<p><strong><font size="3"><span id="btAsinTitle">Putting Auction Theory to Work (Hardcover)</span><!--Element not supported - Type: 8 Name: #comment--><br/></font></strong>by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;search-type=ss&amp;index=books&amp;field-author=Paul%20Milgrom"><font color="#003399">Paul Milgrom</font></a> (Author)</p><p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0521551846/ref=sib_dp_pt#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="240" alt="Putting Auction Theory to Work" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41BS0C37E9L._SL500_BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="240" border="0"/></a></p><li><b>Hardcover:</b> 392 pages </li><li><b>Publisher:</b> Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (August 1, 2003) </li><li><strong>Language: </strong><font color="#ff0000"><strong>English</strong>
</font></li><li><div class="content"><b>Review</b><br/>"Paul Milgrom has combined fundamental work in economic theory and, in particular, the theory of auctions, with extensive practical participation in the auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. This book is a brilliant synthesis of his own and others' contributions to the field. The impact of practical problems on the need for theory is thoroughly exemplified. The exposition of the theory has that complete ease only achievable through complete mastery and intense work." <font color="#ff0000">Kenneth Arrow</font>, Nobel Laureate, Stanford University<br/><br/>"One of the recent revolutions in economics is an understanding that markets do not automatically work well. Design matters, and the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction design that Milgrom pioneered kicked off a new era of market design using economic theory to make real markets work better. Now, Milgrom makes the underlying ideas and theories more widely accessible--so other markets too will reap the benefits of these insights." <font color="#ff0000">Joseph Stiglitz</font>, Nobel Laureate, Columbia University<br/><br/>"Whether you are an expert on auction theory or just a novice curious about how auction theory works, you will be in for a marvelous journey. There's no one better at capturing the essence and generality of economic ideas than Paul Milgrom. He's a master in a class of his own." <font color="#ff0000">Bengt Holmstrom</font>, Massachusetts Institute of Technology<br/><br/>"Milgrom's ideas were critical to helping the FCC design its multi-billion dollar spectrum auctions. His thoughtful economic reasoning and attention to practical detail made the auctions successful. Whether you are seeking careful theorizing or practical insights, Milgrom's work is the first place to look." <font color="#ff0000">Reed Hundt</font>, Former Chair, Federal Communications Commission<br/><br/>"Paul Milgrom is universally acclaimed as one of the outstanding economic theorists of our generation. He has turned auction theory into the crucial tool for modern market design. His book will be an essential resource for theorists and practitioners alike." <font color="#ff0000">Paul Klemperer</font>, University of Oxford<br/><br/>"In Paul Milgrom's hands, auction theory has become the great culmination of game theory and economics of information. Here elegant mathematics meets practical applications and yields deep insights into the general theory of markets. Milgrom's book will be the definitive reference in auction theory for decades to come." <font color="#ff0000">Roger Myerson</font>, University of Chicago<br/><br/>"Market design is one of the most exciting developments in contemporary economics and game theory, and who can resist a master class from one of the giants of the field?"<font color="#ff0000"> Al Roth</font>, Harvard University<br/><br/>"No one is better qualified than Paul Milgrom to give an up-to-date and lucid guide to the accomplishments of auction theory. Both rigorous and enjoyable to read, this exciting book is a must for graduate students and auction designers." <font color="#ff0000">Jean Tirole</font>, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, France <br/><br/><b>Product Description</b><br/>Providing a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications, this book is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the volume provides the most up-to-date analysis of traditional theories of "optimal auctions" as well as newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. It explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. Paul Milgrom is the Leonard and Shirley Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Economics, Stanford University. He is the author of more than sixty articles and co-author of the influential textbook, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice Hall, 1992). Professor Milgrom is a pioneer in the economic theory of auctions and co-designer of the simultaneous, multiple round auction that the FCC adopted for selling radio spectrum licenses.<br/><br/>Visit the author's website for instructor resources. </div></li><li><div class="content">
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</div></li><li><div class="content"><strong><font size="4">Contents</font></strong><br/>Preface page xi<br/>Foreword by Evan Kwerel xv<br/><strong>1 Getting to Work 1</strong><br/>1.1 Politics Sets the Stage 3<br/>1.2 Designing forMultiple Goals 3<br/>1.2.1 Substitutes and Complements 6<br/>1.2.2 New Zealand’s Rights Auction 9<br/>1.2.3 Better Auction Designs 13<br/>1.2.4 The FCC Design and Its Progeny 13<br/>1.3 Comparing Seller Revenues 16<br/>1.4 The Academic Critics 19<br/>1.4.1 Resale and the Coase Theorem 19<br/>1.4.2 Mechanism Design Theory 21<br/>1.4.3 Theory and Experiment 25<br/>1.4.4 Practical Concerns 26<br/>1.5 Plan for This Book 31<br/><strong>PART I THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH 35<br/>2 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanisms 45</strong><br/>2.1 Formulation 45<br/>2.2 Always Optimal andWeakly Dominant Strategies 49<br/>2.3 Balancing the