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Colin F. Camerer,著名的California Institute of Technology的教授,是行为博弈论的掌门。他撰写的行为博弈论即将由中国人民大学出版社出版

他的主页是:http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/camerer.html

如果大家看了俺后面贴的他的简介,一定会产生同样的感受:吓死了!

大家在看该贴时,不要忘了浏览后面卡梅瑞教授对行为经济学、实验经济学、行为博弈、神经元经济学、行为政策研究等的介绍。适当的时候俺会写成中文

699.rar (912.78 KB) 本附件包括:

  • 行为博弈导论.pdf

Behavioral Game Theory: Thinking, Learning, and Teaching

Colin F. Camerer,Teck-Hua Ho,Juin Kuan Chong

700.rar (164.96 KB) 本附件包括:

  • 经济学的行为挑战.pdf
The behavioral challenge to economics: Understanding normal people

701.rar (236.98 KB) 本附件包括:

  • 年纪和决策.pdf
Aging and Decision Making: A broad comparative study of decision behavior in neurologically healthy elderly and young individuals

702.rar (195.92 KB) 本附件包括:
  • 行为经济学和计量.pdf
THE ECONOMETRICS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT: A RE-EXAMINATION OF STAW & HOANG'S NBA DATA

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-7-11 11:58:43编辑过]

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关键词:Camerer 行为经济学 mere 行为经济 经济学家 论文 行为 经济学家 Camerer

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面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!
沙发
闲人 发表于 2004-7-7 19:09:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

703.rar (430.03 KB) 本附件包括:

  • 神经元经济学.pdf
Neuroeconomics

704.rar (278.88 KB) 本附件包括:

  • 神经元经济学导论.pdf
Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics

这两篇是一个经济学和自然科学紧密结合的崭新学科——神经元经济学的综述和介绍性文章,诺奖得主乔治梅森大学的斯密斯教授曾说,该方向研究将改变经济学的未来,所以他自己也建立了神经元经济学研究小组,把早先的实验经济学进一步推广。

很多国内人认为斯密斯的研究和行为经济学无关,这是多么可笑!

面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!

