发帖
雷达卡
When the architects of the euro starteddrawing up plans for its creation in the late 1980’s, economists warnedthem that a viable monetary union required more than an independent centralbank and a framework for budgetary discipline. Study after study emphasized asymmetries within the future common-currencyarea, the possible inadequacy of a one-size-fits-allmonetary policy, the weakness of adjustment channels in the absence ofcross-border labor mobility, and the need for some sort of fiscal unioninvolving insurance-type mechanisms to assist countries in trouble.
Beyond economics, many observers noted that European Union citizens wouldaccept tight monetary bonds only if they were participating in a sharedpolitical community. The former president of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer,liked to quote a medieval Frenchphilosopher, Nicolas Oresme, who wrote that money does not belong to theprince, but to the community. The question was, which political community wouldsupport the euro?
Some of these warnings were inspired bydeep-seated doubts about European monetary unification.But others merely wanted to emphasize that Europeansneeded a better-equipped and stronger vessel for the journey that they were contemplating. Their message was simple: nationalgovernments must make their economies fit for the stricturesof monetary union; the euro must be supported by deeper economic integration;and a common currency needs political legitimacy – that is, a polity.
In the end, the leaders at that time – especially German Chancellor HelmutKohl and French President François Mitterrand and his successor, Jacques Chirac– set forth to sea in a light vessel. On theeconomic front, they agreed on only a bare-bonesEconomic and Monetary Union built around monetary rectitudeand an unenforceable promise of fiscal discipline. On the political front, theydid not agree at all, so the creation of a European polityremained stillborn.
Some at the time, like then-European Commission President Jacques Delors,openly deplored this narrow approach. Thoughpolitical constraints prevailed, the euro’s architects were however not naive.They knew that their brainchild wasincomplete. But they assumed that, over time, monetary unification would createmomentum for national reforms, further economic integration, and some form ofpolitical unification. After all, that piecemeal approach is what had helped to build theEU ever since its origins in the coal and steel community of the 1950’s. Fewamong the euro’s proponents expected thatthere would be no significant change after its launch.
But this assumption was mistaken. From the signing of the MaastrichtTreaty in 1992 to the tenth anniversary of the euro in 2009, the expectedmomentum for creating a common European politywas nowhere in sight.
Indeed, very few countries have bothered to spellout, let alone implement, a euro-inspired economic-reform agenda. Havingagreed to delegate responsibility formonetary policy to the European Central Bank, most governments put up fierce resistance to any further transferof sovereignty. In 2005, a timid attempt tofoster political integration by adopting a constitutional treaty was defeatedin popular referenda in France and theNetherlands.
So, contrary to expectations, things stayedput. Soon after the introduction of the euro in 1999, it became clearthat the scenario favored by the common currency’s architects would not berealized. Everybody accepted – if grudgingly– that the bare-bones EMU was the only gamein town.
Now, however, what did not happen through smooth evolution has started tohappen through crisis. Since 2009, the Europeans have already put in place thecrisis-management and resolution apparatusthat they initially refused even to discuss. Simultaneously, governments, undermerciless pressure from the bond markets,are introducing labor- and product-market reforms that they deemed politically inconceivable only a few quarters ago.
But the bond markets want more. Thequestions that they are asking more loudly with each passing day demandanswers. Will Europeans agree to mutualizepart of the cost of the crisis? Greece’s creditors (mostly eurozone residents)have already accepted some of the burden by accepting a “haircut” on their assets. But, if another countryfinds itself unable to bear the fiscal cost of the crisis, will it also shiftthe burden to its external creditors in some form or another?
And, beyond transfers, will Europeans, or some of them, agree to create abanking union (that is, Europeanization of banking supervision, depositinsurance, and crisis resolution)? Will they agree to pool tax revenues so thatEU-level institutions can credibly take charge of financial stability?
These questions are vital for the future of the common European currency.In spite of their desire not to raise them, European leaders face theuncomfortable prospect of having to answer them – and without much delay.
The historical irony is that an environment of crisis is forcing Europeansto make choices that they did not want to envisage,much less confront, in quieter times. The Greek debt crisis forced them tocreate an assistance mechanism. The Spanish crisis may well force them tocreate a banking union. And the threat of a Greek exit from the euro may forcethem to decide how far-reaching a fiscalunion they are prepared to embrace.
For many, recent developments mark the beginning of the end for the euroarchitects’ bold creation. But, depending on how Europeans answer thesequestions, today’s crises might one day be remembered as the end of thebeginning.
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
京公网安备 11010802022788号
