Bidding for Incomplete Contracts_ An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs-AER-201404【对不完全契约的报价:一种对适应成本的实证研究(AER论文,2014年第4期,非working paper)】
Abstract
Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes
that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts
we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation
costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically
to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are
an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model
compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation
costs account for 7.5–14 percent of the winning bid. Markups
from private information and market power, the focus of much of the
auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications
for government procurement are discussed.