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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:22:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
VITA COLIN F. CAMERER PERSONAL Office address: Rea & Lela Axline Prof. of Business Economics Division of Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125 Home address: 8458 Carlton Way Los Angeles CA 90069 E-mail address: camerer@hss.caltech.edu Website: www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/camerer.html Phones: Work 626 395 4054 Fax: 626 432 1726 Home: 323 654 1752 Cell: 323 252 1752 Date of birth: December 4, 1959 EDUCATION University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. MBA, 1979 (finance). Ph.D., 1981 (behavioral decision theory). Johns Hopkins University. BA, 1977 (quantitative studies). ACADEMIC POSITIONS Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of Technology, 1994-present. Professor of Strategy and Behavioral Science, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 1991-94. Visiting Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 1997-98. Visiting Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation, 1991-92. Associate Professor of Decision Sciences (secondary appointment in Management), 1989-91; Assistant Professor, 1983-89, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Visiting Assistant Professor of Business, California Institute of Technology, Winter-Summer 1987. Assistant Professor of Policy and Environment, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 1981-83. Instructor in Statistics, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 1980-81. BOOKS Foundations of Human Sociality (with 14 co-authors), Oxford Univ. Press, 2004. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. (Chinese translation by China People抯 University Press). Advances in Behavioral Economics. Co-edited with George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin, 2004. Pathological gambling: A critical review. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999. (Coauthored with 12 other National Research Council panelists). Making Decisions about Liability and Insurance: A Special Issue of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. Co-edited with Howard Kunreuther. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. JOURNAL ARTICLES 1. Weber, Roberto, Camerer, Colin F., and Mark Knez, 2004. "Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and `weak-link' coordination games," Experimental Economics, 7, 25-48. 2. Camerer, Colin F. and Dick Thaler. "In honor of Bates Clark Medalist Matthew Rabin" J. Econ Perspectives. 3. Camerer, Colin F., Teck-Hua Ho and Kuan Chong 2004. "A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in games", Quarterly Journal of Economics. 4. Camerer, Colin F. 13 June 2003. 揝trategizing in the Brain.?Science. Vol. 300, 1673-1675. 5. Camerer, Colin F. May 2003. 揃ehavioural Studies of Strategic Thinking in Games.?Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 7, No. 5, 225-231. (Invited paper). 6. Weber, Roberto, and Colin F. Camerer 2003. 揅ultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach." Management Science. Vol. 49, No. 4, 400-415. 7. Camerer, Colin F. and Howard Kunreuther. 1989. "Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Vol. 8, No. 4, 565-92. 8. Knez, Mark, and Colin F. Camerer 1996. 揅oordination, Organizational Boundaries, and Fads in Business Practice." Industrial and Corporate Change. Vol. 5. 89-112. 9. Camerer, Colin, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O扗onoghue, and Matthew Rabin. Jan 2003. 揜egulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 慉ssymetric Paternalism.挃 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 151, 1211-1254. 10. Johnson, Eric, Colin F. Camerer, Sankar Sen, and Talia Rymon. May 2002. 揇etecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining." Journal of Economic Theory, 104:1, 16-47 (lead article). 11. Camerer, Colin F., Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin Kuan Chong. May 2002. 揝ophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games." Journal of Economic Theory, 104:1, 137-88. 12. Camerer, Colin. F., Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath. May 2001. 揅ooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies." American Economic Review, 91, 73-78. (Reprinted in Trust, Elias Khalil (Ed.), In press, Edward Elgar Publishing). 13. Weber, Roberto, Colin F. Camerer, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Marc Knez. 2001. 揟he Illusion of Leadership: Misattributions of Cause in Coordination Games.?Organizational Science, 12, 582-98. 14. Camerer, Colin F., and Chris Anderson. 2000. 揈xperience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games." Economic Theory, 16, 689-718. (Reprinted in Advances in Experimental Markets, T. Cason and C. Noussair (Eds.), Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2001, 209-38.) 15. Knez, Marc, and Colin F. Camerer. 2000. 揑ncreasing Cooperation in Prisoner抯 Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82, 194-216. 16. Camerer, Colin F., and Teck-Hua Ho. July 1999. 揈xperience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning in Normal-Form Games." Econometrica, 67, 827-74. 17. Camerer, Colin F. April 1999. 揜appresentazione mentale dei giochi: Framing e editing." Sistemi Intelligenti, 11, 113-43. (in Italian) 18. Camerer, Colin F., and Dan Lovallo. March 1999. 揙verconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach." American Economic Review, 89, 306-18. 19. Camerer, Colin F., and Robin Hogarth. 1999. 揟he Effects of Financial Incentives in Economics Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7-42. 20. Camerer, Colin F. 1999. 揃ehavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96, 10575-77. 21. Camerer, Colin F., and Roberto Weber. 1999. 揟he Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of Escalation to Commitment in NBA Draft Choices." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 22. Ho, Teck, Colin F. Camerer, and Keith Weigelt. September 1998. 揑terated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental 憄-beauty contests?" American Economic Review, 88, 947-69. 23. Camerer, Colin F. June 1998. 揅an Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting." Journal of Political Economy, 457-82 (lead article). 24. Camerer, Colin F., and Teck-Hua Ho. 1998. 揈xperience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination Games: Probability Rules, Heterogeneity and Time-Variation." Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 305-26. 25. Camerer, Colin F. 1998.揃ounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making." Experimental Economics. 26. Camerer, Colin F., and Martin Weber. 1998. 揟he Disposition Effect in Securities Trading: An Experimental Analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33, 167-84. (Reprinted in Hersh Shefrin (Ed.), Behavioral Finance, London: Edward Elgar, 2000) 27. Camerer, Colin F., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler. May 1997. 揕abor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 408-41. 28. Camerer, Colin F. Fall 1997. 揚rogress in Behavioral Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 167-88. (invited paper). (Reprinted in J. Shogren (Ed.), Experiments in Environmental Economics, volumes I-II, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002 and also reprinted in Max H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management. UK: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2003.) 29. Cachon, Gerard P., and Colin F. Camerer. February 1996. 揕oss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 165-94. 30. Babcock, L., G. Loewenstein, S. Issacharoff, and Colin F. Camerer. December 1995. 揃iased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining." American Economic Review, 1337-1343. 31. Camerer, Colin F., and Richard Thaler. Spring 1995. 揂nomalies: Dictators, Ultimatums, and Manners." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 209-19. 32. Knez, Marc, and Colin F. Camerer. 1995. 揝ocial Comparison and Outside Options in Three-Person Ultimatum Games." Games and Economic Behavior, 165-94. 33. Harless, Charles, and Colin F. Camerer. 1995. 揂n Error-Rate Analysis of Experimental Data Testing Nash Refinements." European Economic Review, 39, 649-60. 34. Banks, J., Colin F. Camerer, and D. Porter. January 1994. 揈xperimental Tests of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games." Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 1-31. 35. Camerer, Colin F. and Marc Knez. 1994. 揅reating 慐xpectational Assets?in the Laboratory: 慦eakest-link?Coordination Games." Strategic Management Journal, 15,101-19. 36. Harless, David, and Colin F. Camerer. 1994. 揟he Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories." Econometrica, 62, 1251-90. (Reprinted in J.D. Hey (Ed.), The Economics of Uncertainty, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., in press.) 37. Camerer, Colin F., and Teck Ho. 1994. 揤iolations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probabilities." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, 167-96. 38. Camerer, Colin F., G. Loewenstein, S. Issacharoff, and L. Babcock. January 1993. 揝elf-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining." Journal of Legal Studies, 22, 135-59. 39. Heath, Chip, Marc Knez, and Colin F. Camerer. 1993. 揟he Strategic Management of the Entitlement Process in the Employment Relationship." Strategic Management Journal, 14, 75-93. 40. Camerer, Colin F., and M. Weber. 1992. 揈in Experiment zum Anlegerverhalten." Zeitschrift f黵 Betriebswirtschaftsliche Forschung, 44, 131-48. (in German) 41. Camerer, Colin F. 1992. 揟he Rationality of Prices and Volume in Experimental Markets." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 237-72. 42. Camerer, Colin F., and M. Weber. 1992. 揜ecent Developments in Modelling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 325-70. 43. Camerer, Colin F. Winter 1991. 揇oes Strategy Research Need Game Theory?" Strategic Management Journal, 12, 137-52.(Reprinted in R. Rumelt, D. Schendel, and D. Teece, (Eds.) Fundamental Issues in Strategy: A Research Agenda for the 1990s, Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.) 44. Camerer, Colin F., and K. Weigelt. October 1991. 揑nformation Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets." Journal of Business, 64, 463-93. 45. Camerer, Colin F. December 1989. 揇oes the Basketball Market Believe in the 慔ot Hand?" American Economic Review, 79, 1257-61. 46. *Camerer, Colin F., G. Loewenstein, and M. Weber. October 1989. 揟he Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis." Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1232-54. 47. Camerer, Colin F. 1989. 揃ubbles and Fads in Asset Markets: A Review of Theory and Evidence." Journal of Economic Surveys, 3, 3-38. (Reprinted in Italian in G. Vaciago and G. Verga (Eds.), La Teoria dei Mercati Finanziari, Italy, Societa Editrice II Mulino.) 48. Camerer, Colin F., and H. K. Kunreuther. 1989. 揈xperimental Markets for Insurance." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 265-300. 49. Camerer, Colin F., and H. K. Kunreuther. 1989. 揇ecision Processes for Low Probability Risks: Policy Implications." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 8, 565-92. (Reprinted in W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer, Classics in Risk Management, two-vol. set, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., forthcoming.) 50. Camerer, Colin F., and A. Vepsalainen. July 1988. 揟he Efficiency of Cultural Contracting." Strategic Management Journal, 9, 77-94. 51. Camerer, Colin F. April-June 1988. 揑llusory Correlations and Obviousness in Organizational Theory." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1, 1-36. 52. *Camerer, Colin F., and K. Weigelt. January 1988. 