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美国UT Dallas的Mike Peng （彭维刚）2002年在AMR(Academy of Management Review)发布了题为Institutional transitions and strategic choices的论文。后来一位华人学者李绍民指责其论文的主要贡献抄袭了李的研究，而彭曾因为与李合作期间得到该工作论文。该指控反映到AMR后，主编Art Brief组织了专家审阅，认为彭文的核心剽窃了李的观点。主编依此责成彭在AMR公开道歉，该道歉信在AMR2004年 （29期3-340页)刊登。但是在信中PENG并没有诚恳道歉，而轻描淡写的将此事件当做引用不当，增加了引用李的文章。此事由李所在大学的律师参与调查，可能重新被提起。当然，学术期刊的更正通常是对印刷错误的更正，专门加上一个引文本来就是很反常的。下面是AMR专家给主编的意见。
Special Review for AMR as Requested by Art Brief
Based on comparisons of Michael Peng’s article (“Institutional Transitions and Strategic Choices”), Shuhe Li’s paper (“The Benefits and Costs of Relation-based Governance: An Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Crisis”), and the related articles, it seems to me that Peng’s main offense is a sin of omission—namely, not citing the work of Li(s). Certainly Peng appears to draw from and build on Li’s framework. I would therefore agree that Li’s thesis is in some ways the foundation for what Peng proposes, and should be attributed.
The thrust of Peng’s paper is the exploration of “how organizations make strategic choices during fundamental institutional transitions” (p. 275), or “how institutional transitions matter for strategic choices” (p. 291). Thus, “strategic choices and organizational forms” is the focus of his work, which “integrates the convergent insights of institutional and strategic choice perspectives in a dynamic sense” (p. 291)—a statement that hints at both the influence of Li’s work and the aim of his own original research. It seems that ultimately Peng’s paper goes considerably beyond Li’s, and also in a different direction—in addition to co-opting Li’s ideas of costs/benefits of rule- vs. relation-based systems, if co-opting is indeed the case.
As Shaomin Li notes in his email to you, their biggest concern is the similarities between the cost/benefit models, depicted in Figures 1 through 3 in Peng’s paper and related to the graphs of transaction cost curves in Figures 1 and 2 in Shuhe Li’s paper. There appear to be indisputable similarities between the graphs, which depict the respective frameworks, as indicated in some of the more detailed analyses later in this review.
In the bigger picture, the Li work is more macro-economically oriented, while Peng’s is at the institutional and organizational level as applied to management. Avinash Dixit, the well-known Princeton economist, not only acknowledges Li’s contributions to the economic literature, but goes one step further by positioning the aim of his research as “to develop Li’s idea in these dimensions, bring out its promise, and thereby spur further research on it” (p. 2). In this regard, I would agree with Dixit’s assessment that “the novelty and special merit of Li’s approach, at least to economists, is that it grounds the distinction squarely in tangible economic concepts of costs—low fixed, high and rising marginal versus high fixed, low and flat marginal—instead of pulling the distinction out of the culture or history” (p.3, emphasis added).
In contrast, this same approach may not mean much in the management (particularly in international business) literature, which has long studied national (or transnational) culture. Still, this is not to suggest that Peng didn’t borrow without attribution the Li ideas or that he shouldn’t admit that such is case.
This raises the issue of intent, which is at the heart of the issue. Is the omission or oversight intentional or inadvertent?
It would be very surprising if Peng were somehow unaware of Shuhe Li and Shaomin Li’s work. (Along this line, Dixit is certainly prominent in the economics field, and hence his work could be even less likely to be overlooked). But perhaps because other, related work apparently preceded the Lis’ research (such as North, 1990, often cited by Peng), he did not feel the need to cite Li; that is, giving the benefit of the doubt, one might guess that in the best case, his subjective judgment preempted his perceived need to reference Li. However, this seems unlikely: again, the similarities seem striking enough to suggest that he did derive some of his foundational ideas from the Lis. That alone would seem to require acknowledgement, regardless of how his paper diverges in other aspects.
I do not know why Peng would not concede and acknowledge the Li framework. As Shaomin Li writes, they are simply seeking “public acknowledgement” of their work. But perhaps this goes to political issues in the academic publishing world. Unfortunately, Peng’s “non-response”—assuming this is indeed the case, as Shaomin Li pointed out in his email to you—could be interpreted as a tacit admission that he borrowed without attribution the Li framework. And that would seem to be transparently true, if Shaomin is accurately relating the sequence of events—specifically, that Peng was invited to work on the framework and was planning to visit the Lis in Hong Kong to do so. In that light, it seems very unlikely that he was not influenced by the Li research.
Below are some passages (pp. 278-282) from Peng’s description of his models of the costs and benefits of relationship-based and rule-based exchanges, and of his “two-phase model of institutional transitions,” as well as some comparisons and other observations.
--“I develop a two-phase model of market-oriented institutional transitions。。。I identify the points of inflection of institutional transitions, predict different strategic choices, and delineate their performance implications (p. 276).”
Peng’s “points of inflection” mirror to some degree the points of transition of Li’s framework, such as the “turning point” (p. 14) in market development from relation-based to rule-based cost-effectiveness.
--“Known as ‘relational contracting,’ the first [transaction structure] is relationship-based, personalized exchange that ‘has characterized most of economic history’ (North, 1990).”
This is an example of Peng’s frequent citing of North’s work, which appears similar to Li’s later work in relation-based governance.
--“When the scale, scope, and specificity of transactions expand, the costs per transaction are likely to move down and benefits move up.”
Cf. Li, “…as the market expands and the number of transaction partners increases, the average cost of rule-based governance will decrease due to the large fixed costs and the negligible marginal costs,” p. 14.
。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。（部分删节）
These points are similar to Li’s, only in a different form. Often the differences seem to be in terminology or nomenclature.
专家信中罗列了大量比较具体段落，因为长度限制不能全部转发，不得不部分删节。
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