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[推荐] 本人珍藏的Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences (1969 - 2004) [推广有奖]

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7696.rar (2.28 MB)

Arrow 7697.rar (1.99 MB) Becker 7698.rar (1.03 MB) Buchanan 7699.rar (933.26 KB) Coase 7700.rar (1.53 MB) Debreu 7701.rar (3.18 MB) Fogel 7702.rar (1.66 MB) Friedman 7703.rar (2.33 MB) Frisch 7704.rar (1.16 MB) Hicks 7705.rar (1.55 MB) Tobin

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关键词:Lectures Economic Sciences Science Lecture Economic 珍藏 Sciences Nobel Lectures

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leewrcn 发表于6楼  查看完整内容

2004 Economics, Finn E. Kydland Edward C. Prescott 2003 Economics, Robert F. Engle III Clive W.J. Granger 2002 Economics, Daniel Kahneman Vernon L. Smith 2001 Economics, George A. Akerlof A. Michael Spence Joseph E. Stiglitz 2000 Economics, James J. Heckman Daniel L. McFadden 1999 Economics, Robert A. Mundell 1998 Economics, Amartya Sen 1997 Economics, Robert C. Merton My ...
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The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I
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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 09:04:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

[推荐] 本人珍藏的Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences (1969 - 2004) (二)

7714.rar (849.58 KB) Koopmans 7715.rar (1.58 MB) Kuznets 7716.rar (1.24 MB) Leontief 7717.rar (1.22 MB) Lewis 7718.rar (887.01 KB) Markowitz 7720.rar (2.16 MB) Modigliani 7721.rar (1.14 MB) North 7722.rar (1.68 MB) Samuelson 7723.rar (1.77 MB) Sharpe 7724.rar (2.51 MB) Simon

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The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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baiming 发表于 2005-1-13 09:05:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
向无私的人致敬!

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 09:11:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

[推荐] 本人珍藏的Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences (1969 - 2004) (三)

7730.rar (1.44 MB)

Solow 7731.rar (1.26 MB) Stigler 7732.rar (2.14 MB) Stone 7733.rar (876.95 KB) Tinberger

这样的lectures在不断地更新中。

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hawks 发表于 2005-1-13 09:16:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

真是好多啊,谢谢楼主的整理工作!

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 09:28:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

[公告]1969-2004年所有的诺贝尔经济学奖得主

2004 Economics, Finn E. Kydland Edward C. Prescott

2003 Economics, Robert F. Engle III Clive W.J. Granger

2002 Economics, Daniel Kahneman Vernon L. Smith

2001 Economics, George A. Akerlof A. Michael Spence Joseph E. Stiglitz

2000 Economics, James J. Heckman Daniel L. McFadden

1999 Economics, Robert A. Mundell

1998 Economics, Amartya Sen

1997 Economics, Robert C. Merton Myron S. Scholes

1996 Economics, James A. Mirrlees William Vickrey

1995 Economics, Robert E. Lucas Jr.

1994 Economics, John C. Harsanyi John F. Nash Jr. Reinhard Selten

1993 Economics, Robert W. Fogel Douglass C. North

1992 Economics, Gary S. Becker

1991 Economics, Ronald H. Coase

1990 Economics, Harry M. Markowitz Merton H. Miller William F. Sharpe

1989 Economics, Trygve Haavelmo

1988 Economics, Maurice Allais

1987 Economics, Robert M. Solow

1986 Economics, James M. Buchanan Jr.

1985 Economics, Franco Modigliani

1984 Economics, Richard Stone

1983 Economics, Gerard Debreu

1982 Economics, George J. Stigler

1981 Economics, James Tobin

1980 Economics, Lawrence R. Klein

1979 Economics, Sir Arthur Lewis Theodore W. Schultz

1978 Economics, Herbert A. Simon

1977 Economics, James E. Meade Bertil Ohlin

1976 Economics, Milton Friedman

1975 Economics, Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich Tjalling C. Koopmans

1974 Economics, Gunnar Myrdal Friedrich August von Hayek

1973 Economics, Wassily Leontief

1972 Economics, Kenneth J. Arrow John R. Hicks

1971 Economics, Simon Kuznets

1970 Economics, Paul A. Samuelson

1969 Economics, Ragnar Frisch Jan Tinbergen

以上整理的近似于诺贝尔奖经济学史,大家可以看到他们获奖的理由,在颁奖典礼上所作的Prize Lectures,也可以看到他们的自传,等等。

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-23 21:54:00编辑过]

The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 10:46:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
上贴中的年份和经济学家的名字都能直接打开链接。而且其链接非常丰富。

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-14 10:51:10编辑过]

