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TITLE: ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK ANALYSE POLICY CHANGE IN CHINA
HAND IN DATE: 11/01/2005
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------page
The overview of Advocacy Coalition Framework------------------------------------page
1) Basic principles of ACF------------------------------------------------------------------page
2) Policy-Oriented Learning---------------------------------------------------------------page
Case study: Applied ACF to Information Communication
Technology (ICT) policy change in China----------------------------------------------page
1) Narrative of ICP policy change in China from 1990
to 2002:From monopoly to competition-------------------------------------------page
2) Applied ACF to explain policy change in China-----------------------------------page
Discussion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------page
1) The power of knowledge: policy change and learning
in the China ICT case--------------------------------------------------------------------page
2) Practical Limitations of the ACF-------------------------------------------------------page
Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------page
Reference-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------page
Introduction
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a conceptual framework of the policy process developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993; 1999) to deal with what Hoppe and Peterse (1993) have termed “wicked” policy problems. It has been applied to about 35 cases of policy-making in OECD countries (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) and is viewed by Schlager (1995) as one of the two most promising theories of the policy process--the other being institutional rational choice as represented by Ostrom (1999). The ACF views policy change over time as primarily the result of competition among advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, such as Florida water policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 1999). First of all, the Advocacy Coalition Framework goes beyond the institutional analysis political scientists have long focused on, which are the "iron triangle" interactions between the legislative arena (congress), the administrative arena (federal agencies), and special interest groups. It expands the actors by looking at civil society, market and state actors, and different levels of actors – local, state, federal and international level. Further, the approach goes beyond the stages of policy analysis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:5,24).
Though Advocacy Coalition Framework has been used to explain policy change in many cases, and was claimed by Sabatier that the AFC can be applied to most industrial societies. I more interested in how the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) explain policy change in most developing countries. This paper will focus on using ACF approach explain policy change in Chinese ICT policy. And then the strengths and weaknesses of ACF will be discussed. On one hand, this paper illustrate that the ACF is a valuable approach to explain policy change in China because of the power of knowledge, as Weiss (1987) noted that knowledge product a long term effect on policy making. On the other hand, because of institutional failure in developing countries, thus there are some practical limitations of the ACF.
This paper presents a theoretical examination of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Placed within the context of developing states over the adequacy of policy networks to explain policy change, it examines whether the ACF provides a useful alternative. First sections of this paper provide a review of the ACF and the role of policy oriented learning within the model. Then, in second section I shall illustrate how useful to analyse policy change by the ACF using a study of Chinese ICT policy, in the years 1990 to 2002. I primarily concerned with whether the case of Chinese ICT policy can be explained by using the ACF approach to analyze. A narrative of the events taking place between 1990 up to 2002 outlines the beliefs of the key actors by looking at the actions taken. The narrative will illustrate the beliefs held at that time; it also highlights the central role of policy oriented learning in influencing policy. This is accord to Sabatier who is dismissive of ‘raw political power’ and believes that in the long run, policy learning has a greater capacity to change the agendas and the decisions of government (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:44). But the argument will then be set out also using a study of Chinese ICT policy in last section. In the political circumstance of developing states it is more difficult to distinguish different coalitions by indicating believe from different coalitions. With the coalitions within the subsystem distinguished by their different beliefs and resources (Parsons,1995:195-197). As a result, use the ACF approach to analyse policy change in developing states has practical limitations.
The overview of Advocacy Coalition Framework
Basic principle of ACF
The ACF views policy change over time as primarily the result of competition among advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 1999). Sabatier (1998) also noted that an advocacy coalition consists of interest group leaders, legislators, agency officials, researchers, and even journalists who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus critical perceptions of causal relationships) and engage in some degree of coordinated behavior in an effort to make governmental policy more consistent with those beliefs. Policy brokers mediate conflict among coalitions. While the framework focuses on competition among coalitions within the subsystem, changes external to the subsystem (such as fluctuations in socio-economic conditions) and stable system parameters (such as constitutional rules) play an important role in major policy change.
