The effect of informal employment and corruption on income levels in Brazil

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

The effect of informal employment and corruption on income levels in Brazil This paper exploits a unique dataset on corruption and informal sector employment in 476 Brazilian municipalities to estimate whether corruption impacts GDP or income levels once variation in informal economic activity is taken into account. Overall, I find that higher lev- els of corruption and a large informal economy are generally associated with poor economic outcomes. However, only the size of the informal economy has a statistically significant effect. This effect is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls and fixed effects, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. Further, these effects are large in magnitude. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the share of total employees that are informally employed explains a decrease in GDP per-capita of about 18%. Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (3) (2016) 657–695. College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA.

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：employment CORRUPTION informal Corrupt informa corruption employment levels income

The size of the informal sector in Brazil is extremely large. Both employment and incomes from the informal sector are in- cluded in each decennial Census, making this an ideal country for this specific type of analysis. In the sample of municipalities used in this paper, the size of the Brazilian informal sector in 20 0 0, as measured by share of employees without a formal con- tract, was over 50% of total employees. Furthermore, informal sector employees accounted for almost 40% of total income from employees of all types in these municipalities. Thus, it is clear that the informal sector is an integral part of the Brazilian economy. In addition, corruption in Brazil has long been a serious problem. Due to a number of scandals exposing specific politician’s behavior in the latter half of the 20th century, Brazil is recognized as a country that is suffering from corrupt acts ( Geddes & Neto, 1992 ; da Silva, 1999 ). In order to combat corruption, in May of 2003, the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva implemented a program based on random auditing of municipal governments’ expenditures ( Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Ferraz & Finan, 2011 ). This program randomly selects about one percent of the total number of municipalities with a population less than 50 0,0 0 0 (Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU)). The CGU auditors collect information on all federal funds transferred to the municipal government, inspects public work construction, and consults the population through community councils on any complaints of misconduct (CGU). This collected information is then organized into a report and made available to the public. In a series of papers, Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan used these reports to construct measures of corruption in the audited municipalities (2008; 2011). This paper uses the corruption indicators developed in their 2011 paper, specifically. Ferraz and Finan (2011) focus on three different types of corruption that could be found in these audit reports: fraud in the public procurement of goods and services, diversion of funds, and the over invoicing of goods and services. They estimate that corruption in these local governments alone amounts to be about $550 million per year. The main corruption variable of interest in this paper is the s