Federalism or Bust for Europe?

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

August was quieter than feared on the European bondmarkets. So, while resting on Europe’s beachesand mountains, policymakers could take a step back from the sound and fury of the last few months and thinkabout the future. Is the eurozone sleepwalkinginto becoming a United States of Europe? Is it exploring uncharted territory? Or are its constituentnation-states drifting apart?
To answer these questions, the best starting point is the US.The model of a federal union that emerged from its history consists of a single currency managed by a federal agency;closely integrated markets for products, labor, and capital; a federal budgetthat partly, but automatically, offsets economic disturbances affectingindividual states; a federal government that assumes responsibility fortackling other major risks, not least those emanatingfrom the banking sector; and states that provide regional public goods but playvirtually no role in macroeconomic stabilization.
This model served as a templatefor the European Union’s architects, notably for the creation of a unifiedmarket and a common currency. But, in several respects, Europehas diverged significantly from the Americanmodel.
First and foremost, Europehas not established a federal budget. Back in the 1970’s, there was still hope that common spendingwould eventually amount to 5-10% of EU GDP, but this dream never materialized.The EU’s budget today is no larger than it was 30 years ago: a meager 1% of GDP.
Unlike in the US,where federal public spending grew as a consequence of the creation of newexpenditure programs throughout the twentieth century, public spending wasalready high at the national level when Europebegan to integrate. Significant federal spending programs could have emergedonly from the transfer of existing national programs to the European level. Notsurprisingly, such transfers were strongly resisted.
More recently, the eurozone has begun to create a system of mutual insurance among member states.Since 2010, assistance has been extended to Greece,Ireland, Portugal, and now Cyprus. Spain may soon follow suit, with a particular focus on supportfor its banking sector. So a specific pattern is emerging: states help eachother.
But solidarity is notfree. It is conditional on beneficiaries’ having signed on to a fiscal treatythat commits them to budgetary responsibility and makes them liable toquasi-automatic sanctions. Moreover, assistance requires that beneficiariesimplement negotiated measures and accept close external monitoring of policydevelopments. In other words, the price ofsolidarity is limited sovereignty.
Unlike in America,however, EU member states’ governments – and, increasingly, their parliaments –are calling the shots. Because assistancedoes not rest on federal resources, but rather on the pooling of nationalresources, creditor states inevitably demand more power in exchange for providingmore support to their neighbors. As a result, currency unification has notbrought Europe closer to the US;on the contrary, it has pushed Europe furtheraway.
In the US, the federal government acts as an overall shield against common risks and providesautomatic, unconditional support to states in trouble; but, in the end, it doesnot come to the rescue of a defaulting state, nor does it take over itsgovernment. In Europe, by contrast, there isalmost no aggregate shield and almost no automatic support for member states introuble – better-off states simply extend aconditional helping hand to prevent default. So, while US states compete withthe center for power, in Europe theyincreasingly compete with each other.
This inter-state rivalry – at times bordering on acrimony – iswhat makes the politics of European integration difficult. All federations haveexperienced periods of tense relations between the federal and stategovernments. But to accept that your neighbors look over your shoulder and tellyou what to do is one degree more dreadfulthan to accept oversight from the center.
Indeed, a major problem with the current state of affairsis the weakness of EU institutions that are in charge of advancing the commoninterest and that are accountable to Europeans as a whole. Common Europeandirection cannot emerge from the calculus ofnational interests by governments and parliaments that are accountable only tonational voters.
The big question to which nobody has a clear answer iswhether Europe is in the process of inventinga model of its own, or has only taken a detourfrom the inevitable choice between disaggregationand convergence on the standard federal template. One solution could be to providenational representatives a venue to convenefor European-wide debates. Another would be to transfer the insurance role to afederal institution accountable to the European parliament.
Whatever route it takes, Europe in the coming years will have to address the weakrepresentation of the common interest – or else admit that no such commoninterest can justify remaining on the path of integration.

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Federalism Federal Europe feder euro territory mountains becoming starting future

Is the eurozone sleepwalking intobecoming a United States of Europe? Is it exploring unchartedterritory? Or are its constituent nation-states driftingapart?
To answer these questions, the best starting point is the US.The model of a federal union that emerged from its history consists of a single currency managed by a federal agency;closely integrated markets for products, labor, and capital; a federal budgetthat partly, but automatically, offsets economic disturbances affectingindividual states; a federal government that assumes responsibility fortackling other major risks, not least those emanatingfrom the banking sector; and states that provide regional public goods but playvirtually no role in macroeconomic stabilization.(US model)
This model served as a template forthe European Union’s architects, notably for the creation of a unified marketand a common currency. But, in several respects, Europehas diverged significantly from the Americanmodel..First and foremost, Europe has notestablished a federal budget.More recently, the eurozone has begun to create a system of mutual insurance among member states.a specific pattern is emerging: states help each other.But solidarity is not free.the price of solidarity is limited sovereignty.Because assistance does not rest on federal resources, but rather on thepooling of national resources, creditor states inevitably demand more power inexchange for providing more support to their neighbors.All federations have experienced periods of tense relations between thefederal and state governments. But to accept that your neighbors look over yourshoulder and tell you what to do is one degree more dreadfulthan to accept oversight from the center. a major problem with the currentstate of affairs is the weakness of EU institutions that are in charge ofadvancing the common interest and that are accountable to Europeans as a whole(EU Model and his shortage)




One solution could be to providenational representatives a venue to convenefor European-wide debates. Another would be to transfer the insurance role to afederal institution accountable to the European parliament.(two sulutions)