As Sabatier and Zafonte (2001) mentioned that the belief systems of advocacy coalitions are assumed to be organized. At the highest and broadest level, the "deep core" of a coalition's belief system consists of fundamental normative beliefs, such as the familiar Left/Right scale, that operate across virtually all policy domains. Within any given policy subsystem, however, it is the "policy core" and the "secondary aspects" that are most critical. The former consists of basic positions, some of them purely normative (e.g. the relative importance of different values, such as environmental protection vs. economic development), while others are a mixture of normative and empirical, which operates across most or all of the policy subsystem. These policy core positions are very resistant to change, are only intermittently the subject of policy debate, and are usually changed as a result of perturbations external to the subsystem, although long-term "enlightenment" may also play a role (Weiss, 1977). Science plays a much more important role in the secondary aspects of coalitions' belief systems, as these involve disputes over the seriousness of a problem or the relative importance of various causal factors in different locales, the evaluation of various programs and institutions, and specific policy preferences.
The ACF assumes that members of a coalition will readily accept new evidence consistent with their views and seek to discount information which conflicts with their perception of the seriousness of a problem, the relative importance of various factors affecting it, or the costs and benefits of different alternatives (Lord, 1979). At the least, this results in "a dialogue of the deaf" in which members of different coalitions talk past each other. It can get much worse. If members from different coalitions interpret the same evidence in very different ways—which is quite frequent (Sabatier and Zafonte, 2001)—this leads to questioning the motives and reasonableness of opponents. Given the fundamental proposition of prospect theory that people value loses more than gains (Sabatier and Zafonte, 2001), they are likely to remember defeats more than victories and thus to view opponents as more powerful than they actually are. The end result is a “devil shift” in which coalition members view opponents as more nefarious and more powerful than they really are (Sabatier, 1987). The devil shift greatly exacerbates conflict across coalitions and pressures for solidarity within coalitions. Given that policy core beliefs in such a situation are very unlikely to change, the composition of coalitions is hypothesized to be stable over periods of a decade or more.
The ACF explicitly rejects the assumption that most bureaucrats and researchers involved in a policy area will be neutral (Sabatier, 1998). Some may well have no strong policy preferences, at least initially. But the framework contends that, as conflict between coalitions increases and as the interrelationships among sets of beliefs become clearer over time, initially loose groups with amorphous beliefs will coalesce into increasingly distinct coalitions with coherent belief systems. In the process, most neutral actors, particularly university scientists, will drop out. The ACF thus contends that, in well-developed subsystems, most agency officials and researchers who are active will be members of specific coalitions in terms of sharing a set of policy core beliefs and acting in concert to some degree (Sabatier and Zafonte, 2001).
According to Sabatier (1998) there are four basic premises of the ACF:
(1) A time perspective of at least ten years is required to evaluate the effects of policy (as it completes a cycle);
(2) A focus on ‘policy subsystems, that is, the interaction of actors from different institutions who follow, and seek to influence, governmental decisions in a policy area’;
(3) Policy subsystems involve actors from all levels of government (thus negating the top-down effect);
(4) Public policies can be conceptualised in the same manner as belief systems, or, ‘sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them’ (Sabatier, 1998).
Policy-Oriented Learning
Policy-oriented learning involves relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or the assessment of new information involving the precepts of belief systems (Heclo, 1974). Learning is one of two processes of belief change in coalitions. Learning within coalitions is relatively easy, as members share the same value premises and are looking for the most effective means to those ends (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Learning across coalitions is much more difficult, as people from each coalition have quite different values and distrust each other. Nevertheless, the original versions of the ACF hypothesized three conditions facilitating such learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
Sabatier (1998) noted that issues on which there is an intermediate level of conflict. Issues have to be important enough to generate sufficient research--usually by members of several coalitions, as well as neutrals. On the other hand, issues involving conflict between the core beliefs of different coalitions. Learning across coalitions is thus most likely on issues involving important secondary aspects of the relevant belief systems, particularly on aspects that have not previously received much attention. And Sabatier (1998) also noted that issues involving primarily the natural sciences. Across-coalition learning is generally easier in the natural than in the social/behavioral sciences because the theories and accepted methods are better established and the objects of study are not themselves actors in the policy debate.
According Sabatier and Zafonte (2001), the existence of a forum that is (a) prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate and (b) dominated by scientific norms: The latter assures a general consensus on the appropriate rules of evidence, as well as some attention to underlying assumptions.
