positivism where it cannot work . While social and natural sciences differ in important respects, and while these differences severely limit the appropriateness of natural science methodology for the social science, … We argue that logical positivism’s failure is also due to economists’ failure to actually follow the methodology of logical positivism where it is appropriate.”
具体而言，姑且不论在科学哲学方面，逻辑实证论已经受到挑战；惟其毕竟是针对自然科学的理论建构，并不适用于与自然科学迥然不同的社会科学，故东施效颦的结果，既使以逻辑实证论的准则观之，经济学不仅未能更具「科学相」，反而倒退之，充其量只能视为Thomas S. Kuhn 所称的一种「典范」（paradigm）：
”Is economics a science? Economists do not in practice follow their own normative commandments for science and thus economics is not a science in terms of their own criteria. However, economics has a paradigm and devout practitioners, so that economics is a science in a Kuhnian sense of having a single overarching paradigm to which most practitioners in the field subscribe.”(Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983, p. 35).
“In fact, economists seem to pay lip service to the positivist ideals, going off and doing their own thing irrespective whatever normative criteria philosophers of science – or in deed other kinds of scientists – have found to be sound, or at least functional. In this respect, economics may be a science, but only in the bold-faced Kuhnian sense of there being a paradigm within which economists practice and according to which they self-referentially define their activity as science. Economics may thus be a pre-positivist “system of organized cognition” – much in the same way, perhaps, as Ptolemaic geocentrism.” （Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983, p. 22）
综合论之，经济学固然「削足适履」，企图以严谨逻辑分析的数理模型和精准的数量实证方法[6]，建立其科学地位；但其结果，却是适得其反；只是空有科学之名，而无其实：
Moreover, economists have used quantitative techniques too often without due regard to their epistemological and technical limits. Some of this has been done in order to reach certain substantive results, some to reach determinate results, and some to reach optimal solutions. But much of it is due to the failure to recognize the limits of deduction, the limits of induction, and the limits of particular econometric techniques. (Samuels, 1998,p.354)
“Indeed, this delibate concentration on two or three keyrelationships treated moreover under specific assumptions or simply axioms as to human behavior which individuals in a particular social system may or may not follow – does indeed make possible the use of a quantitative mathematical treatment and facilitates the search for determinate levels of stable equilibrium but it is a form loose theoretization based upon concepts which have no clear empirical counterpart – a procedure which most institutionalists would regard as a misuse of the method of simplification and abstraction. In fact they consider this procedure not only as a misuse of theoretical analysis but as a potentially dangerous trivialization of the use of reason which is rapidly making of economics a technique rather than a social science.”(Kapp, 1968, p. 7)
故数理逻辑只不过是掩饰其「伪科学的门面」（pseudoscientific façade）[7]；其对经济学门的学术发展，不仅毫无助益，更是带来「灾难」（disastrous.）[8]。
（二）反思经济学门的发展
数理的运用虽然未能提升经济学的科学地位，但其毕竟形成一种「典范」，而且能够在社会科学的领域，享有其学术权威和霸权，并且已成为「教条」；故其关键不在于其科学地位或理论的有效性，而是学术社群内、外权力运作之被宰制与扭曲。由二十世纪美国经济学的发展历史之检视，可以略知一二：
“Economics’ searching for an identity, its feelings of inadequacy, its paranoia, its infrangible link with policy and the subsequent influence of (control by) outsiders, its tendency toward quantification and penchant for modeling are all intertwined threads of the fabric of economics’ history. Nothing better demonstrates this than the story behind the development of quantification, the most salient trend in American economics.” (Redman, 1993, p.156)
首先就外在力量的影响，主要有二股力量；一是财阀的掌控[9]，另一是政治上的「白色恐怖」：
“In its first half century or so as a subject of instruction and research, economics was subject to censorship by outsiders. Businessmen and their political and ideological acolytes kept watch on departments of economics and reacted promptly to heresy, the latter being anything that seemed to threaten the sanctity of property, profits, a proper tariff policy, a balanced budget, or which involved sympathy for unions, public ownership, public regulation or, in any organized way, for the poor. The growing power and self-confidence of the educational estate, the formidable and growing complexity of our subject and, no doubt, the increasing acceptability of our ideas has largely relieved us of this intervention.”(Galbraith, 1973, pp. 1~2)
在政治的白色恐怖方面，一九五○年代的「麦卡锡主义」（McCarthyism）亦产生相当程度的影响[10]：
“There has, however, been another important influence at work, virtually ignored because of an academic conspiracy of silence. This was the traumatic impact on the American university system of the McCarthy communist witch-hunting period, which served notice on prudent American economists to confine their attention to ‘scientific’ problems and steer clear of issues that might raise suspicions about loyalty to the American nation. The consequence of prudence of this kind was extreme vulnerability to ‘radical’ student demands for ‘relevance’ and for ‘political economy’ rather than ‘(mathematical) economics’, …” (Johnson, 1977, p. 25)[11].
就一个民主社会，麦卡锡主义的影响，毕竟只是短暂的干扰，但财阀的掌控，在一个资本主义社会，不仅却无法摆脱，且由有形转为无形，其并渗入经济学学术社群。故学术社群内的影响力量，值得详细加以检视。正如Galbraith (1973, p.2)所指出的：
“But in place of the old censorship has come a new despotism. That consists defining scientific excellence as whatever is closet in belief and method to the scholarly tendency of the people who are already there. This is a pervasive and oppressive thing not the less dangerous for being, in the frequent case, both self-righteous and unconscious.”