揈xperimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model." Econometrica, 56, 1-36. 53. Camerer, Colin F. Supplement 1988. 揋ifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols." American Journal of Sociology, 94, S180-S214. (Reprinted in Y. Varoufakis (Ed.), Critical Perspectives on Game Theory. UK: Routledge.) 54. Camerer, Colin F., and K. Weigelt. 1988. 揜eputation and Corporate Strategy: A Review of Recent Theory and Applications." Strategic Management Journal, 9, 443-54. 55. *Camerer, Colin F. 1988. 揂n Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 61-104. 56. *Camerer, Colin F. December 1987. 揇o Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 77, 981-97. (Reprinted in J. Shogren (Ed.), Experiments in Environmental Economics, volumes I-II, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002.) 57. Camerer, Colin F., and M. Weber. September 1987. 揜ecent Developments in Modelling Preferences under Risk." OR Spektrum, 9, 129-51. 58. Camerer, Colin F. 1985. 揜edirecting Research in Business Policy and Strategy." Strategic Management Journal, 6, 1-15. 59. Camerer, Colin F. January-February 1982. 揟he Pricing and Social Value of Commodity Options." Financial Analysts Journal. 60. Camerer, Colin F. 1981. 揋eneral Conditions for the Success of Bootstrapping Models." Organizational Behavior and Human Performances, 27, 411-22. *All Reprinted in J. Hey and G. Loomes (Eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd. BOOK CHAPTERS 1. 揃ehavioral game theory. Thinking, learning, teaching?(with Teck Ho and Kuan Chong). In S. Huck (ed), Essays in honor of Werner G黷h, Palgrave Press, 2005. 2. 揂 cognitive hierarchy theory of games and experimental analysis?with Teck Ho and Kuan Chong). In R. Zwick (Ed.) Experimental Business Research, II. Kluwer Academic Press, in press. 3. 揟hinking backward and forward in games?(with Eric Johnson). In I. Brocas and J. Castillo (Eds.), Psychology and Economics, Oxford University Press, in press 2004. 4. "Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists (with Ernst Fehr)". In Foundations of Human Sociality: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small-scale Societies. Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 5. "EWA learning in bilateral call markets," with David Hsia and Teck Ho. In R. Zwick and A. Rapoport, (Eds.), Experimental Business Research, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002. 255-284. 6. "Strategic learning and strategic teaching," with Teck Ho, in S. Hoch and H. Kunreuther (Eds.), Wharton on Making Decisions. John Wiley: New York, 2001. 7. "Experience-weighted attraction learning in games: Estimates from weak-link games," with Teck Ho, in D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick (Eds.), Games and Human Behavior: Essays in honor of Amnon Rapoport. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999, pp. 31-52. 8. "Labor supply of New York City cab drivers: One day at a time,"(abridged version of QJE 1997). 9. "Overconfidence and excess entry: Experimental evidence" (abridged version of AER 1999). 10. "Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field," (pp 288-300) All in D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (Eds.), Choices, Values, and Frames, 2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Reprinted in Max H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management. UK: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2003.) 11. "Asset market manipulation: A field experiment with racetrack betting," in C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in press. 12. "Learning in games," with Teck-Hua Ho, in C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in press. 13. "Experience-weighted attraction learning in games: Estimates from weak-link games," with Teck-Hua Ho, in D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick (Eds.), Human Behavior in Games: Essays In Honor of Amnon Rapoport, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1997. (refereed) 14. "A Test of a Probabilistic Mechanism for Inducing Stochastic Horizons in Experiments," with K. Weigelt, in R. M. Isaac (Ed.), , 6, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996. (refereed) 15. "Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ" in W. Guth and E. Van Damme (Eds.), Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996. 16. "Coordination in Organizations: A Game-theoretic Perspective," with Marc Knez, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), Organizational Decision Making, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 17. "Behavioral Economics and Nonrational Organizational Decision Making," in J. Halpern & R. Stern, Debating Rationality: Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1998. 18. "Individual Decision Making," in J. Kagel and A. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 587-703. 19. "Ambiguity-aversion and Non-additive Beliefs in Non-cooperative Games: Experimental Evidence," with Risto Karjalainen, in B. Munier & M. Machina (Eds.), Models and Experiments on Risk and Rationality, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, 325-358. 20. "Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains and Losses," with E.J. Johnson, T. Rymon, and S. Sen, in K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani (Eds.), Frontiers of Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994, 27-47. 21. "Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining," with G. Loewenstein, in B. Mellers and J. Baron (Eds.), Psychological Perspectives on Justice: Theory and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 155-179. (refereed) (Reprinted in Max H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2003.) 22. "Convergence in Experimental Double Auctions for Stochastically Lived Assets," with K. Weigelt, in D. Friedman & J. Rust (Eds.), The Double Auction Market: Theories, Institutions and Experimental Evaluations, Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1993, 355-396. 23. "Recent Tests of Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory," in W. Edwards (Ed.), Utility Theories: Measurements and Applications, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Publishing, 1992, 207-251. 24. "The Use of Experimental Economics in Strategy Research," with K. Weigelt and M. Hanna, in P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, and J. Dutton (Eds.), Advances in Strategic Management, 8, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992, 163-200. 25. "The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment: Why Do Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?" with E. Johnson, in A. Ericsson and J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a General Theory of Expertise: Prospects and Limits, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 195-217. 26. "Do Markets Correct Biases in Probability Judgment? Evidence from Market Experiments," in J. Kagel and L. Green (Eds.), Advances in Behavioral Economics, 2, Northwood, NJ: Ablex Publ., 1990, 125-172. 27. "Behavioral Game Theory," in R. Hogarth (Ed.), Insights in Decision Making: Theory and Applications, Chicag University of Chicago Press, 1990, 311-336. 28. "The Regression Paradigm in Strategy Research: A Critical Appraisal and Suggested Directions," with L. Fahey, in J. Grant (Ed.), Strategic Management Frontiers, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988. 29. "Thinking Economically about Organizational Strategy," in J.M. Pennings (Ed.), Organizational Strategy and Change, San Francisc Jossey-Bass, 1985. 30. "Underground and Overpaid: Equity Theory in Practice," with K.R. MacCrimmon, in D.M. Messick and K.S. Cook (Eds.), Theories of Equity: Psychological and Sociological Perspectives, New York: Praeger Press, 1983. BOOKS REVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS "Making Decisions about Liability and Risk: Editor's Comments," (with Howard Kunreuther), Journal of Risk Uncertainty, 7, 1993, 5-15. Comments on "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation," by Roger Noll and James Krier, Journal of Legal Studies, 19, 1990, 791-799. Review of "Judgment and Decision Making," by J. Frank Yates, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 4, January-March, 1991, 76-78. Review of "Taking Risks: The Management of Uncertainty," by Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and Donald A. Wehrung, Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, December 1988, 638-640. MAGAZINE AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES "Taxi drivers and beauty contests", Engineering and Science, 40, 1997, 10-19. [E&S is Caltech's alumni publication]. Neue Z黵cher Zeitung, "Der lange Weg ins Gleichgewicht: Lerntheorien und ihre Anwendung in der 謐onomie" Tuesday, 19 June 2001, p. 25 [NZZ is a leading German-language newspaper. Reprinted in Psychologische Grundlagen der Okonmie, E. Fehr and G. Schwarz (Eds.), NZZ: Zurich, 2002] SUBMISSIONS "Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games" with Teck Ho, Kuan Chong (submitted to American Economic Review). "Strategic teaching in repeated games," with Teck-Hua Ho,Juin Kuan Chong, and Keith Weigelt (submitted to Games and Economic Behavior) "Individual differences and payoff learning in games," with Xin Wang and Teck-Hua Ho (submitted to JEBO). WORKING PAPERS 揻MRI studies of trust games?(with Damon Tomlin, Read Montague, Cedric Anen, Steve Quartz, Brooks Casas-King). "Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics," with George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec. "Information traps in experimental asset markets," with Markus Noeth, Charles Plott, and Martin Weber. "Is there a winner抯 curse in baseball free agency? Evidence from the field," with Barry Blecherman. (in turnaround) "Psychology and game theory," with Yuval Rottenstreich 1997. "A Behavioral Account of Crisis in Product Liability," 1989. "The Reputation of Management Consulting Firms: An Analytical Approach," with Harbir Singh, 1990. "Is Trading Self-Generating? Experimental Evidence," with Mike Chernew, 1987. "MCPL Learning of Disordinal Interactions, and the Validity of Expert Judgment," 1986. "Linear Models, Interactions, and Intercorrelation: Analytical Results and Implications," 1985. WORK IN PROGRESS 揈xperimental law and economics? with Eric Talley. In M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (Eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics. 揻MRI study of ambiguity aversion?(with Ming Hsu). 揟he behavioral economics of organizations?(with Ulrike Malmendier). 揟he biology of stock market bubbles?(with Antonio Rangel). "Implications of limited attention for economics" with Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. "Experiments on growth and development" with Charles Noussair and Monica Capra. "Inducing Bubble Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets," with Keith Weigelt. "Hold your horses: Loss-aversion and optimism in the market for thoroughbreds" with Jeff Dominitz and Angela Hung. "A hyperbrain fMRI method for doing social neuroscience" with Greg Berns, Jonathan Cohen, and Read Montague GRANTS, AWARDS, and HONORS Elected Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003. Elected President of the Economic Science Association, 2001-2003. Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society, December 1999. National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant No. SES-095779, "Experimental study of organizational culture", 4/1/2001-4/1/2003, $68,585. NSF Grant No. SES-0078911, "Collaborative research: Sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games," with Teck-Hua Ho, 8/1/2000-7/31/2003, $244,580. NSF Grant No. SBR-9730364, "Experience-weighted attraction learning in noncooperative games," with Teck-Hua Ho, 1/1/98-12/31/99, $126,000. NSF Grant No. SBR-9511001, "Iterated Rationality in Noncooperative Games," with Teck-Hua Ho, 8/1/95-7/31/97, $150,210. NSF Grant No. SES-9023531, "An Experimental Study of Learning and Rationality in Noncooperative Games," with Eric Johnson, 1/1/91-6/30/92, $90,000. NSF Grant No. SES-8809299, "Coping with Risk: The Role of Insurance, Compensation and Protective Behavior," with six Co-P.I.s, 9/15/88-7/28/90, $1,055,7512 (Head P.I., 1989-91). NSF Grant No. SES-8708566, "The Effects of Institutional Structure on Judgment Biases in Experimental Asset Markets," 7/15/87-7/15/88, $37,093. NSF Grant No. SES-8510758, "Do Biases in Individual Judgment Affect Market Outcomes," Co-P.I. with Howard Kunreuther, 8/15/85-1/31/87, $51,032. Sol C. Snider Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Grant to study Reputation, 1987, $5,000. Sloan Foundation Grant 85-5-1 to study Decision-Making in Market Settings, with Howard Kunreuther, 6/85-7/86, $20,000. Winner, 1984-85 best paper, Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Grant to study Reputation, 1987. NYU Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Grant to study Reputation, with Keith Weigelt, 1984-6, $5,000. Richard Paget Research Chair, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 1982-3. PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Current board affiliations: American Economic Review; Economic Journal; Econometrica; Games and Economic Behavior; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Coeditor (with Ernst Fehr), Russell Sage Foundation/Princeton University Press book series in Behavioral Economics Board of Editors, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (1988-present), Strategic Management Journal (1991-2000), Games and Economic Behavior (1992-present), Economic Journal (2000-present), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1997-present). Advisory Editor, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1990-present). Associate Editor, Management Science (1989-92), Econometrica (1992-95, 1999-present), Quarterly Journal of Economics (1989-2001), American Economic Review (2002-present). Board of Editors, Group Decision and Negotiation (1991-95). Co-editor, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (1991-93). Business Strategy Department Editor, Management Science, (1992-95). Member, MacArthur Foundation Preferences Network, 1996-present. Member, American Economic Association, Judgment/Decision Making Society. Referee: Behavioral Science, Journal of Applied Psychology, Management Science, Psychological Bulletin, Journal of Business, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Strategic Management Journal, National Science Foundation (Economics, DRMS), American Economic Review, American Journal of Sociology, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, RAND Journal of Economics, Organization Science, Southern Economic Journal, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Economic Inquiry, Psychological Review, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Consumer Research, Academy of Management Review, International Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Economics Letters, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Science, Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Secretary/treasurer, ORSA Decision Analysis SIG, 1990-93. NSF review panel, Decision, Risk and Management Science 1991-1993; SBE Infrastructure, 2000. INVITED TALKS 1985-86: Minnesota (accounting); NYU (economics). 1986-87: UCLA (decision sciences); British Columbia (commerce); Oregon (finance). 1987-88: Chicago (decision research); Washington University (business); Houston (economics); Arizona (economics). 1988-89: Pittsburgh (accounting); Texas-Austin (accounting); Virginia Commonwealth (economics); Johns Hopkins (political economy); Michigan (accounting). 1989-90: Drexel (economics); Minnesota (accounting); Harvard (economics); Penn (economics); Rutgers (economics); Washington University (organizations). 1990-91: Harvard (decision sciences); Cornell (management); SEC (finance); Santa Fe Institute; MIT (strategy). 1991-92: Harvard/MIT (economics); Caltech (social sciences); Penn State (negotiations center); Germany (NSF counterpart); Carnegie-Mellon (social & decision sciences); NYU (strategy). 1992-93: Berkeley (economics, psychology); Rutgers (economics); NYU (economics); Iowa (business); Northwestern (dispute resolution). 1993-94: Yale (law); Chicago (behavioral science); British Columbia (commerce); Wisconsin (economics). 1994-95: California-Irvine (behavioral science); UCLA (business); UC-San Diego (psychology). 1995-96: California-Berkeley (institutions, economic theory); Chicago (labor); Stanford (dispute resolution); UCLA (five lectures on experimental economics). 1996-97: "Behavioral game theory," SFB, Universitat Mannheim; ESSET conference in Gerzensee, Switzerland; "EWA learning," Wharton (decision sciences); Washington University (Business); Chicago (behavioral science/economics of uncertainty); Pittsburgh (economics); Harvard (behavioral economics and micro theory); NYU (economics); Bonn Conference on Theories of Bounded Rationality; Autonoma, Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), Alicante; "Effects of incentives in experiments," Berkeley/NSF Conference on Measurement of Preferences. 1997-98: "Sunk costs in the NBA, "Vancouver Economics- Psychology Conference; "EWA learning," Berkeley (economics, marketing); Texas-Austin (economics), California-Santa Cruz (economics); USC (economics); Stanford (behavioral science, economics); BDRM (Miami); "Illusion of leadership," Wharton Conference in Honor of Ned Bowman; Berkeley (organizational behavior); "Experiments in strategic interaction," Stockholm School of Economics (three lectures). 1998-99: "EWA learning," University of Arizona (economics); "Experiments in strategic interaction," (USC Law school, five lectures). 1999-2000: "Behavioral game theory," Princeton (psychology); Columbia (business); Harvard (PELS lecture); "Strategic teaching: Boundedly rational reputation-building," Caltech; Harvard (behavioral economics); Hong Kong UST; Carnegie-Mellon. 2000-01: "EWA Lite" Princeton, Wharton, NYU, Pittsburgh, Chicago. "Trust", MIT. 2002-03: "Cognitive hierarchy" Columbia, Berkeley, Yale (law). "Culture", Harvard Business School. 2003-2004: Claremont, UCLA, UCSB, UC Berkeley. Keynote talks: BDRM (1994); SPUDM (1996); FUR VIII (1997); ESA (1997), FURX (2004), ESA (2004). Public lectures: Earnest C. Watson Lecture, Caltech, 1996. MEETINGS CO-ORGANIZED Econometric Society North American Meetings, January 2005, Philadelphia. Conference on iterated reasoning (with A. Cabrales, S.Morris, R. Nagel, Aug 18-19, 2002, Barcelona) USC Conference on behavioral economics, law and organization (co-organized with J. Arlen, B. MacLeod, and E. Talley), June 2001. Nobel Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Dec 3-4, 2001 (co-organized with T. Garling, T. Persson, L Nillson, J. Tirole, J. Weibull). Mental models of games, Venice, August 20-22, 1998 (co-organized with Massimo Warglien). Russell Sage Foundation Conference on Neurobehavioral Economics, May 1996, Pittsburgh (co-organized with George Loewenstein). Russell Sage Foundation Behavioral Economics Summer Camp, July 1994, 1996, 2000 (Berkeley), 1998 (Stanford), and Summer Camp Reunion, July 1995 (Pasadena). Russell Sage Foundation/NBER Meetings on Behavioral Game Theory, September 1990 (Penn), October 1993 (RSF New York), January 1996 (California). Member, program committee, Judgment/Decision Making (JDM) Society, 1991-94 (program chair 1993-94). "Making Decisions about Risk and Insurance," December 6-7, 1991, The Wharton School. Behavioral Decision Research in Management (BDRM), June 1-3 1990, The Wharton School. ORSA Decision Analysis Sessions, October 28-30 1990, Philadelphia PA. Strategy Summer Research Conference, September 1988, 1989, Long Beach Island, NJ. TEACHING EXPERIENCE University of Chicago Graduate School of Business: 320 Introductory Statistics (MBA, 1980-81) 360 Business Policy (MBA, 1992-present) 592 Experiments on Games (PhD, new course) 593 Psychology and Economic Theory (PhD, new course) Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 1981-83: D52 Strategy and Organization (MM) E90-1 Methodology in Policy Research (PhD) E90-2 Related Disciplines in Policy Research (PhD) E90-3 Special Topics in Policy Research (PhD) The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1983-91: BA807 Quantitative Methods (MBA) BA975 Business Policy (MBA, Management Department) BA690 Behavioral Decision Theory (MBA, new course) DS2 Decision Processes (BA) DS900 Decision Processes (PhD) BA691 Negotiations and Decision Making (MBA, new course) DS904 Experimental Economics (PhD, new course) Division of Social Sciences & Humanities, California Institute of Technology, 1987, 1994-present: BEM100b Business Economics and Management (BA) (Corp. Fin.) SS101 Mathematical Models of Choice Under Risk (BA) SS102 Experimental Studies of Game Theory (BA) BEM146 Organizational Design (BA) Psy101 Psychology of Strategic Thinking (BA) SS200 Psychology and Economic Theory (PhD) SS200 Experiments on Game Theory (PhD) Psy115 Cognitive Psychology (BA) SS211b Advanced Economic Theory: Behavioral Economics (PhD) Psy 20 Cognitive Psychology (BA) Psy 101 Neural Foundations of Social Science (BA/PhD) Center for Talented Youth Residential Program, Dickinson College: Economics (summer 1983) Statistics (summer 1984) UNIVERSITY SERVICE Wharton: Co-chair, Decision Sciences Workshop, 1984-87 Chair, Decision Processes Bag Lunch Seminar, 1984-91 Decision Sciences Department Recruiting Committee, 1989-90 Quantitative Methods waiver advisor, 1986-89 Member of Wharton Core Committee, 1987-89 Decision Sciences Ph.D. Admissions committee, 1988-90 Chicag Committee on Faculty Diversity, 1992-93 Caltech: Director of Graduate Studies, 1998-present. Chair, Anthropology Search Committee, 1998-99. Dissertation Committees: Northwestern: Rita Drieghe Wharton: Jim Richardson, Mark Shanley, Sunder Balakrishnan, Don Lee, Kunbae Kim, Rajeev Gowda, Doug Easterling, Bruce Weber Chaired dissertations Keith Weigelt (Northwestern), "Incomplete Information Game Theory in Strategic Management," 1985 (went to NYU; now at Wharton). Marc Knez (Wharton), "Sophisticated learning in rank-order games," 1991 (went to University of Chicago, now at Lexicon). Barry Blecherman (Wharton), "Is There a Winner's Curse in Baseball Free Agency? Field and Experimental Evidence," 1994 (went to and now at New York Polytechnic). David Sally (Chicago), "On Sympathy and Reason," 1995 (went to and now at Cornell). Dan Lovallo (Berkeley), "The Cognitive Psychology of Entry Decisions: Experimental and Field Evidence," 1996 (went to Wharton, now at University of New South Wales). Roberto Weber (Caltech), "Limited Common Knowledge in Games," 1999 (went to and now at Carnegie-Mellon). Angela Hung (Caltech), "Theory and evidence on addiction," 2000 (went to and now at Carnegie-Mellon). Chris Anderson (Caltech), "Behavior in bandit experiments," 2000 (went to and now at Univ Rhode Island). WORK EXPERIENCE President, Fever Records, 1983-95. Writer-in-residence, Washingtonian magazine, summer 1980. Security analyst, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., summer 1978. Reporter, Atlantic Publications, Delaware 1977. CONSULTING & SPEAKING Lecture series, Susquehanna Investment Group, 1994. Speaker, First Quadrant Advisory Panels, April 1996 (Florida); August 1996 (London); DAIS Group Investments, March 1997 (Palm Springs); McKinsey Consulting, March 2000 (London). 6/29/2004
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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:30:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