The ACF assumes that the various coalitions involved in important policy disputes have scientists (or technical experts) whom they trust, presumably because they share most of the coalition's policy core beliefs and can help the coalition understand the scientific aspects of such disputes (Sabatier, 1998). Many interest group leaders, legislative personnel, and agency officials who constitute the leadership core of coalitions have an intuitive awareness of the role of values in determining the agenda of technical advisory committees and how uncertainty is treated. Thus they are very unlikely to accept the recommendations of any technical advisory committee on which someone whom they trust has not argued their point of view. And, if they don't trust the committee's report--particularly in relatively decentralized political systems like the U.S.--they almost always can find some decision-making venue that will enable them to circumvent or obstruct the committee's recommendations. In short, selecting a committee composed entirely of relatively "neutral" scientists--which often seems to be the strategy of the National Academy of Science (Boffey, 1975)--may facilitate short-term consensus but will probably fail in the long run.
On the other hand, Sabatier also noted that the technical advisory committee needs to be chaired by a neutral (and probably include a few other neutrals) whose task is to impose professional norms regarding acceptable evidence, methodologies, etc, on the debate, and to indicate to coalition experts when a professional consensus is beginning to emerge (Sabatier, 1998). Non-professionals must be excluded from these deliberations in order that scientific norms can prevail in weighing the evidence--and the assumptions behind--different points of view.
Case study: Applied ACF to Information Communication Technology (ICT) policy change in China
Narrative of ICP policy change in China from 1990 to 2002:From monopoly to competition
From 1978, Creation of the telecommunication monopoly has appeared in China. For more than forty years, China Telecom had been the monopoly in the ICT. As the only telecommunication carrier, China Telecom has developed into an extremely inefficient bureaucracy, and its monopoly has also entailed tremendous social cost, such as unmet demand for services and quality improvements, and failure to provide advanced infrastructure, etc. It is widely believed within China and beyond that the political and economic future of the country will be shaped in important ways by the expansion of new, powerful information and communications technologies (ICTs). Since then, how to break monopoly and to establish a healthier environment with more competitions has been an important agenda in Chinese ICT policy making.
In 1990s was a time of many conflicts in Chinese ICT. Issues such as China Telecom charges exceptionally high prices, government try to protect its state-owned enterprises, allow foreign companies invest in Chinese ICT. In July 1994 a second telecommunication carrier, China Unicom, was formed. It becomes the first competitor of China Telecom. During this time, generated considerable controversy between conservative and reformer continue. These controversies were initially domestic, but by the late 1990s the debate gradually became more international as China join into WTO. In 1997 China’s 9th NPC approves an ambitious reform of the information and telecommunications industry and merges all the information and telecommunications related regulatory institutions into one single regulator, the Ministry of information Industry (MII). Reformers used the forum provided by the Ministry of information Industry (MII) to intensify their criticism of the monopoly impacts of Chinese ICT development. So as a result, 7th Five-Year Plan propels telecommunications as a national priority. And in 1998, the government establishes China Telecom as an independent legal enterprise. Since the creation of the Ministry of Information Industry, MII, in 1997, it has issued a series of new policies to further liberalize China's telecom market and create domestic competition. In 1999, the new ministry decided to divide the dominant telecom operator, China Telecom, into four companies: China Telecom (fixed line), China Mobile (mobile communication), China Paging and China Satellite. The main purpose was to create competition in an, up to then, very uncompetitive market. In 1999, Sino-US agreement to open the telecommunication market to international competition (WTO Reference Paper and commitments). Upgrade China’s ICT legislation, increase competition in ICT sectors, create an effective ICT regulatory environment, and allow private and foreign investments.
In 2001 China joins the WTO. A new ICT policy was adopted by NPC in 2001. The ICT policy included more liberal goal, and stated that reformer should be given more emphasis. This amounted to a significant change in Chinese ICT policy, because previously conservatives had always been the dominant policy objective. At the end of 2001, the telecom market was further liberalized, as it was announced that China Telecom was once again being divided, this time into two competing companies operating in the north and in the south. Its northern part (covering 10 provinces including the capital Beijing), merged with two smaller rivals China Jitong and China Netcom, to create the new China Netcom Group. The southern segment will retain the name China Telecom, and cover 21 provinces in the south and northwest of the country. The two companies will share the existing China Telecom long distance network - with the new China Telecom (Group) allotted up to 70% of capacity and the rest allocated to China Netcom. Both companies will be free to build local telephone networks and offer local fixed-line services in each other's territory and offer each other "fair and mutually beneficial access" to their respective local networks. The reason for restructuring the telecom company was to increase competition market. With the recent split-up of China Telecom, a break of the monopoly in China’s ICT market is expected in a real sense.
