中国经济发展的动力

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一个国家的经济发展动力有出口（外需）、投资和消费（内需），中国自改革开放依赖主要的动力是出口和投资，而消费相对不足为民众所诟病，这里隐含了背后的分配问题，腐败和贫富分化是民众不满的核心。

每个国家都有自己独特的国情，所以不能完全照套其他国家的发展经验。中国当前的发展动力有中央集权和人口红利，这两个基点支撑了中国的出口和投资，由中央集权支撑的工业体系、国有企业、计划生育、国家产权（土地、矿产等诸多资源都归国家所有）和基础建设，这些成为近30年中国发展的核心推动力；同时还有人口红利，这种人口红利是相对于全球化而言的，如果没有全球化，人口暴增只能对一个国家产生不稳定和灾难，即使在全球化格局下，如果一个国家在全球竞争中没有抢占到足够的发展机遇的话，人口红利会变成人口负担，中国是一个巨体量的国家，这种体量使得中国哪怕以很低水平的人均水平对世界的影响也是惊人的，关键在于中国的人口和中央集权紧密结合的，中央集权推动了教育（扫盲）和卫生，使得中国在全球化的产业转移中具有竞争优势，印度缺乏足够的中央集权，使得印度在教育和卫生方面不能改善人口素质，也就是中国虽然在人均水平上任显不足，但是在整体上还是改善了人口素质，这是在解放后至改革开放时国家奠定的基础，这已经成为中国开放以后发展的基础面。


中央集权是中国目前经济发展的优势，但有利必有弊，中央集权或许对国家创新有一些不利的影响，同时还有分配问题，这些都会由中央集权支生出来隐疾，而当出口和投资达到极限的时候，则是由消费来拉动经济发展，而内需对应的是创新和分配问题，也就是产业升级和福利制度。

就出口而言，中国似乎已经触碰到某种瓶颈，发达国家市场开始萎缩，但是由于中国的政治扩张，中国在广大的亚非拉推进市场扩张，因而现在的出口仍然在增长，但是这个增长还是有极限的，发展中国家市场已经成为中国的新奶酪。

投资仍然是未来中国一二十年发展的核心支柱，因为中国的城市化还有相当大的空间，中国目前的城镇化率刚好超过50%，这个数据应该是显性的，如果考虑到隐形的数据，可能已经高达65%，而达到实质90%的城市化正是中国未来的发展空间，这是内生的发展空间，可以填补出口瓶颈，投资和城市化对应了后面的基础建设、商业化（第三产业就业）和农业工业化。而投资的潜力正是建立在中央集权基础之上的，很多国家在此不同于中国，事实上整个东亚经济体的发展都有极强的集权性，这也是东亚地区经济发展超越其他后发国家的关键。

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关键词：中国经济发展 中国经济 经济发展 发展中国家 中国的出口 中国经济 中央集权 国有企业 贫富分化 改革开放

目前中国的高速发展类似于苏联前期的发展，这里都体现了集权的优势性，但这是国家发展某一历史阶段的需要，而苏联由于理论的束缚，难以在国家发展到一定水平时需要自我变革时难以自我超越，在此中国又不同于苏联，中国引入了市场经济，这样从内在摆脱了苏联那种疾患。

创新和商业具有很强的相关性，中国的中央集权和计划经济有高度的自然契合，在中国追赶发达国家时，中央集权会是中国的优势，但是当中国需要依靠自己的创新能力来推动自身经济发展时，甚至推动人类文明发展时，可能中央集权会显现出体系上的弊端出来，这里并非否定中国人的创新能力，只是对由于中央集权和计划经济的影响使得中国的国家创新存在瓶颈产生隐忧，这里隐含了未来中国的又一次变革的可能性，在政治大一统和生态多样性上要有平衡。

分配制度的变革是推动消费的关键，欧洲、美国和日本的福利制度将是中国福利制度的学习基础，当然中国要在他们的经验基础上按照中国的国情进行改造，但是发达国家的福利理念对于中国应该是最核心的，此外还有腐败治理，而腐败治理背后有中央集权这个特殊国情，这里需要中国有超越先发国家的政治创新。但是不管是福利还是腐败，其背后都涉及到国家产权这个模糊的产权，当前国家产权更多被中央集权垄断，在官民之间有诸多矛盾，这里需要制度创新来均衡彼此的矛盾，很多经济问题其实都是由此支生的，国家资源和国有企业都是支生于国家产权基础之上的，从理论、到制度、到执行需要一系列的理论创新来解决现实问题。国家产权表面上很明晰简单，但是由于牵涉太多利益主体，而主体之间的利益分配使得共有产权产生的利益矛盾引发各种冲突，如何实现均衡同时又不影响国家发展动力，这需要政治智慧和理论创新能力。

中国未来十年的发展动力还是无虞的，但是十年之后，创新、产业升级、分配等问题将会决定中国，这些问题不能解决，内需将会陷入瓶颈，无法真正成为经济发展动力。

  Broken BRICs   （毁了的“金砖四国）”（转载）

全球经济中提到最多的趋势是所谓的“其它国家”的崛起。过去的几年见证了许多发展中国家经济迅速接近发达国家水平。此现象背后最重要的动力来自四个主要的新兴市场国家，即“金砖四国”。

Why the Rest Stopped Rising
By Ruchir Sharma
November/December 2012

为何“其它国家”停止增长？

Over the past several years, the most talked-about trend in the global economy has been the so-called rise of the rest, which saw the economies of many developing countries swiftly converging with those of their more developed peers. The primary engines behind this phenomenon were the four major emerging-market countries, known as the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The world was witnessing a once-in-a-lifetime shift, the argument went, in which the major players in the developing world were catching up to or even surpassing their counterparts in the developed world.