卡梅瑞教授对行为经济学及其相关领域的看法:

1、行为经济学

Behavioral economics Behavioral economics applies psychological principles to economic decisions, in an effort to "reunify" these social sciences. "Literary" economists like Adam Smith, Marshall and Keynes had rich discussions of how people think in behave, but the nuances of these discussions were put aside when the rational choice paradigm emerged. Complete preferences (i.e., utility maximization), equilibrium, perfect competition, and (later) Bayesian updating and rational expectations are undoubtedly useful simplifying assumptions. But most economic models which rest on these foundations can be improved by using psychological regularity to suggest different assumptions which better capture how people actually think and behave, and prove even more useful. For many years economists found assumptions of perfect competition and perfect information to be good approximations; but both idealized cases were eventually replaced by more complicated, and more realistic, models of imperfect competition (e.g., monopolistic competition, and game-theoretic models of corporate behavior), and imperfect information (e.g., signaling). Replacing the useful idealized assumption of perfect rationality with more realistic models, consistent with what is known from psychology, neuroscience, and sociology, is the next natural step in improving economics. To achieve this goal, "behavioral economics" uses evidence from psychological studies of limits on computational ability and willpower, and the influence of emotions like envy, guilt, and moral obligation on economic activity. Behavioral economists study precise mathematical models of how willpower and computational limits and emotions work, and use these models to make predictions about behavior both in the laboratory and in field data, and to suggest governmental policies which make people better off and suggest better ways of organizing exchange and corporate structures ("economic institutions"). George Loewenstein, Mathew Rabin and I recently edited a book of seminal recent readings, Advances in Behavioral Economics (Princeton Press, 2003). Our introductory chapter to the book is a good place to start learning about behavioral economics ("Behavioral economics: Past, present, future"). An article submitted to Journal of Economic Perspectives in May 2004 about how Adam Smith (of "invisible hand" fame) expressed many ideas which reappeared recently in behavioral economics is here.