This article seeks to explore why this is so, and what lessons can be learned from the China experience.
Applied ACF to explain policy change in China
In this section, the ACF is applied to the process of developing ICT policy in China from 1990 to 2002. According to Sabatier the process of public policy-making includes the manner in which problems get conceptualised and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and revised (Sabatier, 1998).
We believe that in China and elsewhere it is impossible to understand one kind of societal role without understanding other roles in close social proximity (Armstrong 1973), including opponents. Since its inception, China’s ICT policymaking has been (and remains) under strong domestic political competition, both from competing ministries and inside the government (conservative and reformers). There are normally two components:
Conservative Coalition Members
Involves managers in the state owned enterprises like China Telecom, or senior officials in the relevant ministries such as Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), and research institution like the Bureau of State Information, etc. ICT conservatives fight to preserve the status that they have been owned.
Reformers Coalition Members
We call them as ICT champions. They can be identified several key characteristics. They include similar personal backgrounds (professional knowledge, overseas education); substantial, valuable knowledge in a strategically important emerging field; attitudes marked by great personal and professional ambition, leavened by high regard for national status and welfare. Many believed in the transformative potentials of the new ICTs.
The China ICT subsystem
According to the literature on ICT policy in China (CNNIC, 2001) there are four key sets of actors in the China ICT subsystem: ICT champions, state owned enterprises, private and foreign companies and the government.
The individuals we call “ICT Champions” appeared in successive waves of innovation. The term ICT champions can be identified those individuals who play motivating and leading roles in the diffusion of ICTs. They are “early adapters”-- individuals who are technical and social innovators ahead of their countrymen. Putnam defines leaders in terms of influence on decisions—elites are influential individuals with substantial indirect or implicit influence, those to whom the decision makers look for advice, whose interests and opinions they take into account, or from whom they fear sanction (Putnam 1976). These are leading individuals who are not only active consumers of ICT services and goods, but also active in expanding the supply and accelerating the access of others to these technologies. They run the range from commercial entrepreneurs to policy entrepreneurs to researchers. They seek to restructure the legal, regulatory and political environment to promote more opening ICT policy. Interviews with these individuals suggest they are highly motivated and deeply engaged with a sense of mission.
The state owned enterprises like China Telecom began to operate in the early 1990s was heavily monopolist. China Telecom was, before the split-up in 2002, the largest ICT operator in the world, with some 180 million subscribers early 2002. Until 1993, China Telecom was the only provider of ICT services in Mainland China.
Concerning the state, the responsibility with developing ICT policy lies with the NPC and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), whereas policy implementation is carried out by the National Board of ICT. This implementation is mostly effected using ‘soft’ policy tools. And personnel have affected its activities in policy implementation and budget cuts in the last decade (Mueller, Milton and Zixiang, 1997). However, it provides funding for research.
In addition to these major actors, other less influential actors include the private companies and foreign invest companies. The widespread belief among foreign companies eager to penetrate the market who seem to believe that China is groping its way towards an opening to foreign direct investment but is held back by the lack of a clearly formulated policy, an absence of a telecommunications law and a failure to establish a regulator independent of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) which is also, through the Directorate-General of Telecommunications or China Telecom, the dominant player.
We can see the ICT subsystem in China as traditionally having been dominated by three major actors: ICT champions and state owned enterprises managers (both represented by associations) and the state. Relations between states owned enterprises managers and ICT champions were close at the national level (where policy of ICT were negotiated and the parliament was lobbied). The role of the state was to provide a basic policy framework, help to resolve differences if these arose.
In light of these features, the state enterprise managers who wanted to preserve the status or closely control any ICT changes had many reasons to oppose the new liberal ideology of the Information Champions, and at the same time to object and court them. The Champions knew how to use ICTs to enhance efficiency, to increase international competition and attract foreign investment. They seemed to be able to bring China even more modern know-how and capital. For the government to protect and promote these Champions – to hire them, to hold them up as examples, and conferred ever more legitimacy on this social formation.
