tag 标签: Fresh经管大学堂：名校名师名课

相关帖子

 版块 作者 回复/查看 最后发表
Advanced Planning in Fresh Food Industries Integrating Shelf Life（首发） attach_img 运营管理（物流与供应链管理） Toyotomi 2013-1-8 5 1790 潭生.经济学笔记 2014-12-8 16:16:43
悬赏 A fresh meat almost ideal demand system incorporating negative TV press and - [!reward_solved!] attachment 求助成功区 kuailemyt 2013-5-11 1 1061 Toyotomi 2013-5-11 11:08:41
新人报道， 冲着spss来的 新手入门区 2437671991 2013-5-9 2 917 2437671991 2013-5-9 17:30:42
悬赏 求该段翻译啊！！！ - [!reward_solved!] 真实世界经济学(含财经时事) bengdi1986 2012-3-5 4 1075 dq19871223 2012-3-5 20:56:36
埃森哲经典文献行业深度研究报告Fresh_Fruit__Vegetables_in_China_2009_A_Market attachment 市场营销 lhs123 2010-11-15 3 2220 armchannel 2011-5-20 13:36:20
Fresh & Processed Fish & Seafood in China 2010 attachment 行业分析报告 longwilliam 2010-4-29 5 1727 hillown 2010-6-17 14:28:33
Merrill Lynch - China Economics Update-02052010 --Fresh from Oven attachment 金融学（理论版） yulijie0124 2010-5-3 1 1398 fallenangee 2010-5-3 18:00:42
[Access Asia] Fresh Fruit & Vegetables in China 2009 attachment 金融学（理论版） city_o2 2009-6-28 0 1501 city_o2 2009-6-28 22:35:04
更多...

