高盛-中美贸易战以及对各自供应链的影响-61页

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高盛-中美贸易战以及对各自供应链的影响-61页.pdf


: https://u899837.pipipan.com/fs/899837-242216178


Potential policy shifts in the United States and China aimed at boosting local
manufacturing threaten to upend 25 years of investment in global supply chains. We
examine what it would cost, both in capital and time, to relocate production and how it
would impact companies, workers, and consumers. We draw on the unique paths to
production for three very different items with global appeal – smartphones, apparel and
airplanes – to identify links in the supply chain where the variables of labor, IP, and product
cycles create the potential for new trade patterns to emerge.
We believe it would take at least five years to move the supply chains for smartphones or
apparel to the United States, largely due to labor challenges (both on costs and supply).
We estimate production costs could increase by 46% for apparel and 37% for
smartphones if made in the United States, and in turn lead to about a 15% increase in
the price for consumers in the United States (assuming no change to OEM/retail profits,
and prior to any FX changes). We see obstacles for China to make large commercial
planes related to IP, safety, and long product cycles.
Some facts that surprised us:
1. Automation has the potential to reduce the number of traditional line workers in phone
assembly but create new engineering roles. One expert estimated that automation can
reduce the number of people needed for final assembly by 40-70%. However, this
would require OEMs to change the product cycle/design to make automation practical.
See our interviews with experts from Jabil and Flex on pages 29 and 30 for details.
2. China buys more robots than the United States even though manufacturing labor costs
just $2-3/hour.
3. >50% of jobs in smartphone and apparel manufacturing are in the final stages of
production, so policies that cause only parts of the supply chain to shift may not create
very many jobs.
Our report breaks into three chapters:
Chapter 1: China and US Trade 101 – ~$300 bn later, supply chains
are linked and the US has a $350 bn goods trade deficit with China
Two things in particular are surprising to us about the foreign direct investment (FDI) data:
a) Nearly $300 bn of gross cumulative FDI has been invested by US entities in China and
Chinese entities in the United States over the last 25 years according to data from the
Rhodium Group. b) In 2015, FDI from China in the United States was larger than US FDI in
China for the first time in the dataset (although we appreciate capital controls and FX
issues could have had an impact on this).
Data suggests that the FDI by US companies in China was both to gain market access and
to reduce labor costs (China employs well over 100 million people in manufacturing
compared with only 12 million in the United States). You may not have known that
China is a larger market for phones, airplanes and apparel than the United States.
Global FDI has led to trade deficits for the United States with China in areas such as
electronics and apparel, and for China with the United States in markets such as
transportation and agriculture.
Chapter 2: Policy in transition – Labor is a key obstacle for the US
and IP is a main challenge for China in achieving domestic goals
Proposed US policies from President Trump, such as border taxes and tariffs, aim to
increase local manufacturing but China’s “Made in China 2025” initiative has a potentially
competing goal of increasing local production in areas like planes and semis.

Notable estimates from the Goldman Sachs Economics teams featured in this section
include: 1) A destination-based tax with border adjustment could cause the aggregate price
level in the United States to increase by 0.8%, net of margin contraction and FX movement.
2) US companies face average tariffs on exports of 4-6.5%, but Chinese imports face
average tariffs of about 3% in the United States.
In the United States a common challenge to doing more manufacturing is labor, both
the 6-7X higher cost per hour than China (though the different mix of manufacturing makes
comparisons difficult) and the availability of skilled labor. In China the main challenge is
around sufficient IP. A number that surprised us: China has increased its R&D to 2.1%
of GDP, up from less than 1% in 2000, and compared to the United States, where R&D
intensity was 2.8% of GDP in 2015 and 2.6% in 2000.
Chapter 3: Case studies on smartphones, apparel, and planes
For phones, we believe it could take five years and require $30-$35 bn in capex to move the
supply chain to the United States, without taking into account changes in the production
processes that would likely come with any major shift. Assuming workers could be found
and not accounting for further automation, we estimate that the cost of production could
increase by 37%. However, given that nearly all of this increase in production cost is due to
labor for final assembly, OEMs could be incentivized to alter design/product cycles to
enable automation.
For apparel, we believe it could take 5-10 years to find and train sufficient labor to move the
supply chain to the US, as the industry has only about 250K manufacturing employees in
the US vs. 8-9 million in China. Production costs could rise by 46%, and consumer prices
could increase by about 14% (assuming no change in retailer/brand margins or FX impacts).
For planes, China is focused on developing technology but there is a duopoly on widebody
IP, product cycles are long, and the safety requirements are very high.
Stock implications
For smartphones, we believe US IDMs (e.g., Intel, TI, Qorvo) could benefit from a border
tax or tariffs given that their US capacity could lead to share gain. We also think US final
assemblers such as Flex and Jabil may benefit as they could take share. Companies most
at risk include Asia foundries (e.g. TSMC, Hua Hong), packagers (ASE/SPIL) and final
assemblers (Hon Hai, Wistron, Pegatron), given each company’s potential to lose share.
We also see risks for OEMs like Apple as demand could be hurt from higher prices.
For apparel, we see mostly negative implications for individual companies. For instance,
we think domestic apparel brands with significant US exposure and low margins (AEO,
GPS, URBN, ASNA) as well as domestic wholesale apparel brands forced to take up
pricing with major retail partners (PVH, UAA, RL, VFC) will suffer the most given that
these companies would have to pass through to consumers the 14% price increases we
estimate are necessary to offset the impact of higher input costs. Similarly, we believe
some Asia-based OEMs would move along with brands’ sourcing strategies and build
capacity in the United States, but we think these companies’ profits would likely suffer as a
result of having to share the cost inflation with brands. Thus, we think Asia-based OEMs
with both higher US exposure and lower margins – such as Stella and Makalot – are worst
positioned given their sensitivity to margin squeeze due to cost increases, and Shenzhou
is best positioned.
For planes, Airbus could benefit over Boeing if China places retaliatory restrictions
specifically on US products.

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