全球经济中提到最多的趋势是所谓的“其它国家”的崛起。过去的几年见证了许多发展中国家经济迅速接近发达国家水平。此现象背后最重要的动力来自四个主要的新兴市场国家，即“金砖四国”：巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国。世界见证着一生一次的转变，持这种主张的人说：主要的发展中国家正在赶超主要的发达国家。

These forecasts typically took the developing world's high growth rates from the middle of the last decade and extended them straight into the future, juxtaposing them against predicted sluggish growth in the United States and other advanced industrial countries. Such exercises supposedly proved that, for example, China was on the verge of overtaking the United States as the world's largest economy-a point that Americans clearly took to heart, as over 50 percent of them, according to a Gallup poll conducted this year, said they think that China is already the world's "leading" economy, even though the U.S. economy is still more than twice as large (and with a per capita income seven times as high).

这些经济预测通常假设2005年左右发展中国家的高增长率会延续到将来。与之相并列的是预言美国和其它先进工业国增长疲缓。据说有例子可以证明。中国快要夺走美国最大经济体的宝座。这点美国人记住了--据今年的一次盖普洛民意调查，超过一半的美国人认为（中国已经是世界“最大”经济体），即使美国经济规模比前者的两倍还多（且美国人均收入是中国的七倍）。

As with previous straight-line projections of economic trends, however-such as forecasts in the 1980s that Japan would soon be number one economically-later returns are throwing cold water on the extravagant predictions. With the world economy heading for its worst year since 2009, Chinese growth is slowing sharply, from double digits down to seven percent or even less. And the rest of the BRICs are tumbling, too: since 2008, Brazil's annual growth has dropped from 4.5 percent to two percent; Russia's, from seven percent to 3.5 percent; and India's, from nine percent to six percent.

然而，正如过去的那些对经济趋势的直线投射（译注：指上文中，将当前增长率直接用于预测未来发展），例如八十年代有人预言日本将不久成为世界经济第一，后来的结果给那些夸张的预测浇一盆冷水。在世界经济处于自2009年以来最坏的一个年头，中国经济增长突然放缓，增长率从两位数降到7%或甚至更少。剩下的金砖三国也不好过：从2008年巴西年增长从4.5%降到2%；俄罗斯从7%跌至3.5%；印度则从9%落到6%。

None of this should be surprising, because it is hard to sustain rapid growth for more than a decade. The unusual circumstances of the last decade made it look easy: coming off the crisis-ridden 1990s and fueled by a global flood of easy money, the emerging markets took off in a mass upward swing that made virtually every economy a winner. By 2007, when only three countries in the world suffered negative growth, recessions had all but disappeared from the international scene. But now, there is a lot less foreign money flowing into emerging markets. The global economy is returning to its normal state of churn, with many laggards and just a few winners rising in unexpected places. The implications of this shift are striking, because economic momentum is power, and thus the flow of money to rising stars will reshape the global balance of power.

这并不奇怪，因为很难在十多年间保持经济高速增长。过去十年不寻常的环境使郑州看起来简单：新兴市场从危机四伏的九十年代脱身，又收到全球巨额热钱的刺激。它们一下子集体高速增长，让每个经济体好像都是赢家。至2007年，全球只有三个国家经济负增长，萧条几乎从国际视野消失。而今，流入新兴市场的外汇大大减少。全球经济被打回原形，重回一团浆糊。大多数国家经济放缓，只有少数几个赢家出现在意想不到的地方。这种转变的含义引人注目，因为经济动力意味着权力，所以资金流向崛起的明星国家将重塑全球权力平衡格局。

FOREVER EMERGING

永远的新兴国家

The notion of wide-ranging convergence between the developing and the developed worlds is a myth. Of the roughly 180 countries in the world tracked by the International Monetary Fund, only 35 are developed. The markets of the rest are emerging-and most of them have been emerging for many decades and will continue to do so for many more. The Harvard economist Dani Rodrik captures this reality well. He has shown that before 2000, the performance of the emerging markets as a whole did not converge with that of the developed world at all. In fact, the per capita income gap between the advanced and the developing economies steadily widened from 1950 until 2000. There were a few pockets of countries that did catch up with the West, but they were limited to oil states in the Gulf, the nations of southern Europe after World War II, and the economic "tigers" of East Asia. It was only after 2000 that the emerging markets as a whole started to catch up; nevertheless, as of 2011, the difference in per capita incomes between the rich and the developing nations was back to where it was in the 1950s.

发达国家和发展中国家广泛的趋同是一个遥不可及的神话。在国际货币基金组织记录在案的大约180个国家中，只有35个是发达国家，其余的都是新兴市场，他们中大部分都已经“新兴”了几十年了，并且会一直”新兴“下去。哈佛经济学家 Dani Rodrik 敏锐的发现了这个现象。他指出，在2000年前，新兴市场整体表现完全达不到发达国家的水平。事实上， 从1950年到2000年 ，发展中国家和发达国家的人均收入差距一直在稳步扩大。期间有少部分达到了西方的水平，但是他们仅限于海湾地区的石油国家，二战后的南欧国家和亚洲的四小龙，而且，直到2000年后，新兴市场作为一个整体才开始迎头赶上。然而，截至2011年，发达国家和发展中国家的人均收入差距又重新回到上世纪50年代的水平。

This is not a negative read on emerging markets so much as it is simple historical reality. Over the course of any given decade since 1950, on average, only a third of the emerging markets have been able to grow at an annual rate of five percent or more. Less than one-fourth have kept up that pace for two decades, and one-tenth, for three decades. Only Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong have maintained this growth rate for four decades. So even before the current signs of a slowdown in the BRICs, the odds were against Brazil experiencing a full decade of growth above five percent, or Russia, its second in a row.

