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现在有一些人自称是国内宏观政治经济学学的开创者，还说要建立宏观政治经济学，但他们却很少阅读或者了解经济学界关于这方面研究的进展。本贴特意把正宗的宏观政治经济学家的代表人物贴出，供大家参考。力争做到驱逐劣币，保护良币。

当在大陆高校的一个人在上课的时候说：我有一个新思想。

这个时候，就要怀疑他的学术水平了。

Allan Drazen

Professor of Economics Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 Tel: 301-405-3477 Email: drazen@econ.umd.edu

Allan Drazen, Professor, received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1976. Prior to joining the Maryland faculty in 1990, he held positions at Tel-Aviv University and at the University of Chicago. He is a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Co-Editor of Economics and Politics, and a member of the board of editors of the American Economic Review and the Journal of Economic Growth. His current research is concerned with political economy, especially in the open economy. Publications include: "Trigger Points and Budget Cuts - Explaining the Effects of Fiscal Austerity" (with Giuseppe Bertola), American Economic Review, 1993; "The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reform" (with Vittorio Grilli), American Economic Review, 1993; "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policy Makers" (with Paul Masson), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994; "Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal" (with Leonardo Bartolini), American Economic Review, 1997.

Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press, 2000 (Winner of the Association of American Publishers Award for best book in economics published in 2000 by a Professional or Scholarly Press)

这本书北图外文新书阅览室有。

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-10-26 8:08:34编辑过]

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关键词：政治经济学 政治经济 经济学家 经济学 open economy 经济学家 政治

Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies (with Adi Brender), April 2004 ABSTRACT: Whereas a political budget cycle was once thought to be a phenomenon of less developed economies, some recent studies find such a cycle in a large cross-section of both developed and developing countries. We find that this result is driven by the experience of “new democracies”, where fiscal manipulation may be effective because of lack of experience with electoral politics or lack of information that voters in more established democracies use. The strong budget cycle in those countries accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries. Once these countries are removed from the larger sample, the political budget cycle disappears. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one arguing it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other arguing that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation.

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies (with Nuno Limao), December 2003 ABSTRACT: We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its bargaining position. In a model of redistribution to lobbies, the government will find it optimal to cap the size of lump-sum transfers it makes below the unconstrained equilibrium level. One implication is that with the optimal cap on efficient subsidies in place, less efficient subsidies will be used for redistribution even when they serve no economic function. We thus offer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally choose to restrict efficient lump-sum transfers to interest groups and partially replace them with relatively less efficient transfers.

Mixed Signals in Defending The Exchange Rate: What Do the Data Say? (with Stefan Hubrich), June 2003 ABSTRACT: High interest rates to defend the exchange rate signal that a government is committed to fixed exchange rates, but may also signal weak fundamentals. We test the effectiveness of the interest rate defense by disaggregating into the effects on future interest rates differentials, expectations of future exchange rates, and risk premia. While much previous empirical work has been inconclusive due to offsetting effects, tests that “disaggregate” the effects provide significant information. Raising overnight interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-term, but also leads to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer and an increase in the risk premium, consistent with the argument that it also signals weak fundamentals.

Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach, July 2002 ABSTRACT: The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country’s best interests to undertake the reform program. It is argued that heterogeneity of interests must form the basis of any discussion of conditionality and ownership. The paper stresses a conflict between a reformist government and domestic interest groups that oppose reform, leading to a distinction between government and country ownership of a program. A model of lending and policy reform is presented that illustrates the effects of unconditional and conditional assistance first without and then with political constraints. It is shown that conditionality can play a key role even when the Fund and authorities agree on the goals of an assistance program.

"Laying Low" During Elections: Political Pressure and Monetary Accommodation, November 2001 ABSTRACT: Monetary surprises are argued to be unconvincing explanations of the political business cycle, both theoretically and empirically. Instead, in many countries we observe significant pre-electoral increases in fiscal expenditures or transfers. When monetary effects are also present, they may reflect the accommodation of fiscal impulses or other aggregate shocks rather than a direct attempt to influence election outcomes. I present a political business cycle model that combines active fiscal policy and monetary accommodation that addresses a number of objections to earlier models. The model stresses the interaction between an independent monetary authority and politicians, with the nature of the cycle depending on the nature of this interaction. In equilibrium the monetary authority accommodates the politicians’ desired policies in an election year, but is generally free from political influence in non-election years.

Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom,Economics and Politics, July 2001 ABSTRACT: We find evidence for a "strong" version of the crisis-induces-reform hypothesis at extreme values of the inflation rate and the black market premium. Episodes of extremely high inflation or black market premiums are followed by periods of better performance than episodes of moderately high inflation or black market premiums. We fail to find similar evidence of the crisis hypothesis when crisis is measured as a high current account deficit, a high budget deficit, or a negative per capita growth rate. We speculate that the ease of correcting different type of crises may explain these different results. The pattern of foreign aid disbursements may also help explain the pattern of results. Foreign aid is sharply reduced at extreme values of inflation or the black market premium, while it is actually increased for more extreme values of the current account deficit and the budget deficit.

Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative Attack as a Signal: A Primer, February 25, 2001 ABSTRACT: A major effect of high interest rates in defending against speculative attack is as a signal of the government’s willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. There are unobserved characteristics of the government that affect the probability that a defense will be mounted or continued, with policy choices being correlated with these characteristics. With imperfect information about these government characteristics, speculators used observed policy choices to make inferences about them and hence update the probability they assign to a devaluation. This paper provides a theoretical introduction to this approach and summarizes some empirical evidence work supporting the argument.

