摘要翻译:
我们认为,一个人对一个结果持有多种程度的信念,给出了证据。然后,我们研究这种噪声概率对二元期权的买方和卖方的影响,并发现为确保零期望下注而商定的赔率不同于与结果的相对频率一致的赔率。更准确地说,买方和卖方同意比他们的平均无偏概率的倒数高(低)的赔率,当这个平均数表明结果发生的可能性大于(小于)偶然发生的可能性时。因此,最受欢迎的长期偏见出现了,以建立公平市场的基础。作为推论,我们的工作表明,通过打赌来揭示某人信仰程度的旧方法可能比以前想象的更有问题,并暗示博彩市场通常不能承诺支持理性决策。
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英文标题:
《Fair Odds for Noisy Probabilities》
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作者:
Ulrik W. Nash
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最新提交年份:
2018
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We suggest that one individual holds multiple degrees of belief about an outcome, given the evidence. We then investigate the implications of such noisy probabilities for a buyer and a seller of binary options and find the odds agreed upon to ensure zero-expectation betting, differ from those consistent with the relative frequency of outcomes. More precisely, the buyer and the seller agree to odds that are higher (lower) than the reciprocal of their averaged unbiased probabilities when this average indicates the outcome is more (less) likely to occur than chance. The favorite-longshot bias thereby emerges to establish the foundation of an equitable market. As corollaries, our work suggests the old-established way of revealing someone's degree of belief through wagers may be more problematic than previously thought, and implies that betting markets cannot generally promise to support rational decisions.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.12516