The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 11:05:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

Ronald Coase -- Autobiography from Nobel Prize.org

My father, a methodical man, recorded in his diary that I was born at 3:25 p.m. on December 29th, 1910. The place was a house, containing two flats of which my parents occupied the lower, in a suburb of London, Willesden. My father was a telegraphist in the Post Office. My mother had been employed in the Post Office but ceased to work on being married. Both my parents had left school at the age of 12 but were completely literate. However, they had no interest in academic scholarship. Their interest was in sport. My mother played tennis until an advanced age. My father, who played football, cricket and tennis while young, played (lawn) bowls until his death. He was a good player, played for his county and won a number of competitions. He wrote articles on bowls for the local newspaper and for Bowls News. I had the usual boy's interest in sport but my main interest was always academic. I was an only child but although often alone, I was never lonely. When I learnt chess, I was happy to play the role of each player in turn. Lacking guidance, my reading (in books borrowed from the local public library) was undiscriminating and, as I now realize, I was unable to distinguish the charlatan from the serious scholar. My mother taught me to be honest and truthful and although it is impossible to escape some degree of self-deception, my endeavours to follow her precepts have, I believe, lent some strength to my writing. My mother's hero was Captain Oates, who, returning with Scott from the South Pole and finding that his illness was hampering the others, told his companions that he was going for a stroll, went out into a blizzard and was never heard of again. I have always felt that I should not be a bother to others but in this I have not always succeeded. Aged 11, I was taken by my father to a phrenologist. What the phrenologist said about my character was, I feel sure, determined less by the shape of my skull than by the impressions he derived from my behaviour. Out of the various printed summaries of character in his booklet, that chosen for "Master Ronald Coase" started: "You are in possession of much intelligence, and you know it, though you may be inclined to underrate your abilities." This printed summary also included the following remarks: "You will not float down, like a sickly fish, with the tide... you enjoy considerable mental vigour and are not a passive instrument in the hands of others. Though you can work with others and for others, where you see it to your advantage, you are more inclined to think and work for yourself. A little more determination would be to your advantage, however." In the written comments, the pursuits recommended were: "Scientific and commercial banking, accountancy. Also, horticulture and poultry-rearing as hobbies." Added were some comments about my character: "More hope, confidence and concentration required - not suited for the aggressive competitive side of business life. More active ambition would be beneficial." It was also noted that I was too cautious. It was hardly to be expected that this timid little boy would one day be the recipient of a Nobel Prize. That this happened was the result of a series of accidents. As a young boy I suffered from a weakness in my legs, which necessitated, or was thought to necessitate, the wearing of irons on my legs. As a result I went to the school for physical defectives run by the local council. For reasons that I do not remember I missed taking the entrance examinations for the local secondary school at the usual age of 11. However, as the result of the efforts of my parents I was allowed to take the secondary school scholarship examination at the age of 12. The only thing I now remember is that at the oral examination I caused some amusement by referring to a character in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night as Macvolio. However, this lapse was not fatal and I was awarded a scholarship to go to the Kilburn Grammar School. The teaching there was good and I received a solid education. I particularly remember our geography teacher, Charles Thurston, who introduced us to Wegener's hypothesis on the movements of the continents long before it was generally accepted and who also took us to lectures at the Royal Geographical Society, one of which, on river meanders, discussed the effect of the earth's rotation on the course of rivers. I took the matriculation examination in 1927, which I passed, with distinction in history and chemistry. It was then possible to spend the two years after matriculation at the Kilburn Grammar School studying for the intermediate examination of the University of London as an external student, which covered the work which would have been taken during the first year at the University as an internal student. I then had to decide what degree to take. The answer was in fact determined by one of those accidental factors which seem to have shaped my life. My inclination was to take a degree in history, but I found that to do this I would have to know Latin and having arrived at the Kilburn Grammar School at 12 instead of 11, there had been no possibility of my studying Latin. So I turned to the other subject in which I had secured distinction and started to study for a science degree, specialising in chemistry. However, I soon found that mathematics, a requirement for a science degree, was not to my taste and I switched to the only other degree for which it was possible to study at the Kilburn Grammar School, one in commerce. Although my knowledge of the subjects on which I was examined was rudimentary, I managed to pass the intermediate examinations and went to the London School of Economics in October, 1929 to continue my studies for a Bachelor of Commerce degree. I took a hodgepodge of courses for Part I of the final examination, which I passed in 1930. For Part II, I specialised in the Industry Group. I then had an extraordinary stroke of luck, another accidental factor which would affect everything I was to do subsequently. Arnold Plant, who had previously held a chair at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, was appointed Professor of Commerce (with special reference to Business