林毅夫 艾普瓦·桑吉：灾难经济学

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尽管目前有许多让人沮丧的经济信息，但如果我们以为事情已经到了不可能变得更坏的地步，那这个月残酷地提醒我们，没有哪个国家可以免于自然力量所带来的破坏。两年前，即2010年1月20日，海地受到地震袭击，造成22万多人丧生，也损害了国家的经济发展前景。

　　这听起来可能有点奇怪，不过，传统中医的确可以教导我们不少应对灾难的道理——特别是防范胜于治疗这一点。按照这一观点，要降低自然灾难风险，最好的办法是专注于预防。

　　根据世界银行和联合国最近发表的《自然风险和非自然灾难：有效预防的经济学》（Natural Hazards，UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention）报告，和事后补救比起来，事前预防可以事半功倍。正确的预防肯定有利无弊，而这意味着需要正确的激励。

　　所有层面的激励——国际、ZF及个人层面——都能在预防自然风险演变为灾难上扮演重要角色。主要纾困和发展慈善组织泪水基金会（Tearfund）一份关于莫桑比克（Mozambique）的报告便是有力的例子。莫桑比克于2000年要求援助国提供200-400万美元，帮助它为即将来临的洪水做好抗洪准备。援助国只提供了这数目的一半。结果，洪水发生后，光是救灾就花费了援助国超过1亿美元。此外，它们还承诺逾4.5亿美元的复苏和重建援助金。

　　援助国以什么管道提供援助是很重要的。预防方面的投资通常意味着长期发展支出。援助国可以明确指定发展援助必须用在与预防有关的项目——这和主要用于立刻作出反应和纾困的人道主义援助不同。

　　但责任也不全在援助国身上。通过提供清楚了解威胁的必要信息、未来风险预警、及确保市场和个人反映风险——ZF在预防灾难上的角色至关重要。

　　为个人作出正确决定提供诱因

　　我们具备提供有用信息的技术。然而，许多国家却没有充分利用。比如，日本和印度尼西亚具有类似的地震风险，但日本拥有超过1000台地震仪，面积约比日本大五倍的印度尼西亚却只有160台左右。

　　还有一个更基本的问题，那就是将已有的信息公之于众，方便人们获得。这些信息往往因国家安全、商业及隐秘等原因而没有公布。比如，在美国，联邦紧急情况管理局（Federal Emergency Management Agency）为高风险的墨西哥湾的海岸风险地图提供更新，但因为担心拖累房地产价格，人们却抗拒接受更新的资料。

　　说到底，价格才是个人行为的终极推动因素，激励不当导致灾难性后果（正确的激励本是可以培养预防意识的）的例子数不胜数。比如，如果政治压力把保险费维持在低水平，这将鼓励人们在高风险地区从事建筑活动，因而提高它们的风险和脆弱性。

　　另一个价格扭曲的例子，来自普遍实施租金管制的孟买。地主数十年来都置维修于不顾，因为他们不能提高租金来收回成本。因此，每年的季风雨季都会导致房屋倒塌。同租金管制相似，缺乏保障的所有权，也让个人没有诱因为预防工作进行长期投资。

　　在秘鲁，土地业权制是住房翻新率在4年里增长几乎70%的相关因素。这意味着ZF应该让土地和住房市场运转起来，但也在必要时进行针对性干预。当个人有正确的信息和激励时，他们一般会作出很好的决定。

　　我们所面临的灾难风险正变得越来越大，因此考虑这些问题变得更是重要。到2050年，大城市中受暴风和地震风险威胁的人将比现在翻番，达到15亿之众——这还是没有考虑气候变化情况下所做的估计。膨胀的城市和变化的气候，正改变灾难预防的未来格局。

　　正确的激励，辅之以各个层面的可信、可靠制度，可以确保御灾能力不会因灾难风险上升而减弱。自然风险是不可避免的，但在每一个层面，我们都有能力确保它们不会演变为非自然灾难。

