Endogenous Political Institutions(Philippe Aghion)

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<P>Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi
This version: January 2004</P>
<P>Abstract
A foundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both “optimal” constitutional design and ”positive”aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.</P>
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2004-9-23 22:00:00 上传

Endogenous Political Institutions(Philippe Aghion)

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关键词：Institutions Institution Endogenous Political Philippe critical Alberto version design action

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