绝对是好书,在网页上面一张一张复制粘贴下来的。
几乎是该领域唯一的一本书。
Third printing, 1998
© 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet.
目录如下
1 General Introduction
1.1 What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do?
1.1.1 Liquidity and Payment Services
1.1.2 Asset Transformation
1.1.3 Managing Risk
1.1.4 Monitoring and Information Processing
1.1.5 The Role of Banks in the Resource Allocation Process
1.2 Banking in General Equilibrium Theory
1.2.1 The Consumer
1.2.2 The Firm
1.2.3 The Bank
1.2.4 General Equilibrium
Notes
References
2 Why Do Financial Intermediaries Exist?
2.1 Transaction Costs
2.1.1 Economies of Scope
2.1.2 Economies of Scale
2.2 Liquidity Insurance
2.2.1 The Model
2.2.2 Autarky
2.2.3 Market Economy
2.2.4 Optimal Allocation
2.2.5 Financial Intermediation
2.3 Information Sharing Coalitions
2.3.1 A Basic Model of Capital Markets with Adverse Selection
2.3.2 Signaling Through Self-Financing
2.3.3 Coalitions of Borrowers
2.3.4 Related Justifications of FIs with Asymmetric Information
2.4 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring
2.5 Coexistence of Direct and Intermediated Lending
2.5.1 A Simple Model of the Credit Market with Moral Hazard
2.5.2 Monitoring and Reputation (Adapted from Diamond 1991)
2.5.3 Monitoring and Capital (Adapted from Holmström and Tirole 1993)
2.5.4 Related Contributions
2.6 Problems
2.6.1 Economies of Scale in Information Production
2.6.2 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law
2.6.3 Intermediation and Search Costs (Adapted from Gehrig 1993)
2.7 Solutions
2.7.1 Economies of Scale in Information Production
2.7.2 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law
2.7.3 Intermediation and Search Costs
Notes
References
3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking
3.1 A Model of Perfect Competition in the Banking Sector
3.1.1 The Model
3.1.2 The Standard Approach: The Credit Multiplier
3.1.3 The Behavior of Individual Banks in a Competitive Banking Sector
3.1.4 The Competitive Equilibrium of the Banking Sector
3.2 The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopolistic Bank
3.2.1 The Original Model
3.2.2 The Oligopolistic Version
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence
3.3 Analyzing the Impact of Deposit Rate Regulations
3.4 Double Bertrand Competition
3.5 Monopolistic Competition
3.5.1 Does Free Competition Lead to the Optimal Number of Banks?
3.5.2 The Impact of Deposit Rate Regulation on Credit Rates
3.5.3 Bank Network Compatibility
3.6 Branch versus Unitary Banking
3.7 Appendix 1: Empirical Evidence
3.8 Appendix 2: Measuring the Activity of Banks
3.8.1 The Production Approach
3.8.2 The Intermediation Approach
3.8.3 The Modern Approach
3.9 Problems
3.9.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of Risky Loans (Adapted from Dermine 1986)
3.9.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks (Adapted from Matutes and Padilla 1994)
3.10 Solutions
3.10.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of Risky Loans
3.10.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks
Notes
References
4 The Lender-Borrower Relationship
4.1 Why Risk Sharing Does Not Explain All the Features of Bank Loans
4.1.1 Optimal Contracts When Cash Flows Are Observable
4.1.2 Extensions and Applications of the Risk-Sharing Paradigm
4.2 Costly State Verification
4.2.1 Incentive Compatible Contracts
4.2.2 Efficient Incentive Compatible Contracts
4.2.3 Efficient Falsification-Proof Contracts
4.2.4 Dynamic Debt Contracts with Costly State Verification
4.3 Incentives to Repay
4.3.1 Threat of Termination
4.3.2 Strategic Debt Repayment: The Case of a Sovereign Debtor
4.3.3 Private Debtors and the Inalienability of Human Capital
4.4 Moral Hazard
4.5 The Incomplete Contract Approach
4.5.1 Delegated Renegotiation
4.5.2 The Efficiency of Bank Loan Covenants
4.6 Collateral and Loan Size as Devices for Screening Heterogenous Borrowers
4.6.1 The Role of Collateral
4.6.2 Loans with Variable Size
4.7 Problems
4.7.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information
4.7.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard (Adapted from Innes 1987)
4.7.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes
4.7.4 The Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management (Adapted from Hart and Moore 1995)
4.7.5 Collateral and Rationing (Adapted from Besanko and Thakor 1987)
4.7.6 Securitization (Adapted from Greenbaum and Thakor 1987)
4.8 Solutions
4.8.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information
4.8.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard
4.8.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes
4.8.4 The Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
4.8.5 Collateral and Rationing
4.8.6 Securitization
Notes
References
5 Equilibrium and Rationing in the Credit Market
5.1 Definition of Equilibrium Credit Rationing
5.2 The Backward Bending Supply of Credit
5.3 How Adverse Selection Can Lead to a Backward Bending Supply of Credit
5.3.1 The Model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
