零工经济中的自尊工人：一个动态的委托代理 模型

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摘要翻译：
我们引入了一个动态的委托代理模型来理解雇主和独立零工之间的合同的性质。我们用内生参与约束对工人的自尊进行了建模；当且仅当一份工作的效用至少与他的参考值一样大时，他才接受一份工作，参考值是基于以前实现的工资的平均数。如果捕捉工人需求的动态变化的参考值太高，则在参考值达到阈值之前不签订合同。低于临界值，合同被提供和接受，工人的工资需求遵循一个随机过程。我们将我们的模型应用于不同的劳动力市场结构，并研究了第一最佳和第二最佳的解决方案。我们表明，一个有远见的雇主可能会牺牲瞬时利润来调节代理人的需求。那些能够承受因较低的主观贴现率而使生产停滞的雇主将获得较高的利润。我们的模型通过一个脆弱性参数来捕捉工人的议价能力，该参数衡量失业时他的工资需求下降的速度。通过低脆弱性参数，工人可以承受失业，不需要不惜一切代价去找工作。相反，具有高度脆弱性的工人可能会被雇主利用，在这种情况下，我们的模型也表现出自我利用。
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英文标题：
《Self-respecting worker in the gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent
  model》
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作者：
Zsolt Bihary, P\'eter Cs\'oka, P\'eter Ker\'enyi and Alexander
  Szimayer
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--

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英文摘要：
  We introduce a dynamic principal-agent model to understand the nature of contracts between an employer and an independent gig worker. We model the worker's self-respect with an endogenous participation constraint; he accepts a job offer if and only if its utility is at least as large as his reference value, which is based on the average of previously realized wages. If the dynamically changing reference value capturing the worker's demand is too high, then no contract is struck until the reference value hits a threshold. Below the threshold, contracts are offered and accepted, and the worker's wage demand follows a stochastic process. We apply our model to different labor market structures and investigate first-best and second-best solutions. We show that a far-sighted employer may sacrifice instantaneous profit to regulate the agent's demand. Employers who can afford to stall production due to a lower subjective discount rate will obtain higher profits. Our model captures the worker's bargaining power by a vulnerability parameter that measures the rate at which his wage demand decreases when unemployed. With a low vulnerability parameter, the worker can afford to go unemployed and need not take a job at all costs. Conversely, a worker with high vulnerability can be exploited by the employer, and in this case our model also exhibits self-exploitation.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.10021

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关键词：委托代理 Contribution exploitation Quantitative Independent 参数 vulnerability contracts 捕捉 失业