Administration) at the London School of Economics in 1930. I attended his lectures on business administration but it was what he said in his seminar, which I started to attend only five months before the final examinations, that was to change my view of the working of the economic system, or perhaps more accurately was to give me one. What Plant did was to introduce me to Adam Smith's "invisible hand". He made me aware of how a competitive economic system could be coordinated by the pricing system. But he did not merely influence my ideas. My encountering him changed my life. I passed the B. Com, Part II final examination in 1931, but having taken the first year of University work while still at school and three years residence at the London School of Economics being required before a degree could be awarded, I had to decide what to do in this third year. Among the subjects studied for Part II, the one I had found most interesting was Industrial Law and what I had decided to do was to study in this third year for the degree of B.Sc. (Econ), with Industrial Law as my special subject. Had I done so I would undoubtedly have gone on to become a lawyer. But that was not to be. No doubt as a result of Plant's influence, the University of London awarded me a Sir Ernest Cassel Travelling Scholarship and although I did not know it, I was on the road to becoming an economist. I spent the academic year 1931-32 on my Cassel Travelling Scholarship in the United States studying the structure of American industries, with the aim of discovering why industries were organized in different ways. I carried out this project mainly by visiting factories and businesses. What came out of my enquiries was not a complete theory answering the questions with which I started but the introduction of a new concept into economic analysis, transaction costs, and an explanation of why there are firms. All this was achieved by the Summer of 1932, as the contents of a lecture delivered in Dundee in October 1932, make clear. These ideas became the basis for my article "The Nature of the Firm", published in 1937, cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding me the 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The delay in publishing my ideas was partly due to a reluctance to rush into print and partly to the fact that I was heavily engaged in teaching and research on other projects. I held a teaching position at the Dundee School of Economics and Commerce from 1932 to 1934, at the University of Liverpool from 1934 to 1935 and at the London School of Economics from 1935 on. At the London School of Economics I was assigned a course on the economics of public utilities in Britain. In 1939, the Second World War broke out and in 1940 I entered government service doing statistical work, first at the Forestry Commission and then at the Central Statistical Office, Offices of the War Cabinet. I returned to the London School of Economics in 1946. I then became responsible for the main economics course, "The Principles of Economics", and also continued with my research on public utilities, particularly the Post Office and broadcasting. I spent nine months in 1948 in the United States on a Rockefeller Fellowship studying the American broadcasting industry. My book, British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly, was published in 1950. In 1951, I migrated to the United States. I went first to the University of Buffalo and in 1959, after a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I joined the economics department of the University of Virginia. I maintained my interest in public utilities and particularly in broadcasting and during my year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I made a study of the Federal Communications Commission which regulated the broadcasting industry in the United States, including the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum. I wrote an article, published in 1959, which discussed the procedures followed by the Commission and suggested that it would be better if use of the spectrum was determined by the pricing system and was awarded to the highest bidder. This raised the question of what rights would be acquired by the successful bidder and I went on to discuss the rationale of a property rights system. Part of my argument was considered to be erroneous by a number of economists at the University of Chicago and it was arranged that I should meet with them one evening at Aaron Director's home. What ensued has been described by Stigler and others. I persuaded these economists that I was right and I was asked to write up my argument for publication in the Journal of Law and Economics. Although the main points were already to be found in The Federal Communications Commission, I wrote another article, The Problem of Social Cost, in which I expounded my views at greater length, more precisely and without reference to my previous article. This article, which appeared early in 1961, unlike my earlier article on "The Nature of the Firm", was an instant success. It was, and continues to be, much discussed. Indeed it is probably the most widely cited article in the whole of the modern economic literature. It, and The Nature of the Firm were the two articles cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences as justification for awarding me the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize. Had it not been for the fact that these economists at the University of Chicago thought that I had made an error in my article on The Federal Communications Commission, it is probable that The Problem of Social Cost would never have been written. In 1964, I moved to the University of Chicago and became editor of the Journal of Law and Economics. I continued as editor until 1982. Editorship of the journal was a source of great satisfaction. I encouraged economists and lawyers to write about the way in which actual markets operated and about how governments actually perform in regulating or undertaking economic activities. The journal was a major factor in creating the new subject, "law and economics". My life has been interesting, concerned with academic affairs and on the whole successful. But, on almost all occasions, what I have done has been determined by factors which were no part of my choosing. I have had "greatness thrust upon me".