三、科学或权力：揭露经济学门之学术社群的真相
回顾百余年来经济学门的学术「演化」，以「异化」来描述，似乎再贴切不过了。当经济学被贯上 ”-ics” 与物理学并驾齐驱，取得「科学」的地位，同时，并赢得「社会科学的女皇」之后，却也开始陷入危机；经济学的危机，并非只是经济学门内的茶壶里的风暴，在所谓「经济学帝国主义」[12]的垄罩之下，在学术领域其更扩散至其它社会科学的学门；不仅如此，在现实政策层面，其更导致国家经济的畸形发展，扭曲人类社会的价值[13]。其学术「权威」也开始受到质疑与批判。
但质疑归质疑，批判归批判，毕竟均未能带来「科学革命」，新古典经济学在经济学门的主流典范地位，却丝毫未发生动摇：
“Yet despite the apparent soul-searching, the teaching of economics, the hiring of young economists and the granting of tenure, the financing of research, and the pages of prestigious ‘refereed’ journals all evidence deep resistance to change.” (Kuttner, 1985, p. 74)
究其缘由，主要因素有二：除了资本主义之社会结构使然[14]；经济学门的学术社群之内部权力结构，造就坚实的内在「合意性」（consensus）[15]，足以「安内攘外」，生生不息，绵延不绝：
“The power inherent in this system of quality within the economics profession is obviously very great. The discipline’s censors occupy leading posts in economics departments at the major institutions, and their students and lesser confreres occupy similar posts at nearly all the universities that train new Ph.D.’s. The lion’s share of appointment and dismissal power has been vested in the departments themselves at these institutions. Any economist with serious hopes of obtaining a tenured position in one of these departments will soon be made aware of the criteria by which he is to be judged. In a word, he is expected to become a normal economic scientist.” (Ward, 1972, pp. 29~30)
（一）美国经济学界的学术「证照」之授予
当经济学门逐渐形成一项「专门职业」（professionalizing），具备博士学位为进入此一专门职业的必备证照，而证照之授予，集中在少数大学；同时，这些大学往往又倾向只聘任自己的学生或「排名前几名」大学的毕业生。
在1935至1969年之间，所有授予经济学博士学位数，有超过半数来自排名前十六的大学。如果根据1966年之排名，依序为Harvard, MIT, University of Chicago, Yale, University of Chicago at Berkeley, Stanford, Princeton等均彼此相互聘任其毕业生[16]；而各大学经济学门之排名，主要又系根据各学系在「主要学术刊物」（the “leading” journals）发表的论文数量，而所谓的主要学术刊物系由这些大学所主导；不仅其编辑群几乎完全为这些大学的博士毕业生，而大多数的论文刊载者亦是。因此:
“Is it any wonder that the departments are ‘distinguished’? Thus the ‘best departments are those who publish in their own journals, which are ‘best’ since they publish the ‘best’ departments. This academic incest would be considered genetically unsound if it involved biological reproduction.” （Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983,p. 28）[17]
这种封闭的优势地位，又透过所谓「同侪评鉴」之 ”Publish-or-Perish” 的升迁制度而强化，得以巩固、屹立不摇[18]。
（二）学术生涯之养成：”Publish-or-Perish”
经济学门不仅在理论的建构、表达语言、与研究方法，摹仿物理学，同时，在研究成果的评价方面，亦是如此；即以发表在「特定」期刊的论文「数量」以及论文的「新鲜度」为判准。并根据这样的数据指针，一方面决定一个人的学术生涯与命运，另方面决定学术机构的学术地位。
“On major reason is the academic prestige structure so important to economists, since academics such as Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson are among the leading figures. The academic publish-or-perish system, the value of “pure research,” and the fact that the doctoral degree is the major license to practice all justify this emphasis on academia.
The most prestigious form of publication is a quantitative theoretical article in a “number-one” journal, such as The American Economic Review, a journal of the American Economic Association. While workers in some academic disciplines (e.g., history, anthropology) prefer books and monographs, economists since World War II, like physicists, prefer the journal article. Journal articles are cited far more than other publications. While many of those who are at the apex of the profession, including Nobel Prize winners like Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, have also written popular books and articles, their professional prestige derives primarily from their writings.” （Canterbery and Burkhardt, 1983, p. 23）
“…. ‘publish or perish’ has become the iron law of promotion of both graduate students and young professors.” (Redman, 1993, p.164)
从科学哲学的角度，自然科学的学术研究，除了问题的发掘而提出「新发现」或「新假说」外，在于对这些新发现或假说的「检验」；其研究成果系渐进、零碎的，对单篇论文的学术贡献，比较容易确认，也就是品质容易管制；故相对的比较适合以期刊论文之数量，评量学术工作者之「成就」。但人文社会科学之研究者，需具备一定之哲学基础、价值观，与完整、成熟之思想体系，与严谨之逻辑结构；故传统上，专着或论文集刊，才足以呈现其学术「素养」和贡献(Ward, 1972, p. 12)。因此，此种「削足适履」、「揠苗助长」，炒短线，以量取胜的评价制度，不仅无益于学术之发展，更扭曲了整个学术生态[19]。
“Enlargement of the infrastructure of communication affects the life of that which is transmitted and intensifies competition among transmitters as well as weakens resistance on the part of potential acceptors. Today economic information is diffused much more rapidly than it was 50-75 years ago. Vulgarized economic information as well as misinformation probably is distributed even more rapidly through so-called highbrow journals. The sheer extent of the flow of information can produce swamping effects. In the absence of an efficient information-retrieval system, it becomes costly to draw on the current flow, perhaps so costly that it is cheaper to generate the information anew. Contributions, significant and insignificant, tend to be forgotten, neglected or hidden from the minds of all but the authors’ contemporaries. Preoccupation ‘with the latest fashion causes much that is valuable in former work to be discarded and forgotten, only to be ‘rehabilitated’ when fashion changes again.’ Progress itself is slowed down by the resulting high ration of waste to gross output of ‘information’.”（Spengler, 1968, pp. 171~72）[20]
Colander and Klamer在访问212位University of Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Yale, Columbia, Harvard等六个大学的研究生之后，亦得到下列的结论：
“The likely reason for students’ transformation into technique-oriented individuals is that most of them aspire to academic jobs. They know that tenure depends on publication in the right journals. They logically choose a source of study that is most likely to lead to their goal of succeeding in that intermediate goal. Knowing a technique that can be applied to ten areas can lead to ten articles; knowing a specific area well might lead to one or two articles. Thus, students see little incentive to know the literature in an area or to have institutional knowledge of a particular area.” (Colander and Klamer, 1987, p. 108)
不仅如此，此种重量不重质的评价制度，更导致期刊数量的大量增加，论文数量的膨胀，衍生「品质」更难以管制的恶性循环。既使是自然科学，根据经济学人（The Economist）1987年”Why Scientific Fact Is Sometimes Fiction”之报导：自从1750年以来，科学期刊之数目，每十五年增加一倍；科学家在其专业领域，根本无法保持同样之步调，其导致之后果为，在过去的十五年之间，就被发现有十六件「重大欺骗」的科学研究，大部份属于生物和医学领域（Redman, 1993, pp. 163~164）。
（三）学术之传承：训练而非教育
”Publish-or-Perish”的学术评价制度，往下亦直接扭曲美国的经济学门之学术传承，并强化新古典经济主义：
“Of course it is not true, as the last paragraph may seem to imply, that this decision as to whether to become a normal science economist is made at the stage in his career at which the economist has obtained his last degree. For, as in all normal sciences, the entire academic program, beginning usually at the undergraduate level but certainly at the graduate, consists of indoctrination in the ideas and techniques of the science. As much as anything, this is a self-selection process. Those who do not accept the basic ideas of the science will not proceed very far with its study.” (Ward, 1972, p. 30)
”The average American economist is ….., swamped with literature to absorb or referee, intimidated by his superiors and colleagues, goaded along by two creeds – ‘publish or perish’ and ‘conform or perish’ – and unhappy with the state of current economics. In addition, the typical graduate student - … - believes success means techniques and not an understanding of the economy or even of the literature, even though, as contrary as it may be to common sense, he knows that publications are what will lead to recognition within the discipline.” (Redman, 1993, pp. 165~166)
“None of these doubts, however, was allowed to threaten the analytical core of ‘pure economics’ and for several decades the dominant brief inspiring the intellectual community of economists was that they shared a common nucleus of views in the scope and method of economic science. They could go on teaching successive generations of undergraduates from the same, or similar, textbooks of economic theory and could assume that, whatever the intractability of the problems posed in the applied areas of their discipline, they were building on virtually impregnable analytical foundations.” (Deane, 1983, p. 8)
一九八八年，美国经济学会会长Robert Eisner指定设立The Commission on Graduate Education in Economics (COGEE)[21], 除了就全美国各大学研究所[22]之经济学教育，由入学考、核心课程、领域课程、毕业论文等有系统的全面加以检视外，且就在学学生对经济学的看法，以及社会对经济学学系毕业生之能力的评价，做深入调查[23]。并于一九九一年提出报告(Krueger, et al, 1991)。
就经济学者应具备之「技能」（ skills），如果分为七项：Critical judgment, Analytics, Applications, Mathematics, Computation, Communication, Creativity; 根据COGEE之意见调查，一般教师认为目前美国经济学门对博士生的养成教育，「过度」偏重Mathematics，忽视Communication和Creativity。偏重程度（数字愈小表示愈重要），依序为：Analytics(2.1), Mathematics(2.9), Critical judgment(3.8), Applications(3.8), Computation(4.3), Creativity(5.3), Communication(5.5)。并认为「应有」（should be）的相对重要性，依序为：Analytics(2.2), Creativity(2.6), Critical judgment(2.9), Applications(3.9), Communication(5.0), Mathematics(5.2), Computation(6.0) 。就1977-78获得博士学位者而言，其所受到的专业训练，依序为：Analytics(1.9), Mathematics(3.1), Critical judgment(3.4), Applications(4.4), Computation(4.6), Creativity(5.0), Communication(5.4)；但就其现从事之工作所需之技能的重要性，依序为：Communication(2.7), Critical judgment(3.2), Applications(3.3), Analytics(3.5), Creativity(3.6), Computation(5.5), Mathematics(6.2)。若其是从事学术工作，包括研究和教学，所需之技能的重要性，依序为：Creativity(2.4), Communication(3.2), Analytics(3.5), Applications(3.5), Critical judgment(3.8), Computation(5.7), Mathematics(5.9)。(Hansen, 1991, p. 1071)[24]。
对经济学博士之「雇主」而言，亦认为，其缺乏「创造力」与「沟通技巧」：
“Two of these – creativity and communication (especially writing) skills – surfaced repeatedly as concerns of employers of new Ph.D.’s of graduate faculties, and of students themselves.”
