On the World's Factory Floor:
How China's workers are changing China and the global economy
China is a big country, with lots of people, and lots of workers, and as its economy has liberalised and
globalised it has built the world's largest manufacturing workforce. Shifts in the scale, price, and
movement of this workforce thus have enormous consequences for both the domestic and global
economies. Whether investors decide to expand capacity in China or to look elsewhere, whether wage
inflation is seeping out of China into the goods overseas consumers buy, or whether China can really
begin its restructuring into a consumption-driven economy, labour is key.
In this Special Report, we take a deep look at labour in China. How big is the urban labour force? How
much are they paid? How fast are wages rising? Is this a macro-economic problem? Is labour still
losing out to capital, and if so, why? Are firms leaving China for other locations because of wage
inflation? How big is China's "surplus" labour force? If it is disappearing, what are the implications?
What needs to be done to support more urban migration into the next century? What would a "New
Socialist Town Policy" look like?
Stephen Green, Ph.D.
Head of Research, China
Tel: +86 21 5887 1230 ext. 5223
Email: Stephen.Green@standardchartered.com
We wish to thank the many academics, government officials and businesspeople, particularly our
customers in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Chongqing who showed us around their factories, who
contributed to this report.
Content
Part I. On the Shanghai building site (pp.3-5)
We start our story on the Shanghai building site. There have been significant wage increases among
unskilled construction workers since 2005. Most of the men we met wanted to return to the countryside -
partly for cultural reasons, and partly because urban social services were closed to them. Land at home
drew them back. Most of their wages are saved for housing and marriage back home.
Part II. Counting the working masses (pp.6-9)
Official figures over-state how urban present-day China is. But they also under-estimate what proportion of
the labour force is working in the factories, as opposed to the fields. In 2005, we believe, China's
urbanisation rate was nearer 37% than the official 43%, though it will have risen a bit since then. We also
count an urban workforce of 330mn, 60mn above the official estimate.
estimate.
Part III. Inflated pay packets (pp. 10-14)
Official wage data counts only relatively well-paid state-sector workers. It misses two thirds of all urban
workers. As a result official numbers exaggerate both the level and growth of urban wages. We estimate
the average urban wage at some CNY 1,250 (USD 160) in 2006, 30% less than the official level. And it is
rising at around 8% y/y, not 15-19% y/y.
Part IV. Ignore the hype: China is still cheap (pp.15-19)
Wages in China are still low. According to our numbers, they are still only about 3% of the US wage and
25% of Mexico's. Other costs, including welfare contributions and corporate tax, will push up costs over the
next few years. However, there are still vast regional disparities in wage rates across China. These are
created by different minimum wage environments, as well as different social insurance regimes. Firms
sensitive to labour costs are 'wage-shopping' and 'tax-shopping' across the country. As a result, most firms
relocating out of the coast are moving inland, rather than offshore.
Part V. A smaller slice of a bigger GDP pie (pp.20-23)
Wage earners' share of the overall income pie is probably falling, although it is probably not in free-fall. As
a result, the share of income going to capital is increasing. This trend has its roots in the growth model -
cheap capital, a lack of labour protection, the bias to heavy industry etc. However, at the same time, there
is some positive news too - real wages are finally rising, and labour force growth seems to have
accelerated over the past few years. It is clear, though, that the growth model still needs fundamental
reform.
Part VI. Is anybody out there? (pp.24-32)
Labour supply growth has slowed while labour demand has accelerated over 2005-06. As a result, wage
pressures have appeared. China's "surplus" labour is disappearing, with major implications for the growth
model. However, the Lewis Turning Point is still likely more than a decade away. This is because more
young workers are arriving in the market, some 5 mn more a year to 2015, and many are wanting to stay
longer in the cities. Moreover, rural income policies have also contributed to urban wage growth - and these
will eventually fade.
Part VII. A New Socialist Town Policy (pp.33-38)
Over 2010-20 China would be well served by a New Socialist Town Policy, one that promotes intelligent
migration into the cities, boosts the urban workforce and makes migration more permanent. Social supports
in the countryside are required, especially pensions, but not grain production-linked subsidies. Access to
urban services - education and healthcare, as well as residency - needs to be opened up to outsiders.