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摘要翻译：
现有的合作博弈理论对天然气管道系统讨价还价能力的研究是基于所谓的特征函数形式(CFF)。如果某些管道属于受监管的第三方访问(TPA)范围，这种方法可能会误导。TPA是目前欧盟的规范，它要求管道所有者为他人运输天然气，前提是他们支付受监管的运输费用。从博弈论的角度来看，这种制度设置创造了所谓的“外部性”，对其描述需要配分函数形式(PFF)博弈。本文提出了一种计算管道系统的收益的方法，该方法反映了管道系统的功率结构。该方法基于迭代流动机制来确定单个玩家的气体流量和运输费用，并使用递归核心和最小索赔函数将PPF博弈转化为CFF博弈，该博弈可以用标准方法求解。我们用一个简单的、程式化的中东欧天然气网络的数值例子来说明这种方法，重点是乌克兰作为一个主要过境国的电力指数。
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英文标题：
《Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative
game-theoretic model of natural gas networks》
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作者：
D\'avid Csercsik, Franz Hubert, Bal\'azs R. Sziklai and L\'aszl\'o
\'A. K\'oczy
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "externalities," the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine's power index as a major transit country.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.11435
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