“The worry is that current forms of graduate education may actually be stifling creativity.” (Krueger, et al, 1991, pp. 1048)
故对研究所之核心课程（core curriculum），COGEE表示忧心：
“The Commission’s fear is that graduate programs may be turning out a generation with too many idiots savants, skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues.” (Krueger, et al, 1991, pp. 1044~1045).
Minsky (1996, p. xi)更毫不保留的指出: 这样子的课程，系「异常反智，系一种训练，而非教育」：
“Unfortunately, economists are generally ill-equipped to provide much practical guidance. One peculiarity of the preparation of economists at the end of the twentieth century is that the modern graduate curriculum does not require students to study either the history of economics or economic theory. In fact the curriculum is extraordinarily anti-intellectual: graduate programs in economics aim to train rather than educate.”
Winch亦曾以反讽的口吻批评：
“Economics may have produced some great scholars but it is not a scholarly discipline.” (Winch, 1962, p. 198)[25]
（四）无力可回天
COGEE的研究结果，固然印证社会以及社会科学界对经济学门的批评，但不仅毫无能力扭转乾坤，更未能舒缓此种情况之恶化。主要之因素，由前述1977-78获取博士学位者所具备之专业技能之结构，即了然于胸。具体而言，经济学界已自形成一个封闭坚实「自我繁衍」的生态体系，其内部之利益与权力结合信仰，不仅阻却一切外来的挑战，亦扼杀内部之「异端」：
“I believe, a pervasive feeling among a large number of economists – even though they are only a minority of the profession – that there is something so fundamentally wrong with economics that, until the error is corrected and economics placed on a different footing, little advance in economic knowledge can be expected. This feeling is accompanied by the belief that there is little hope economics will reform itself – at least not without substantial pressure from without – and that therefore the necessary change must come from within. Criticisms are rejected, not because they lack intellectual merit, but rather, because they go against the grain of the prevailing orthodoxy. No appeal to the evidence will succeed. Only the evidence which accords with a priori belief is acknowledged. Economics has, in this respect, become a closed system of ideas, more like a religion than a science.” (Eichner, 1983a, p. xiii)
“A dismal performance…. What economists revealed most clearly was the extent to which their profession lags intellectually” (Business Week, 18, January 1982, p. 124) This editorial comment by the leading economic weekly (on the 1981 annual proceedings of the American Economic Association) says, essentially, that the “king is naked.” But no one taking part in the elaborate and solemn procession of contemporary U.S. academic economics seems to know it, and those who do don’t dare speak up.” (Leontief, 1983, p. vii)
（五）被害人转为加害人：拾人牙慧
在前述的经济学「训练」体制下，获取经济学博士之研究生，美国公民所占比率，大幅下降；获取经济学博士之研究生人数，属美国公民者，1977年为560位，1987年降为475，1989年为422位，占47.2％；外国学生中，相当高的比例，来自亚洲国家；同时，值得注意的是GRE的分数，quantitative scores虽然维持不变，但verbal scores却有下降(Hansen, 1991 , pp. 1057~1058)。
换言之，美国的经济学教育对学术之扭曲，透过其授予外国学生博士学位，亦扩散到「外国」；而其扭曲的程度，远超过美国本土。一方面，由于语言文化之限制，外国学生必然偏向数量之训练；另方面，这些外国学生回到本国以后，挟着美国教育背景的优势，以及其美国同侪之奥援，又迅速掌握本国学术发展之霸权。而诚如Jacob Viner所言：”What economists do is what they are trained to do in their graduate programs.” (Hansen, 1991 , p. 1054)。因此，对为何能运用「反科学」的标准检验科学研究的成果，而不汗颜（shameless）也就不足为奇！
四、飞越杜鹃窝
就学术评鉴之本质谈起。学术评鉴系针对学术工作者的研究成果，所谓「学术工作者」又系指涉科学研究者，其主要担负之社会使命，在于「发现」真理，创造「新知」。如果这样的界定是可接受的话，应可发现，学术工作者的研究成果系「独一无二」；就自然科学而言，系古今「内」外，独一无二；就社会科学而言，则在一定之时、空环境内，独一无二[26]。因此，一个学者之学术成就，或许能够评价，但两个学者之间的学术成果是否能够「评比」，则值得深究；更遑论是否有一套「科学」的判准，资为「评比」之准据！
换言之，对学术（特别是社会科学）研究者而言，除了缺乏科学、客观的标准，评价其研究「产出」外，对学术研就者之「成就」，亦无科学、客观的评比指针。故学术评鉴就如同科学知识的界定：
“Kuhn’s focus on the community of scientists and on consensus and change is crucial because it brings us to the rather obvious question: When no mechanical rules or absolute critical determine what scientific knowledge is, is the consensus of the scientific community scientific?” (Redman, 1993, p.166).
