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VOLUME2目录：
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 2
Introduction to the Series v
Contents of the Handbook vii
Preface: Empirical Corporate Finance ix
PART 3: DIVIDENDS, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Chapter 10
Payout Policy
AVNER KALAY and MICHAEL LEMMON 3
Abstract 4
Keywords 5
1. Introduction 6
2. The Miller and Modigliani irrelevance propositions 9
2.1. Dividend policy irrelevance 9
3. Dividends and taxes 10
3.1. Tests of the Brennan model 11
3.2. The ex-dividend day studies 13
3.3. Ex-day and cross-sectional studies 20
3.4. The case of citizen utilities 24
3.5. Recent evidence on dividends and taxes 25
4. Agency relationships and dividend policy 26
4.1. The main claimholders of the firm 26
4.2. Stockholder–Bondholder conflict and dividends 26
4.3. Conflicts of interest between stockholders and other senior claimholders 31
4.4. Ownership versus control and the dividend decision 31
5. Asymmetric information and payout policy 36
5.1. Dividend-signaling models 37
5.2. Dividend smoothing and dividend clienteles 40
5.3. Empirical evidence on signaling 42
6. Share repurchases 44
6.1. Empirical evidence on share repurchases 45
7. Alternative theories and new stylized facts 47
8. Conclusion 48
References 50
xix
xx Contents of Volume 2
Chapter 11
Taxes and Corporate Finance
JOHN R. GRAHAM 59
Abstract 60
Keywords 60
1. Introduction 61
2. Taxes and capital structure—the U.S. tax system 62
2.1. Theory and empirical predictions 62
2.2. Empirical evidence on whether the tax advantage of debt increases firm value 68
2.3. Empirical evidence on whether corporate taxes affect debt vs. equity policy 73
2.4. Empirical evidence on whether personal taxes affect corporate debt vs. equity policy 79
2.5. Beyond debt vs. equity 86
3. Taxes and capital structure—international tax issues 90
3.1. Tax incentives and financial policy in multinational firms: theory and tax rules 91
3.2. Empirical evidence related to multinational tax incentives to use debt 97
3.3. Other predictions and evidence about multinational tax incentives 99
4. Taxes, LBOs, corporate restructuring, and organizational form 100
4.1. Theory and predictions 100
4.2. Empirical evidence 102
5. Taxes and payout policy 105
5.1. Theory and empirical predictions 105
5.2. Empirical evidence on whether firm value is negatively affected by dividend payments 107
5.3. Evidence on whether ex-day stock returns and payout policy are affected by investor taxes 108
6. Taxes and compensation policy 112
6.1. Theory and empirical predictions 112
6.2. Empirical evidence 114
7. Taxes, corporate risk management, and earnings management 118
7.1. Theory and empirical predictions 118
7.2. Empirical evidence 119
8. Tax shelters 120
9. Summary and suggestions for future research 121
References 124
Chapter 12
Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt
MURRAY Z. FRANK and VIDHAN K. GOYAL 135
Abstract 136
Keywords 136
1. Introduction 137
2. Theory 139
2.1. Kinds of theories 139
2.2. The Modigliani-Miller theorem 140
Contents of Volume 2 xxi
2.3. The trade-off theory 141
2.4. The pecking order theory 150
3. Evidence 155
3.1. Financing decisions at the aggregate level 155
3.2. Leverage differences between firms 168
3.3. Studies of leverage changes 179
3.4. Market valuation of leverage changes 188
3.5. Natural experiments 190
3.6. Surveys 192
4. Conclusion 194
5. Appendix: the stylized facts 195
References 197
Chapter 13
Capital Structure and Corporate Strategy
CHRIS PARSONS and SHERIDAN TITMAN 203
Abstract 204
1. Introduction 205
2. Endogeneity 207
3. The determinants of capital structure choice 208
3.1. Debt and the firm–worker relationship 210
3.2. Debt and the firm–customer relationship 214
3.3. Debt and competition 220
4. Conclusion 231
References 233
Chapter 14
Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress
EDITH S. HOTCHKISS, KOSE JOHN, ROBERT M. MOORADIAN and
KARIN S. THORBURN 235
Abstract 236
Keywords 236
1. Introduction 237
2. Theoretical framework 238
2.1. Restructuring of assets and financial contracts 238
2.2. Efficiency issues in recontracting 239
2.3. Rules and procedures of the U.S. bankruptcy code 241
2.4. The choice between private and court-supervised restructuring 243
3. Asset restructuring 245
3.1. Frequency and determinants of asset sales 246
3.2. Do “fire sales” of assets exist? 247
4. Debt workouts 249
4.1. The choice between out-of-court restructuring and formal bankruptcy 249
4.2. Characteristics of debt restructurings 252
xxii Contents of Volume 2
5. Governance of distressed firms 254
5.1. Conflicts of interest and the fiduciary duties of managers and directors 254
5.2. Management and board changes 256
5.3. Management compensation in financial distress 257
5.4. Changes in ownership and control 259
6. Bankruptcy costs 260
6.1. Direct costs 260
6.2. Indirect costs 263
7. The success of chapter 11 reorganization 265
7.1. Outcomes of chapter 11 filings 265
7.2. Post-bankruptcy performance 267
