<p><strong><font size="3">The Economic Approach to Law <!--Element not supported - Type: 8 Name: #comment--><br/></font></strong>by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/002-7036074-4884051?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;search-type=ss&amp;index=books&amp;field-author=Thomas%20Miceli"><font color="#003399">Thomas Miceli</font></a> (Author) </p><p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0804746559/ref=sib_dp_pt/002-7036074-4884051#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="241" alt="The Economic Approach to Law" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/31CHK5SWHYL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="258" border="0" style="WIDTH: 258px; HEIGHT: 241px;"/></a><a href="http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?book_id=4655%20%20"></a></p><li><b>Hardcover:</b> 408 pages </li><li><b>Publisher:</b> Stanford Economics and Finance; 1 edition (November 11, 2003) </li><li><b>Language:</b> English </li><li><strong>Book Description<br/></strong><div>In recent decades, the economic approach to law has developed into a mainstream field of study for both legal scholars and economists. This book provides a textbook treatment of the subject, primarily directed toward undergraduate economics students. It presumes a basic familiarity with economic principles, but little knowledge of the law. An effort is made to show both how economic principles can explain the actual structure of the law, and how they can help to make the law more efficient. <br/><br/>The book emphasizes unifying themes and methodologies rather than an exhaustive coverage of legal topics. To that end, the scope of analysis is limited to the basic common law areas of torts, contracts, and property, as well as the legal process and criminal law. The hope is that after reading the book, students can apply the basic principles to other areas of law.<br/><br/><b>Book Info</b><br/>Text provides an overview of the economic approach to law, directed toward undergraduate economics students. Topics include the basic common law areas of torts, contracts, and property; as well as the legal process and criminal law. Includes index, references, and chapter exercises. DLC: Law and economics.</div></li><li><div>
168640.rar
(1.33 MB)
</div></li><li><div><strong>Contents</strong><br/><strong>Chapter 1 Introductory Concepts 1<br/></strong>What Is Law and Economics? 1<br/>Positive and Normative Analysis 2<br/>Is Efficiency a Valid Norm for Evaluating Law? 3<br/>Efficiency Concepts 4<br/>Pareto Efficiency 4<br/>Potential Pareto Efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 5<br/>Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Exchange 6<br/>The Coase Theorem 7<br/>The Law in “Law and Economics” 10<br/>The Nature of the Common Law 10<br/>The Court System in the United States 11<br/>Conclusion 12<br/>Discussion Questions 12<br/>Problems 13<br/>Appendix to Chapter 1 Review of Microeconomics 15<br/>The Theory of the Consumer and Market Demand 16<br/>The Theory of the Firm and Market Supply 20<br/>Market Equilibrium 23<br/>Perfect Competition 23<br/>Monopoly 25<br/>Oligopoly and Game Theory 27<br/>Welfare Economics 30<br/>Welfare Theorems 30<br/>Market Failure 31<br/>Uncertainty and Imperfect Information 32<br/>Choice Under Uncertainty and Insurance 32<br/>Moral Hazard 34<br/>Adverse Selection 36<br/><strong>Chapter 2 An Economic Model of Tort Law 38</strong><br/>What Is a Tort? 38<br/>The Social Function of Tort Law 39<br/>Elements of a Tort Claim 39<br/>Cause-in-Fact 40<br/>Proximate Cause 41<br/>Liability Rules 41<br/>An Economic Model of Accidents: The Model of Precaution 42<br/>The Unilateral Care Model 42<br/>Social Optimum 43<br/>Actual Care Choice by the Injurer 43<br/>Comparison of Strict Liability and Negligence 45<br/>Bilateral Care Model 46<br/>No Liability and Strict Liability 47<br/>Negligence 48<br/>The Hand Rule 48<br/>The Reasonable-Person Standard 50<br/>Contributory Negligence 52<br/>Negligence with Contributory Negligence 53<br/>Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence 54<br/>Further Topics 55<br/>Sequential Care Accidents* 55<br/>The Injurer Moves First 55<br/>The Victim Moves First 56<br/>Last Clear Chance 