Springer2005年出版的经济理论论文集,绝对的好!
Differential Information Economies
Table of Contents
Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicolas C. Yannelis
Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part 1 Core notions, existence results
Robert Wilson
Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Information, efficiency
and the core of an economy Comments onWilson’s paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Nicholas C. Yannelis
The core of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Isabelle Lefebvre
An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Erik J. Balder and Nicholas C. Yannelis
On the continuity of expected utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Frank H. Page, Jr.
Market games with differential information
and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
A two-stage core with applications to asset maket
and differential information economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Stefan Maus
Balancedness and the core in economies
with asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Part 2 Core andWalrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence
Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin Shitovitz
Competitive and core allocations in large economies
with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Fran¸coise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, and Enrico Minelli
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria
in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Stefan Maus
Exchange economies with asymmetric information:
competetive equilibrium and core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Part 3 Core, Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Incentive compatibility and information superiority
of the core of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Guangsung Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Efficiency and incentive compatibility
in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Beth Allen
Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core . . . . . . . . 279
Tatsuro Ichiishi and Murat R. Sertel
Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm . . . . . . 297
Stefan Krasa and Anne P. Villamil
Optimal multilateral contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Martin F. Hellwig
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility
with ex post information asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
J¨ulide Yazar
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans . . . 365
Philip Bond
Incentive compatible contractible information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
Part 4 Continuity and stability
Stefan Krasa and Wayne Shafer
Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete . . . . . . . . 397
Gabrielle Demange and Roger Guesnerie
On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Douglas Gale
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Konstantinos Serfes
Non-myopic learning in differential information economies the core . . . . . . . 465
Part 5 Value allocations and the bargaining set
R.B. Myerson
Cooperative games with incomplete information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis
The value allocation of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . 507
Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Existence and properties of a value allocation
for an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin Shitovitz
The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information. . . . . . . . 541
Stefan Krasa, Akram Temimi, and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Coalition structure values in differential information economies:
Is unity a strength? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Part 6 Implementation
Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation
in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, and Nicholas C. Yannelis
An extensive form interpretation of the private core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, and Nicholas C.Yannelis
On extensive form implementation of contracts
in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619
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