这与其说是对新兴市场的消极解读，不如说是一个简单的历史事实。1950年以来任意十年中， 平均只有三分之一的新兴市场年增长率达到5%及以上。 能保持这个增长速度达20年 的不到四分之一，达到30年的不到十分之一，只有马来西亚，新加坡，韩国，台湾，泰国以及香港保持这个速度增长了四十年。所以，即使在金砖四国经济呈现放缓迹象之前，巴西能连续十年保持平均年增长5%以上的机会也不大。同理，俄罗斯能连续两个十年保持年增长5%以上的机会也十分渺茫。

Meanwhile, scores of emerging markets have failed to gain any momentum for sustained growth, and still others have seen their progress stall after reaching middle-income status. Malaysia and Thailand appeared to be on course to emerge as rich countries until crony capitalism, excessive debts, and overpriced currencies caused the Asian financial meltdown of 1997-98. Their growth has disappointed ever since. In the late 1960s, Burma (now officially called Myanmar), the Philippines, and Sri Lanka were billed as the next Asian tigers, only to falter badly well before they could even reach the middle-class average income of about $5,000 in current dollar terms. Failure to sustain growth has been the general rule, and that rule is likely to reassert itself in the coming decade.

同时，许多新兴市场无力支撑经济增长的势头，其中一部分在达到中等收入水平后，经济进入停滞状态。之前马来西亚和泰国似乎有望成为发达国家，直至权贵资本主义、过度的债务以及过高的货币导致1997-98年的亚洲金融危机。从那以后，他们的经济增长令人失望。在60年代后期，缅甸，菲律宾和斯里兰卡被誉为下一批亚洲老虎，但尚未达到人均5千美元（今天的价值）这一中等收入水平就止步不前。难以维持经济持续增长已经成为通用的规律，这个规律可能在未来十年再一次体现出来。

In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, emerging markets became such a celebrated pillar of the global economy that it is easy to forget how new the concept of emerging markets is in the financial world. The first coming of the emerging markets dates to the mid-1980s, when Wall Street started tracking them as a distinct asset class. Initially labeled as "exotic," many emerging-market countries were then opening up their stock markets to foreigners for the first time: Taiwan opened its up in 1991; India, in 1992; South Korea, in 1993; and Russia, in 1995. Foreign investors rushed in, unleashing a 600 percent boom in emerging-market stock prices (measured in dollar terms) between 1987 and 1994. Over this period, the amount of money invested in emerging markets rose from less than one percent to nearly eight percent of the global stock-market total.

在二十一世纪开始的十年里，新兴市场成为全球经济重要的支柱，这让人很容易忽视“新兴市场”是一个全新的概念。新兴市场首次出现要追溯到1980年代中期，当时华尔街把它们作为一个独立的资产类别。一开始贴上的标签是＂新奇＂，很多新兴市场是首次对外开放股票市场：台湾于1991年开放，印度是1992年，韩国是1993年，俄罗斯是1995年。外国投资者的大量涌入，引发了1987-1994年新兴市场股票价格600%的增长（以美元计算）。在此期间，投入新兴市场的资金从最初低于全球股市总和的1%上升到近8%。

This phase ended with the economic crises that struck from Mexico to Turkey between 1994 and 2002. The stock markets of developing countries lost almost half their value and shrank to four percent of the global total. From 1987 to 2002, developing countries' share of global GDP actually fell, from 23 percent to 20 percent. The exception was China, which saw its share double, to 4.5 percent. The story of the hot emerging markets, in other words, was really about one country.

这个阶段结束于1994-2002年从墨西哥至土耳其的经济危机。发展中国家的股市市值损失了近一半，降至全球总量的4%。1987至2002年间，发展中国家占全球GDP总值的份额从23%下降至20%。中国是个例外，其市场份额翻倍，达到4.5%。关于新兴市场火热的故事，换句话说，只表现在一个国家。

The second coming began with the global boom in 2003, when emerging markets really started to take off as a group. Their share of global GDP began a rapid climb, from 20 percent to the 34 percent that they represent today (attributable in part to the rising value of their currencies), and their share of the global stock-market total rose from less than four percent to more than ten percent. The huge losses suffered during the global financial crash of 2008 were mostly recovered in 2009, but since then, it has been slow going.

第二个繁荣期始于2003年，新兴市场作为一个整体开始腾飞。他们在全球GDP中份额迅速攀升，从20%升至现在的34%（部分由于本国货币价值的上升），所占全球股市总值从低于4%上升至高于10%。
在2008年全球金融危机中蒙受巨大损失，虽然在2009年大部分新兴市场得到恢复，但至此之后，经济发展一直处于缓慢状态。


The third coming, an era that will be defined by moderate growth in the developing world, the return of the boom-bust cycle, and the breakup of herd behavior on the part of emerging-market countries, is just beginning. Without the easy money and the blue-sky optimism that fueled investment in the last decade, the stock markets of developing countries are likely to deliver more measured and uneven returns. Gains that averaged 37 percent a year between 2003 and 2007 are likely to slow to, at best, ten percent over the coming decade, as earnings growth and exchange-rate values in large emerging markets have limited scope for additional improvement after last decade's strong performance.

第三个时期才刚开始，其特点为：发展中世界的温和增长、再现繁荣与萧条的交替轮回、以及新兴市场国家羊群效应的崩溃。过去十年里推动投资热潮的宽松货币政策和盲目的乐观情绪已经不存在了，发展中国家股市的回报收益可能会表现得更为谨慎和不均。在最好的情况下，2003-2007年37%的平均年收益在未来十年将放慢到10%，在过去十年经济的强劲表现之后，新兴市场的收入增长和汇率值将会遏制其进一步的发展。

PAST ITS SELL-BY DATE

超过了“保质期”

No idea has done more to muddle thinking about the global economy than that of the BRICs. Other than being the largest economies in their respective regions, the big four emerging markets never had much in common. They generate growth in different and often competing ways-Brazil and Russia, for example, are major energy producers that benefit from high energy prices, whereas India, as a major energy consumer, suffers from them. Except in highly unusual circumstances, such as those of the last decade, they are unlikely to grow in unison. China apart, they have limited trade ties with one another, and they have few political or foreign policy interests in common.

