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[学科前沿] The 'asset crisis' of emerging economies [推广有奖]

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BEIJING – In theory, the difference between capital inflows and outflows in developing countries should be positive – they should be net capital importers, with the magnitude of the balance equivalent to the current-account deficit. Since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, however, many East Asian countries have been running current-account surpluses – and hence have become net capital exporters.
Even odder is the fact that while they are net capital exporters, they run financial (capital) account surpluses. In other words, these countries lend not only the money they earned through current-account surpluses, but also the money they borrowed through capital-account surpluses – mainly to the United States. As a result, East Asian countries are now sitting on a huge pile of foreign-exchange reserves in the form of US government securities.


While China has attracted a large amount of foreign direct investment, it has bought an even larger amount of US government securities. Whereas the average return on FDI in China was 33% for American firms in 2008, the average return on China’s investment in US government securities was a mere 3-4%. So, why does China invest its savings so heavily in low-return US government securities, rather than in high-return domestic projects?
One answer lies in the fact that China’s FDI policy over the past 30 years has crowded out Chinese investors from high-return projects, forcing them to settle for less lucrative projects. But there are still potential investors who cannot find any suitable investment opportunities in China, generating excess resources, which in turn are invested in US government securities.
But, while China’s foreign assets are denominated in US dollars, its liabilities, such as FDI, are mostly denominated in renminbi. As a result, when the dollar depreciates against the renminbi, the value of China’s foreign liabilities increases in dollar terms, while that of its foreign assets remains unchanged. As a result, China’s net international investment position (NIIP), which is the difference between China’s gross assets and its gross liabilities, automatically worsens. The deterioration of China’s NIIP is a reflection of the transfer of wealth from China to the US.
Since the 2000’s, China’s gross assets and gross liabilities have increased dramatically, owing to the success of China’s trade-promotion and FDI policies. As a result, China’s net international investment position has become very vulnerable to the devaluation of the dollar.
Meanwhile, capital inflows into developing countries have surged since the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In 2010, China’s capital-account surplus stood at $230 billion, and capital inflows remain large this year. With ever-increasing gross dollar assets and gross renminbi liabilities, a stronger renminbi means that China will suffer additional welfare losses from the valuation effect of exchange-rate movements. (It is worth noting that this is not solely a Chinese phenomenon; all major emerging-market economies are faced with the same fate.)
During the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, East Asia’s economies paid heavily for excessive accumulation of dollar-denominated debts. Because governments failed to defend their currencies, they lost hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign-exchange reserves to international speculators.
Whether for self-insurance or to maintain a competitive exchange rate, East Asia has since then once again accumulated too much dollar-denominated debt. This time around, thanks to the deterioration of the US fiscal position and the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy, “the long-term risk [for] emerging markets’ external balance sheets is shifting,” as Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution has pointed out, “to the asset side.”
Rather than confronting a debt crisis, as in 1997-98, emerging-market economies now face an “asset crisis,” but they will suffer the same result: great capital losses on their foreign-exchange reserves. Indeed, the magnitude of the losses will be on par with that of Asian financial crisis, if not higher.
While China’s government should make greater efforts to rebalance the economy by conventional measures, it also should focus more attention on adjusting the currency structure of the country’s gross assets and gross liabilities. In particular, China should try to replace its dollar-denominated assets with renminbi-denominated assets, and its renminbi-denominated liabilities with dollar-denominated liabilities.
If China cannot do very much about existing gross assets and gross liabilities, it should address new assets and liabilities in order to minimize future capital losses. In short, China must take into consideration the ongoing asset crisis facing emerging economies, especially when considering highly consequential questions such as full renminbi convertibility and the currency’s internationalization.
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关键词:Economies Emerging economie conomie Crisis emerging

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xuehe 发表于 2012-4-17 09:10:59 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
新兴经济体的“资产危机”


● 余永定

  理论上,发展中国家的资本流入和流出之间的差距应该为正数——它们应该是资本净进口国,余额应等于经常项目赤字。然而,自从1997-1998年的亚洲金融危机以来,许多东亚国家便一直持有经常项目盈余,成了资本净出口国。

东亚国家持有巨大美国国债

  更奇怪的是,尽管它们是资本净出口国,却有着金融(资本)项目盈余。换句话说,这些国家不仅借出了从经常项目盈余中赚取的钱,也借出了从资本项目盈余中借来的钱——主要是借给美国。结果,东亚国家现在积累了巨大美国国债外汇储备。

  中国吸引了大量的外国直接投资(FDI),但它所购入的美国政府债券数额更大。在2008年,美国公司在中国的FDI平均回报率是33%,而中国的美国国债投资平均回报率只有3-4%。为什么中国要把这么多储蓄投资在低回报的美国国债上,而不投资于高回报的国内项目?

  一个答案是过去30年来,中国的FDI政策将中国投资者挤出了高回报项目,迫使他们不得不接受回报较低的项目。然而,还是有不少投资者在中国找不到任何合适的投资机会,他们手里握着的过剩资源,只能投资于美国国债。

美元贬值对东亚国家意味着什么  然而,中国的海外资产是以美元计价,其债务如FDI却大多数是用人民币计价的。结果,当美元对人民币贬值时,中国的对外债务的美元价值就会上升,而其海外资产的价值却维持不变。结果,中国的净国际投资头寸(Net International Investment Position,简单NIIP),即中国总资产与总负债之差距会自动恶化,反映了财富从中国向美国的转移。

  进入21世纪以来,拜贸易扩张和FDI政策所赐,中国的总资产和总负债显著地增加了。结果,中国的NIIP变得极其容易受美元贬值影响。

  与此同时,自2007-2009年的全球金融危机以来,发展中国家的资本流入出现了剧增。去年,中国的资本项目盈余为2300亿美元。今年的资本流入额也依然颇为可观。由于总美元资产和总人民币负债不断增长,人民币升值意味着中国将因汇率变动的价值效应而遭受额外的利益损失。(值得注意的是,这并非只是中国独有的现象,所有新兴市场国家都面对这个问题。)

  在1997-1998年亚洲金融危机期间,东亚经济体为过度积累美元债务付出了沉重代价。由于政府无法捍卫本国货币,它们被国际投机者赚去了数千亿美元的外汇储备。

  不管是为了自我保险,还是为了维持竞争性汇率,东亚于亚洲金融危机后再一次积累了过多的美元债务。这一回,由于美国财政状况恶化及美联储扩张性的货币政策,正如布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)经济学家埃斯瓦尔·普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)所说:“新兴市场外部资产负债表的长期风险正转向资产方面”。

  与1997-1998年间面临债务危机的情况不同,新兴市场经济体如今面临的是“资产危机”,但其结果是一样的:巨大的外汇储备资本损失。事实上,损失的程度将不亚于当年的亚洲金融危机,甚至会更高。

  中国政府需要更努力地通过常规手段实现经济再平衡,但同时也应该更关注调整总资产和总负债的货币结构。中国尤其应该尝试用人民币资产取代美元资产,用美元负债取代人民币负债。

  如果中国不能对现有的总资产和总负债做什么改变,那它就应该修正新的资产和负债,以便把未来的资本损失最小化。简言之,中国必须认真考虑当前新兴经济体所面临的资产危机,特别是当它在探讨实现人民币完全可兑换和国际化等有重大后果的课题的时候。

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