短小外文文献翻译求助，谢谢了！！

This paper presents an empirical examination of whether evidence of the implicit use of RPE can be found in the cash
compensation of boards of directors for 169 UK non-financial listed companies that existed for all of the period from 1971 to
1998. Our results suggest that board cash compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and negatively related to
industry value-weighted accounting earnings. Little evidence is found to suggest that cash compensation is related to stock
market performance, whether for the firm or for the peer group. Our conclusion, overall, is that the results suggest the use of
implicit RPE, but using accounting measures of performance.
    Our conclusions can be taken to provide some support for the position of the ABI and NAPF that compensation ought to be
linked to the performance not only of the firm concerned but also of that of the peer group. To the extent that our sample
firms can be deemed ‘successful’ by dint of having continuously survived from 1971 to 1998, it appears that ‘successful’ firms
have used implicit RPE as a way of rewarding their top managers. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the concern of the ABI
and NAPF with stock market performance, as opposed to accounting performance, could be misplaced – for these ‘successful’
firms, accounting performance alone seemed a suitable way of evaluating board performance.
    With regard to the lack of a relationship between pay and stock market performance, our results contrast with those of
Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Gregg et al. (2005), amongst others. Conyon and Murphy (2000) find a positive relationship
between CEO cash compensation and firm stock market performance for the largest 510 UK firms in 1997. Gregg et al. (2005)
also find a positive relationship between cash compensation and firm stock market performance. They also find a positive
relationship between cash compensation and CAPM-adjusted or industry-adjusted stock market performance. Their study
uses data for 1994–2002 for FTSE 350 firms and an unbalanced panel approach.
    There are a number of main differences in research design between this study and Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Gregg
et al. (2005). First, neither of the two aforementioned studies employs the time series or the balanced panel approaches of this
study. Second, the years studied are much more recent (although there are degrees of overlap with this study). Third, neither
study considers accounting performance. Fourth, the underlying model of the relationship between pay and performance in
their paper is different from the one in this paper. In particular, in their studies the dependent variable is the log of cash
compensation and the performance measure involves the log of a measure of stock market return. This implies a non-linear
relationship between pay and performance, whereas the current study assumes a linear relationship. Given the number of
differences in research design, it is difficult to identify which can be attributed the difference in results. Identifying the
reasons for differences could be a topic for future research.
    There remain some caveats with respect to our paper. First, we follow previous research (e.g., Janakiraman et al., 1992; and
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) by using a broad industry definition as our reference group to construct the peer group annual
stock returns and pre-tax accounting earnings. Although Holmstrom (1982) model of RPE considers that incorporating peer
group performance measures can help shareholders better infer directors’ unobservable behaviour, and therefore improve
the efficiency of compensation contracts, it is silent on the selection of reference/peer groups. Buck et al. (2003) note that the
boards of directors have incentives and opportunities to change the reference group in their own favour, especially when the
firms perform poorly in comparison to the industry. A case study approach to investigate explicit boards of directors’
compensation contracts incorporating RPE may provide more insights as to how reference groups are determined and how
relative performance evaluation is actually used.
    Second, as mentioned above, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) derive the form of optimal contracts in a principal-agent
model of strategic competition in which a board of directors can be rewarded positively on both his/her own performance and
the industry’s performance due to the strategic interactions amongst competitors in product markets and the intensity of the
market competition. They demonstrate that the use of relative performance might arise from the nature of competition, not
purely as a response to an agency problem. They argue that compensation contracts incorporating a relative performance
element should recognise that the standard principal-agent model ignores the importance of strategic competition in product
markets to the value of the firm. We have not built this insight into our research design. As a consequence, future RPE research
in the UK could explore the importance of strategic competition in product markets and the intensity of the market
competition on the use of RPE in boardroom compensation.
    Third, our research design uses a time series approach, which incurs certain costs. Although, as mentioned above, this
approach has advantages with respect to the research questions we pursue, and is consistent with some prior literature, it
rules out the splitting of our board compensation data into separate components for salary and bonus. These data are
unavailable because separate disclosure was not required by accounting standards or government regulation during all of the
time period studied. Additionally, adopting a time series approach limits the number of firm-year observations that can be
included in the analysis. Further studies might consider not only the use of time periods which allow the separate identi-
fication of salaries and bonuses (Strivens et al., 2008) but also unbalanced panel approaches which impose less strict data
requirements. Acknowledgements
  We thank two anonymous reviewers, Elisabeth Dedman, John Holland, Phil Ormrod, Peter Taylor and seminar participants
at Warwick Business School, Cardiff Business School and the British Accounting Association Annual Conference 2003 in
Manchester for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are, as always, solely the responsibility of the authors.

这还短小啊。不过，这英文都看不懂，我看还是别舞文弄墨了。

多交几个人帮帮我吧，谢了

好长。要花很多时间的，悬赏高点。重赏之下，必有能人...

2个币看这么长的东西？疯了吗，时间也是金钱啊。

2个币？这段认真翻译下来要个把小时。还是找google百度吧，呵呵

呜呜。。。。