在世界经济理论中，没有比金砖四国概念更能混淆视听的了。除了各自是本地区的最大经济体外，这四个大的新兴市场没有更多的共同点。他们通过不同甚至相互竞争的方式促进经济增长，例如：巴西和俄罗斯，作为主要的能源生产国受益于高昂的能源价格，而印度作为主要的能源消费国则因此受损。除了像过去十年那样的非凡情形，它们不大可能会共同增长。除开中国，其它国家之间的贸易联系相当有限，而在政治和外交政策上，金砖四国也几乎没有共同利益。

A problem with thinking in acronyms is that once one catches on, it tends to lock analysts into a worldview that may soon be outdated. In recent years, Russia's economy and stock market have been among the weakest of the emerging markets, dominated by an oil-rich class of billionaires whose assets equal 20 percent of GDP, by far the largest share held by the superrich in any major economy. Although deeply out of balance, Russia remains a member of the BRICs, if only because the term sounds better with an R. Whether or not pundits continue using the acronym, sensible analysts and investors need to stay flexible; historically, flashy countries that grow at five percent or more for a decade -- such as Venezuela in the 1950s, Pakistan in the 1960s, or Iraq in the 1970s -- are usually tripped up by one threat or another (war, financial crisis, complacency, bad leadership) before they can post a second decade of strong growth.

使用首写字母缩简词思考问题的缺陷在于，一旦这个缩写词流行起来，它倾向于将分析师们锁定在一个或许会很快过时的世界观里。近年来，俄罗斯的经济和股市作为新兴市场中最薄弱的部分，被资产占GDP20%的石油亿万富豪阶层所控制，这也是迄今为止所有主要经济体中超级富豪持有的最大份额。尽管极度不平衡，俄罗斯仍然作为金砖四国的成员之一，或许仅仅是因为加上一个“R”听起来更好罢了。无论专家们是否继续使用BRlCs一词，明智的分析师何投资者也需要保持灵活；从历史上看，增长率保持在5%及以上长达十年的光鲜国家（例如50年代的委内瑞拉、60年代的巴基斯坦和70年代的伊拉克）通常在第二个强劲增长的十年到来之前，由于这样或那样的威胁（战争、金融危机、自满、糟糕的领导阶层）而导致经济增长受阻。

The current fad in economic forecasting is to project so far into the future that no one will be around to hold you accountable. This approach looks back to, say, the seventeenth century, when China and India accounted for perhaps half of global GDP, and then forward to a coming "Asian century," in which such preeminence is reasserted. In fact, the longest period over which one can find clear patterns in the global economic cycle is around a decade. The typical business cycle lasts about five years, from the bottom of one downturn to the bottom of the next, and most practical investors limit their perspectives to one or two business cycles. Beyond that, forecasts are often rendered obsolete by the unanticipated appearance of new competitors, new political environments, or new technologies. Most CEOs and major investors still limit their strategic visions to three, five, or at most seven years, and they judge results on the same time frame.

如今的经济预测都喜欢做的很长远，可是这样做的结果是，没有人会真正相信你做的预测。回顾这种趋势就是，在17世纪，当中国和印度占据全球GDP一半，“亚洲时代”即将来临的时候，兴盛被再次断言。事实上，从长期而言，可以清晰的发现全球经济的周期大约是十年。典型的商业周期大约是5年，从一个经济衰退的最低点到下一个衰退的最低点，大多实际的投资者把他们的预测控制在一到两个商业周期。超过这个时间，预测通常被预料之外的新竞争者，新的政治环境或者新科技证实是过时的。大多CEO和主要投资者仍然将他们的战略控制在3,5至多7年，并且他们基于相同的时间架构来判断成果。

THE NEW AND OLD ECONOMIC ORDER

新老经济规则

In the decade to come, the United States, Europe, and Japan are likely to grow slowly. Their sluggishness, however, will look less worrisome compared with the even bigger story in the global economy, which will be the three to four percent slowdown in China, which is already under way, with a possibly deeper slowdown in store as the economy continues to mature. China's population is simply too big and aging too quickly for its economy to continue growing as rapidly as it has. With over 50 percent of its people now living in cities, China is nearing what economists call "the Lewis turning point": the point at which a country's surplus labor from rural areas has been largely exhausted. This is the result of both heavy migration to cities over the past two decades and the shrinking work force that the one-child policy has produced. In due time, the sense of many Americans today that Asian juggernauts are swiftly overtaking the U.S. economy will be remembered as one of the country's periodic bouts of paranoia, akin to the hype that accompanied Japan's ascent in the 1980s.

在即将来临的10年，美国，欧洲和日本会发展缓慢。这些国家的迟缓发展和中国相比，似乎让人舒心一点，中国的经济发展会降低3%至4%——事实上已经发生了，随着经济的成熟可能下降得更厉害。中国的人口数量太大以及不断加快的老龄化速度使得中国很困难像之前那样发展的那么迅速。由于超过50%的人口居住在城市，中国正接近被称之为”lewis转折点“的经济情况：一个国家的农村富余劳动力被大量地消耗。这个结果是由过去20年大量的城市移民和独生子政策带来的收缩工人力量导致的，在适当的时候，很多美国人认为亚洲霸主（中国）将很快超越美国经济的想法会被当做国家的周期性妄想，和二十世纪90年代伴随日本腾飞的炒作类似。


As growth slows in China and in the advanced industrial world, these countries will buy less from their export-driven counterparts, such as Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Taiwan. During the boom of the last decade, the average trade balance in emerging markets nearly tripled as a share of GDP, to six percent. But since 2008, trade has fallen back to its old share of under two percent. Export-driven emerging markets will need to find new ways to achieve strong growth, and investors recognize that many will probably fail to do so: in the first half of 2012, the spread between the value of the best-performing and the value of the worst-performing major emerging stock markets shot up from ten percent to 35 percent. Over the next few years, therefore, the new normal in emerging markets will be much like the old normal of the 1950s and 1960s, when growth averaged around five percent and the race left many behind. This does not imply a reemergence of the 1970s-era Third World, consisting of uniformly underdeveloped nations. Even in those days, some emerging markets, such as South Korea and Taiwan, were starting to boom, but their success was overshadowed by the misery in larger countries, such as India. But it does mean that the economic performance of the emerging-market countries will be highly differentiated.

