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雷达卡
摘要翻译：
我们研究了通过市场机制将可分割商品分配给竞争代理的问题，重点讨论了具有Leontief效用的代理。大多数经济学和机制设计文献都集中在\emph{线性}价格上，这意味着一件商品的成本与购买数量成正比。线性价格均衡是已知的最大纳什福利分配。\emph{价格曲线}允许商品的成本是购买数量的任何（递增）函数。我们证明了价格曲线均衡不限于最大Nash福利分配，并得到了两个主要结果。首先，我们证明了一个配置可以由严格递增的价格曲线支持当且仅当它是\emph{无群控制}。类似的特征也适用于弱增长的价格曲线。我们利用这一点来证明，给定任何分配，我们可以在多项式时间内计算出严格（或弱）支持它（或表明不存在）的递增价格曲线。这些结果涉及到一个分配的\emph{agent-order矩阵}的连接，该分配可能有其他应用程序。其次，我们利用对偶性证明了在带宽分配条件下，任何使CES福利函数最大化的分配都可以得到价格曲线的支持。
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英文标题：
《Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities》
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作者：
Ashish Goel and Reyna Hulett and Benjamin Plaut
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning that the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased. Equilibria for linear prices are known to be exactly the maximum Nash welfare allocations. \emph{Price curves} allow the cost of a good to be any (increasing) function of the quantity purchased. We show that price curve equilibria are not limited to maximum Nash welfare allocations with two main results. First, we show that an allocation can be supported by strictly increasing price curves if and only if it is \emph{group-domination-free}. A similarly characterization holds for weakly increasing price curves. We use this to show that given any allocation, we can compute strictly (or weakly) increasing price curves that support it (or show that none exist) in polynomial time. These results involve a connection to the \emph{agent-order matrix} of an allocation, which may have other applications. Second, we use duality to show that in the bandwidth allocation setting, any allocation maximizing a CES welfare function can be supported by price curves.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.05293
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