楼主: 杨振伟
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转:英报: “大趋同”使东西方面临同一难题 [推广有奖]

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楼主
杨振伟 发表于 2011-1-22 20:03:20 |AI写论文

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  前言:这是一篇我仅见的新闻,有着很强的洞察力,已经部分的揭示了人类发展的真谛,虽然还不是很全面,但也很令人震惊,因为根据经济学研究这么多年的感受,所有这一切只有通过一系列的经济学方程才能看的更加清楚,一个研究者能够抛开这些而且能够感悟这么多,真的很令人佩服。



文章认为,“大趋同”是一场划时代的变革。它是一个向人类大多数普及能源充足型经济模式的过程。然而,如果处理不好由此造成的资源压力,“大趋同”之势就可能悲惨收局。如果处理不好权力转换问题,“大趋同”之势则可能以战争的形式告终
    英国《金融时报》网站1月12日文章 原题:东西方在一个问题上趋同(作者该报首席经济评论员马丁·沃尔夫)
    “大趋同”之势如何在21世纪塑造这个世界呢?在解答这个宏大的问题时,我幸好有个向导:斯坦福大学的伊安·莫里斯教授。莫里斯在一部探究1.6万年人类历史的杰作中对我们当前的状况,我们如何发展至今以及我们去向何方进行了精辟分析。
    据莫里斯教授说,推动社会发展的是那些“贪婪、慵懒和心怀恐惧的人”,“他们会根据自身意愿在安逸自在、尽量少工作和安全这三者之间寻求平衡”。人类很聪明,且具有高度的社会性,于是便发明了许多技术,还制定了许多制度,目的就是实现这些目标。但人类群体能实现何种成就则取决于地理因素。
    东西方互相赶超
    此外,莫里斯教授对两极文明的发展的描述也十分引人入胜。这两极就是“西方”和“东方”。西方文明起源于在如今的中东地区的所谓“新月沃土”发生的农业革命;东方文明则起源于在当今中国版图内发生的一场独立的革命。莫里斯的结论是,在西罗马帝国灭亡前,西方略微领先东方,而此后直至18世纪,西方落在了东方的后面,此后则又赶超了东方。东方利用“后发优势”———这是一个反复出现的主题———表明,21世纪将再次出现逆转。
    对莫里斯教授而言,“社会发展”是一个由四个因素组成的混合体:能源使用、城市化进程、军事实力和信息技术。第一个因素是最根本的:获取能源是生存的必要条件;社会越复杂、越发达,其获取的能源也就越多。由此看来,反映过去200年发展的代名词不应是“工业革命”,而应是能源革命。能源和思想正可谓是我们人类文明的两大基石。
    莫里斯教授对社会发展和“能源获取”的分析结果十分相符。此外,我们还可以看出三点。第一,公元1700年时,西方获取的能源与公元100年时是持平的,而中国已在12世纪达到了进入近代史前的巅峰水平。第二,过去200年里,能源获取和社会发展呈爆炸式增长。第三,东方的能源消耗增长速度极快。
    大趋同影响深远
    经合组织发展中心分析指出,趋同之势改变着全球资源供需平衡。近来金属和能源实际价格的上涨便是明证。国际能源机构指出,截至2035年,全球初级能源需求量还会增加50%。如果不在能源生产强度方面进行大的调整,以下就是我们看到的经济趋同之势将带来的必然结果:如果所有人都像今天的富国那样消耗能源,商业能源消耗量届时将达到当前规模的三倍之多。
    正如经合组织所指出的那样,趋同之势对经济造成的影响远不止于此。随着中国、印度和原苏联国家加入世界经济一体化进程,上述国家的劳动力大军使全球开放型经济体劳动力总人数翻了一番。这必然会给低技能人群的相对工资造成负面影响。中国和印度的发展直接惠及资源出口国和劳动密集型产品的购买者。作为资源出口国,资源大国一直都是大赢家,虽然它们会面临去工业化的风险。而作为劳动密集型产品的购买者,富国消费者也是大赢家。此外,更出人意料的一个后果是,预期储蓄增速高于投资增速,由此造成了“储蓄过剩”的局面,并对实际利率构成了下行压力。
    这些影响关系重大,但确实也至少反映出“正和”的发展:经济不断繁荣,机会也越来越多。而最严重的挑战出自更有可能出现“零和”结果的领域。资源和政权便是明显的例子。东方必定会在崛起过程中改变全球力量平衡和廉价资源充足的局面。
    资源限制挑战大
    公元1800年以前,事实证明,资源通常是具有约束性的限制因素。而在21世纪,最主要的问题可能是,事实是否会再次证明,资源会是个限制因素。人类的聪明才智是否还能解决资源稀缺的问题?如果答案是肯定的,所有人也许最终得享当今幸运儿所享受的史无前例的生活方式。而如果答案是否定的,我们就可能沦为莫里斯教授所说的“天启五骑士”———即气候变化、饥荒、国家破产、移民和疾病———的牺牲品。
    大国政治亦是如此。我们而今具备了摧毁文明的能力,大国关系由此变得十分危险。艾伯特·爱因斯坦在人类使用原子弹后指出,“唯有建立世界**才能拯救文明和人类”。世人斥其幼稚可笑,但他的这番话可能仍是正确的。
    “大趋同”是一场划时代的变革。它是一个向人类大多数普及能源充足型经济模式的过程。然而,如果我们处理不好由此造成的资源压力,“大趋同”之势就可能悲惨收局。如果我们处理不好权力转换问题,“大趋同”之势则可能以战争的形式告终。莫里斯教授最乐观的一个观点是,每个时代都会形成时代所需的思想。鉴于当前变革速度如此之快,如今这个时代所需要的思想会及时出现吗?
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关键词:大趋同 东西方 经济一体化进程 马丁·沃尔夫 劳动密集型 难题 东西方 趋同