随着中国和其他发达工业国增长放缓，它们会减少从其他出口导向型经济体（如巴西、墨西哥、俄罗斯、台湾等）的进口。在过去十年的发展中，新型市场每年的贸易顺差在GDP中所占的份额几乎翻了三倍，达到了6%。但从2008年起，贸易已经跌回了2%的旧份额。出口导向型新兴市场需要寻找其他能带来强劲经济增长的方法，投资者认识到很多新兴国家将无法做到这一点：2012上半年，主要新兴股市上最佳表现价值和最差表现价值的价差从10%猛涨到35%。因此接下来的几年里新兴市场的情形会非常接近1950年代和1960年代，那时平均增长率在5%左右，许多国家在激烈的竞争中败下阵来。这并不表示1970年代的第三世界（包括所有非发达国家）会再度出现。即使在那时，一些新兴市场（如韩国和台湾）已经开始繁荣，但是它们的成功被一些更大国家，如印度，的悲惨状况所掩盖。但这至少表明各个新兴市场国家的经济表现将会差异悬殊。

The uneven rise of the emerging markets will impact global politics in a number of ways. For starters, it will revive the self-confidence of the West and dim the economic and diplomatic glow of recent stars, such as Brazil and Russia (not to mention the petro-dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East). One casualty will be the notion that China's success demonstrates the superiority of authoritarian, state-run capitalism. Of the 124 emerging-market countries that have managed to sustain a five percent growth rate for a full decade since 1980, 52 percent were democracies and 48 percent were authoritarian. At least over the short to medium term, what matters is not the type of political system a country has but rather the presence of leaders who understand and can implement the reforms required for growth.

新兴市场国家的不均衡发展将从多个方面影响国际政治。首先，它将使西方恢复了自信，并让当下耀眼的经济和外交明星（如巴西和俄罗斯）失去光芒，更不用说对非洲、拉美和中东那些依赖石油出口的专政政权的影响。产生的另外一个结果是，人们最终会意识到中国的成功并不能说明独裁和国家资本主义更加具有优越性。在124个自1980以来达到保持连续十年增长率在5%的新兴市场国家中，52%是民主国家，48%是独裁国家。至少在中短期内，一个国家的政体是哪种类型并不重要，重要的是它的领导人能否 了解并施行带来发展的改革。

Another casualty will be the notion of the so-called demographic dividend. Because China's boom was driven in part by a large generation of young people entering the work force, consultants now scour census data looking for similar population bulges as an indicator of the next big economic miracle. But such demographic determinism assumes that the resulting workers will have the necessary skills to compete in the global market and that governments will set the right policies to create jobs. In the world of the last decade, when a rising tide lifted all economies, the concept of a demographic dividend briefly made sense. But that world is gone.

另外一个将会被人们重新认识的理论就是所谓的人口红利理论。因为中国的繁荣很大程度上来自于充足的年轻劳动力，现在咨询师们浏览人口普查数据以期找到类似的人口膨胀最为下一个经济奇迹的标志。但是人口决定论的前提是假设带来经济奇迹的劳动者能够具有在国际市场上竞争所必需的技能，以及假设ZF能够制定正确的政策创造足够的工作岗位。在上个十年里全部经济腾飞的大趋势下，人口红利暂时发挥了作用。可那个世界已经一去不复返了

The economic role models of recent times will give way to new models or perhaps no models, as growth trajectories splinter off in many directions. In the past, Asian states tended to look to Japan as a paradigm, nations from the Baltics to the Balkans looked to the European Union, and nearly all countries to some extent looked to the United States. But the crisis of 2008 has undermined the credibility of all these role models. Tokyo's recent mistakes have made South Korea, which is still rising as a manufacturing powerhouse, a much more appealing Asian model than Japan. Countries that once were clamoring to enter the eurozone, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Turkey, now wonder if they want to join a club with so many members struggling to stay afloat. And as for the United States, the 1990s-era Washington consensus -- which called for poor countries to restrain their spending and liberalize their economies -- is a hard sell when even Washington can't agree to cut its own huge deficit.

随着多项增长趋势的疲软，目前的这种经济发展模式会被新的模式取代，或者不再有新的经济模式出现。过去，亚洲诸国倾向于将日本当成模范，从波罗的海到巴尔干的诸国都盯着欧盟，几乎所有国家在某种程度上都以美国为榜样。但2008年经济危机的冲击，使这些榜样看起来不那么可靠了。东京最近犯下的错误，使得韩国，这个制造业体系仍在蓬勃发展的国家，比日本更加像是亚洲模范。曾经嚷嚷着要加入欧盟的那些国家，比如捷克共和国，波兰，还有土耳其，开始重新考虑要不要加入这个已是泥菩萨过河的俱乐部。至于美国，上个世纪90年代的华盛顿共识——号召贫穷国家减少开销和解放经济。因为华盛顿不同意削减巨额赤字而越来越不受待见。

Because it is easier to grow rapidly from a low starting point, it makes no sense to compare countries in different income classes. The rare breakout nations will be those that outstrip rivals in their own income class and exceed broad expectations for that class. Such expectations, moreover, will need to come back to earth. The last decade was unusual in terms of the wide scope and rapid pace of global growth, and anyone who counts on that happy situation returning soon is likely to be disappointed.