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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:31:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

2、实验经济学

Experimental economics Until relatively recently (the 1970抯), economists thought of economic systems as being like astronomical systems of planets and stars梩hey could only be observed from afar, and not touched or created experimentally. But economic systems can be created in artificial laboratory environments and studied experimentally, as in most older sciences (physics, chemistry, and biology). In an economics experiment, the experimenter specifies 揺ndowments敆what agents start out with? the messages they send and choices they make, and how the messages and choices agents pick determines their economic outcomes. (Usually they are paid substantial sums according to their experimental performance, to be sure they are thinking carefully and acting like agents do in naturally-occurring economic interactions.) The experimenter does not determine how the experimental participants actually behave, because seeing what people do is the whole point of the experiment. (Usually we have one more competing theories about what is likely to happen; an experiment can tell us which of these various theories, which may all sound intuitive, is just wrong.) A good place to learn how to do experiments is from the books by Friedman and Sunder and Davis and Holt. A good place to learn what we found out from economics experiments through 1995 is the Handbook of Experimental Economics, and since then, from the Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (in press). Some of my early experiments concerned how people weigh the chance of winning (probability) and the amount they can win when they choose among risky gambles. (Economists use gambles over money as simple metaphors for risky economic activity like investing in education or assets, starting up a business, buying a house, and so on.) In the 1970抯 and 1980抯 many theories were proposed about how people weight probabilities and value outcomes differently than is proposed in 揺xpected utility theory? My experiments and analyses found that of the new theories that were proposed, prospect theory seems best able to explain patterns in experimental data. Those papers are:

"An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 1988, 61-104. (Reprinted in J. Hey and G. Loomes (Eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.) "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," with David Harless, Econometrica, 62, 1994, 1251-1290. (Reprinted in J.D. Hey (Ed.), The Economics of Uncertainty, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2000.) "Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probabilities," with Teck Ho, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, 1994, 167-196. People often note that most data evaluating theories of risky choice have been collected by offering subjects simple choices between simple monetary gambles in the lab. But, in fact, many of these models can also be used to understand labor supply, asset pricing, consumer choice, and gambling in field settings which matter for everyday life. Using prospect theory elements to explain interesting patterns in field data is discussed in my paper "Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field," (pp 288-300) in D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (Eds.), Choices, Values, and Frames, 2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. An exciting new development in experimentation is studying unusual, important special populations. A clever undergraduate, Stephanie Kovalchik, with a little coaching from me, John Allman, Dave Grether, and Charlie Plott, studied an amazing sample of 80-year olds and compared them to 20-year old students on a variety of judgment, bargaining, and game theory tasks. The older and younger folks are remarkably similar, except on how much they know about the world and how good their self-knowledge is (i.e., whether they know how much they know): The 80-year olds know more, and know when they don't know and when they do. (Is that a definition of wisdom?) Our paper is here; it's forthcoming (2003-4) in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Keith Weigelt and I did some early studies on experimental asset markets. In these experiments participants get a valuable asset, which will pay a cash dividend if they hold it at the end of a trading period. We study the prices at which people buy and sell the asset. In 1991 we published the first study on 搃nformation cascades?(which we called 搈irages?梟amely, is it possible for nobody in a market to have 搃nside information?about what an asset is worth, but for some traders to think that price movements mean other people have inside information, which creates a self-fulfilling kind of cascade or 揾erd behavior? The answer is Yes, cascades do occur. But they only occur early in the experiments when traders are inexperienced. After participants trade for a while, they learn to figure out whether other traders have inside information by whether the market is lively or quiet (if it抯 quiet, nobody wants to trade because nobody has inside information) and the cascades stop. That paper is: "Information Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets", with K. Weigelt, Journal of Business, 64, October 1991, 463-493. Keith and I also studied 損rice bubbles? If an asset lives a long time, like a share of stock or a house, prices can go up simply because people think they can sell at a higher price in the future. Financial economists have known about the theoretical possibility of such bubbles for decades, and there are many famous examples like the Dutch tulip bulb bubble in the 1600抯. But it is hard to establish when prices are really in a bubble because we never know the true value of a naturally-occurring asset. In the experiments we create the value of the asset and so we know what it should be worth (and we know that subjects know its 揻undamental value?too). In one experiment we observed many bubbles?in some cases the asset traded for five times its intrinsic value. That paper is "Convergence in Experimental Double Auctions for Stochastically Lived Assets," with K. Weigelt, in D. Friedman & J. Rust (Eds.), The Double Auction Market: Theories, Institutions and Experimental Evaluations, Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1993, 355-396. An early survey of ideas about bubbles and fads (well before the 搕ech stock?and Japanese stock bubbles!) is: "Bubbles and Fads in Asset Markets: A Review of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, 3, 1989, 3-38. (Reprinted in Italian in G. Vaciago and G. Verga (Eds.), La Teoria dei Mercati Finanziari, Italy, Societa Editrice II Mulino.) One of my current research projects, with Roberto Weber is about organizational culture. A culture is a set of values, rules for behaving (搃nstitutions?, and symbols and language. In our experiments subjects get a set of pictures which they must describe to each other, under time pressure, by creating a slang or code. Their code is an element of culture which we can create artificially, and quickly, in the lab and study. We wrote one paper (''Cultural conflict and merger failure: An experimental approach'') on this project and are doing more in 2003. Charlie Hornberger and John Lin developed nice "CultureX" software for studying code development using the kind of picture-naming Rob Weber and I used to study "corporate culture", which we are happy to share. Documentation is here. If you use it please give us feedback. Besides Caltech, there are many universities with labs in experimental economics. This brief list omits many important centers (please email me to correct omissions), but among the most active labs are: Amsterdam; Arizona; Harvard; University College London; Nottingham; Ohio State; Oxford; Pittsburgh;%20Technion; Texas; Texas A&M; Trento; UCLA; Wisconsin; and Zurich.
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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:32:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

