摘要翻译:
当信息只能缓慢产生时,最佳说服的价值和形式是什么?我们在一个动态模型中研究这个问题,在这个模型中,一个“发送者”在一个渐进的约束下随时间提供公共信息,一个决策者在每个阶段采取一个行动。利用一个新的“粘性”动态规划原理,我们刻画了发送者的平衡值函数和信息提供。我们发现渐进性约束抑制了相对于无约束说服的信息提供。差距可能很大,但随着约束的放松,差距会缩小。与不受约束的说服相反,即使玩家有一致的偏好但不同的先前信念,也可能提供不完全的信息。
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英文标题:
《Slow persuasion》
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作者:
Matteo Escud\'e, Ludvig Sinander
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最新提交年份:
2021
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel 'viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.09055