因为起点低的国家很容易获得快速增长，所以对不同收入水平的国家进行比较毫无意义。极少数获得爆发的国家是那些在中产阶级收入上超过对手的国家，同时这些国家中产阶级规模也比其他国家来得大。然而，人们对收入阶层的期望应该回到现实中来：从全球发展的规模和速度来看，过去的十年的确是非同寻常的。任何一个指望这种盛况再现的人很可能会大失所望。

Among countries with per capita incomes in the $20,000 to $25,000 range, only two have a good chance of matching or exceeding three percent annual growth over the next decade: the Czech Republic and South Korea. Among the large group with average incomes in the $10,000 to $15,000 range, only one country -- Turkey -- has a good shot at matching or exceeding four to five percent growth, although Poland also has a chance. In the $5,000 to $10,000 income class, Thailand seems to be the only country with a real shot at outperforming significantly. To the extent that there will be a new crop of emerging-market stars in the coming years, therefore, it is likely to feature countries whose per capita incomes are under $5,000, such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and various contenders in East Africa.

在人均收入在20000-25000美元范围内的国家中，只有两个国家拥有较好的机会在下一个十年达到甚至超过每年三个百分点的增长率：即捷克和韩国。而在年收入在10000-15000美元的庞大国家群体中，则只有一个国家——即土耳其——最有可能达到或者超过四个乃至五个的百分点增长，尽管波兰或许也有些许机会。而在5000-10000美元的收入阶段，泰国似乎是唯一真正拥有引人注目的胜出可能的国家。因此，如果说未来几年将出现一批新兴市场中的新星，它们很可能是一些人均收入在5000美元以下的国家，比如印尼、尼日利亚，菲律宾，斯里兰卡，还有各位东非的竞争者。

Although the world can expect more breakout nations to emerge from the bottom income tier, at the top and the middle, the new global economic order will probably look more like the old one than most observers predict. The rest may continue to rise, but they will rise more slowly and unevenly than many experts are anticipating. And precious few will ever reach the income levels of the developed world.

虽然我们可以期望世界上涌现出更多能够摆脱收入底层地位的国家，但在高层和中层收入国家中，新的全球经济秩序在众多观察者眼里可能仍然看起来更像是原有的旧的经济秩序。余下的部分国家可能会继续发展，但是它们将发展得比许多专家预测的更加缓慢和不平衡。能达到发达国家收入水平的将是凤毛麟角。


Big Ben • 8 days ago −
The author (Ruchir Sharma) brings up a great point that the great majority of countries do not graduate from emerging economies to developed economies. However, Sharma did not address the underlying reasons why. This is the biggest shortcoming to this article. After all, there are those selected few that have been able to catch up and continue to prosper. This article by Credit Suisse offers some of the key underlying explanations.
Why some countries succeed and others fail?
https://www.credit-suisse.com/...
In fact, some of these reasons in one form or another can be seen in economic history over the last few thousands of years.
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作者（ruchir sharma）提出了一个非常好的观点——大多数的新兴经济体并没有成功转为发达国家。但是，Sharma并没有告诉我们造成这个问题的根本原因。这是这篇文章的短处。毕竟，还是有那么几个国家有幸赶上发达国家并且持续繁荣。这篇瑞士信贷所写的文章给了我们一些对于这个问题的关键的基本解释
为什么有的国家成功了有的失败了？
https://www.credit-suisse.com/...
其实，里面提到的某些原因在过去几千年的经济史中以各种形式出现过

Jessie • 13 days ago −
While Brazil has a long way to go, I disagree about their promise as a rising global power and economic stronghold. Brazil is experiencing lower growth, a credit bubble, and high interest rates right now, but the entire global economy is still in the middle of a downturn.
Brazil is strengthening the foundation of their institutions to promote democracy and improve their "crony capitalism" and rent-seeking practices by corrupt politicians and wealthy business owners. Due to this institution-building and their dominance and large market share in agriculture and energy industries, I would indeed say they will be a force to be reckoned with in the future, and would not be surprised if their economy continues to grow, albeit at a slower rate.
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巴西还有很长的路要走，但是我不同意作者轻视巴西这么一个崛起中的全球性政治经济大国的前景。。巴西正在经历低增长、信贷泡沫和高利率。而全球经济还处在经济衰退之中
（译注：这个Jessie的英文有点问题，所以他所表达的意思要通过上下文来确定。从上下文看，他是看好巴西的经济前景的。）
巴西正在加强他们的制度基础以促进民主和他们的权贵资本主义。通过限制权贵资本主义和官商勾结的行为来改善商业环境。因为制度建设和他们在农业及能源领域的优势和巨大的市场份额。我真的可以说巴西是一股在未来需要被考虑的力量。如果巴西的经济持续增长，即使是以一个比较低得速度也不会让我惊讶。

PSY • 7 days ago −
Regardless of the whether the BRIC or other EM will eventually catch up to the per capita income of the developed world, they're already substantial players in the global economy. Today's EMs (especially the BRIC) are very different from EMs of the past like (Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, etc) due to their sheer size. Never in modern history has EM have so much impact on the global economy.
Take China alone as an example. It's officially the world's 2nd largest economy after the US. However, it's already equally as important. In both upstream (commodities) and midstream (manufacturing), China is already the world's largest player. In downstream (consumption), the US is still larger but that is all because of the service sector (partly China's service sector is understated). In consumption of goods (retail sales market), China is already about the same size as the US. Moreover, goods are tradable in the global market, so it has a greater direct impact on the global economy. Whereas, services are generally domestic oriented.
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无论金砖国家和其他新兴经济体是否能最终能在人均收入上赶上发达国家，他们已经是全球经济的重要参与者了。今天的新兴市场（尤其是金砖国家）由于其庞大的规模和过去的新兴市场（日本，韩国，台湾）有很大的不同。在现代历史上，新兴国家在全球经济上从未有过如此的影响力
以中国为例。官方数据来说，它是仅次于美国的全球第二大经济体。但是，中国已经和美国同样重要。在（产业链）上游（原材料）和中游（制造），中国已经是全球最大的玩家了。在下游（消费），美国仍然比中国大，但是这是由第三产业造成的（部分中国的第三产业被低估）。在货物消费方面（零售市场），中国的市场已经和美国差不多大。此外，货物在全球市场是可以交易的，所以中国对全球经济有更大的直接影响。然而，服务业是国内导向的。

