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雷达卡
摘要翻译：
本文提出了可分资产的离散时间双重拍卖市场的一个简单描述模型。在交换经济的经典模型中，我们考虑由初始禀赋和偏好描述的有限代理集合。与经典的Walrasian型市场模型不同，我们假设所有的交易都发生在集中的双重拍卖中，在这种拍卖中，代理人通过密封的限价指令进行买卖。我们发现，在非策略性竞价下，当代理人的当前持有量处于帕累托前沿时，双重拍卖以零交易清零。更有趣的是，双重拍卖实现了亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”，即当从非均衡开始时，重复的双重拍卖导致一系列配置，这些配置收敛于个别理性的帕累托配置。
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英文标题：
《Efficient allocations in double auction markets》
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作者：
Teemu Pennanen
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead of the classical Walrasian-type market models, however, we assume that all trades take place in a centralized double auction where the agents communicate through sealed limit orders for buying and selling. We find that, under nonstrategic bidding, the double auction clears with zero trades precisely when the agents' current holdings are on the Pareto frontier. More interestingly, the double auctions implement Adam Smith's "invisible hand" in the sense that, when starting from disequilibrium, repeated double auctions lead to a sequence of allocations that converges to individually rational Pareto allocations.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.02071
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