Credit Suisse：China-Leverage and De-leveraging [推广有奖]

3月20号，瑞信谈了中国的杠杆率与去杠杆，值得一读，21页：

High and rising leverage has been a well-known problem for the Chinese economy in the past six to seven years. We believe the sudden attention it gets from the Chinese government is due to the emergence of a new phenomenon – rising leverage of the financial sector. With a very stable short-term interbank repo market, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in China leveraged up aggressively to buy longer maturity bonds. As a result, the interbank lending (rolling 12 month total) rose from around 100% of GDP to the peak of 350% in last November before government tightening to raise the short-term repo rate as well as creating more volatility. The rise in short-term bond repo rate after the tightening will drive up the effectively lending and deposit rate in China, but not likely to have too much influence on overall credit growth.

In past few years, borrowing from households (mainly mortgage), government (both formal government bond as well as LGFV debt for infrastructure projects) and property companies were growing fastest, particularly after 2014. In contrast, the growth of industrial sector borrowing was rather slow. The current focus of debt-to-equity swap of industrial SOEs by the government, despite a good move, may not be able to solve a large part of the problem.

At some point, the government will have to force two policy dilemmas related to de-leveraging: 1) without a vibrant property market, it is difficult to reduce the property sector leverage; and 2) if infrastructure investment is slowed down to reduce borrowing for the purpose of de-leveraging, it will hurt economic growth. In 2017, we don’t expect credit growth to slow down much, but there will be more corporate loans (infrastructure) and less household loans (mortgage) given the current policy preference. Post 2018, this will be issues need to be addressed by the new administration.

In the long run, if the government wants to keep growth around current level, credit growth will have to keep at around 14%, and it is difficult to bring down the country’s leverage with credit growth at this pace. In contrast, if credit growth slows to 7%, nominal GDP growth may fall to as slow as 2% based on historical relationship.

The chance for a domestic financial crisis is low in China given the high savings ratio of the domestic economy and the government’s effective ownership of all key financial institutions. However, with the leverage of the economy becomes much higher, effectiveness of credit expansion to boost economic growth is reducing. For example, in 2009 only 19% of new credit was used for interest payment, but this ratio surged to 51% in 2014 before dropping to 35% in 2016, due to lowering interest rate environment and expensive LGFV loans shifted to lower cost government bonds. However, if interest rate rise again, it is entirely possible for this ratio to rise above the previous peak.



20170320-Credit Suisse-China：Leverage and De-leveraging.pdf (1.04 MB, 需要: 5 个论坛币)

2017-4-1 12:14:23 上传

需要: 5 个论坛币  [购买]