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Brief Glossary for New Institutional Economics Compiled by Alexandra Benham 主要包括：Collective action|Commons|Contract|Corruption|Governance structure| |Informal economy| Institution|New Institutional Economics|Opportunity cost| |Organization|Path dependence|Property rights|Rent-seeking|Social capital| |Social cost|Transaction|Transaction costs| Institution The rules of the game: the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Ref New Institutional Economics Incorporates a theory of institutions into economics. It builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory. It retains and builds on the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition - the basis of the choice theoretic approach that underlies microeconomics. It has developed as a movement within the social sciences, especially economics and political science, that unites theoretical and empirical research examining the role of institutions in furthering or preventing economic growth. It includes work in transaction costs, political economy, property rights, hierarchy and organization, and public choice. Most scholars view the work of Ronald Coase as a central inspiration for the field. Ref Organization A group of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Organizations include political bodies (political parties, regulatory agencies), economic bodies (firms, trade unions), social bodies (churches, clubs), and educational bodies (schools, universities). Note that the term "institution" refers to the rules of the game, whereas "organization" refers to players of the game. Ref Transaction A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. Ref Transaction costs The costs of resources utilized for the creation, maintenance, use, and change of institutions and organizations. They include the costs of defining and measuring resources or claims, the costs of utilizing and enforcing the rights specified, and the costs of information, negotiation, and enforcement. Ref Property rights There are two distinct meanings: economic property rights and legal property rights. The economic property rights of an individual over a commodity or an asset are the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good or the services of the asset directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange. These can include (1) the right to use an asset, (2) the right to earn income from an asset and contract over the terms with other individuals, and (3) the right to transfer ownership rights permanently to another party. The legal property rights are the property rights that are recognized and enforced by the government. Ref Governance structure An institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided. Governance is the means by which order is accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains. Ref Contract A legally enforceable agreement. It is a formal, legal commitment to which each party gives express (though not necessarily written) approval and to which a particular body of law applies. Ref Social cost An actor (business firm, individual, etc.) initiating an action does not necessarily bear all the costs or reap all the benefits of that action. Those that the actor does bear are the private costs; those that the actor does not bear are the external costs. The sum of these two is the social cost. Ref Collective action Actions taken by two or more people, comprising a group or organization, in pursuit of the same collective good—a good such that, if any member of the group consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in the group. Ref Commons A scarce resource used in common, from which it is not feasible to exclude potential beneficiaries from using or consuming it, and for which each actor's use or consumption of it subtracts from its availability to others. Ref Social capital 1. Features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions. 2. Features inherent to the structure of relations between and among actors. Each variety of social capital consists of some aspect of social structure, and each facilitates certain actions of actors—persons or corporate actors—within the structure. Ref Informal economy Economic actions and activities conducted outside the legal framework of society. The activities or products may in themselves may be legal, but they are conducted in a way which disobeys specific legal provisions, such as registration with the government, payment of taxes, and so on. Ref Corruption Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (close family, personal, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. Ref Rent-seeking The outlay of resources by individuals and organizations in the pursuit of rents created by government. Ref Opportunity Cost The evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the rejected alternatives or opportunities when a choice is made. It is the value that is given up in order to secure the higher value that selection of the chosen object embodies. Ref Path dependence A condition that exists when the outcome of a sequence of economic changes can be significantly influenced by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces. Ref Sources (terms listed alphabetically)Collective action Mancur Olson (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 1, p. 14. Commons Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2, p. 6. Contract Scott E. Masten (2000), Contractual Choice, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III. The Regulation of Contracts, Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 25. Corruption Joseph S. Nye (1967), Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, American Political Science Review, 61 (2): 417-427. Governance structure Oliver E. Williamson (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-12. Informal economy Hernando de Soto (1989), The Other Path, New York, Harper & Row, p. 12. Institution Douglass C. North (1994), Economic Performance Through Time, Nobel prize lecture, December 19, 1993. Also published in The American Economic Review, 84 (3): 359-368, p. 360. New Institutional Economics Douglass C. North (1992), The New Institutional Economics and Development, Washington University in St. Louis, p.1. John Nye (2004), personal communication. Opportunity cost James M. Buchanan (1987), Opportunity Cost, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds, London: Macmillan Press, volume 3, pp. 718-721. Organization Douglass North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5. Path dependence Paul A. David (1985), Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, American Economic Review 75 (2): 332-337, p. 332. Property rights Yoram Barzel (1997), Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edition, pp. 1-2. Thrainn Eggertsson (1990), Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rent-seeking Anne O. Krueger (1974), The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, The American Economic Review, 64 (3): 291-303, p. 291. Gordon Tullock (1998), The Fundamentals of Rent-Seeking, The Locke Luminary Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter 1998) Part 2. Social Capital Robert D. Putnam (1993), Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 167. James S. Coleman (1988), Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital , The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, Supplement, pp. S95-S120, p. S98. Social cost Ronald Coase (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44. Transaction Oliver E. Williamson (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 379. Transaction costs Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, p. 40.
这里，“制度”（institution）被理解为一种博弈规则，而“组织”则被理解为博弈者。
比较有意思的是对“交易”的定义，“通过一种技术上可分离的界面而进行的产品或服务的转移”。
这表明，假设技术上的需要而进行的团队生产，在这里不存在了。也就是说，交易彻底成为分析单位。
此处对“交易费用”的界定是广义的，即制度或组织运行的费用。我记得对交易费用大概有三种定义，最狭义的当属哈特吧，仅仅只预测、描述或然状况以及执行契约的费用；巴泽尔次之，将交易费用定义为界定产权的费用；最宽泛的就是张五常了，定义和这里的定义差不多。至于其他的定义，例如将交易费用定义为交易效率，这就是物理成本了，恐怕违背了科斯的本义。所以，从这个角度讲，杨小凯的超边际分析也许有点问题，周业安跟我提到过这点。不过，目前还没有看到更好的形式化的方法。
“产权”，这里的解释还是张五常的，只是没有明确指出法律上的产权与经济学上的产权究竟有什么差别？
“治理结构”，和Zingales为《新帕尔格雷夫法经济学大辞典》撰写的词条一样罢，不过后者明确指出，应该在不完全契约的视角下理解公司治理，这显然是很有洞见的。
“契约”，这里的解释不同于威廉姆森和哈特的，他们更强调私人执行而不是法律执行。看来，这个词条乃至这个研究所还是主要反映科斯主义的。
“社会成本”，定义和新古典一样，都承认存在“外部性”(externality)。搞笑的是，张五常直到现在还认为，他“手起刀落”砍掉了这个伪概念。更搞笑的是，浙大一个张五常的fans居然还专门为此做了考证，结果自己也胡涂了！
“Commons”，译为“公共品”（public goods），免得大家误解。
“腐败”（corruption），即任何为了私利而偏离公共责任的行为。按此定义，学者抄袭、搞学权交易，那铁定是“学术腐败”了，仅仅用“学术不道德”真是板子打得太轻了，中国科学院那帮人，一边搞学术腐败，还一边要争名头。要当婊子就别立牌坊了。
“机会成本”，定义大家都知道，不过我怀疑它从来就不能正确地计算。你如何知道什么价值是你放弃的价值中最高的？你能穷尽所有的选择？有信息约束和无信息约束的结果大不一样。
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-24 22:51:55编辑过]
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