3、神经元经济学

Neuroeconomics What is neuroeconomics? Neuroeconomics is the use of data on brain processes to suggest new underpinnings for economic theories, which explain how much people save, why there are strikes, why the stock market fluctuates, the nature of consumer confidence and its effect on the economy, and so forth. Until recently, economists have always been content to treat the human brain as a "black box" and suggest mathematical equations which simplify what the brain is doing. Most empirical studies of economic behavior have therefore relied on measuring inputs, like prices, and predicting outputs, like how much people will buy, from a simplified theory of brain processes. This approach reflects a bias traceable to the 1880抯, when Jevons wrote 揑 hesitate it is impossible to measure the feelings of the human heart? This 搑ational choice?approach has been enormously successful. But now advances in genetics and brain imaging (and other techniques) have made it possible to observe detailed processes in the brain better than ever before. Brain scanning (ongoing at the new Broad Imaging Center at Caltech) shows which parts of the brain are active when people make economic decisions. This means that we will eventually be able to replace the simple mathematical ideas that have been used in economics with more neurally-detailed descriptions. For example, when economists think about gambling they assume that people combine the chance of winning (probability) with an expectation of how they will value winning and losing (搖tilities?. If this theory is correct, neuroeconomics will find two processes in the brain梠ne for guessing how likely one is to win and lose, and another for evaluating the hedonic pleasure and pain of winning and losing梐nd another brain region which combines probability and hedonic sensations. More likely, neuroeconomics will show that the desire or aversion to gamble is more complicated than that simple model. Research already shows that pathological gamblers tend to lack a certain gene which limits how much pleasure (in the form of the amount of 揹opamine?neurotransmitter that is released when they win) they get from winning. Not getting enough dopamine from everyday pleasures means gamblers need bigger and bigger 揻ixes?to feel stimulated. In our lab at Caltech, we are also investigating the 揻ear of the unknown?or 搕olerance for ambiguity敆how willing are people to gamble, invest, or take a social risk (like going to a party where they don抰 know anybody)? Our hunch is that fear of the unknown is triggered by activity in the 揳mygdala? an almond-shaped region (common to most mammals) which is active in registering very rapid sensations of fear, and in both learning and unlearning what to be afraid of. Understanding the neural basis of investing in the face of unknown odds is important for understanding economic phenomena like entrepreneurship, since entrepreneurs start businesses knowing little about their odds梩hey are economically fearless in a way that most people are not. Another example is discounting future rewards. The standard theory, which was invented in the 1950s, is that people apply a single declining 揹iscount factor?to future rewards when weighing present rewards against future ones. New theories suggest that there are *two* components to 搕ime discounting? not one: One component is the steady discounting of future rewards, and the second is a preference for immediate rewards. The second factor can explain why people struggle with temptations and procrastinate. Using fMRI imaging of brain activity when people choose between immediate and future rewards, we will be able to see whether there are two components of time discounting (as the new theories predict) or just one (as the old theories predict). If we find two components, we will know more about the nature of the preference for immediate reward. It may be an emotional desire, or even a physical instinct like grasping for food that is within your reach. The research could yield dramatic insights in helping people resist temptation, saving more and spending less. A third area we are actively exploring is trust. In a typical 搕rust game?one person has some money, say $10, which they can invest part of, keeping the rest. The amount they invest is tripled (representing the return to a productive investment, like investing in a factory in a rapidly-growing foreign country). But that tripled amount rests in the hands of a second person, or 搕rustee? who is free to repay as much as she likes and keep the rest. To make the game challenging and scientifically interesting, if the second trustee keeps all the money there is nothing the first person can do about it. (Economists call this 搘eak enforcement of property rights?which is often characteristic of less-developed economies with weaker legal systems.) This game enables us to measure loose concepts like trust and trustworthiness in a crisp numerical way. The amount the first person invests is a measure of how much she expects the trustee to repay her. The amount the trustee repays is a measure of trustworthiness, moral obligation, or reciprocity. Trust is important in the economy because even large, complex economies rely largely on trust every day. When you deposit a large sum in a bank ATM, or donate money to a charity assuming it will be spent on good causes, or invest in an overseas business partner you barely know, you are trusting that your money will be safe. Studies show that simple measures of trust, like asking people 揑n general, do you trust people??are highly correlated with how wealthy a society is. (The poorest countries, like many in Asia and Africa, have very low levels of trust, which reflects and tolerates corruption, prevents investment, and causes the most productive workers to emigrate.) So understanding trust in the brain may enable us to understand economic behavior from synapse to society. In early fMRI brain scanning, with collaborators at Baylor Medical Center, we have studied what goes on in peoples?brains when they trust and decide how much to repay. We found a surprising effect of gender. When men decide how much to trust or repay, an area called the 搈edial cingulate sulcus?is active. This is an area used to process potential reward, and calculate numbers. The male brains are just 揹oing the math?and turn off after they have made a decision. The female brains are quite different. After women have decided how much to repay, but before they know how their partner reacted to their decision, areas of the brain active in processing potential reward (ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum) and in regulating worry and error-detection (caudate nucleus) are active. The women are worrying, and thinking about the reward consequences, after they have decided how much to repay. The difference in brain activity in the two genders is like the kind of behavior you might see after a couple gets home from a potluck dinner and rehashes the event. The man wants to turn on the TV and catch some sports scores (his medial cingulate is turned off). The woman is more likely to rehash the evening抯 events, and worry about whether she said the right thing and whether the hostess was happy with the dish she brought, and whether plans for having lunch later in the week are genuine. Some other economists are working in this new area producing actual images of peoples' brains as they do economic tasks (like picking between gambles or bargaining), including John Dickhaut, George Loewenstein, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith , and Paul Zak. I am collaborating with a team at Baylor headed by Read Montague and with Caltech colleague Steve Quartz on studies of this sort. George, Drazen Prelec and I wrote an overview (''Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics'') about this emerging area. A New York Times column addresses this subject, and another New York Times article describes this exciting new field in more detail. A brief perspective on neuroscience and game theory from Science can be found here. A short paper on the promise of neuroeconomics (written for academic economists, but with some examples of general interest) is here. In a collaboration with neuroscientists at Baylor, Emory, and Princeton, we have created a 揾yperscan?consortium that enables linked fMRI scanners to create images of more than one brain at the same time. This is a breakthrough because many aspects of social behavior are not easily understood by looking at just one brain. Would you try to understand a bitter argument by only recording what one person said? Could you understand the ebb and flow of a tennis match by looking only at one player抯 shots (never turning your head)? Of course not. Hyperscanning enables us to see both sides of the equation ?or many sides of the equation, if many people are trading with each other in a marketplace. It sheds light on behaviors that are a property of shared social behavior. A disagreement in bargaining, for example, is a shared activity that can be best understood by seeing the joint activity in two brains at the same time. The two brains might both show simultaneous anger; or they might show that one person is calm and surprised that the other person is angry. A nice picture of two brains is shown here. An exciting conference in "neuromarketing", to be held April, 2004 is described here. An article from the Public Library of Science is here.

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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:33:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

4、行为博弈论

Behavioral game theory My specialty in the last few years has been "behavioral game theory", a subfield (or "franchise") of behavioral economics which uses experimental evidence to establish how psychological limits on the ability to make calculations and plan ahead, the way in which people react to fairness, and learning from experience, influence behavior in situations described by "game theory". Game theory is a mathematical analysis of any social situation in which one player梩ypically a person, but possibly a firm or nation梩ries to figure out what other players will do, and choose the best strategy given those guesses about others. Most game theory describes the fictional behavior of an ideal, hypercalculating, emotionless player (like Dr. Spock from Star Trek) and, as a result, is not always a good guide to how normal people who don't plan too far ahead will actually behave. My 2003 book Behavioral Game Theory describes hundreds of different experimental studies which show where game theory predicts well and predicts poorly, and suggests some new kinds of theory. Behavioral game theory gives precise predictions about how people who think only a couple of steps ahead, have both guilt and envy toward others, and learn from experience, are likely to behave (Bibliography for my book.) In work with Teck Ho, Kuan Chong and many talented collaborators, we have created some new theories for explaining how people actually think, learn and "teach" other players in games. Most of our work uses simple statistical theories which are rooted in some psychological principle, and sees how well these theories fit and predict many different types of experimental games. (We also see whether the theories have "economic value", in the sense that a player equipped with these theories, and doing their best assuming other players' behavior was predicted by the theories, could earn more money than the average player does. The answer is that they would.) Here are some of our papers:

"Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games." Includes 4 more data sets not in May 2002 version. Ho, Teck-Hua; Colin F. Camerer; and Juin-Kuan Chong. Nov. 2002. May 2002 version. Sophisticated EWA learning and strategic teaching in repeated games," with Teck-Hua Ho and Juin Kuan Chong. Journal of Economic Theory, May 2002, 104 (1), 137-188. "Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games," with Chris Anderson, Economic Theory, 2000, 16, 689-718. (Reprinted in Advances in Experimental Markets, T. Cason and C. Noussair (Eds.), Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2001, 209-238.) "Experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning in normal-form games," with Teck-Hua Ho, Econometrica, 67, July 1999, 827-874.
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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:38:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