Harsh Vijaysingh • 4 days ago −
The BRIC's had a good run, hopefully one of more to come in future. Their political leadership has got a lot of homework to do. A very well timed essay, especially when any minor development is painted as an indicator of economic forecasts for posterity.
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金砖国家风光了一阵，希望它们今后还会有风光的时候。
他们的政治领袖有很多需要做的。这是一篇把握时机的文章，尤其是当每个微小的发展都被粉饰为未来经济预测的重要指标。

phillip • 2 days ago −
I author over look the issue that the majority of those countries that rise above to developed country income are mostly Chinese countries, or Sino-culture dominated countries. Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, S Korea etc. They are all of east Asian, or Sino origin. The focus is in material achievement, education, and capitalism.
The Malay, and Thailand come close, but they are not pure Chinese, or Sino cultures.
The BRIC was always a mistake. Russia, Brazil are producer countries, and provider of raw material. Without China, those countries would be nothing. India have a missive uneducated class of people, and never seek to build up its own industries. It is China, Taiwan, S Korea, Singapore, and Japan that have strive to compete by building domestic firms, and competitiveness. There is a level of blood, culture, and temperament that is part of the Sino, East Asian thing.
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我认为作者忽视了这个问题——大部分的上升至发达国家收入的国家是华人国家或者是由中华文化所统治的国家。 新加坡、台湾、香港、日本、韩国等等。他们都是东亚国家或者说是中华文化出身。（他们）注重物质成就，教育和资本主义。
（译注：“I author over look the issue”应该漏了个“think”）
马来西亚和泰国差不多，但是他们不是纯粹的中国人或者被中华文化完全统治
金砖国家（这个概念）一直是错误的。俄罗斯，巴西是原材料的生产国和供应者。没有了中国，这些国家什么都不是。印度有大量的未受教育的人，而且从来不寻求建立自己的工业。 而中国、台湾、南韩、新加坡、日本则通过建立本土的工厂和提高竞争力来努力竞争。（这要归功于）中华或东亚文化里的某种血统、文化和气质。


Kenington • 13 days ago −
There is current debate on relaxing the one child family policy which only applies to the urban areas and the Han people themselves. Minorities and rural areas are exempt from this policy.
This article presupposes that the BRICs will never progress as they are dependent upon the current G8 nations for their further development. It does not take into account that the BRICs can develop and are developing intra trade among themselves and other emerging nations, Africa, Latin America, etc.
The current G8 nations are caught in a financial mess due to their own bad policies. The BRICs and other nations are affected but will restructure their economies and trade ties to progress further. They will not be permanently held back by the current shambles in the G8 nations. The G8 nations can participate and benefit from this global restructuring or be the proverbial dog in the manger trying to hopelessly maintain their current privileged status which benefits no one including themselves.
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目前正在讨论放开针对城市地区和汉民族的一胎化生育政策。小数民族和农村地区是不包括在这个政策里的。
这篇文章预先假定金砖四国不会取得进步，因为他们的进一步发展有赖于G8国家。它没有考虑到金砖四国可以并且正在他们自己以及如南非、拉丁美洲等新兴国家之间发展内部贸易。
目前的8国集团由于他们自己的弊政而身陷金融混乱当中。金砖四国和其他国家会受到影响，但是也会调整他们的经济和贸易结构以便能够取得长远的发展。他们不会永远在G8国家的阴影下局促不前。G8国家可以参与到这个全球重组中并从中受益，否则他们会像众所周知的“饲槽之犬”绝望的保持着他们当前的特权地位，这对谁都没有好处，包括他们自己。
（译注：寓言“饲槽之犬”讲的是一条狗守在饲槽旁，不让马吃槽里的饲料，尽管它自己也吃不了。粗俗的理解就是“占着茅坑不拉屎”）

Dylan Rees • 18 hours ago −
The BRIC concept is just a marketing tool. But the underlying concept might well be valid. Much of the "truths" of the paper (and of readers´s comments) demonstrate profound ignorance and misunderstanding. Just as an example, Brazil does not depend on commodities exports nor is this the motor of growth. Exports represent 11% of GDP and commodities exports represent 5% of GDP. How can 5% of GDP be considered a motor of an economy? Brazil does not depend on exports to China. China exports represent 17% of exports or 1.9% of the Brazilian economy. Brazil´s commodities exports are very similar in proportion to those of the USA yet the USA is not considered to be motored along by these exports. What motors Brazil´s economy along is its internal market (89% of GDP), the growth of credit, the high rate of employment, the growth of services.... Export of commodities helps but is not the motor.
Another misconception is that though Brazil is a large economy it has little relations outside the traditional North-South relations. This is simply not true. The diversity of Brazils commercial and business ties is large and growing. Latin America is the major trade partner followed by Asia and only then, Europe and the US. Africa is growith quickly (the largest investor in Africa after China is Brazil).
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金砖四国的概念只是一种营销工具。但是基本概念可能是有根据的。很多文章（和读者评论）中的“真相”显示了极端的无知和误解。举例来说，巴西并不是依靠商品出口，（商品出口）也不是其经济增长的发动机。出口占据了其国内生产总值的11%而商品出口占据了国内生产总值的5%。怎么会认为只占据5%国内生产总值（的商品出口）是经济增长的发动机呢？巴西也不依赖于出口到中国。出口到中国的产品占总出口的17%，巴西整体经济的1.9%。巴西的商品出口比例和美国非常相似。但是并不认为商品出口是美国经济增长的发动机。巴西的经济增长主要依靠内需市场（占国内生产总值的89%），信贷的增加，高就业率，公共事业的增加……出口产品会促进经济，但是不是发动机。
另一个错误概念是——巴西虽然是个巨大的经济体，但是除了传统的南北美洲关系外，就没有什么其他关系了。这显然是错误的。巴西的商业和商业关系非常多元化也越发具有多样性。拉丁美洲是最重要的贸易伙伴，其次是亚洲，之后才是欧洲和美国。非洲的业务增长很快（巴西在非洲是仅次于中国的第二大投资者）