56<br/>Comparative Negligence 57<br/>Causation and Liability* 59<br/>Cause-in-Fact 59<br/>Proximate Cause 61<br/>Res Ipsa Loquitur 63<br/>Uncertainty over Causation 64<br/>Activity Levels 66<br/>Punitive Damages 68<br/>The Judgment-Proof Problem 70<br/>The Impact of Liability Insurance 71<br/>Litigation Costs 72<br/>Legal Error* 73<br/>The Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits 74<br/>Intentional Torts 74<br/>Valuing Human Life and Safety 75<br/>Conclusion 77<br/>Discussion Questions 77<br/>Problems 78<br/><strong>Chapter 3 Applying the Economic Model of Tort Law 80</strong><br/>Products Liability 80<br/>A Brief History of Products Liability Law 82<br/>An Economic Model of Products Liability 84<br/>Equilibrium Price and Output for a Dangerous Product 85<br/>Care Choices by Manufacturers and Consumers 88<br/>Consumer Perceptions of Risk 89<br/>A Note on Custom as a Defense 91<br/>Recent Trends 92<br/>Evidence on the Impact of Products Liability Laws 92<br/>Concluding Remarks 93<br/>Workplace Accidents 93<br/>Respondeat Superior 94<br/>Accidents in which the Victim Is an Employee 94<br/>Workers’ Compensation Laws 95<br/>Liability for Environmental Damages 96<br/>Characteristics of Environmental Accidents 97<br/>Multiple Victims 97<br/>Causal Uncertainty 98<br/>Superfund 100<br/>Case Study: Asbestos 102<br/>Medical Malpractice 103<br/>Customary Practice and Informed Consent 105<br/>Do Physicians Practice Defensive Medicine? 105<br/>Conclusion 106<br/>Discussion Questions 106<br/>Problems 107<br/><strong>Chapter 4 The Economics of Contract Law I:</strong><br/>The Elements of a Valid Contract 109<br/>Contracts and Efficient Exchange 109<br/>The Elements of a Valid Contract 112<br/>Reasons for Invalidating Contracts 113<br/>Mental Incapacity or Incompetence 114<br/>Coercion or Duress 114<br/>Mistake and the Duty to Disclose Private Information 116<br/>Purely Distributive Information 118<br/>Socially Valuable Information 121<br/>Casual Versus Deliberate Acquisition of Information 122<br/>Disclosure of Unfavorable Information 123<br/>Unconscionability 124<br/>Conclusion 125<br/>Discussion Questions 126<br/>Problems 126<br/>Chapter 5 The Economics of Contract Law II: Remedies for Breach 128<br/>The Efficient Breach Model 129<br/>Money Damages and Efficient Breach 130<br/>Incentives for Efficient Reliance 133<br/>Mitigation of Damages 137<br/>Impossibility and Related Excuses 138<br/>Efficient Risk Sharing 139<br/>Commercial Impracticability 142<br/>Specific Performance 144<br/>Transaction Costs 145<br/>Subjective Value and Efficient Breach 146<br/>The Value of Consent 147<br/>Self-Enforcement of Contracts 149<br/>Liquidated Damage Clauses 149<br/>Product Warranties* 150<br/>Express Warranties 151<br/>Implied Warranties 153<br/>Long-Term Contracts* 154<br/>Conclusion 157<br/>Discussion Questions 158<br/>Problems 158<br/><strong>Chapter 6 The Economics of Property Law: Fundamentals 161</strong><br/>The Nature and Function of Property Rights 162<br/>The Definition of Property Rights 162<br/>Property Rights and Incentives 163<br/>The Emergence of Property Rights 164<br/>Enforcement of Property Rights 166<br/>Fundamentals of the Economics of Property Law 167<br/>The Coase Theorem 168<br/>The Assignment of Rights and the Distribution of Wealth 171<br/>Examples of the Coase Theorem 172<br/>The Role of Transaction Costs 175<br/>Enforcement of Property Rights 176<br/>Property Rules and Liability Rules 176<br/>The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules 177<br/>Trespass and Nuisance 179<br/>The General Transaction Structure 181<br/>Consensual Transfers of Property 185<br/>The Legal Protection of Ownership 185<br/>Should the Law Protect the Possessor or the Claimant?<br/>An Analysis of Land Title Systems* 187<br/>Land Title Systems: Recording Versus Registration 187<br/>Land Title Systems in the United States 190<br/>Title Protection and Economic Development 191<br/>Limited and Divided Ownership 192<br/>Leasing 192<br/>The Lease: A Contract or Conveyance? 