8. International evidence 270
8.1. The United Kingdom: receivership 272
8.2. Sweden: auctions 274
8.3. France: weak creditor rights 277
8.4. Germany: bank-driven reorganizations 278
8.5. Japan: keiretsu banks 279
9. Conclusion 280
References 281
PART 4: TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND MANAGERIAL
INCENTIVES
Chapter 15
Corporate Takeovers
SANDRA BETTON, B. ESPEN ECKBO and KARIN S. THORBURN 291
Abstract 293
Keywords 293
1. Introduction 294
2. Takeover activity 297
2.1. Merger waves 297
2.2. Takeover contests, 1980–2005 301
2.3. Merger negotiation v. public tender offer 313
3. Bidding strategies 317
3.1. Modeling the takeover process 317
3.2. The payment method choice 322
3.3. Toehold bidding 332
3.4. Bid jumps and markup pricing 336
3.5. Takeover defenses 340
3.6. Targets in bankruptcy 349
3.7. Offer premium summary 354
Contents of Volume 2 xxiii
4. Takeover gains 358
4.1. Econometric caveats 358
4.2. Runup- and announcement-period returns 361
4.3. Dollar returns 369
4.4. Estimating expected bidder gains 372
4.5. Post-takeover (long-run) abnormal returns 374
5. Bondholders, executives, and arbitrageurs 380
5.1. Takeovers and bondholder wealth 380
5.2. Takeovers and executive compensation 381
5.3. Merger arbitrage 385
6. Takeovers, competition and antitrust 389
6.1. Efficiency v. market power: predictions 389
6.2. Effects of merger on rival firms 393
6.3. Effects of merger on suppliers and customers 397
6.4. Some implications for antitrust policy 399
7. Summary and conclusions 403
7.1. Takeover activity 403
7.2. Bidding strategies and offer premiums 410
7.3. Takeover gains 413
7.4. Bondholders, executives and arbitrage 414
7.5. Competition and antitrust 415
References 416
Chapter 16
Corporate Restructuring: Breakups and LBOs
B. ESPEN ECKBO and KARIN S. THORBURN 431
Abstract 432
Keywords 433
1. Introduction 434
2. Restructurings and the boundaries of the firm 435
2.1. Breakup transactions 435
2.2. Highly leveraged transactions 437
3. Divestitures 439
3.1. Transaction volume 439
3.2. Valuation effects 439
3.3. Drivers of value creation in divestitures 442
3.4. Corporate governance 444
4. Spinoffs 446
4.1. Transaction volume 447
4.2. Valuation effects 449
4.3. Drivers of value creation in spinoffs 450
xxiv Contents of Volume 2
4.4. Corporate governance 454
4.5. Splitoffs 454
5. Equity carveouts 455
5.1. Transaction volume 456
5.2. Valuation effects 457
5.3. Drivers of value creation in equity carveouts 458
5.4. Agency issues 460
6. Tracking stocks 461
6.1. Transaction volume 461
6.2. Valuation effects 462
6.3. Drivers of value creation in tracking stock 462
6.4. Agency issues 463
7. Leveraged recapitalizations 464
7.1. Transaction volume 464
7.2. Valuation effects 466
7.3. Drivers of value creation in leveraged recapitalizations 466
8. Leveraged buyouts (LBO) 468
8.1. Transaction volume 468
8.2. The LBO capital structure 470
8.3. Value creation in LBOs 472
8.4. Drivers of value creation in LBOs 475
8.5. Industry effects 482
8.6. Organizational longevity and exit 483
9. Conclusions 485
References 486
Chapter 17
Executive Compensation and Incentives
RAJESH K. AGGARWAL 497
Abstract 498
Keywords 498
1. Introduction 499
2. Trends in executive compensation 500
2.1. Short-term components of compensation 500
2.2. Long-term components of compensation 501
2.3. Aggregate measure of compensation 504
2.4. Compensation statistics 505
3. Incentives and agency 508
3.1. Pay-performance sensitivities 508
3.2. How should incentives be set? 511
3.3. Executive discretion 514
3.4. Firm size 514
Contents of Volume 2 xxv
3.5. Accounting returns 514
3.6. Ability 515
3.7. Incentives within firms 516
4. Relative performance evaluation 517
4.1. RPE using industry returns 518
4.2. RPE using market returns 518
5. Do incentives influence firm performance? 519
5.1. Some evidence 519
5.2. What actions are incentives designed to influence? 522
6. Alternatives to the agency view 527
6.1. The skimming view and rent extraction 527
6.2. Pay without performance and stealth compensation 528
6.3. The shortage view 529
6.4. The value of termination 530
6.5. Common agency and boards 532
6.6. Executive compensation and executive beliefs 533
7. Conclusion 533
References 534
Chapter 18
Managing Corporate Risk
CLIFFORD W. SMITH JR. 539
Abstract 540
Keywords 540
1. Introduction 541
2. Risk exposures and hedging 541
2.1. Risk management instruments 541
2.2. Risk exposure 543
3. Benefits of risk management 544
3.1. Ownership structure 545
3.2. Risk shifting within the firm 545
3.3. Taxes 547
3.4. The underinvestment problem 547
3.5. Information problems 548
3.6. Free cash flow problems 549
3.7. Hedging motives and methods 550
4. The costs of risk management 550
5. Evidence on corporate hedging 551
5.1. Investment policy 552
5.2. Financing policy 552
5.3. Managerial incentives 553
5.4. Firm size 553
xxvi Contents of Volume 2
5.5. Taxes 554
5.6. Ownership structure 554
6. Conclusion 554
References 555
Author Index 557
Subject Index

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