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摘要翻译：
我考虑信息商品的垄断定价。购买者愿意为信息付费，是通过推断决策过程中行为的未知收益来实现的。垄断的卖方和买方都观察到一个关于收益的私人信号。卖方的信号是二进制的，她可以承诺出售她的信号的任何统计实验给买方。假设买方决策问题涉及丰富的行动，我刻画了利润最大化菜单。它包含一系列的实验，每个实验包含不同数量的信息。我还发现了顾客的私人信息和信息提供之间的一个互补：当顾客的私人信号信息更多时，最优菜单包含的实验信息更多。
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英文标题：
《Selling Information》
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作者：
Weijie Zhong
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal about the payoffs. The seller's signal is binary and she can commit to sell any statistical experiment of her signal to the buyer. Assuming that buyer's decision problem involves rich actions, I characterize the profit maximizing menu. It contains a continuum of experiments, each containing different amount of information. I also find a complementarity between buyer's private information and information provision: when buyer's private signal is more informative, the optimal menu contains more informative experiments.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.06770
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