经济理论必须像自然科学那样严谨,才称得上科学。[/img]

沙发
kangarro 发表于 2011-1-22 20:43:24
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f590e ... .html#axzz1BldzsxmN

Please respect FT.com's ts&cs and copyright policy which allow you to: share links; copy content for personal use; & redistribute limited extracts. Email ftsales.support@ft.com to buy additional rights or use this link to reference the article - http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f590e ... .html#ixzz1BlePwrtE

East and west converge on a problem

By Martin Wolf
Published: January 11 2011 23:38 | Last updated: January 11 2011 23:38


How is the “great convergence” – the topic of last week’s column – going to shape the world in the 21st century? Happily, in tackling this huge question, I have a guide: Ian Morris of Stanford, who has written a brilliant analysis of where we are, how we got here and where we might be going in a book that covers 16,000 years of human history.*

EDITOR’S CHOICE
Wolf: US will win global currency battle - Oct-12

More from Martin Wolf - Sep-02

Martin Wolf’s Exchange - Sep-02

Economists’ Forum - Oct-01

According to Professor Morris, social development is driven by “greedy, lazy, frightened people” who “seek their own preferred balance among being comfortable, working as little as possible, and being safe”. Since human beings are clever and highly social, they invent technologies and create institutions to achieve these aims. Yet what any group of human beings is able to achieve is determined by geography. The impact of a given geography also changes: 1,000 years ago, the oceans were a barrier; 500 years ago, they were a highway.

Prof Morris also provides a fascinating account of the progress of two poles of civilisation. These are the “west”, the civilisations that descended from the agricultural revolution in the so-called “fertile crescent” in today’s Middle East, and the “east”, the civilisations that descended from an independent revolution in a part of what is now China. His conclusion is that the west was somewhat more advanced than the east until the fall of the western Roman empire, behind it from then until the 18th century, and then ahead. Eastern exploitation of the “advantages of backwardness”, a recurring theme, suggests another reversal in the 21st century.

Martin Wolf’s Exchange

Martin Wolf elicits readers’ views on current economic issues

For Prof Morris, “social development” is an amalgam of four factors: energy use; urbanisation; military capacity; and information technology. The first is fundamental: the capture of energy is a necessary condition for existence; the more complex and advanced the society the more energy it captures. This is why “industrial revolution” is a misnomer for what happened two centuries ago. It was an energy revolution: we learnt how to exploit fossilised sunlight. Energy and ideas are the twin bases of our civilisation.

Prof Morris’s measures of social development and “energy capture” closely coincide with each other (see charts). We can notice three other things. First, western energy capture was the same in 1700 of the common era as it had been in 100, while China’s reached its pre-modern apogee in the 12th century. Second, energy capture and social development have exploded over the past two centuries. Finally, the east’s use has been rising very rapidly.

An analysis, from the development centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, argues that convergence has been changing the global balance of supply and demand for resources.** This is shown in recent rises in the real prices of metals and energy. The International Energy Agency points out that global primary energy demand could rise by another 50 per cent by 2035. Without a big change in the energy intensity of production, that is what the economic convergence we see has to mean: if all of humanity used the same energy per head as the rich countries do today, consumption of commercial energy would be three times what it is now (see charts).



As the OECD notes, the economic impact of convergence is broader than just this. The integration into the world economy of the labour supplies of China, India and the former Soviet Union doubled the number of people working in open economies. That must have had a downward impact on the relative wages of low-skill people, though the evidence contradicts the widespread belief that this has been a principal driver of rising inequality in rich countries. The growth of China and India has directly helped exporters of resources and purchasers of labour-intensive products. Resource-rich countries have been big winners from the first of these effects, though they face risks of de-industrialisation. Consumers in rich countries are the big winners from the second. In addition, among one of the more surprising consequences has been that desired savings have risen faster than investment, so generating the “savings glut” and downward pressure on real rates of interest.

Important though these effects are, they do at least reflect positive-sum developments: rising prosperity and widening opportunity. The biggest challenges arise where zero-sum outcomes are more likely. Resources are a big example. Political power is another. A rising east must alter the balance of global power and the abundance of cheap resources.