因此，目前备受争议，以发表于符合「特定规格」的期刊之论文「篇数」作学者与学术机构之学术评鉴评量指针，不仅是「反科学」，更是戕害、扭曲学术之发展。
（一）学术「威权」的箝制：权力非科学[27]
省思自威权体制遗留迄今的「模范」学生、母亲、劳工、、、之制度，与所谓学术评鉴，有异曲同工之妙。
人生而平等，乃是普遍被接受的普世「价值」（非真理亦非科学可以验证），因此，人与人之间既不能评比，亦不应评比。惟虽如此，为何又能经由「评比」而产生「模范」、、、；如由历史经验，加以观察，所谓「模范」、、之举行，大致上[28]都是独裁专制政体之产物。换言之，这是独裁专制统治者之统御术的运用；透过「模范」、、、的赐予，就如同封建王权之贵族头衔的恩赐，呈现其政治统制的权威，以达到威权统治的效果。
学术的评鉴，系掌握学术资源者，透过评鉴制度，包括评鉴评比指针的设定，评鉴人员的遴选，遂行其「权力」之行使，藉以排除异己，招降纳叛，以建立其学术威权，掌控学术版图，分配学术资源。至所谓「量化」指针，只是为粉饰其「公正、客观」性[29]；所谓提升学术水准，只是为掩饰其「权力欲」之企图。其对学术发展会产生何种影响！显而易见：
”How long ….? That state is likely to be maintained as long as tenured members of leading economics departments continue to excise tight control over the training, promotion, and research activities of their younger faculty members and, by means of peer review, of the senior members as well. The methods used to maintain intellectual discipline in this country’s most influential economics departments can occasionally remind one of those employed by the Marines to maintain discipline on Parris Island.” (Leontief, 1983, p.xi)
（二）学术商品化：金钱或道德
如前所述，由主流经济学者所推动的学术评鉴，隐藏着市场经济逻辑的运用；其企图经由学术评鉴制度，将学术「市场化」，透过市场机制（包括竞争、金钱利益），规范学术资源（包括人力、物力）之配置（allocation），以提升其效率。
“…, there is a ‘new orthodoxy’ favouring the use of prices. All too often solutions are sought by using markets and perfect competition. Liberalization and privatization tend to be offered as solutions to all problems,…
This ‘new market orthodoxy’ by far stretches the limits in which the price system is an effective and useful social decision-making mechanism.” (Frey, 1997, p.2)
姑且不论，主流经济学者对市场经济逻辑的运用在一般正常的商品，是否已达到其所宣称的结果，仍未能提出「证据」外，由历史经验及人类之社会行为观之，就学术商品，市场机制不仅未能提升学术发展，反而带来灾难[30]。
首先，就「竞争」是否可提升「效率」论之，借用Krugman针对1993年六月欧体理事会主席（President of the EC Commission）Jacques Delors于Copenhagen之欧体领袖会议所指出的，欧洲各国失业问题的肇因在于对美、日缺乏竞争力（a lack of competitiveness）之诊断的评论： ”is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong.”（Krugman, 1994, p. 30）；故即使就所谓的国家竞争力而言，Krugman明白的指出：
“…., the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system.”
“Competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous.” ( Krugman, 1994, p. 30, p. 44)
Sabel and Herrigel亦提到：
“Recently, however, economists, public officials and managers have begun to concede that competition can be a barrier to innovation”[31]
Polanyi亦更由历史经验强调：竞争并非是一种「状态」，而是过程；竞争必将导致独占:
“That competition must ultimately lead to monopoly was a truth well understood at the time.” (Polanyi, 1944/1957, p.66)。
其次，检视金钱诱因的后果；如前所述，学术评鉴只是手段，其是否「有效」，也就是能否达到既定之目的，完全在其奖、惩，主要系以金钱为诱因；故部份的学校为争取评鉴成绩，对其教师发表在特定期刊，均发给奖金，依期刊之不同等级，奖金金额亦不同[32]。这种因评鉴制度而衍生出来的「按件论功行赏」的机制，是否真的能提升学术水准？还是反而「污染」整个学术环境，「腐蚀」学者之学术良知，扭曲学术之发展？
首先，根据观察人类生产活动的历史演化，Aristotle早就注意人类的生产活动，基本上分为为「使用」而生产（production for use）和为「获利」而生产（production for gain）；在市场经济体系（market economy）形成之前，经济系镶嵌于社会关系之中（economy being embedded in social relations），人类社会基本上系为「使用」而生产，为「获利」而生产，不仅是一种偶然，而且并不能得到认同；然市场经济体系形成之后，不仅为「获利」而生产不仅成为必然，且亦是属于「当然」，而且社会关系系镶嵌于经济制度之中（social relations are embedded in the economic system）（Polanyi, 1944/1957, pp. 54~57)。这种为市场所控制的经济制度，也就是市场经济体系（market economy），Polanyi有深刻之描述：
“A market economy is an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. It assumes markets in which the supply of goods (including services) available at a definite at a definite price will equal the demand at that price. …… Under these assumptions order in the production and distribution of goods is ensured by prices alone. (Polanyi, 1944/1957, p.68)
在市场经济体系之社会，经济因素（the economic factor）成为维持社会生存不可或缺的要素，而排除其它任何社会关系；市场经济体系只能存在于市场社会之中（A market economy can exist only in a market society）（Polanyi, 1944/1957, p. 71）。而当市场机制（the market mechanism）成为决定人类与自然环境命运，甚至购买力之数量和使用的唯一主事者（sole director），将导致社会之倾颓（result in the demolition of society）(Polanyi, 1944/1957, p. 73)。[33]
由此种历史经验，当市场经济法则侵入学术社群，可预期的其产生的冲击，必然是为「五斗米折腰」不仅有其正当性，且「获利的多寡」亦成为「学术成就」的评价指针；执着于学术真理者，将遭排挤[34]。
”Moreover, economics has long operated under a scoring system that rewards technical wizardry and discourages investigations of real economic issues. (Whalen, 1996, p.5)
其次，以奖、惩制度制约学者之研究行为，是否真的能提升其学术研究、教学水准？如根据瑞士经济学者Bruno S. Frey由现实生活的观察，以及心理学之论据，其结论是：「适得其反！」[35]：
“Do people act just because they expect a monetary gains? Do they work solely because they are paid? I claim that this is not so: people undertake many activities simply because they like them.