phillip Dylan Rees • 15 hours ago −
This is a mistake. Brazil is expanding, but like western economies( not east Asians ones), it based on ease of credit as a driver of growth. The problem is bad debt. Ultimately, the China( Sino cultures such as the tigers, and Japan) is based on culture, and blood that cannot be replicated outside of a non-Sino countries.
The same is true of turkey where the grow is driven by bad debt.
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这是错误的。巴西正在扩张，但是就像西方经济体一样（和东亚的不同），这依赖宽松的信贷作为增长的动力。（宽松信贷）的问题就是坏账。根本上来看，中国（中化文化圈比如亚洲四小虎和日本）依靠文化和血统，这些不会被中华文化圈以外的国家所复制。
土耳其也是如此，他的增长依靠坏账。

YU LIU • 13 days ago −
Great observations. But I don't think they can be used for future economic predictions.

这篇文章写的很好。但是我不觉这篇文章里的内容可以用来预测未来的经济走势。

RG3 JS • 8 days ago −
China's demographics is a "POTENTIAL" problem. The key word is "POTENTIAL". It is well known that China's working age population is expected to peak between 2016-2020. However, what is often overlooked is that its prime working age segment (those between 30-55) will continue to increase well pass 2030. This prime working age segment is normally the most productive for economic growth. The World Bank in conjunction with Barclays did a report on this recently. The big challenge for China is to continue to move up the industrial base, providing jobs for this coming group of increasingly educated prime working age segment. There is still a window for them to lessen the impact of the potential demographics problem down the road.

中国的人口是一个“潜在的”问题。关键词是“潜在的”。大家都知道中国的工龄人口在2016到2020年间将会达到顶峰。可是经常被大家忽视的一点是其主要的工龄人群（30岁到55岁之间）的数量在2030年后还会得到不断的增加。而这部分的人群一般来说是经济增长的最大动力。世界银行最近和巴克莱银行一起就这个议题出炉了一份报告。中国面临的最大挑战是继续升级其工业生产基地，以及给这些不断增长的受过良好教育的主要工龄人群提供工作机会。所以在未来，中国还是有一个窗口期来减少潜在人口问题带来的影响 。

MARJORIE SWIFT JS • 12 days ago −
China had better wake up to the fact that the one child policy may have been handy in the past, but it spells doom for the future. Consider an economy on the skids and a population of mostly aging horny males, since most couples over the last thirty years preferred male children, either aborting or leaving their female children to die by the roadside. Is this a recipe for disaster? China has never been able to think further than next two weeks--and China you bought the one child policy--you own it--and we in the west will not pay for it.
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中国最好面对现实：独生子女政策在过去或许不错，但是在未来一定会走向末路。想一下一个正在刹车的经济体，一个大部分人口是由迈向老年化的单身男人组成（的国家），因为大多数夫妇在过去的30年来都希望生男孩，如果是女孩他们会选择流产或者将她们遗弃在路边。这不是造成灾难的因素吗？中国从来没有能力思考2周以后会发生的事。 中国你采取了独生子女政策，你活该。我们西方不会替你们埋单的。

James Stuart MARJORIE SWIFT • 17 hours ago −
What an absolute nonsense. The Chinese plan decades ahead. You seem to be forgetting (or are ignorant of) that China still has a command economy planned in stages of development and revised as necessary. Indeed the Chinese political leadership talk in terms of centuries, not just decades. This is an old nation, they know that now is not forever.
And China has a one child policy in urban areas (and even there, ethnic minorities are exempt). In rural areas, where 50% of the population live, the policy is not applied and this is of course where China's labour force is coming from. This has its own problems of course, but it helps demonstrate that the idea that China is running out of young people is a fallacy.
However the demographics are shifting (in terms of gender as well as age) and this needs to be, and is being addressed. And the One Child Policy (such as it is) is being revised accordingly and China is now looking to a "Two Child Policy" in urban areas.
However, since you make the pretty disgusting and racist assertion that "most couples...(are) either aborting or leaving their female children to die by the roadside", I am not sure why I am even bothering to explain anything rationally to someone who hold such deeply ill-informed and irrational (and indeed, inhuman) views about any other society.
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这完全是荒谬的。中国人做数十年的计划。你看来是遗忘（无视）中国仍然有不同发展阶段经济计划指标而且根据需要修改他们。的确，中国的政治领袖是以世纪为单位而不是以十年为单位来说的。这是一个古老的国家，他们知道现状不会一成不变的
而且中国只在城市执行计划生育（而且即使在城市，少数族裔是个例外）。在有超过50%人口居住的农村地区，独生子女政策并没有执行而且这就是中国劳动力的来源。政策当然有自己的问题。不过证明了那个观点：中国的年轻人正在减少是个谬论
无论如何，人口分布特征（在性别和年龄方面）正在改变，这个问题需要解决并正在解决。计划生育政策（和类似的政策）会根据统计资料进行调整。现在中国已经着眼在城市中执行“两个孩子的政策”
而且，由于你说了那恶心的和种族主义的断言： “大多数夫妻……要么流产要么遗弃他们的女儿” 。我也不知道为什么我要来向那些对其他社会根本几无所知和持有不理性的（当然也是毫无人性的）观点的人来理性的解释任何东西