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中国的财务丑闻何时爆发
文章来源：经济学人
Markets in China are barely fazed by scandal, unlessthe state is involved
中国的资本市场很少会因为丑闻而受到冲击，除非牵涉到ZF
近来，一批在中国境外上市的中国公司在遭到财务造假的指控后相继遭遇抛售而股价大跌，更甚者被摘牌退市，而这些中国公司的卖空者们则欢呼雀跃。譬如拿嘉汉林业，一家在加拿大上市的林业公司，在一家研究机构质疑其财务造假后，其股价从今年三月的每股25.3加元暴跌至六月的每股1.99加元。（嘉汉林业已公开表态否认这些指控，并许诺将聘请一独立委员会进行审阅）。
当一家公司遭遇财务欺诈的指控后，其股票必然会遭到抛售并随之股价暴跌，但也许中国例外。那些在中国公司的丑闻事件中起决定性影响的因素与其它大多数地方都不同。
最近，一份来自三位学者的研究报告*（译者注：注释请见文末）针对1997年至2005年期间发生的数百起在上海及深证两地证券交易所交易的上市公司丑闻事件进行了研究，结果出人意料。诸如美国及其他健全的资本市场财务舞弊、资金挪用或是商业贿赂等类似违规事件的曝光会立刻引发违规公司股价暴跌，丧失短期融资能力及管理层、董事会撤换等连锁反应，在中国并非对涉嫌公司的股价毫无影响，但是需要另一个必备条件：ZF的牵连。
研究显示，对于仅仅陷入会计丑闻等破坏了市场经济契约的公司，在事件曝光前后6个月，即合计一年期间内，其股价平均下跌8.8%。（译者注：论文原文对这个比例的表述为cumulative abnormal stock returns，可理解为累积问题证券回报率，与本文的描述稍有出入，为了更靠近论文所表述观点，这里增加了一些描述）另一方面，对于那些牵涉到ZF官员受贿，或是盗用国有资产等丑闻的破坏ZF关系契约的事件，股价平均下跌近三分之一。
当然对于这些丑闻的曝光，股价下跌只是一方面。在西方国家，牵涉到ZF的丑闻事件的曝光，同时会使违规公司陷入短期负债追讨及董事会成员变动等危机中。然后那些被揭露财务造假并破坏了市场经济契约的中国公司却很少会遭遇如此困境。
造成这一差别的原因在于，西方的市场经济是建立在法律监督下强制执行的契约之上，建立在以可靠财务信息为基础的，企业投资者，供应商，消费者等企业利益相关方的市场经济行为之上。相比之下，在中国及其他一些市场经济欠发达的国家，商业行为主要依靠ZF及社会关系，而非市场经济下的契约。这使得丑闻影响中国公司的过程变的不同。
与ZF保持良好的关系是至关重要的：与ZF的亲密关系可以使企业享受到低成本的资金，土地，商业合同以及常常被忽视的（但显然非常危险）利益输送。因为中国没有公正的司法体系，中国企业在进行交易时，常常困惑于是否应该信任陌生的客户或者供应商。而司法的判决也许常常受到企业与ZF官员关系的左右。如果类似的司法腐败，受ZF丑闻所牵连，一同大白于天下，违规企业将无法继续正常经营。
不仅资本市场会有如此反应，ZF官员同样如此。在中国，投资人及其他利益相关者成为会计造价等控诉的受害者时，惩罚力度仍然不足。然而一旦国家成为经济犯罪的受害者，惩罚将极为严厉。一个伪造假币的团伙在今年7月被判刑，其中主犯被判死刑。
长期以来，人们一直认为随着中国市场经济的不断发展，中国企业会更加西方化，在市场经济中运营，而不是依靠向ZF寻租获取利益。现在这个设想也许需要重新审视了，不仅因为中国的大ZF继续着对市场经济的干涉，并且一些西方的市场经济体开始向中国的体制靠近了。
譬如美国及英国ZF，金融危机爆发后，他们成为了几家大型金融机构及工业企业的大股东（尽管是无奈之下的）。之前那片论文所提及的结论-新兴经济体中，与ZF间的亲密关系，而不是公司的投资者，决定了公司的价值-也许也将适用于发达国家。
* “ZF关系契约及市场经济契约下的公司价值：基于中国公司丑闻的实证研究”，MingyiHung，T.J. Wong 和Fang Zhang著（译者注：2011年5月）
原文：
SHORT-SELLERS havebeen feasting of late on a crop of Chinese companies whose shares havecollapsed on foreign markets amid allegations of deceptive accounting. TakeSino Forest, a forestry firm listed in Canada, whose shares slumped fromC$25.30 ($26) in March to as low as C$1.99 in June after a research outfit questioned itsaccounts (Sino Forest has denied the claims and has commissioned a review by anindependent committee).
A sharp fall in acompany’s share price after allegations of deceptive accounting is hardlyunexpected, except perhaps in China. What matters in a scandal there is alittle different from in most other places.
A recent study bythree academics* looks at several hundred scandals linked to companies tradedon the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 1997 and 2005. Theirresults are striking. Revelations of financial fraud and various other similarcrimes, such as embezzlement and kickbacks, are not entirely irrelevant to acompany’s share price. But to trigger the sort of collapse in a company’sstock, the loss of short-term financing and the managerial and board changesthat occur in America or other developed markets requires another element inChina: the involvement of the state.
The study foundthat companies caught up in mere accounting scandals saw their shares drop byan average of 8.8% over the six months on either side of the incident. In thoseinvolving the bribery of government officials or theft of state assets, on theother hand, the stock fell by almost a third.
Collapsing shareprices tell only part of the story. Companies caught up in funny business involvingthe government faced a withdrawal of short-term financing and changes to theboard—responses common in Western companies implicated in all sorts of scandalbut rare among Chinese companies caught cooking the books.
The reason for thedifference is that Western markets rely on contracts being enforced by courtsand on investors, suppliers and customers all acting on the basis of auditedaccounts. In China and other less developed markets, by contrast, business isdone on the basis of political and social relationships, not numbers. Thatchanges the dynamic of a scandal.
Staying pals withthe government is extraordinarily important: it can lead to cheap financing,land and contracts, along with one other often overlooked (but absolutelycritical) benefit. Because China lacks an impartial judicial system, Chinesecompanies are often at a loss as to whom they can trust when dealing with newcustomers or suppliers. “Legal” redress for a problem may often hinge on acompany’s relationship with officials. If that is compromised and the lossbecomes public knowledge—as would happen with the disclosure of agovernment-related scandal—the company’s ability to operate will be undermined.
It is not justmarkets that behave this way: officials seem to as well. Reports ofprosecutions in China over dodgy accounting in cases where investors or clientsare victims remain scarce. But the penalties for financial crimes when thestate is the victim can be extreme. A group of people found guilty ofcounterfeiting money were sentenced to death in July.
It has long beenassumed that as China’s market evolved, it would come to look more like theWest with the legitimacy of Chinese companies hinging on their own accountsrather than their ties to the government. That assumption may be worth re-examining,not only because China’s vast state apparatus shows little interest in sheddingcontrol but also because some Western markets are starting to look a bit morelike China’s.
Since thefinancial crisis governments in America and Britain, to name but two, havebecome large shareholders (albeit reluctant ones) in financial and industrialcompanies. The conclusions of the academics’ paper—that the value of a companyin developing markets is tied more tightly to its relationship with thegovernment than its investors—may become the new normal elsewhere too.
* “The Value ofRelationship-based and Market-based Contracting: Evidence from CorporateScandals in China”, by Mingyi Hung, T.J. Wong and Fang Zhang.
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