From an ACF perspective, the information presented above indicates that in the late 1990s before the ICT Act was modified and the ICT reform process began, the Chinese ICT subsystem included two coalitions as shown in Table 1. The first and weaker one was a ‘Reformer Coalition’ made up of ICT Champions associations, the private ICT companies and foreign invest ICT companies. A second and dominant ‘Conservative Coalition’ was made up of state owned enterprises like China Telecom. A review of the sources cited in the references suggests that the deep (normative) core belief systems of the two coalitions were quite different. The Reformer Coalition’s normative beliefs included priority of opening ICT market and strong support increase competition in ICT sectors, create an effective ICT regulatory environment, allow private and foreign investments. The Conservative Coalition accorded more importance to protect and maintain their monopoly in ICT field.
Reformer Coalition Members
ICT champions
Private ICT company Association
Foreign invest ICT companies
Customers Association
Researcher in Institution and University
State Planning Commission
Conservative Coalition Members
China Telecom
Other sate own ICT companies
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
Research institution like the Bureau of State Information
Table 1 The Chinese ICT policy domain in the late 1990s
The ACF identifies four categories of external system events which can promote policy change: changes in socio-economic conditions, in public opinion, or in systemic governing coalitions and policy decisions, and impacts from other subsystems. All these occurred to some degree in China during the 1990s and led to significant changes in the subsystem.
In terms of changes in socio-economic conditions, the economic developing and growing foreign invest in the early 1990s was one of the factors which led to economic reform in China. This represented a change in the systemic governing coalition, as defined by the ACF. The Prime Minister at the time, Zhu RongJi, implemented a series of economic reforming and a programme of market economy. During this time China also joined the WTO in 2001. This had an important impact on the ICT sector. Increase foreign influence and rival of reform in ICT field in China.
DISCUSSION
This China ICT case study shows the value of the ACF, especially analysis policy change in developing country. It also provides support for policy change and coalition learning. These are discussed below. But a number of practical limitations of the ACF are also discussed.
The power of knowledge: policy change and learning in the China ICT case
Research on “why things go right”in Chinese ICT case also stressed the role of knowledge in the policy process. Policy learning contributes to a new view of the policy process, in which power and knowledge perform complementary functions (Radaelli, 1995). From an ACF perspective, it can be considered that the resignation of conservative representatives from the working group marks a major shift in the subsystem (Sabatier, 1998). We can see in the Chinese ICT process not only an example of policy-oriented learning across belief systems, but power of knowledge in the policy process.
According to Sabatier (1998), policy-oriented learning, therefore, is a policy dynamic in that it is an important identifiable force in the altering of beliefs over time. In turn, the altering of beliefs affects coalition action and hence public policy. As Sabatier (1998) mention that if the learning is sufficiently significant, either: (a) a dominant coalition will change its actions and hence public policy directly; or, (b) a formerly minority coalition may succeed the formerly dominant coalition by identifying the performance gaps inherent in its programmes, thus again causing changes to the dominant policy beliefs and hence policy change (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1998). However, it should be reiterated that policy-oriented learning is only one force affecting belief systems and is indeed not the most important. Rather, changes in socioeconomic conditions and system-wide governing coalitions alter the composition and resources of coalitions and hence their constituent beliefs and actions (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier , 1992)
Within Chinese ICT subsystems, policy-oriented learning occurs. Coalitions will seek to ‘out-learn’ each other and to use various strategies to seek to have their belief systems translated into public policies. The existence of professional fora for policy debate is thought to facilitate this. However, the ACF assumes that although policy-oriented learning can contribute to policy change, major shifts in the distribution of political resources, leading to modification of the core aspects of a governmental policy or programme, are usually the result of perturbations external to the subsystem. Thus there were significant differences between the two coalitions on both secondary aspects and policy core beliefs. It is clear that some of the representatives from both coalitions had the technical resources to engage in a debate on ICT issues in China. The Information Champions had to define themselves to some extent as arising in opposition to the ICT Conservatives. When they returned from abroad they were very impatient with their country’s slow pace of technological changes. They recognized that China risked being left behind in the information revolution as it was in the industrial revolution. Reflecting perhaps their own ambitions, and the scope and depth of the substantive challenges they faced, these individuals forged a number of sophisticated and successful alliances across institutional boundaries. Where the early Information Champions managed to work well across boundaries, and to seek allies in other institutions to push forward the common elements of their liberal agenda. But political ties and political skills aren't enough to keep up the pace. Vision and knowledge are also required, along with the kinds of strong social networks. These early Information Champions did the original missionary work to convert the knowledge from their own to other sectors of the country. The Champions were able to mobilize needed organizational and even political resources. The most successful Information Champions were apparently able to affect government that helped change ICT policy. As Chinese society opened more to the forces of globalization, international media and the possibilities of personal wealth accumulation, then their social status and popular prestige grew apace. At the same time the top party officials and central government leaders try to balance the opposing desires to advance economic efficiency through new ICTs, wanting to provide more modern services to a growing consumer group. As a result, professional knowledge finally affects policy decisions.
