by Robert Z. Aliber (Editor), Gylfi Zoega (Editor)
About the Author
Robert Z. Aliber received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Williams College (1952) and Bachelor of Arts (1954) and a Master of Arts (1957) from Cambridge University. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University. He has been a staff econo-mist at the Commission on Money and Credit (1959–61) and at the Committee for Economic Development (1961–64). Aliber served as a senior economic advisor at the United States Agency for International Development (1964–65). He was appointed as an associate professor at the University of Chicago in 1964. He is best known for his contribution to the theory of foreign direct investment. He is the author of revised editions of Charles Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes(Palgrave Macmillan).
Gylfi Zoega received his first degree at the University of Iceland and a PhD in economics from Columbia University in 1993. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Iceland and Birkbeck College, London, since 1993 and an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Central Bank of Iceland. He has followed the financial crisis in Iceland and taken part in the recovery effort for the past ten years. In addition, he has written a number of academic papers on financial turbulence and capital flows and co-authored the book Preludes to the Icelandic Financial Crash in 2011.
About this book
This book addresses the causes and consequences of the international financial crisis of 2008. A range of esteemed contributors explore developments in the United States, where the crisis of 2008 originated, as well as the smallest country affected, Iceland, by evaluating developments since 2008. Currently, many countries are facing similar problems as Iceland did in 2008: this book is of interest to econo-mists and policy makers in these countries to study what happened in Iceland, and why the recovery of that economy was strong and swift. The chapters in this book originate from panel discussions and conferences and explore areas including regulation, state projects and inflation.
Brief contents
1. A Retrospective on the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
Part I. The Source of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
2. The Financial Alchemy That Failed
3. Prudential Regulation and Capital Controls
4. Three Grand State Projects Meet the Financial System
5. The 2008 GFC: Savings or Banking Glut?
6. Capital Flows into the United States Ahead of the Great North Atlantic Financial Crisis
7. The Foreign Capital Flow and Domestic Drivers of the US Financial Crisis and Its Spread Globally
8. Financial Crises and Bank Capital
9. Three Reflections on Banking Regulations and Cross-Border Financial Flows
Part II. Iceland and the 2008 Global Crisis
10. From a Capital Account Surplus to a Current Account Deficit
11. Lessons from the Icelandic Financial Crisis
12. Iceland’s Capital Controls
13. Wage of Failure: Executive Compensation at the Failed Icelandic Banks
14. Financial Policy After the Crisis
15. Business Cycles and Health: Lessons from the Icelandic Economic Collapse
16. Ten Years After: Iceland’s Unfinished Business
17. After 100 Years of Experimenting: One Solution?
18. Iceland Should Replace Its Central Bank with a Currency Board
19. Post-crisis Monetary Policy Reform: Learning the Hard Way
20. Inflation Targeting, Capital Controls, and Currency Intervention in Iceland, 2012–2017
Part III. Panel Discussion on the 2008 Crisis
21. Summary of Panel Discussion
Pages: 443 pages
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan; 1st ed. 2019 edition (August 5, 2019)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 3030123944
ISBN-13: 978-3030123949
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