I claim even more: a higher monetary compensation crowds-out this inner motivation in important circumstances. To offer higher pay then makes people less committed to their work, and may reduce their performance.” (Frey, 1997, p. ix)
人的社会行为动机分为「内在、固有的动机」（intrinsic motivation）[36]以及「外在、非本质的动机」（extrinsic motivation）[37]。当然，如果这两种动机可以兼容，即外在、非本质的动机可以强化内在、固有的动机，则此种区分似乎并无必要。不过，由实际之观察，甚至经由实验心理学的实验证明，有相当多的日常活动，外在、非本质的动机会「排挤」内在、固有的动机；即会产生所谓的「奖赏之隐藏成本」（the hidden cost of reward）。奖赏之隐藏成本的发生，归诸于三个心理过程：自决的减弱（Impaired Self-Determination），自尊的受损（Impaired Self-Esteem），以及表现机会的降低（Impaired Expression Possibility）。外在、非本质的动机是否产生「排挤」或「内渗」（crowding in）内在、固有的动机，关键在于当事者对于外部干预之「主观意识」（subjective perception）；如果其认为外部干预是一种「控制」（controlling），将损及其自决、自尊、与表现机会，则将产生排挤效果。如果其认为外部干预是一种「支助」（supportive），则将产生内渗效果（Frey, 1997, pp. 16~18）。
据此，就学者而言，如果将学术工作视为其「天职」或其「社会责任」，其对此种外部干预，无论是奖或惩，将视为一种控制，其可能的反应，一是背离学术工作独立自主与批评的精神，而曲意迎合；另一是，不予理会或不屑为之，其结果将面临「被排挤」的命运；换言之，不是其执着于学术工作之内在、固有的动机被排挤，就是其学术生命被排挤。至对将学术工作当作只是「糊口」的一项「职业」，或追求名利之工具的学者而言，显然的，将视此种外部干预为「外援」，强化其追求名利之正当性。
因此，奖或惩制度，对学术社群之戕害，尚不在其「有、无」效果，而在其「奖励劣币、驱逐良币」，并扭曲学术工作之「社会价值」。由于心理学家通常强调内在、固有的动机；经济学者则只考虑外在、非本质的动机，故对任何的问题，其所能提出的对策，只有「一招」：胡萝卜与棍子。因此，
“These views are at odds with conventional economics. ….. the idea is too unorthodox for many economists to accept.” (Frey, 1997, p. ix, p. xii)
作者曾经将Frey之论述，函陈中研院李远哲院长，并获李院长迅速赐函响应，来函全文如下：
世鑫教授道鉴：
随函所附论文敬悉，谢谢。学术研究首重创新，学术领导者之要务在提供良善之研究环境与知识创新之诱因。诚如先生所言，金钱并非万能，有时还会戕害学术。惟「奖助」仅是创新诱因之一，而非全部；因此，应不致掉入金钱奖励之陷阱。端此，敬颂
道安
李远哲 谨上
民国九十二年一月十三日
诚然，「奖助」仅是创新「诱因」之一，而非全部，但检视，例如已实施多年的公务人员考绩奖金，不仅未能提升行政效率，反而造成同仁间的勾心斗角和推诿卸责；警察的破案积效奖金，不仅无助于治安的维护，反而「吃案」、「栽赃」、「栽枪」充斥。故借助此种「外在、非本质的动机」所可能产生之「隐藏成本」；恐怕应是学术领导者之当前要务而非汲汲营营于提供更多、更丰硕的「诱因」！
结语：科学哲学取代 ”Money”
毫无疑问的，当政治经济学（Political Economy）更名为经济学（Economics），所谓的新古典学派不仅取得经济学的主流地位，经济学亦成为社会科学的「女皇」，而且更扩张成所谓「经济学帝国主义」的霸权；除了掌控社会科学的学术版图外，在实务面，更是长期主导各国国内，以及国际政策的走向。不过，新古典学派经济学霸权（hegemony）的形成，不论是在学术界或现实的社会，并非建立在其理论的有效性之基础上[38]，而是一方面，在表达形式上，其与自然科学，特别是物理学，接轨，在学术「市场」上，得享垄断、主控[39]；更重要的是，另方面，其在实务上，偏爱市场经济，完全与当代现实社会之「强势者」，也就是资产阶级之利益，相结合[40]。
因此，经济学者在享受这种荣显之际，应该更为谦悲、知所节制：
“In all these respects economics is important, so much so that it behooves us to be attentive to the limits of our work and, therefore, to the reasons we must be diffident and restrained in making policy recommendations. In affirming this position, ….. economists must dutifully and constantly pay attention and give explicit effect to the limitations of their tools, models, theories, paradigms, lines of reasoning, and so on.”
“For all of these reasons and in all of these respects it seems to me that the true scientific and scholarly spirit requires considerable diffidence and restraint by economists. ….. Economics, for all its limits, is one of mankind’s great possessions. Economics is rich and robust, indeed more so than its typical detractors and critics acknowledge. But the nature of its practice and its strength carries with it limitations. Diffidence, not hubris, is called for. … Let a sense of modesty replace hubris. Let a sense of perspective, openness and multiplicity and a tolerance for ambiguity replace the lust to be authoritative. Let the exercise of professional expertise enlighten the choice process rather than serve, illegitimately, to mask both ideology and the surreptitious making of normative assumptions.”(Samuels, 1998, p. 346, pp. 360~361)
然当经济学者为确保其科学家和政策专家之「地位」（status）[41]而傲慢、冥顽不灵，则要挣脱此种桎梏，只有呼应林俊义教授于1998年11月21日在中国时报时论广场所发表的：科学哲学基础薄弱，台湾发展隐忧：科研执着技术层次，在国际只能做卫星附庸；欲建立学术实践主体性，须扎下科学哲学深根[42]。实际上，国外经济学界早已注意到这个问题，国内经济学界，对此，似乎完全无知，在「一般均衡」（general equilibrium）的世界中，激不起一丝丝的涟漪[43]：
”At the same time, there is a growing methodological self-consciousness within economics itself. The rise of economics to prominence in public life, … ..., has intensified the scrutiny directed against it by other disciplines, not least from those displaced in influence and authority. Much of that scrutiny is methodological in character.” (Brennan and Waterman, 1994, p.5)。
“Economists have been looking for the key to scientific success in the philosophy of science. They will find much valuable in the philosophy of science, but a formula for success will not be among the fruits won. If we really want to know we can do advance science, we can guarantee that this attitude, scientific rationalism – tolerance, honesty, commitment to the advance of science above personal advance and to the freedom to exercise criticism, a willingness to listen and learn from others, and so on – is not violated and becomes entrenched as a tradition.”
“This, of course, is a plea for a good liberal arts education to counteract Fachidiotie. Moreover,it indicates how valuable methodology is for economics because methodology emphasizes limitations, valid argument, reflection upon purpose.” (Redman, 1993, p. 172, p. 164)
一九九二年，更有包括Modigliani, Samuelson[44], Simon, Tinbergen 等四位诺贝尔经济学奖得主在内的四十四位经济学者，联名在AER年会论文集刊登广告："A Plea For A Pluralistic And Rigorous Economics"，其主要内容：
"We the undersigned are concerned with the threat to economic science posed by intellectual monopoly. Economists today enforce a monopoly of method or core assumptions, often defended on no better ground that it constitutes the 'mainstream'. Economists will advocate free competition, but will not practice it in the marketplace of ideas."
"Consequently, we call for a new spirit of pluralism in economics, involving critical conversation and tolerant communication between different approaches. Such pluralism should not undermine the standards of rigor; not a less, rigorous science."
"We believe that the new pluralism should be reflected in the character of scientific debate, in the range of contributions in its journals, and in the training and hiring of economists."(AER, 1992, 粗体为笔者所加)。
参考文献
黄世鑫（1998/2000），财政学概论，修订再版，台北：国立空中大学。
黄世鑫（2002），真理或邪说？理论或教条？独尊新古典经济主义的祸患，李文
志、萧全政主编，社会科学在台湾，台北：元照出版社，第五章，页159~211。（暨南国际大学公共行政与政策学系举办之社会科学在台湾学术研讨会（2000.12.23）发表论文）。
Blatt, John (1983), How Economists Misuse Mathematics, in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.),
Why Economics is not yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 166~186.
Boulding, Kenneth E. (1969), Economics As a Mora Science, in: American Economic
Review, Vol. 59, pp.1-12.
Brennan, H. Geoffrey, and A.M.C. Waterman (1994), Introduction: Economics and
Religion? In: H. Geoffrey Brennan and A.M.C. Waterman (eds.), Economics and Religion: Are They Distinct? Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Ch. 1.
Brown, E. H Phelps (1972), The Underdevelopment of Economics, in: The Economic
Journal, Vol. 82, pp. 1-10.
Canterbery, E. Ray and Robert J. Burkhardt (1983), What Do We Mean By Asking
Whether Economics is a Science? in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.), Why Economics is not yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 15~40.