Because core beliefs are so fundamental in the ACF, we might expect to find changes in coalition structure and membership if these beliefs change. This is what happened in Chinese ICT case. A strong case can be made that during the Chinese ICT process there were a number of changes in the secondary aspects and core policy beliefs of actors in both coalitions. This policy learning, combined with external events such as China joining the WTO, and competitive pressures from foreign companies in domestic markets, led to a restructuring of the ICT subsystem which is now dominated by a reformer coalition made up of the members of the ICT champions Coalition and the foreign companies, together with private companies unions. The state-own company owners have been left isolated as the only remaining members of the conservative Coalition. In Chinese ICT case illustrates the policy core and secondary beliefs of the new coalition, and shows the new alignment of actors in the policy domain.
As Sabatier mentioned, in the ACF, policy learning across coalitions is said to occur if one or both coalitions alter policy core, or important secondary aspects of their belief systems as a result of observed dialogue, rather than a change in external conditions (Sabatier, 1998). The probability of such learning is seen as a function of three variables: the level of conflict, the analytical tractability of the issue and the presence of a professionalized forum. And the China ICT case provides support for all of them. But at the other hand, though the ACF can explain the policy change in developing countries, we also obverse some practical limitation of it, because of the characters of policymaking in developing countries.
Practical Limitations of the ACF
As Hann argue that although ACF approach offer an interesting alternative to the rational action models, it is not without its difficulties (Hann, 1995). Especially applied the ACF approach in developing countries. Dror (1974:105) noted that developing states vary so much, in the degrees to which any of their aspects may be underdeveloped. And Dror (1968) also state developing states’ characteristics are (a) very low technological development; (b) a mass leader and a small political elite, who are aspiring toward a rapid and radical socio-economic transformation by means of centrally directed social change, the leader maintaining a strong grip on the masses by both charisma and force, but depending on support by the military; (c) nearly no middle class; (d) wide-scope public policymaking that covers most economic activities.
Because the dearth of reliable data on developing states and of suitable methods for dealing with such data makes it even less possible to estimate the net probable real output of policymaking in developing states than in modern states (Dror, 1968). Thus these lead to more difficult to apply the ACF in predict policy change in developing states. The ACF fails to predict convincingly why the policy changes. The ACF may be suspect as an afterthought. These are practical limitations of the ACF discussed below.
Firstly, how to identify beliefs in coalition members in developing countries?
Belief systems, however, are the main focus of the ACF as they distinguish the ACF from other conceptions of the policy process. Sabatier (1998) argues that policies contain implicit theories on how to achieve objectives, and so can be conceptualized as belief systems. Sabatier favours considerations of beliefs because the inference of ‘real’ interests is difficult. He thus advocates the use of questionnaires and content analysis of documents to elicit such beliefs. Questions of the naivete of this approach aside, as Hann argues, there are severe practical difficulties with such an approach (Hann, 1995).