193<br/>Mitigation in Leases 194<br/>The Law of Waste 194<br/>Sharecropping 196<br/>Private Versus Group Ownership 197<br/>The Optimal Scale of Ownership 197<br/>Public Goods 198<br/>The Anticommons Problem and the Right to Partition* 199<br/>Time-Limited Property Rights: Intellectual Property 199<br/>Patents 200<br/>Copyrights 202<br/>Conclusion 203<br/>Discussion Questions 204<br/>Problems 204<br/><strong>Chapter 7 Involuntary Transfers and Regulation of Property 207</strong><br/>Involuntary Transfers and Restrictions on Transfers<br/>Between Private Parties 208<br/>Adverse Possession 208<br/>The Mistaken Improver Problem* 210<br/>Inheritance Rules 213<br/>Primogeniture 213<br/>The Rule Against Perpetuities 214<br/>Government Acquisition of Property Under Eminent Domain 214<br/>The Eminent Domain Clause 215<br/>Public Use and the Scope of the Takings Power 215<br/>The Meaning of Just Compensation 219<br/>Case Study on the Determination of Just Compensation:<br/>“The Assassin’s Bequest” 221<br/>Eminent Domain and Land Use Incentives 222<br/>The No-Compensation Result 222<br/>Arguments Against the No-Compensation Result 224<br/>Government Regulation of Property 225<br/>The Compensation Question 226<br/>Tests for Compensation 226<br/>An Economic Model of Regulatory Takings 229<br/>Implications of the Efficient Compensation Rule 232<br/>Investment-Backed Expectations: Does the Market Eliminate<br/>the Need for Compensation?* 234<br/>Regulation Versus the Common Law 235<br/>Conclusion 238<br/>Discussion Questions 239<br/>Problems 239<br/><strong>Chapter 8 The Economics of Dispute Resolution 242</strong><br/>The Litigation Process 243<br/>Why Do Trials Occur? 245<br/>The Differing Perceptions, or Optimism Model 246<br/>The Asymmetric Information Model 248<br/>The Social Versus Private Incentive to Sue 250<br/>Procedural Rules and Litigation Costs 252<br/>Discovery 252<br/>The English Versus American Rule 253<br/>The English Rule and Settlement 253<br/>The English Rule and the Incentive to File Suit 255<br/>Evidence on the Impact of the English Rule 256<br/>Rule 68* 257<br/>Contingent Fees* 259<br/>The Benefits of Contingent Fees 259<br/>Contingent Fees and Settlement 261<br/>Do Contingent Fees Promote Frivolous Suits? 261<br/>Frivolous Suits 262<br/>Court Delay* 264<br/>Alternative Dispute Resolution 265<br/>Evolution of the Law 266<br/>Selection of Disputes for Trial 267<br/>Is the Common Law Efficient? 268<br/>Empirical Evidence on Legal Change 270<br/>Judicial Decision Making and Legal Change 271<br/>Decision by Precedent 271<br/>An Economic Model of Precedent 271<br/>Precedents as a Stock of Knowledge 274<br/>Procedural Responses to Legal Errors* 274<br/>The Standard of Proof 274<br/>Appeals as a Means of Error Correction 276<br/>What Do Judges Maximize? 277<br/>Judicial Self-Interest and the Law 278<br/>Pragmatism and the Economic Approach to Law 278<br/>Conclusion 280<br/>Discussion Questions 280<br/>Problems 281<br/><strong>Chapter 9 The Economics of Crime 283</strong><br/>Distinguishing Crimes and Torts 284<br/>Crimes Are Intentional 284<br/>Other Reasons for Public Enforcement 284<br/>Examples of Private Enforcement 286<br/>Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Sanctions 287<br/>The Economic Model of Crime 288<br/>The Offender’s Decision to Commit a Crime<br/>and the Supply of Offenses 289<br/>Optimal Punishment 290<br/>The Optimal Fine 291<br/>Gain Versus Harm-Based Fines 291<br/>Fines and Imprisonment 292<br/>Prison, Probation, and Parole 294<br/>The Probability of Apprehension Is Variable 295<br/>Why Are Fines Not Equal to Offenders’ Wealth? 297<br/>Repeat Offenders 301<br/>Empirical Evidence on the Economic Model of Crime 302<br/>The Death Penalty 303<br/>Economics of the Death Penalty 304<br/>Constitutional Issues 305<br/>The Bail System* 305<br/>Private Protection* 307<br/>Plea Bargaining 308<br/>Economic Models of Plea Bargaining 309<br/>Plea Bargaining and Deterrence 311<br/>A Comparative Perspective 312<br/>Topics 313<br/>Crime and the Business Cycle* 313<br/>Gun Laws and Crime 315<br/>Primitive Law Enforcement 317<br/>Some Constitutional Issues 318<br/>Free Speech 318<br/>The Rule Against Self-Incrimination 320<br/>The Right of Privacy 321<br/>Conclusion 323<br/>Discussion Questions 324<br/>Problems 325<br/>Answers to In-Chapter Exercises 327<br/>Notes 337<br/>Works Cited 355<br/><strong>Index 375</strong></div></li>
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