Colander, David (1991), Why Aren’t Economists As Important As Garbagemen?
Essays on the State of Economics, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe.
Colander, David and Arjo Klamer (1987), The Making of an Economist, in: Economic
Perspective, vo. 1, pp. 95~111.
Deane, Phyllis (1983), The Scope and Method of Economic Science, in: The
Economic Journal, 93, pp. 1~12.
DeMartinom George (2000), Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical Objections
and Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism, London and New York: Routledge.
Dugger, William M. and Howard J. Sherman (1998), Comparison of Marxism and
Institutionalism, in: David L. Prychitko (ed.), Why Economists Disagree: An Introduction to the Alternative Schools of Thought, New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 211~234.
Eichner, Alfred S. (1983a), Preface, in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.), Why Economics is not
yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. xiii~xiv.
Eichner, Alfred S. (1983b), Introduction, in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.), Why Economics
is not yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 3~14.
Eichner, Alfred S. (1983c), Why Economics is not yet a Science, in: Alfred S. Eichner
(ed.), Why Economics is not yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp.205~241.
Frey, Brunno S. (1997), Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal
Motivation, Cheltenham (UK) and Brookfield (US): Edward Elgar Publishing.
----, and Reiner Eichenberger (1997), Economists: First Semester, High
Flyers and UFOs, in: Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, A. Lans Bovenberg, Eric EC. van Damme, and Jarig van Sinderen(eds.), Economic Science and Practice: The Roles of Academic Economists and Policy-makers, Cheltenham (UK, Lyme (US): Edward Elgar, Ch. 2.
Galbraith, John K. (1973), Power and the Useful Economist, in: American Economic
Review, vol. 63, pp. 1~11.
Hansen, W. Lee (1991), The Education and Training of Economics Doctorates: Major
Findings of the Executive Secretary of the American Economic Association’s Commission on Graduate Education in Economics, in: Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXIX, pp. 1054~1087.
Kapp, K. William (1968), In Defense of Institutional Economics, in: Swedish Journal
of Economics, vol. 70, no. 1, pp 1~18.
Kirchgässner, Gebhard (19999), On the Political Economy of Economic Policy
Advice, in: E. Mohr (ed.), The Transfer of Economic Knowledge, Cheltenham (UK), Northampton (MA, USA): Edward Elgar, Ch. 2.
Krueger, Anne O. et al (1991), Report of the Commission on Graduate Education in
Economics, in: Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXIX, pp. 1035~1053.
Krugman, Paul (1994), Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, in: Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 28-44.
Kuttner, Robert, (1985), The Poverty of Economics, in: The Atlantic Monthly, vol.
255, pp. 74~84.
Leontief, Wassily (1983) Foreword, in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.), Why Economics is not
yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. vii~xi.
Mayer, Thomas (1993), Truth versus Precision in Economics, Aldershot and
Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Minsky, Hyman P. (1996), Foreword, in: Charles J. Whalen (ed.), Political Economy
for the 21st Century: Contemporary Views on The Trend of Economics, Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, pp.xi~xiii.
Polanyi, Karl (1944/1957), The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press.
Redman, Deborah A. (1993), Economics and the Philosophy of Science, New York,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robbins, Lionel(1981), Economics and Political Economy, in: American Economic
Review, Vol. 71, pp.1-10.
Samuels, Warren J. (1998), The Methodology of Economics and The Case for Policy
Diffidence and Restraint, in: David L. Prychitko (ed.), Why Economists Disagree: An Introduction to the Alternative Schools of Thought, New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 345~366.
Swaney, James A. and Robert Premus (1983), Modern Empiricism nd Quantum-Leap
Theorizing in Economics, in: Alfred S. Eichner (ed.), Why Economics is not yet a Science, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 41~60.
Tabb. William K.(1999), Reconstructing Political Economy: The great divide in
economic thought, London and New York: Routledge.
Trauth, Eileen M. (2000), The Culture of an Information Economy, Dordrecht (The
Netherlands): Kluwer.
Ward, Benjamin (1972), What’s Wrong with Economics? New York London: Basic
Books.
Waters, William R. (1998), Social Economics: A Solidarist Perspective, in: David L.
Prychitko (ed.), Why Economists Disagree: An Introduction to the Alternative Schools of Thought, New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 179~210.
Whalen, Charles J. (1996), Beyond Neoclassical Thought: Political Economy for the
Twenty-first Century, in: Charles J. Whalen (ed.), Political Economy for the 21st Century: Contemporary Views on The Trend of Economics, Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 3~28.
[1] 反思台湾的（人文及社会）高教学术评鉴研讨会（2004.9.25~26）。
[2] 对学术「机构」之评鉴，主要也是以对「人」的评鉴为基础。
[3] “Commodities are here empirically defined as objects produced for sale on the market; markets, again, are empirically defined as actual contracts between buyers and sellers. Accordingly, every element of industry is regarded as having been produced for sale, as then and then only will it be subject to the supply-and-demand mechanism interacting with price.” (Polanyi, 1944/1957, p.72)
[4] 本节详参考：黄世鑫（2002）。
[5] “Modern philosophy of science grew out of a movement called logical positivism, which emerged in the early twentieth century. … Logical positivism as a movement was essentially Germanic in its inception, growing out of evening meeting of the Vienna Circle. … The logical positivist program was dedicated to clarity, rigor, and attention to detail. Many of the logical positivists believed that all significant problems could and should be reducible to problems formalizable in logic. In addition, they aimed to form an Einheitswissenschaft, an all-encompassing science jointed by one method: the logical method of analysis. The assumed that science is rational and progressive. The spreading of science meant, in their view, extending rationality to the culture.” (Redman, 1993, p. 8).
[6] Blatt (1983)是位数学家，其严厉批判经济学者在纯经济理论（pure economic theory）和计量模型如何「误用」数学。
[7] “The objection here is not to the use of mathematics – or even to the mathematicization of economics. It is rather to the misuse that has been made of mathematics in economics – and in particular to the way mathematics has been used to give a pseudoscientific façade to a body of theory which can meet none of the empirical tests by which science is distinguished from mere superstition or crude ideology.” (Eichner, 1983c, p. 231).
[8] “This reformulation of economics – actually translation of theory into mathematic language – was to have a number of important consequences, not the least of which was to make economics appear to be more scientific. ….. Whatever the reason, the effect on economics as a discipline has been disastrous.” (Eichner, 1983c, p. 229).
“Neoclassicism is not just irrelevant because it is based on unrealistic assumptions and tenuously long threads of deductive reasoning. Rather than just being irrelevant, it is pernicious. Would that it were only irrelevant then it would be ignored. But, in a very real sense, it is perfectly relevant – as a justification and rationalization of continued inequality, that is.” (Dugger and Sherman, 1998, p. 215)
[9]十八世纪后半，欧洲的政治经济学存在二大典范之竞争，即德国历史学派与英国边际效用学派；十八世纪末初期美国的政治经济学者，大部份向往德国留学，承袭德国历史学派，在1890年代初达到高峰，至1900年代走下坡（至1910年几乎完全终止），转向英国。故最初，德国历史学派在美国各大学享有相当大的影响力；例如1886年American Economic Association即由留学德国代表历史学派John Hopkins大学的Richard T. Ely 所创立。但在1880至1890年代间，美国的经济学者之政策主张与大企业家的利益相冲突，而这些大企业家却是各大学的主要资助者；拥护讲学自由（Lehrfreiheit）的Ely和其学生所遭受的影响最大，Ely因而未能获得终身职而离开John Hopkins大学；其死对头，对政治经济学看法倾向Jevons的数学家Simon Newcomb，在论争中，赢得胜利（Redman, 1993, pp. 154~155）。
[10] 对照我国，此种影响更为深远、根深柢固。
[11] Harry G. Johnson, The American Tradition in Economics, in: Nebraska Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 16, pp. 17~26; 引自：Redman (1993), p. 156.