5、场研究

Field studies: Cabs and basketball Most scientists specialize in either theorizing, looking for patterns in naturally-occurring data, or collecting their own data through surveys or experimentation. But theory, naturally-occurring data, and experimental data are complementary梕ach kind of exploration provokes questions which can be answered with the other kinds of data or theory. To this end, I've also done some studies with field data. Field studies are especially important because many of the phenomena behavioral economists have studied are established in the lab (where it is easier to clearly show that people are making a mistake); so it is crucial to explore whether these phenomena occur in field settings too, especially when people are more experienced and the stakes are high. For example, people are often sensitive to a "reference point" and dislike losing relative to the reference point or falling short of it. To test whether this sensitivity exists in the amount of labor some workers supply, we collected data on how many hours New York City cabdrivers choose to drive on different days, when their daily wage fluctuates (on rainy days, for example, everyone wants a cab, and on weekends in the summer the cab business is slow). The standard theory of labor supply assumes that drivers plan ahead and "intertemporally substitute"梩hey drive a lot on high-wage days and save up so they can quit early on low-wage days (they "make hay when the sun shines"). We found the opposite pattern: Inexperienced drivers act as if they set a daily income target and quit when they reach it. While this pattern seems like a good idea, it means they drive a lot on low-wage days (because it takes a lot of hours to reach their target) and quit too early on high-wage days. (They could have earned about 15% more if they switdhed their hours around and drove longer on high-wage days.) Experienced drivers, however, drive about the same number of days on good and bad days so they earn more than inexperienced drivers. The long version is "Labor supply of New York City cab drivers: One day at a time," with L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, May 1997, 407-441. A shorter version, published in the book Choices, Values and Frames, is here. A 2003 New York Times column mentions this research, and some follow-up studies, in the context of whether a tax cut will boost productivity. Another study explores whether sports bettors have a good sense of what a random lucky streak is. Psychologists showed that basketball players seem to have streak "hot hand" shooting, and are likely to hit one shot after they hit a couple in a row, but they actually do not. The hot hand just seems to exist because most people expect that a random series will reverse itself or "mean revert"; when it doesn't, they are surprised and come to believe that the sequence of data has momentum or "heat". We discovered that the basketball market makes the same mistake in setting the odds that different teams will win. The point spread on teams on losing streaks is too pessimistic (as if the bettors believe in a mythical "cold hand") and the point spread on teams with winning streaks is too optimistic. That paper is "Does the Basketball Market Believe in the 'Hot Hand'?" American Economic Review, 79, December 1989, 1257-1261. Roberto Weber and I became interested in a phenomenon called "escalation of commitment"梔o people who have sunk money in an investment that seems to be going badly sink even more money or do they cut their losses (treating their costs as "sunk")? Many psychologists have shown this pattern in laboratory studies, but there are almost no conclusive field studies. We replicated a creative study by Staw and Hoang looking at how often NBA basketball players who were picked high and low in the draft actually played. We found that players who were drafted high (a large investment because draft picks are valuable) tended to play more minutes, even controlling for actual performance. This means coaches梠r perhaps owners, or fans梩end to "throw good minutes after bad" and stick to players they had high hopes for even when it is clear their investment was a mistake. But the coaches gradually give up on underperforming draft picks after a couple of seasons. That paper is "The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation to commitment in NBA draft choices," with Roberto Weber, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999.

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闲人 发表于 2004-7-11 11:39:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

6、行为经济学的政策研究

Policy applications Since economic theories often have very clear implications for "welfare" (making society as a whole better off), economic analysis has been important in many aspects of guiding government policy. While most of my research tries to document basic facts about how people behave, and suggest theories which organize those facts, sometimes the facts and theories suggest policy ideas or brush up against policy debates. In 1999 I coauthored a National Research Council book with a dozen other people, Pathological Gambling (published by the National Academy of Sciences Press) about the impact of the explosion of gambling opportunities in the US on individuals, families, and communities. About 2% of people who gamble lose control over their gambling in ways that harm their personal and workplace relationships, and sometimes leads to white-collar crime. The main "finding" in our NRC book was that so little is known about pathological gambling that it is hard to guess what impact the rapid growth of gambling opportunities will have. (The economic analyses which suggest gambling is good for a community are also usually badly flawed梩hey don't add up all the "externalities" and also take a local view rather than a national or international one.) Internet gambling is particularly ominous because of the difficulties of monitoring teenage gambling, and of finding the proper legal jurisdiction for cyber-casinos which are located "offshore" (many are in the Caribbean, where regulation and legal reporting is casual) but which are accessed by people around the world. There is also a modest, but disturbing rise in pathological gambling among women, particularly in states where "video poker" and other sorts of private, nonsports gambling are increasingly common. (Women tend to gamble less on cards, dice and other games of "skill" compared to slot machines and lotteries.) I have also attended meetings of the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA), branches of the National Institute of Health, on how behavioral economics can inform the "disease" model of addiction, which guides much public policy toward drugs and alcohol. To an economist, it is surprising that drug policy is largely shaped by a consortium of physicians (who think it is important to investigate the biological bases of addiction桰 agree) and other interest groups, like the military (which inherited a lot of drug-interdiction efforts after the end of the Cold War), and the prison guards' lobby. My personal view is that there is too much spending on restricting supply (particularly for highly addictive drugs like heroin and cocaine) and much too little on basic research and rehabilitation. Prisons are expensive and rehab is cheap. While most rehabilitation leads to only modest rates of success at present (most addicts "relapse"), advances in genetics and other basic research are very promising for improving treatments dramatically梥o the science is worth doing a lot more of, and the economic payoff will probably be huge. A constant question policymakers ask is whether the limits on rationality and willpower we discover in behavioral economics justify policies which are "paternalistic"梩hat is, which seek to limit the choices people have on the grounds that people won't always choose what is good for them. As a Chicago-trained economist, I am not eager to see much broad paternalism without doing more research. At the same time, paternalism is part of the fabric of policy in many ongoing ways桽ocial Security is a kind of "forced saving", minors are prohibited (at least in law) from buying cigarettes and alcohol, people with mental illness have restricted choices, many transfers to the poor are earmarked for certain spending categories (housing, food stamps) rather than given as cash, and so forth. In our Penn Law Review paper, Regulation for conservatives: Behavioral economics and the case for "asymmetric paternalism'', Sam Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, Mathew Rabin and I argued for a middle ground you might call "conservative paternalism" (we called it "asymmetric paternalism" in our paper). Conservative paternalism is a set of policies which may help a few people who make judgment mistakes a lot, and impose very little harm on people who behave rationally. Examples include informed consent, disclosing information which profit-motivated firms may not disclose voluntarily (such as nutritional content of food or drug efficacy), mandatory waiting periods (which exist for marriage and divorce), and "cooling-off" laws which allow consumers to break contracts for purchase of certain consumer goods. The Boston Federal Reserve Bank devoted its annual conference in 2003 to behavioral economics, see here.

面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!

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一刹春 发表于 2004-7-11 13:57:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

浏览了一下Camerer的简介,确实有点奇怪。

18岁本科毕业,20岁MBA,22岁博士,似乎是百年不遇的神童,岂料从获得教职到晋升正教授却花了整整10年,又沦为经济学家的一般水平;

从81-04的23年间,在JEP、QJE、AER、Etrica、JPE上发文17篇,加上JET、JEBO、GEB、EER这些准一流杂志,共计24篇,年均一篇,还算不错;不过细看之下,在努力为终身教职拼搏的81-91这十年间,竟只发表了4篇,倒是当上正教授后,从91-04的十三年里,发表了20篇。

再参考其著书、获奖及各种头衔、受邀等情况,也多是在获得正教授职位以后。

由此可见,Camerer的学术经历是行为经济学从上世纪90年代开始的发迹史的一个写照。

与其平淡地活着,不如用死亡搏一次无法遗忘的传说。

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