摘要翻译:
各国政府花费数十亿美元补贴不同商品的采用。然而,很难衡量这些货物是否被转售,或被最终收件人估价。这个项目研究一个方案,在世界上最贫穷的国家之一补贴移动电话的采用。卢旺达为选定的农村地区补贴了相当于8%的移动电话存量。我们使用来自占主导地位的移动电话网络的53亿交易记录来分析该程序。交易记录显示了补贴手机最终被使用的地点和数量,以及转售的指标。一些补贴手机从农村地区转移到城市中心,但补贴手机的使用量与零售价购买的手机一样多,这表明它们是有价值的。收件人类似于那些支付电话费用的人,但彼此之间高度联系。然后,我们使用一个网络需求系统模拟福利影响,该系统说明每个人的采纳如何影响网络的其他部分。溢出效应是巨大的:由补贴产生的运营商收入的73-76%来自非接受者。我们将制定的补贴计划与基于不同网络启发式的反事实目标计划进行了比较。
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英文标题:
《The Effect of Network Adoption Subsidies: Evidence from Digital Traces
in Rwanda》
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作者:
Daniel Bj\"orkegren and Burak Ceyhun Karaca
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:Economics 经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要:
Governments spend billions of dollars subsidizing the adoption of different goods. However, it is difficult to gauge whether those goods are resold, or are valued by their ultimate recipients. This project studies a program to subsidize the adoption of mobile phones in one of the poorest countries in the world. Rwanda subsidized the equivalent of 8% of the stock of mobile phones for select rural areas. We analyze the program using 5.3 billion transaction records from the dominant mobile phone network. Transaction records reveal where and how much subsidized handsets were ultimately used, and indicators of resale. Some subsidized handsets drifted from the rural areas where they were allocated to urban centers, but the subsidized handsets were used as much as handsets purchased at retail prices, suggesting they were valued. Recipients are similar to those who paid for phones, but are highly connected to each other. We then simulate welfare effects using a network demand system that accounts for how each person's adoption affects the rest of the network. Spillovers are substantial: 73-76% of the operator revenue generated by the subsidy comes from nonrecipients. We compare the enacted subsidy program to counterfactual targeting based on different network heuristics.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.05791