我之前有一个非常粗略的估算，就是大概30%的可能性，俄国会以某种方式侵入乌克兰。而最近的发展，让我更加相信，战争的可能性进一步提高了。

关键的发展是：

乌克兰不是北约成员，俄国入侵，西方无法对俄国宣战；西方已经明确了对俄国的经济战策略，他们忘记了一点，普京集团和俄国利益的分离，经济战并不能遏制普京；

疫情期间，普京更加封闭，精神状态可能处于比较偏执的状态，而他们从世界观上面，认定了东升西降，他们真的怀有改变现有秩序的想法；

中国方面的慎重态度非常值得琢磨，普京到访中国一定是带来了至关重要的信息；

目前西方的策略让普京找不到台阶，双方的核心诉求差距较大，这种被羞辱的感觉更容易让普京采取极端行为，更何况，他认为极端行为的后果并不严重；

今天美国外交事务整理了过去30年俄国外交政策的几个关键变化点，非常值得一读：

After the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers expected Russia to peacefully settle into the global political order. Writing in 1992, Andrei Kozyrev—Russia’s first post-Soviet foreign minister—pledged cooperation with the world’s other powers. Moscow, he wrote, would be “an honest partner complying with the established rules of the game.” It would continue to prioritize its national interests, “but these will be interests understandable to democratic countries, and Russia will be defending them through interaction with partners, not through confrontation.”

Kozyrev, however, warned that many Russians would welcome politicians with a “vision of restoring Russia in its grandeur to the borders of the former U.S.S.R.” And two years later, Dimitri Simes wrote that the country was experiencing “new elements of autocracy and heavy-handedness” that could lead to an aggressive foreign policy. “There is a demonstrable new readiness to use Russian forces stationed in the near abroad,” he noted.

After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Charles King wrote that the Kremlin “has embarked on a new era of muscular intervention, showing little faith in multilateral