3150.rar
(158.68 KB)
本附件包括：
Oliver Hart
May 2001 Harvard University Norms and the Theory of the Firm
Most standard models of incentives and/or organizations assume that economic agents are self-interested and must rely on formal contracts enforced by the courts to uphold their relationships. In reality, of course, many economic transactions are sustained by self-enforcing (“implicit”) contracts, or norms of behavior, such as honesty or trust. An interesting question to ask is, does ignoring norms/self-enforcing contracts lead to misleading conclusions? That is, would a theory of incentives or organizations that incorporated norms look very different from the standard theory?
3151.rar
(182.52 KB)
本附件包括：
Partnership Firms, Reputation, and Human Capital Forthcoming, American Economic Review Alan D. Morrison Saïd Business School and Merton College, University of Oxford.
William J. Wilhelm, Jr.
McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia; Saïd Business School, University of Oxford.
This version: March, 2004
Abstract In human capital intensive industries where it is difficult to contract upon the training effort of skilled agents a socially suboptimal level of training may occur. We show how partnership organisations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital. Partnerships are illiquid and partners must stay with the firm until clients discover their type and update the firm’s reputation. This renders unskilled agents, who will adversely affect reputation, unwilling to accept partnerships. Skilled agents therefore train the next generation so as to ensure that there is an adequate market for their own shares. We comment upon the salient differences between partnerships and joint stock firms.
3153.rar
(282.5 KB)
本附件包括：
REGULATION FOR CONSERVATIVES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE CASE FOR “ASYMMETRIC PATERNALISM” COLIN CAMERER, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, TED O’DONOGHUE, AND MATTHEW RABIN
In this paper, we are concerned with a third form of regulation: paternalistic regulations that are designed to help on an individual basis. Paternalism treads on consumer sovereignty by forcing, or preventing, choices for the individual’s own good, much as when parents limit their child’s freedom to skip school or eat candy for dinner. Recent research in behavioral economics has identified a variety of decision- making errors that may expand the scope of paternalistic regula-tion. To the extent that the errors identified by behavioral research lead people not to behave in their own best interests, paternalism may prove useful. But, to the extent that paternalism prevents people from behaving in their own best interests, paternalism may prove costly.
3154.rar
(264.59 KB)
本附件包括：
Behavioral Economics and the SEC Stephen J. Choi University of California, Berkeley Adam C. Pritchard Georgetown University; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
USC Center for Law, Economics & Organization CLEO Research Paper No. C03-6 University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-002 Georgetown University Law and Economics Research Paper No. 389560 University of California, Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 115
Instead of attempting to determine when the behavioral biases of regulators outweigh those within the market, we take a different tactic. Because behaviorally flawed (and possibly self-interested) regulators themselves will decide whether market-based biases outweigh regulatory biases, we propose a framework for assessing such regulatory intervention. Our framework varies along two dimensions. The more monopolistic the regulator (such as the SEC), the greater is the presumption against intervention to correct for biases in the market. Monopolistic regulatory agencies provide a fertile environment for behavioral biases to flourish. Second, the more regulations supplant market decisionmaking, the greater is the presumption against such regulations. Market supplanting regulations are particularly prone to entrenchment, making reversal difficult once such regulations have become part of the status quo.
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