On the latter, it is an irony of intellectual history that Thomas Malthus, prophet of overpopulation, worried about the lack of resources just as these pessimistic assumptions became untrue. The biggest question of the 21st century may be whether resources prove to be binding constraints once again, as they so often proved to be, prior to 1800. Will ingenuity continue to overcome scarcity, or not? If the answer is “yes”, all of humanity might come to enjoy the historically unprecedented lifestyles of today’s most favoured people. If the answer is “no”, we might, instead, fall prey to what Prof Morris calls the “five horsemen of the apocalypse” – climate change, famine, state failure, migration and disease. Moreover, even if these problems are soluble, it may take a far higher level of political co-operation than is available to do so. This is particularly true where economic growth creates global externalities, climate change being the biggest challenge of this kind. This is not being managed. Political developments lag today’s reality.

The same is true of power politics. Now that we have the capacity to destroy civilisation, relations among powerful states have become perilous. After the use of the atomic bomb, Albert Einstein argued that “the only salvation for civilisation and the human race lies in the creation of world government”. Einstein was condemned as naive but his comment might still be true.

The “great convergence” is an epoch-making transformation. It is the spread of the energy-abundant economy to much of humanity. But if we do not manage the consequent pressure on resources, it may end in misery; and if we do not manage the shifts in power, it may end in war. One of Prof Morris’s most optimistic views is that each age gets the thought it needs. Given the speed of change, will it come soon enough?

藤椅
kangarro 发表于 2011-1-22 20:46:46
http://finance.sina.com/gb/wsj-f ... 109/1430208485.html
全球大分流还是大趋同?       
2011年01月09日 14:30       
转寄给朋友
列印


  收入趋同而增长趋异——这正是当前时代的经济现实。我们正在见证19世纪及20世纪初收入分化时代的逆转。在那个时代,相对于其它地区的人们,西欧及其最成功的前殖民地的人们实现了巨大的经济优势。如今,这种优势逆转的速度比出现时更快。这种情况无可避免,也是可取的。但它也为全球带来了巨大的挑战。

  位于尔湾的美国加州大学(University of California)的彭慕兰(Kenneth Pomeranz)在一本颇具影响力的书中,提到了中国和西方之间的“大分流”(“great divergence”)*。他指出,这些分流出现在18世纪末和19世纪。这种说法存在争议:已故的统计研究大师安格斯 麦迪森(Angus Maddison)辩称,到1820年,英国和美国的人均产出已分别是中国的三倍和两倍(见图表)。然而,随后的差距无疑要大得多。到了20世纪中叶,以购买力平价衡量,中国和印度的实际人均收入分别降至美国的5%和7%。此外,这种情况直到1980年都没有什么变化。



  曾经是全球科技中心的这些国家已远远落在了后面。如今,这种分化正在逆转。这无疑是当今世界最重要的一个事实。

  根据麦迪森的数据,1980年至2008年间,中国与美国的人均产值之比从6%升至22%,而印度与美国的比值则从5%升至10%。根据大企业联合会(Conference Board)“经济数据总库”的数据(估算基础略有不同),从上世纪70年代末到2009年,中国与美国的人均产值之比从3%升至19%,印度则从3%升至7%。这些对比不那么稳定,但相对改变的方向则是明确的。

  在二战结束后的年代里,西方发达经济体生产率的迅速趋同并非没有先例。日本一马当先,紧随其后的是韩国和东亚三小龙——香港、新加坡和台湾。日本在19世纪就已开始了工业化进程,并取得了显著成功。在二战战败后,日本重新起步时的人均产值只有美国的五分之一左右(大约相当于中国目前的水平),而上世纪70年初则达到了70%。在日本泡沫经济破灭的1990年,这一比例达到了近90%的峰值水平,随后再度下降。韩国在上世纪60年代中期开始起步时,人均产值是美国的10%,而在1997年则达到了50%,2009年为64%。

  这一次,前所未有的并非趋同性,而在于规模。假若中国遵循日本上世纪五、六十年代的发展路径,那它仍将有20年的高速增长,到2030年,人均产值将达到美国的70%左右。到那时,按购买力评价计算,中国的经济规模将接近美国的三倍,超过美国和西欧的总和。印度则落后得更远一些。按照最近的增长率,到2030年,印度经济规模将达到美国的80%左右,但其人均GDP仍将不足美国的五分之一。

  相对于美国当时的水平,中国目前相当于1950年的日本。但以绝对值计算,其人均产值则要高得多,因为美国经济自身增长了三倍。今天,中国实际人均GDP大约相当于日本上世纪60年代中期的水平,相当于韩国上世纪80年代中期的水平。印度目前相当于日本上世纪50年代和韩国上世纪70年代初的水平。

  简言之,目前成功的新兴经济体与高收入经济体之间增长率的分化,反映了它们之间的收入趋同速度。这种增长的分化令人吃惊。美联储(Fed)主席本 伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在去年11月份的一次重要演讲中指出,在2010年第二季度,新兴经济体实际总产值比2005年年初增长41%。中国增长了70%,而印度增长了55%左右。但在发达经济体,实际产值仅增长了5%。对新兴经济体而言,“大衰退”转瞬即逝;而对高收入国家而言,则是一场灾难。

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