相关日志

分享 What Do High Yield Bonds Know That No One Else Does?
insight 2012-10-27 16:16
What Do High Yield Bonds Know That No One Else Does? Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/26/2012 14:20 -0400 Barclays Bond CDS High Yield Wizened old market participants are often heard mumbling into their cups of green tea that "credit anticipates, and equity confirms" and so it is once again that the credit markets - fresh from the exuberance of endless technical flows, CLOs, and PIK-Toggles - has made a rather abrupt U-Turn in recent weeks. As Barclays points out, the ratio of High-Yield bond spreads to Investment-Grade bond spreads is its highest in three years as IG has been dragged lower by QEtc's impact on MBS and rotation up the spread spectrum. Typically, this kind of push would mean high-beta credit would outperform but far from it as cash bond markets have gapped out very recently. With call constraints (thanks to ZIRP) on high-yield bonds, the extreme price dislocation (given HY's inability to rally 'enough') will likely drag IG credit out - and that is a very crowded trade. Just one more unintended consequence from the Fed. HY bond spreads are pricing in considerably more pain than IG bond spreads - what do they know? CDS markets are not moving as much - having short-squeezed recently and just reracking with stocks. Bonds - real money accounts - are in trouble here...if this differential remains... but it seems that the crap-end of the credit quality spectrum remains active with new issuance. Average: 5 Your rating: None Average: 5 ( 4 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 9255 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: CDS Market Begins Trading Imaginary Credit With LIBOR-Style Fixings 8 Ways Of Looking At A High Yield Bond Selloff What Does High Yield Credit Know That Stocks Don't? Why The High-Yield Market Won't See A Performance-Chasing Rally Dow Closes At Highest Since 2007 As High Yield Outperforms
33 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Forget Class-Warfare; It's Age-Warfare We Should Worry About
insight 2012-10-11 17:16
Forget Class-Warfare; It's Age-Warfare We Should Worry About Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/10/2012 13:52 -0400 Demographics Savings Rate As class-warfare implicitly breaks out - trumpeted by our political leaders - it seems that there is another, much more relevant, trend that is occurring that strikes at the heart of our nation. With Friday's jobs number still fresh in our minds, Citi's Steve Englander takes a look at one small slice of the demographics subject and found a rather concerning and little discussed fact. Employment-to-population ratios among older individuals have gone up in recent years, in contrast to the so-called prime-aged 25-54 cohort, where employment-to-population is much lower than earlier . It seems the real divide in this nation is not between rich and poor but old and young - as the 55-plus (and even more 65-plus) are forced to stay in the workplace as retirement remains a dream (thanks to ZIRP and Keynesianism's excess crises from boom-to-bust leave median wealth well down - even if the rich are 'ok'). Via Steve Englander of CitiFX, Figure 1 shows the percentage point change in the employment to population for the three age groups since 2007. One characteristic which is striking is that the employment-to-population ratios for older people based very quickly after the financial crisis hit . In fact, it barely moved in 2007-09 among the 55+ age group. The trend in the 25-54 age group is more sideways than up so far. (As a side comment, it suggests that the drop in the overall employment-to-population probably has a modest demographic component since the lower participation rate of the elderly is being offset by the additional jobs they are finding.) It is hard to tell what is driving this upturn in older worker participation. We suspect it is a combination of: pure demographics – older people are healthier than in the past; structural retirement issues – it is hard to retire at 65 (or younger) and beyond 80 when the gross national savings rate averages around 15% and the net national savings rate around 3% (and negative since Q4 2008!); the wealth effect – even if QE3 has propped up asset prices, personal wealth is still far off where it was at the beginning of 2008. For the USD the increase in older people’s employment is probably a modest positive rather than a negative. Compare two situations: a) early retirement and consumption out of wealth and; b) later retirement and consumption out of production rather than wealth. The imbalance between national consumption and production (often called absorption) is lower in the second case than the first. If the trend to spend out of income rather than wealth continues, the US current account balance would tend to fall. That said, the actual USD impact thus far is probably modest since the actual shifts are small. A sharper increase in participation rates among the elderly could contribute a stronger USD effect . The second conclusion is that this may be another avenue by which QE weakens the USD . A big positive impact of QE is via the wealth affect because QE forces lower the discount factor that is applied to any stream of returns. If this pure wealth effect supports consumption because individuals who feel richer consume a portion of their wealth, we have exactly the opposite effect – more consumption but no additional production. This would increase external funding needs . Once could also argue that the lowering interest rates also discourages the inflow of capital, so successful QE will very likely be a USD negative, even if the weaker USD is not the explicit intention of the Fed. (As a last concern, there is the dependence of this wealth on a low discount factor rather than faster topline growth, but we will leave this aside for now.) Average: 3.666665 Your rating: None Average: 3.7 ( 3 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 10410 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: America's Demographic Cliff: The Real Issue In The Coming, And All Future Presidential Elections Two Reasons Why the Global Economy Will Slow and Government Promises to Retirees Will be Broken Guest Post: The Chart Of The Decade The twin lost decades in housing and stocks The US Labor Market Is In A Full-Blown Depression
18 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Diagnosing Liquidity Addiction
insight 2012-6-25 16:11
Diagnosing Liquidity Addiction Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/22/2012 08:47 -0400 Central Banks Commercial Paper CRB CRB Index default Deutsche Bank Gross Domestic Product Lehman Market Crash Nominal GDP Primary Dealer Credit Facility recovery Over the last few weeks markets have recovered from the significant stresses that were building towards the end of May (until yesterday's slow realization). The recovery has been in no small part due to expectations of intervention and that fresh rounds of QE and their equivalents will soon be implemented around the developed world. Deutsche Bank believes that markets are now addicted to stimulus and can’t function properly without it as they show that the periods between central bank balance sheet activity have actually been fairly poor/average periods for risk assets over the last three years. There is little evidence yet to suggest that markets in this post crisis world have the ability to prosper in a period without heavy intervention, though empirically asset prices benefit from liquidity but that the environment remains fragile enough for them to struggle to maintain their levels when the liquidity stops. Finally, they note that while QE in the US was partly implemented to bring long-term yields down to encourage investors into riskier