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课程简介
Optimal decisions of economic agents depend on expectations of other agents' actions. Subject examines various models of equilibrium, which correspond to different ways that agents might make their decisions, and various kinds of games: static games, dynamic games, and games of incomplete information.
Lecture Notes
| 1． 1．A Synopsis of the Theory of Choice (PDF) 2 2, 3, 10Forward Induction, Signaling and Reputation (PDF) 3 4, 5Repeated Games (PDF) 4 7 Noncooperative Solutions (PDF) 5 8 Bargaining Theory - I (PDF) 6 9 Bargaining Theory (PDF) 7 11, 12 Interactive Epistemology (PDF) 8 13, 14 Interactive Epistemology – II (PDF) 9 17 Learning 1: Fictitious Play (PDF) |
10 18 Learning 2: Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stability (PDF)
| 11 19 Learning 3: Replicator Dynamics and Adjustment with Persistent Noise (PDF) 12 20 Learning 4: Adjustment with Persistent Noise (PDF) 13 21 Learning 5: Adjustment with Persistent Noise (PDF) 14 22 Supermodular Games (PDF) 15 23 Auctions 1: Common Auctions and Revenue Equivalence (PDF) 16 24 Auctions 2: Revenue Equivalence Optimal Auctions (PDF) 17 25 Auctions 3: Departures from Symmetric IPV (PDF) |
18 26 Auctions 4: Interdependent Values Multi-Unit Auctions (PDF)
The lecture notes below from 2001-2002 are by Prof. Paul Milgrom. These are materials that were used in the 14.126 class taught in the Fall of 2001 and that were not covered in this class.
| 19 2 Game Theory is Evolving (PDF) 20 2 The Core (PDF) 21 5 Nash Bargaining and Alternating Offers (PDF) 22 7 5 Noncooperative Solutions (PDF) |
23 20 Price Theory Encompassing (PDF - 2.2 MB)
Assignments
Problem Set 1, due in class #10 (PDF)
Problem Set 2, due in class #12 (PDF)
Problem Set 3, due after class #17 (PDF)
Problem Set 4, due after class #21 (PDF)
[此贴子已经被作者于2007-2-8 6:15:41编辑过]
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