5.3.2 Risk Characteristics of Loan Applicants
5.4 Collateral as a Sorting Device
5.5 Credit Rationing Due to Moral Hazard
5.5.1 Nonobservable Technology Choice
5.5.2 Nonobservable Capacity to Repay
5.6 Problems
5.6.1 The Model of Mankiw (1986)
5.6.2 Efficient Credit Rationing (Adapted from De Meza and Webb 1992)
5.6.3 Too Much Investment (Adapted from De Meza and Webb 1987)
5.7 Solutions
5.7.1 The Model of Mankiw (1986)
5.7.2 Efficient Credit Rationing
5.7.3 Too Much Investment
Notes
References
6 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Imperfections
6.1 A Short Historical Perspective
6.2 The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy
6.2.1 The Money Channel
6.2.2 Credit View
6.2.3 Credit View versus Money View: Relevance of the Assumptions and Empirical Evidence
6.2.4 Endogenous Money
6.3 The Fragility of the Financial System
6.3.1 Financial Collapse Due to Adverse Selection
6.3.2 Financial Fragility and Economic Performance
6.4 Financial Cycles and Fluctuations
6.4.1 Bankruptcy Constraints
6.4.2 Credit Cycles
6.5 The Real Effects of Financial Intermediation
6.6 Financial Structure and Economic Development
Notes
References
7 Individual Bank Runs and Systemic Risk
7.1 Banking Deposits and Liquidity Insurance
7.1.1 A Model of Liquidity Insurance
7.1.2 Autarky
7.1.3 The Allocation Obtained When a Financial Market Is Opened
7.1.4 The Optimal (Symmetric) Allocation
7.2 A Fractional Reserve Banking System
7.3 The Stability of the Fractional Reserve System and Alternative Institutional Arrangements
7.3.1 The Causes of Instability
7.3.2 A First Remedy to Instability: Narrow Banking
7.3.3 Regulatory Responses: Suspension of Convertibility or Deposit Insurance
7.3.4 Jacklin's Proposal: Equity versus Deposits
7.4 Efficient Bank Runs
7.5 Interbank Markets and the Management of Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
7.5.1 The Model of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)
7.5.2 The Role of the Interbank Market
7.5.3 The Case of Unobservable Liquidity Shocks
7.6 Aggregate Liquidity Shocks
7.6.1 The Model of Hellwig (1994)
7.6.2 Efficient Risk Allocation
7.6.3 Second Best Allocations under Asymmetric Information
7.7 Systemic Risk and the Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective
7.7.1 Four Views on the LLR Role
7.7.2 The Effect of LLR and Other Partial Arrangements
7.7.3 The Moral Hazard Issue
7.8 Problems
7.8.1 Different Specifications of Preferences in the Diamond-Dybvig Model
7.8.2 Information-Based Bank Runs (Adapted from Postlewaite and Vives 1987)
7.8.3 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility (Adapted from Gorton 1985)
7.9 Solutions
7.9.1 Different Specifications of Preferences in the Diamond-Dybvig Model
7.9.2 Information-Based Bank Runs
7.9.3 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility
Notes
References
8 Managing Risks in the Banking Firm
8.1 Default Risks
8.1.1 Institutional Context
8.1.2 Evaluating the Cost of Default Risks
8.1.3 Extensions
8.2 Liquidity Risk
8.2.1 Reserve Management
8.2.2 Introducing Liquidity Risk in the Monti-Klein Model
8.2.3 The Bank as a Market Maker
8.3 Market Risk
8.3.1 Modem Portfolio Theory: The Capital Asset Pricing Model
8.3.2 The Bank as a Portfolio Manager: The Pyle (1971), Hart-Jaffee (1974) Approach
8.3.3 An Application of the Portfolio Model: The Impact of Capital Requirements
8.4 Appendix: Institutional Aspects of Credit Risk
8.4.1 Interest Rate and Rate of Return
8.4.2 Collateral
8.4.3 Endorsement and Insurance
8.4.4 Loan Covenants
8.4.5 Information Costs
8.4.6 Accounting
8.4.7 Bankruptcy
8.4.8 Fraud
8.5 Problems
8.5.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka (1986)
8.5.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates (Adapted from Merton 1974)
8.5.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing
8.6 Solutions
8.6.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka
8.6.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates
8.6.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing
Notes
References
9 The Regulation of Banks
9.1 Regulation Theory and Banking Theory
9.1.1 The Justification of Regulation
9.1.2 The Scope of Banking Regulation
9.1.3 Regulatory Instruments
9.2 Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?
9.2.1 The Monopoly of Money Issuance
9.2.2 The Fragility of Banks
9.2.3 The Protection of Depositors
9.3 Portfolio Restrictions
9.4 Deposit Insurance
9.4.1 The Moral Hazard Issue
9.4.2 Risk-Related Insurance Premiums
9.4.3 Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?
9.4.4 The Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Banking Industry
9.5 Solvency Regulations
9.5.1 The Portfolio Approach
9.5.2 The Incentive Approach
9.5.3 The Incomplete Contract Approach
9.6 The Resolution of Bank Failures
9.6.1 Resolving Banks' Distress: Instruments and Policies
9.6.2 Who Should Decide on Banks' Closure?
9.6.3 Can Banks Be ''Too Big to Fail''?
9.7 Complements
Notes
References
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