Budget 53<br/>2.4 Uniqueness 55<br/>2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction 56<br/>2.5.1 Practical Disadvantages 56<br/>2.5.2 Monotonicity Problems 57<br/>2.5.3 TheMerger–Investment Disadvantage 60<br/>2.6 Conclusion 61<br/><strong>3 The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence 64</strong><br/>3.1 Hotelling’s Lemma 65<br/>3.2 The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form 66<br/>3.3 Quasi-linear Payoffs 69<br/>3.3.1 Holmstrom’s Lemma 70<br/>3.3.2 The Green–Laffont–Holmstrom Theorem 71<br/>3.3.3 Myerson’s Lemma 73<br/>3.3.4 Revenue Equivalence Theorems 75<br/>3.3.5 TheMyerson–Satterthwaite Theorem 77<br/>3.3.6 The Jehiel–Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems 80<br/>3.3.7 Myerson and Riley–Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing<br/>Auctions 84<br/>3.3.8 TheMcAfee–McMillanWeak-Cartels Theorem 87<br/>3.3.9 Sequential Auctions andWeber’sMartingale Theorem 90<br/>3.3.10 Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence 91<br/>3.4 Conclusion 94<br/><strong>4 Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences 98</strong><br/>4.1 The Single Crossing Conditions 99<br/>4.1.1 TheMonotonic Selection Theorem 101<br/>4.1.2 The Sufficiency Theorem 102<br/>4.1.3 The Constraint Simplification Theorem 105<br/>4.1.4 TheMirrlees–Spence Representation Theorem 106<br/>4.2 Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies 110<br/>4.2.1 The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price 111<br/>4.2.2 The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction 112<br/>4.2.3 TheWar of Attrition Auction 117<br/>4.2.4 The All-Pay Auction 119<br/>4.3 Revenue Comparisons in the BenchmarkModel 119<br/>4.3.1 Payoff Equivalence without Revenue<br/>Equivalence 121<br/>4.3.2 Budget Constraints 132<br/>4.3.3 Endogenous Quantities 135<br/>4.3.4 Correlated Types 137<br/>4.4 Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions 140<br/>4.4.1 Myerson’s Theorem 144<br/>4.4.2 Bulow–Klemperer Theorem 148<br/>4.4.3 The Irregular Case 148<br/>4.5 Auctions withWeak and Strong Bidders 149<br/>4.6 Conclusion 154<br/><strong>5 Interdependence of Types and Values 157</strong><br/>5.1 WhichModels and Assumptions are “Useful”? 158<br/>5.1.1 Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types 158<br/>5.1.2 Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private 159<br/>5.1.3 Types Are Statistically Independent 161<br/>5.2 Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions 162<br/>5.3 Wilson’s Drainage TractModel 166<br/>5.3.1 Equilibrium 167<br/>5.3.2 Profits and Revenues 173<br/>5.3.3 Bidder Information Policy 175<br/>5.3.4 Seller Information Policy 177<br/>5.4 Correlated Types and Interdependent Values 181<br/>5.4.1 Affiliation 182<br/>5.4.2 TheMilgrom–Weber Ascending AuctionModels 187<br/>5.4.2.1 The (Second-Price) Button Auction withMinimal<br/>Information 188<br/>5.4.2.2 The Button Auction withMaximal Information 195<br/>5.4.2.3 Some Revenue Comparisons 198<br/>5.4.3 First-Price Auctions 200<br/>5.5 Conclusion 204<br/><strong>6 Auctions in Context 208</strong><br/>6.1 The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant 214<br/>6.2 SymmetricModels with Costly Entry 216<br/>6.2.1 Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry 218<br/>6.2.1.1 Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions 218<br/>6.2.1.2 Setting the Reserve Price 222<br/>6.2.2 Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors 225<br/>6.2.2.1 Pre-qualifying Bidders 227<br/>6.2.2.2 Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices 230<br/>6.2.2.3 Buy Prices 232<br/>6.3 AsymmetricModels: Devices to Promote Competition 234<br/>6.3.1 Example of Set-asides 235<br/>6.3.2 Example of Bidding Credits 237<br/>6.3.3 Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes 238<br/>6.3.4 Premium Auctions 239<br/>6.3.5 Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design 241<br/>6.4 After the Bidding Ends 243<br/>6.4.1 Bankruptcy and Non-performance 243<br/>6.4.2 Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids 245<br/>6.5 Conclusion 247<br/><strong>PART II MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS 251</strong><br/><strong>7 Uniform Price Auctions 255</strong><br/>7.1 UniformPrice Sealed-Bid Auctions 257<br/>7.1.1 Demand Reduction 258<br/>7.1.2 Low-Price Equilibria 262<br/>7.2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 265<br/>7.2.1 The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and theWalrasian<br/>Tatonnement 268<br/>7.2.2 Clock Auctions 279<br/>7.2.3 Strategic Incentives in UniformPrice Auctions 284<br/>7.2.3.1 The Basic Clock AuctionModel 284<br/>7.2.3.2 The Alternating-Move Clock Auction 287<br/>7.2.3.3 Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply 290<br/>7.3 Conclusion 293<br/><strong>8 Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding 296</strong><br/>8.1 Vickrey Auctions and theMonotonicity Problems 302<br/>8.1.1 Bidders’ Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs 305<br/>8.1.2 Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle 305<br/>8.1.3 When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core? 307<br/>8.1.4 Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes 308<br/>8.1.5 Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes 312<br/>8.2 Bernheim–Whinston First-Price Package Auctions 315<br/>8.2.1 Formulation 316<br/>8.2.2 Profit-Target Strategies 318<br/>8.2.3 Equilibrium and the Core 319<br/>8.3 Ausubel–Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions 324<br/>8.3.1 The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets 325<br/>8.3.1.1 Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes 326<br/>8.3.1.2 Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium 327<br/>8.3.1.3 The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes 329<br/>8.3.2 The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction 330<br/>8.4 Conclusion 333<br/>Bibliography 339<br/><strong>Author Index 347<br/>Subject Index 351</strong></div></li>
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