In the Chinese ICT case, It is impossible in China to use this approach elicit such beliefs, because these individuals diffuse in all around of the country, and the government forbidden such sort of questionnaires. Even if individuals of ICT Champions were willing to fill in the questionnaires on core beliefs, they may not be too sure what those beliefs are and may not be able to articulate them. The beliefs would thus have to be inferred, but beliefs cannot, simply be read off from behavior without making other contestable assumptions about the agent’s aims. One will have as much difficulty, then, in discerning core beliefs as in discerning ‘real’ interests. Possibly, the only way to be sure to elicit beliefs would be to read ministerial diaries after the fact. However, we might do well to remember in Chinese ICT case that such a diary was riddled. Second, given the difficulties of discerning an individual’s beliefs, how could you discover the core beliefs of an entire coalition or subsystem? This would seem impossible unless again one were to infer from behaviour. That is, one would need to assume a prior that action reflected a consensual core belief. However, considering the examples in Chinese ICT case, this would be an invalid assumption. The ACF is undermined by the unconvincing nature of the arguments on the role of belief systems. Particularly, it does not explain coalitions which develop on a short time pragmatic basis, important conflicts between actors with similar core beliefs, and such beliefs are extremely difficult to discern anyway.
From Chinese ICT cases it seems that belief systems are complex and difficult to measure comprehensively. Thus it is more accurate to identify beliefs through action, rather than as the ACF attempts predict action, or policy change, through knowledge of beliefs. If it is difficult to distinguish believes in different coalitions, certainly, the ACF in this case would be extremely limited in application.
Secondly, the ACF ignore different political system
The first concerns Sabatier’s insistence that individuals engage in politics solely to turn beliefs into policies, as well as his subsequent lack of distinction between policy advocates and policy brokers. Sabatier (1993) claims that the ACF can be applied to most industrial societies, it is surprising that he places so little emphasis on the distinguishing characteristics of such countries. For example, the distinction between broker and advocate in the U.S. system is often difficult to maintain and relatively unimportant given the political appointments of higher-level civil servants. That is, civil servants are picked on the basis of their political beliefs and their activity is therefore easily subsumed within the ACF. This is a key cultural difference in China, where in principle the entire civil service is maintained over time and Civil servants must hold the political and ideological views of the Party, respect the Party leadership, share a commitment to Marxism/Leninism, a belief in socialist ideology and the democratic dictatorship of the people. The concept of a neutral civil service does not apply. Therefore, the levels of advocacy or overt political activity are surely diminished in the Chinese political system. Granted, Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1993) do recognise that ‘high civil servants’ may perform the role of policy broker, but that they will have some ‘policy bent’ which guides their actions within subsystems. The distinction between broker and advocate is thus on a continuum. However, the only justification for such a position is a footnote stating their experience. Further, remember that Sabatier’s position is that individuals enter politics to turn beliefs into policies. How, then, does this explain civil service action over time, if a civil servant in moving from one department to another has to support conflicting positions? Such a dilemma is illustrative of the other and more important causes of civil service action, such as reference to ministerial/ departmental protocols, wider political concerns, and the appearance of impartiality. In other words, civil servants are classic policy brokers. However, the ACF gives scant attention to the process of policy brokers, because advocacy coalitions are the main causes of policy change. Again, then, this seems to go against the whole ethos of networks or subsystem research which focuses on the brokerage process. Therefore, the ACF seems to revert back to ‘black-box’ conceptions of the policy process in which the political system is relatively ignored in favour of the wider political environment (Easton, 1965).
Conclusion
This paper has applied the Advocacy Coalition Framework to analyze Information Communication Technology policy change from 1990 to 2002 in China. This study has deal with the concepts of the ACF generally. Some of ACF key concepts have been examined in this paper. It also reviewed the history of ICT policy change in China. Policy change occurs within a social, economic and political context, and involves competition policy change. Sabatier is particularly interested in the role of technical information and ideology throughout the policy process (Sabatier, 1993
These cases showed that different types of knowledge can affect the policy change process. According to Sabatier, which consider the role of knowledge, ideas and learning as key components in the policy change process (Sabatier, 1993
However, China as a developing country there are some difficulties to use the ACF to analyze policy change. As Dror mentioned that because the dearth of reliable data on developing states and of suitable methods for dealing with such data makes it even less possible to estimate the net probable real output of policymaking in developing states than in modern states (Dror, 1968). There are practical limitations of the ACF. Firstly, It is difficult to distinguish believe between different coalitions. Secondly the ACF ignore different political system. By neglecting different political system and frequently failing to identify beliefs of different coalitions, these lead to more difficult to apply the ACF in predicting policy change in developing states. Thus the ACF fails to predict convincingly why the policy changes. Further the ACF may be suspect as an afterthought.
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[此贴子已经被angelboy于2008-3-12 8:51:39编辑过]
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