[12] Boulding所称，其内涵如：”Usually, economic theorizing employs the economic model of behaviour, ‘homo economicus’, assuming that individuals (economic agents) are self-interested rationally acting utility maximizers. This is first of all assumed to hold for all individuals acting in markets. On the contrary, when analysing behaviour in nonmarket decision situations, traditional economic theory used other assumptions, such as benevolent or altruistic behaviour. …. During recent decades, however, economic theory became imperialistic, as more and more areas of human behaviour were analysed using the economic model.” (Kirchgässner, 1999, p.14)。
[13] “Indeed, institutional economists, unlike positive economists, are convinced that as social scientists committed to certain values they have a responsibility to indicate when and in which way socio-economic processes may endanger human values and human life.”(Kapp, 1968,p.11).
[14] 在政策实务上，新古典经济理论典范「隐藏」新自由主义之泛市场经济主义的意识形态；”The most forceful and coherent defense of neoliberalism appears in mainstream economic theory, or ‘neoclassical theory’. In the view of neoclassical economics, the market is an extraordinary mechanism that allows a society - … - to organize the production and distribution of goods and services efficiently.” ( DeMartino, 2000, p. 4).
惟在一个「无政府或小政府」市场经济体制里，谁是「老大」？谁是真正的获利者？”…, the proponents of neoliberalism have generated the most powerful economic ideology of the past several centuries. In this account, the success of neoclassical theory stems not from its purported scientific principles, objectivity or verisimilitude. It results instead from the attractiveness of the vision of science to which it aspires, and from the power of the interests which are be served by the type of economic system that it celebrates. The persuasiveness of the neoclassical defense of neoliberalism is therefore grounded in its rhetorical attributes and political consequences, not its epistemological properties.” (DeMartino, 2000, p. 18).
[15] 顾忠华在一篇有关社会学之方法论论文（应是刊载于当代？）中，对经济学门之「合意性」，似乎颇为羡慕。不过： “We have seen that a consensus exists and that economists strive to reach a consensus. Certainly, consensus can be born of clubs and maintained by pressure of all sorts. But such consensus is not scientific.” (Redman, 1993, p.166)。同样的，如后文所述，美国经济学门之训练内容高同构型，亦受到关切：”The most striking result to emerge from examing the descriptive brochures, course syllabi, and comprehensive Ph.D. examinations provided by departments is not their diversity but rather their great similarity. The similarity of graduate training is something many members of the profession have long suspected.”(Hansen, 1991, p. 1061)。
从认识论的角度，Kapp在论及制度学派之贡献时，亦特别强调：”It is important to emphasize first that institutionalism starts from a basis of dissent – i.e. a common critique of the conventional wisdom, … I shall mention here only two major epistemological insights: 1. That scientific inquiry always proceeds within a cultural matrix – in other words, all theorizing operates within a framework of preconceptions which is not of our own making but is taken over from society - …These inherited preconceptions which are at the root of all our knowledge – including our scientific knowledge – need to be made explicit, and must be held up for critical examination. In fact, any improvement of our scientific knowledge presupposes such critical awareness. 2. A second contribution of American pragmatism to institutional economics is its skepticism toward any quest for certainty. This skepticism questions the widespread belief that social processes move toward a pre-established and determinate end – a fixed telos; instead of this teleological bias pragmatists stress indeterminacy and uncertainty as basis characteristics of all processes, including and particularly social processes.” (Kapp, 1968, p. 5).
[16] 分为五级Tier 1~5;1980年代之排名，Tier 1: top 6:Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, Yale; “Tier 1 programs employed 64 percent of their own Ph.D.’s. Tier 2 programs employed 28 percent of their own Ph.D.’s, with 64percent coming from tier 1 programs. Tier 3 programs employed 15 percent of their own Ph.D.’s, with 41percent coming from tier 1 and 2 programs. Tier 4programs hired 11 percent of their own Ph.D.’s, with another 80 percent divided equally among tiers 1-3. Tier 5 programs jired 82 percent of their Ph.D.’s from higher tier programs.” (Hansen, 1991, p. 1065).
[17] DeMartino (2000, p.19): “The loss of the many traditions of dissent within economics is apt to lead to a single-mined pursuit of damaging policies, and to an intolerable intellectual hubris among theorists and policymakers.”
[18] 诺贝尔经济学奖得主同时本身亦是数理经济学家（mathematical economists）Leontief就指出：”That state (the abstraction crisis) is likely to be maintained as long as tenured members of leading economics departments continue to exercise tight control over the training, promotion, and research activities of their younger faculty members and, by means of peer review, of the senior members as well.” (Wassily Leontief, Letters: Academic Economics, in: Science, 1982, vol. 217, p. 107), 引自：Redman (1993), p.158.
[19] Frey and Eichenberge (1997, pp.18-19): “The output produced is self-defined by the international economics community and is measured in terms of scientific publications and citations in professional journals. Articles in scientific reviews do not mainly serve to propagate knowledge but act as a selection device for academic economists. Ray-economics is thus inward oriented. The topics and questions dealt with are theory-driven (..), and the task is to (marginally) improve on existing formal models which in turn are based on previous formal models. What matters is technical rigour and formal elegance. The presentation of the results is highly regulated (..). Content is only relevant as far as it gives a reason to apply a certain technique of analysis. The same holds for institutional knowledge. Content and institutions are disregarded because they are irrelevant for the self-defined quality standards. The quality of a professional contribution can only be evaluated with respect to internationally valid aspects. Formal rigour and elegance perfectly meet this requirement: the quality of the proof of a theorem can be judged by other scholars irrespective of whether they live in Bonn, Madison or Hongkong. In contrast, academic contributions based on an extensive knowledge of local conditions and institutions cannot be judged by an external scholar. ….The impersonal scientific ‘objectivity’, a major standard in this type of economics, is then at risk because the few evaluators almost certainly know each other well, resulting in judgments biased by non-scientific considerations.” 同时参考：Colander (1991, p.4)，Mayer(1993, ch. 1,2)。
[20] Joseph J. Spengler, Exogenous and Endogenous Influences in the Formation of Post-1870 Economic thought: A Sociology of the Knowledge Approach, in: Robert V. Eagley (ed.), Events, Ideology and Economic Theory, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968, pp. 159~187. 引自：Redman (1993), p. 163.
[21] 成员包括：Anne O. Krueger (Duke University, Chair), Kenneth J. Arrow (Stanford University), Olivier Jean Blanchard (M.I.T.), Alan S. Blinder (Princeton University), Claudia Goldin (Harvard University), Edward E. Leamer (UCLA), Robert Lucas (University of Chicago), John Panzar (Northwestern University), Rudolph G. Penner (Urban Institute), T. Paul Schultz (Yale University), Joseph E. Stiglitz (Stanford), Lawrence H. Summers (Harvard University).