assets and help lower borrowing/funding rates, the evidence is actually contrary to this. Critically, they agree with us that the structural problems the West faces mean that QE and its equivalents and refinements will likely need to be around for several years to come to ensure that the financial system and its economies don’t relapse into a depressionary tail-spin. There is no evidence that we are currently close to being able to wean ourselves off our liquidity addiction. The hope would be that with further injections we can prevent the worst case scenario but the base case remains for the stress and intervention cycle repeating itself as far as the eye can see. Central banks still have much to do. Deutsche Bank: A World Addicted To Liquidity Risk assets before, during and after monetary stimulus in the US Here we focus on the performance of risk assets through QE1 and QE2 as well as through Operation Twist. For each program we look not just at the actual announcement dates and program start and finish dates but also the date when it might be argued that further stimulus started to be priced in. Below in Figure 1 we provide a brief description for each of the three programs along with the relevant dates and explanations for those dates. The Fed’s balance sheet In Figure 2, we first take a look at the Fed’s balance sheet growth since the crisis started. The shaded areas highlight the three phases of monetary stimulus that have taken place and we have split each of them into three sections, as described below. The period where we have argued that QE/stimulus started to be expected until it was actually announced. The period from the announcement date to the actual start date. The period from the start date to the end date. The first major step change occurred in the weeks immediately after the Lehman default where the Fed looked to provide short-term funding to the market as interbank lending ground to a halt. These facilities included the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Term Auction Facility, the foreign-exchange swaps with other central banks, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility and the various money market support facilities. After that, the two rounds of QE did see the balance sheet increase by several hundred Billion Dollars. However since QE2 officially ended on June 30th 2011 the Fed’s balance sheet has been broadly static which is understandable given that Operation Twist simply extends the duration of their balance sheet rather than increasing it. Equities and credit performance In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we look at the performance of equities and credit through each of the three distinct monetary stimulus programs. Highlighting these phases of stimulus as described above. The take away from all three programs is that both credit and equities definitely seemed to benefit from the stimulus as in general risk assets had been quite weak leading up to the stimulus before generally performing through much of the stimulus period. It’s also probably worth noting that the magnitude of the performance seems to have diminished with each round of QE/stimulus . Of perhaps more interest is that since QE2 ended almost exactly a year ago, the SP 500 has essentially been flat. One would have to say that balance sheet expansion has been more risk positive than simply Twisting. Commodities – Benefitting from balance sheet expansion but not from Twist? The story for commodities is fairly interesting. As we can see in Figure 5, focusing on the CRB index, commodities certainly seemed to benefit from the liquidity boost provided by both QE1 and QE2. It’s also interesting to note towards the end of both QE1 and QE2 commodities started to weaken quite aggressively perhaps indicating their correlation to actual injections of liquidity. Indeed the period around Operation Twist has seen the CRB index fall by around 20%. Perhaps this is not entirely surprising. If our hypothesis about liquidity being the main reason for the rally during QE1 and QE2 then the fact that Operation Twist didn’t actually add any more liquidity could be a key reason for the lack of positive momentum for commodities . Treasuries – A confusing picture With regards to 10 year Treasuries the picture is slightly more confusing. The original broad intention of QE was to bring down yields to encourage money into riskier assets and investments. Figure 6 shows that QE1 actually saw yields rise sharply from around 2% as speculation of QE started to 2.5% on the announcement to 4% as the first round ended. This perhaps shows that the market believed that QE was very positive for the economy which outweighed the reduction of supply of Treasuries in the market place . Like with QE1, QE2 actually sent yields higher again to around 3.75% within 6 months as hope again prevailed that QE could restore health to the economy . However the data turned in early 2011 and yields fell back to around 3% by the time QE2 ended. Immediately after QE2 ended we then saw 10 year yields rally to below 1.65% in less than 3 months which repeated the extreme rally seen after QE1 ended. This is pretty much where yields are today as Operation Twist hasn’t had any lasting impact on yields. So overall, although QE was supposed to lower yields, the two largest rallies of the last 3 years have occurred in the period between QE1 and QE2 and then the period between QE2 and Operation Twist. The US economy before, during and after monetary stimulus We now turn our attention to how the US economy has reacted to the various stimulus programs. In order to have a fairly timely indicator of economic activity we have used the ISM manufacturing PMI, showing its progression through the various stages of QE. Focusing initially on QE1 we can see that the US economy saw a strong recovery based on the ISM as it rose from below 35 to around the 60 level. Where QE1 was very successful was that it pulled the economy out of a potential depressionary tailspin. For both QE2 and Operation Twist although the ISM has remained above the important 50 level throughout we have not seen the same kind of improvement in the PMI. In fact during QE2 it actually fell from around 60 to the low 50s where it broadly stands today. Indeed if we look back through history this recovery is one of the weakest on record in spite of all the Fed actions, plus the three largest peacetime deficits in the US on record. Figure 8 reminds us that only the recovery of 1927 (that ran into the 1929 stock market crash) has been weaker than this one in Nominal GDP terms. This probably tells us that a) the structural problems that encouraged QE were much larger than most believed at the time and b) that QE has limited power to actually power growth forward in such an environment. With regards to the European economy, it’s also interesting that the PMIs did pick up over the period of the LTROs before falling again immediately after their completion. Europe more than anyone is perhaps addicted and in need of constant intervention to prosper. Average: 4.857145 Your rating: None Average: 4.9 ( 7 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 6317 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: San Fran Fed Defends QE2 By Comparing It To Gold Scramble Prevention Contraption "Operation Twist" BofA's Jeffrey Rosenberg Blasts QE2, Says It Will Lead To Bubbles And Further Confidence Destruction Why QE2 + QE Lite Mean The Fed Will Purchase Almost $3 Trillion In Treasurys And Set The Stage For The Monetary Endgame Rosenberg Joins Chorus Of Those Accusing Bernanke Of Asset (Read Stock) Price Targeting Hilsenrath Speaks: "Fed Prepares To Act"
32 次阅读|0 个评论
更多...

京ICP备16021002号-2 京B2-20170662号 京公网安备 11010802022788号 论坛法律顾问：王进律师 知识产权保护声明   免责及隐私声明

GMT+8, 2025-12-29 05:42