　　作者林毅夫是世界银行首席经济学家兼负责发展经济学的高级副行长；Apurva Sanghi是世界银行高级经济学家及《自然风险和非自然灾难：有效预防的经济学》报告的小组组长

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关键词：经济学 林毅夫 Prevention Management Effective 经济学 林毅夫 灾难

楼主有没得这本书看咯？

以下是英文：WASHINGTON, DC – Despite all of the gloomy economic news nowadays, if we thought that things couldn’t get much worse, we had a grim reminder this month that no country is immune to the forces of nature and the havoc they wreak. Two years ago, on January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake that killed more than 220,000 people and shattered the country’s prospects.
As strange as it may sound, traditional Chinese medicine has much to teach us about dealing with disasters – in particular, to pay more attention to prevention than to therapy. In the same way, it is best to focus on reducing natural-disaster risks through prevention.
According to a recent report released by the World Bank and the United Nations, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention, an ounce of prevention in planning for disasters is worth a pound of cure. So prevention pays, if done right. And that means getting incentives right.
Incentives at every level – international, government, and individual – can play an important role in helping to prevent natural hazards from turning into disasters. A report by Tearfund, a leading relief and development charity, provides an instructive example from Mozambique. In 2000, Mozambique requested $3-4 million from donor countries to help it to prepare for impending floods. It received only about half that amount. But, after the floods struck, donors gave Mozambique more than $100 million in relief alone, and pledged more than $450 million for recovery and reconstruction.
How donors channel aid matters. Investments in prevention often imply long-term development expenditures. Donors could specifically earmark development aid – as opposed to humanitarian aid, whose primary focus is immediate response and relief – for prevention-related activities.
But it is not only donors’ responsibility to get it right. Governments play a crucial role in preventing disasters – above all, by providing information, which is necessary to understand threats, to warn of impending hazards, and to ensure that markets and individuals reflect risks.
The technology to produce useful information exists, but, unfortunately, many countries are not fully taking advantage of it. For example, even though Japan and Indonesia have similar seismic exposure, Japan is equipped with more than 1,000 seismographs, compared to only about 160 in Indonesia, which is roughly five times larger.
But there is also the more fundamental issue of making already-existing information public and easily accessible, which too often does not happen, frequently on national-security, commercial, and privacy grounds. In the United States, for example, the Federal Emergency Management Authority updates coastal risk maps for the hazard-prone Gulf of Mexico, but there is resistance to their adoption because such information could reduce property prices.
But prices are precisely what individuals ultimately respond to, and there are many other examples of skewed incentives that contribute to disastrous outcomes where the correct incentives could help to promote a culture of prevention. If political pressure keeps insurance prices low, for instance, that encourages people to construct in hazard-prone areas, thereby increasing their exposure and vulnerability.
Another example of distorted prices comes from Mumbai, where rent control was pervasive. Landlords neglected maintenance for decades, because they could not recoup the costs by raising rents, causing buildings to crumble in the annual monsoon rains. Like rent control, insecure ownership also reduces individuals’ incentives to make long-term investments in prevention.
In Peru, land titling is associated with an almost 70% increase in housing renovation within four years. One implication is that governments should let land and housing markets work, but complement them with targeted interventions when necessary, because, when individuals have the right information and the correct incentives, they generally decide well for themselves.
These considerations are all the more important in light of rising exposure to disasters. By 2050, the number of people exposed to storms and earthquakes in large cities could more than double, to 1.5 billion – and that is without taking climate change into account. Growing cities and a changing climate are shaping the future of the disaster-prevention landscape. But debating whether the recent Thailand floods or Hurricane Katrina was a result of climate change diverts attention from policies that continue to misprice risk, subsidize exposure, and promote hazardous behavior in the long run.
The right incentives, supported by credible and reliable institutions at all levels, can ensure that rising exposure does not translate into increasing vulnerability. Natural hazards are inevitable, but at every level we have the power to ensure that they do not become unnatural disasters.
Justin Yifu Lin is Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. Apurva Sanghi is a World Bank senior economist and team leader of the report Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: the Economics of Effective Prevention.
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