委员会成立的缘由，系响应一般对美国各大学经济学门之研究与训练的批评: “At a symposium on the state of economics held late in 1986, sponsored by the National Science foundation, many participants put forth the view that economics as taught in graduate school had become too divorced from real world questions. This viewpoint seemed to be shared by a sufficiently large number of people inside and outside of profession that it merited careful scrutiny.” (Krueger, et al, 1991, p. 1035).
[22] 91个大学之经济学系。
[23] 不过，由于这个标榜其它学门所没有的”self-critical”, “self-evaluation”，仍是囿于新古典经济主义典范，故其仅止于教学技术层次问题，未及于其所传授之「知识」本质。其得到的结论，亦仅触及皮毛；”In brief, we believe that graduate education can be improved if relatively more emphasis is given to providing students with applications of the tools of economics to economic problems. To do this does not require a complete overhaul of graduate education in economics.” (Krueger, et al, 1991, pp. 1052)。七项建议，亦是属技术层次(Krueger, et al, 1991, pp. 1052~53)。这样的结论，如果对照照「是否应改变教学之结构与内容」的问卷调查的结果，更凸显其矛盾性；参考：Hansen(1991), pp. 1065~1066.
[24] 研究生之意见，除了Critical judgment「应」重于Creativity外，余相同。
[25] D. N. Winch, What Price the History of Economic thought? in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1962, vol. 9, pp. 193~204. 引自：Redman (1993), p.164.
[26]”Can the social sciences be ahistotical? ….. Economic relations and policies must be continually reevaluated in the light of changing circumstances. Economic doctrine and theory must evolve along with changing circumstances.” (Dugger and Sherman, 1998, p.217).
[27] 学术社群不能自外于社会，在科学的掩盖之下，反而让人忽视权力之存在。 “What are the most important relationships in society? Power relationships are the most important relationships in society. Power means the ability to get others to do what you want them to do. Because of myths and misconceptions, weaker groups and individuals often do not understand their own interests, and they end up serving the interests of others. Myths and misconceptions are not harmless. They enable one group to dominate another and to excise power over them. Enabling myths are those that enable one group or individual to get others to do what is wanted of them, even when it is not in the interest of the dominated group or individual.”( Dugger and Sherman, 1998, pp. 212~213).
[28] 这种叙述并不「精准」，不过， “it is better to have imprecise or approximate answers to the right questions than to have precise answers to the wrong questions.”(Kapp, 1968, p. 18).
[29] 这是如Kapp所称的「伪科学之正当化」（pseudo-scientific justification）(Kapp, 1968, p. 3).
[30]市场经济带来的灾难，罄竹难书；联合报（2004.7.13）A6版：记者余炎昆、廖肇祥：害死山林的，非原非汉！是市场经济！
[31] F. Charles Sabel and Gary B. Herrigel, Losing a Market to a High-Wage Nation, New York Times, Sunday, June 14, 1987.引自：Waters (1998), p.204.
[32] 目前所知，国立大学中，有政治大学和台北大学。
[33] 指劳动、土地、与货币。
[34] 制度学派Veblen亦由权力关系探讨此二种活动之纠葛： “Power relationships are interwoven with the Veblenian dichotomy – the distinction first made by Veblen between socially useful activity and selfish aggrandizement. … Selfish activity; especially that of the powerful, is overlaid with ceremonial justification, while useful activity is simply a matter of fact. Hence, ceremonialism versus instrumentalism is a theme that runs through much of institutionalism. Radical institutionalists emphasize the need to take collective action against ceremonialism, …” (Dugger and Sherman, 1998, p.213)
[35] Frey 并以大学教授之教学为例：
“Take now particularly rational people (so it is said), university professors (Case 3):
Some professors at a (state) university who are particularly engaged in their profession teach more than the required eight hours per week. Some professors, however, disregard this duty and teach less than required. The ministry of education issues a general regulation whereby the teaching hours of all professors are tightly controlled.
What is likely to happen? It can be expected (the author has circumstantial evidence in this respect) that the particularly engaged professors react by reducing their teaching hours to the minimum required.” (Frey, 1997, p. 8)
[36] 根据心理学家Deci的定义：”one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself.” (Edward l. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, in: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 22, p. 105: 引自：Frey(1997), p. 13.
[37] “ … induced to do so by monetary payment or by command.” (Frey, 1997, p. 14)
[38] Brown(1972): “It will be remembered that my argument began with the divergence between the increasing power of economists to elaborate trains of subtle and rigorous reasoning and build complex models, on the one hand, and on the other the slow advance of their power to diagnose and prescribe for the problems of our day.” (pp. 6-7)
[39] 值得注意的是，当国内知名的主流经济学者（包括院士级），各据一方（即坊间所称四人帮或六人帮）撰写「经济学教科学」，以争夺「市场」时，也应该反省，在社会科学领域，「教科书」对学术发展是福还是祸？”It may be due rather to the fact that as dissenters institutionalists have been preoccupied with a host of issues and have certainly not written the kind of massive textbooks which tend to systematize and to perpetuate a dominant school.” (Kapp, 1968, p. 17) 同时参考：黄世鑫（1998/2000），序言。
[40] Tabb(1999): “Theory impacts policy and the consciousness of an age, although it may better be said that the dominant powers of the age shape consciousness, and lend support to the economic theories they find conducive.” (p.97)。
[41] ”Economists desire determinate solutions because such will sanction their status as scientists. Economists desire optimal solutions because such will sanction their status as policy experts. Both desires are driven by status emulation and ambition; both desires produce or reinforce an intolerance for ambiguity, openness and pluralism in favor of a pretense of closure and finality. Both desires manifest status emulation and the marks of ceremonial adequacy associated therewith.” (Samuels, 1998, p.361)
[42] 林俊义提到：「…. 『联合国教育、科学暨文化组织』提出各国如何发展科学与技术政策的优先级时，把科学哲学放在最优先的第一项。…发展科学与技术政策的十二优先级列举如下：一、科学哲学；二、科学史；三、科技社会学、政治学和伦理学；四、、、、」。
[43] 作者为撰写本文，透过馆际合作，由台大法学院图书馆借得Ward(1972)的书（1973.6.4购入）；里头所夹借书单记载之借阅者，作者所识：李显峰（1974.5.27，第二位；第一位为郭震坤，1973.11.26）；叶淑贞（1979.2.4）；陈师孟（1981.12.8，1982.12.31）。有趣的是，这几位经济学者正是作者所尊重的，比较不”orthodoxy”，也是相当谦逊的学者。
[44] Samuelson在其1961著名的教科书还宣称：新古典经济理论”is accepted in its broad outlines by all but a few extreme left-wing and right-wing writers.” (Kuttner, 1985, p.74)。
对这些少数所谓的” extreme left-wing and right-wing writers”，也许Kapp的这段话，值得深思：”Instead of withdrawing into the lonely position of the dissenter they will have to work together in closer contact not only with one another but also with other social scientists because they will have to know more of what is known in related social disciplines than the pure economist.” (Kapp, 1968, p. 18)
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
京公网安备 11010802022788号
