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摘要翻译：
我们考虑了一个具有两个战略变量的部分非对称三人零和博弈。两个玩家（A和B）有相同的支付函数，而玩家C没有。两个策略变量是$T_I$'s和$S_I$'s,用于$I=A、B、C$。我们将主要展示以下结果。1.所有玩家选择$T_I$'s时的均衡，相当于玩家A、B选择$T_I$'s而玩家C选择$S_C$作为策略变量时的均衡。2.所有玩家选择$S_I$'s时的均衡，相当于玩家A、B选择$S_I$'s而玩家C选择$T_C$作为策略变量时的均衡。当所有参与者都选择$T_I$'s时的均衡和当所有参与者都选择$S_I$'s时的均衡是不等价的，尽管它们在一个对称博弈中是等价的，其中所有参与者都有相同的支付函数。
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英文标题：
《Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game
with two strategic variables》
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作者：
Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$. Mainly we will show the following results. 1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $t_i$'s and Player C chooses $s_C$ as their strategic variables. 2. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $s_i$'s and Player C chooses $t_C$ as their strategic variables. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s and the equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$'s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all players have the same payoff functions.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.02465
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