The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years , May 2000, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 ABSTRACT: Research on the political business cycle since the mid-1970s is surveyed and assessed. We argue that models based on monetary surprises as the driving force are unconvincing explanations of either opportunistic or partisan cycles. Research should concentrate on fiscal policy as the driving force, with monetary effects being the result of accommodation of fiscal impulses. We present a model political business cycle model that combines active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy (which we term the AFPM model), which addresses a number of objections to earlier models.

Interest Rate and Borrowing Defense Against Speculative Attack, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 53, 2000. ABSTRACT: Our understanding of defense against speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates is incomplete. Though interest rates are often raised to defend a currency, there is almost no formal modeling of interest rate defense. We present a framework of analysis with special emphasis on signaling when there is incomplete information about the central bank’s ability or commitment to defend the fixed exchange rate. The primary focus is on why a high interest rate defense may fail even if it raises the cost of speculation and hence temporarily deters speculation. It is shown that the effect of high interest rates under asymmetric information very much depends on the information structure, and hence on the signal that high interest rates send. Depending on what is known, high interest rates may either deter or fuel further speculation. The analysis should be useful in understanding the mixed empirical results on the effectiveness of the interest rate defense in practice.

What Is Gained By Selectively Withholding Foreign Aid?, April 1999 ABSTRACT: We consider the case for withholding foreign aid from countries with a history of aid being ineffective in achieving its goals. The argument may be summarized by four statements. First, foreign aid is often ineffective in achieving its aims because it is misappropriated by the recipient governments. Second, this misappropriation reflects the nature of the “political regime” (broadly defined) by which collective decisions are made. Third, in these cases, aid will not become effective in the absence of a “regime change”. Fourth, absent that regime change, denying aid (“selectivity”) may be not simply the only way to ensure that it is not wasted, but also the only way to help bring about the necessary change in the political regime. Put another way, the paper investigates the political economy of “blunt instruments” and argues that they while they generally cannot be justified by economic arguments, they may be justified by political arguments given the nature of aid appropriation in recipient countries. We present a formal model of the role of denying foreign aid in inducing policy reform and summarize empirical research that supports the approach of selectivity.

Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative Attack Under Asymmetric Information, February 24, 1999 ABSTRACT:Characteristics of speculative attacks, such as the role of asymmetric information and especially the use of high interest rates to defend a currency, are largely absent from existing models. A model of defending against speculative attacks by raising interest rates is presented in which governments are optimizing and speculators are solving a dynamic signal extraction problem subject to imperfect information about the government’s objectives and the evolution of fundamentals. It is shown how such a model may be useful in understanding the dynamics of speculative attacks.

Uncertain Duration of Reform: Dynamic Implications,(joint with Guillermo Calvo), Journal of Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol 2, no. 4 (December 1998). Figure 1, Figure 2. ABSTRACT: We develop a framework to study the effects of policies of uncertain duration on consumption dynamics under both complete and incomplete markets. We focus on the dynamic implications of market incompleteness, specifically on the lack of state-contingent bonds. Two policies are considered: pure output-increasing and tariff-reducing (trade liberalization). With complete markets, the output-increasing policy leads to flat consumption, while with no contingent assets, consumption jumps upward on the announcement of the policy, continues rising as long as the policy is in effect, and collapses when it is abandoned. A similar consumption path obtains in a trade liberalization in the realistic case of low elasticity of substitution and no rebate of tariffs. Market incompleteness rationalizes the existence of gradual changes in consumption.

Political Contagion in Currency Crisis,(March 1998).

Towards a Political-Economic Theory of Domestic Debt, in G. Calvo and M. King, eds., The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, Macmillan: London, 1998. Figure.

Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-Examination, in H. Wolf, ed., Contemporary Economic Development Reviewed, vol. 5, Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Systems, Macmillan: London, 1997. ABSTRACT: The standard model of signaling used in open economy macroeconomics concentrates on building a reputation when a policymaker’s “type” is unknown. Observing tough policy leads market participants to raise the probability that a policymaker is tough, and, therefore, to expect tough policy in the future. This approach leaves unexplained a number of commonly observed occurrences, for example, toughness in defending an exchange rate leading to increased speculation against the currency. To explain many phenomena, this paper argues, more sophisticated signaling models are needed, models which include signaling of resources rather than preferences, policy affecting the environment in which signals are sent, and exogenous changes in the environment affecting the informativeness of signals. These models are explored and are shown to be able to explain a number of phenomena the standard reputational model cannot.

闲人辛苦了！

国内吹牛的人实在是太多，看了柏杨的《丑陋的中国人》更是让人体会深刻！

无知者无畏嘛，难的是一旦知道自己无知，敢于承认自己无知才是真正的大无畏。

《宏观经济学中的政治经济学》，这书的英文版和中文版，人大图书馆都有。。 再介绍l两个： Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini: political economics:explaining economy policy, the MIT press

the economic effects of constitutions,the MIT press

研究收入分配、政治市场等问题的宏观经济学家很多。很多增长、公共财政等宏观问题在很大程度上是政治经济学问题。

当代把政治经济学问题引入宏观经济学的开山人物是现任哈佛大学经济系主任的Alberto Alesina。

Professor Alberto AlesinaNathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy Chairman, Department of Economics

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/alesina.html