The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 11:07:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in

Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991

Presentation Speech by Professor Lars Werin of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Translation of the Swedish text.

Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, The economic system has an institutional structure, which we often regard as self-evident because we observe it around us every day. But it is actually peculiar and intricate. For instance, people make agreements among themselves in many different ways, ranging from simple purchases to complex contracts; what determines the pattern? Economic activity takes place within a framework of legal rules: contract law, tort law, etc; why are these laws formulated as they are? And why do we have firms at all?

These and other components of the institutional structure must certainly be essential elements in the functioning of the economic system. Nevertheless, economic theory could not answer these questions. This state of affairs annoyed a young economist who had just received his first degree in London in the 1930s. He wrote an essay with the perhaps untactically pretentious title The Nature of the Firm. He provided a strong and productive answer to the last question, why firms exist, although hardly anyone bothered to listen. He gradually added building blocks to his theoretical construction, and had eventually - in the early 1960s - set forth the principles for answering all of the questions. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the breakthrough for his ideas occurred. Astonishingly, basic economics had to be revised, managerial economics received a new foundation and research in economic history new impulses, a new discipline, law and economics, was established on the borderline between economics and legal science, and traditional jurisprudence itself became unsettled. It is for this achievement that the originator, Ronald Coase, is rewarded; no longer an angry young man, but still a most active researcher.

Coase pointed out that a large proportion of the total use of resources takes place within firms. Thus, it has deliberately been withheld from the price mechanism - the market system - in order to be coordinated administratively instead. A general theory has to be able to explain this phenomenon; traditional theory could not.

Someone has aptly described Coase's problems as follows. A firm may be regarded as an island of administration in a sea of contracting, in "the sea of markets". If we look out across the economy, we find that it is an archipelago. But why is it an archipelago ? Why is it not an open sea of simple contracts between separate individuals? And why are there so many small islands, that is, why are they islets rather than a few large continents?

Coase's answer was that traditional theory disregarded what he called transaction costs, i.e., the time, work and other resources used in order to enter into contracts and manage firms and similar institutions. His relatively simple - but, as it turned out, highly viable - thesis was that a firm arises if the costs of achieving a certain use of resources are lower when carried out administratively as compared to purchases and sales on the market. If it did not cost anything to enter into contracts, then there would be no need for firms.

This was not only a new view of the firm; from now on a searchlight would be aimed at the abundance of variation inherent in the patterns of contracts which comprise what we usually call "markets".

As a next step, Coase showed that whatever is bought and sold or otherwise becomes the object of a contract does not actually consist of goods and other resources, but of rights to the disposal of goods and resources. Rights such as ownership rights, usership rights, etc. are fundamental components of the economy. Of course, rights are also a basic component of the legal system.

In an influential study, Coase began with a now famous hypothetical experiment. He examined a court which has to determine whether a certain right should be awarded to one or the other of two subjects, each of whom is engaged in a particular type of activity. This, in fact, is a very common decision situation in the legal system. If no resources whatsoever would be consumed in contracting, as economists and perhaps even lawyers carelessly used to presuppose, then - according to Coase - it does not really matter how the court decides. The right will still end up with the party who can achieve the largest output. If she does not receive the right directly from the legal or judicial authority, then she will buy it from the other party, who stands to gain by selling it.

The conclusion of the experiment is that if, in reality, transaction costs were zero, then a great deal of legislation would obviously be pointless and unnecessary. Earlier, Coase had found that firms do not serve any purpose if transaction costs are zero. Supported by empirical studies, such as legal cases, he could now draw his fundamental conclusion: that not only firms and large bodies of the law, but the entire institutional structure of the economy can be explained by transaction costs. Transaction costs and a formulation in terms of rights: two relatively simple ideas - but with the power to propel all the economic sciences, and legal science as well, in new directions.

Professor Coase, By your refusal to take anything for granted, and your skepticism toward conventional wisdom, you have succeeded in explaining the principles behind the institutional structure of the economy. You have remarkably improved our understanding of the way the economic system functions - although it took some time for the rest of us to realize it. On behalf of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, I congratulate you warmly and sincerely. May I ask you to receive, from the hands of His Majesty the King, this year's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.

From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1991-1995, Editor Torsten Persson, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1997

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-14 11:39:44编辑过]

The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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leewrcn 发表于 2005-1-13 11:11:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 1991, to Professor Ronald Coase, University of Chicago, USA, for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy. Breakthrough in Understanding the Institutional Structure of the Economy Until recently, basic economic analysis concentrated on studying the functioning of the economy in the framework of an institutional structure which was taken as given. Efforts to explain the institutional structure were usually considered unnecessary or futile. For instance, the existence of organizations of the type we call firms seemed almost self-evident. Observed variations in contract forms in the economic sphere were also regarded as a given fact, and the laws and rules of the legal system were perceived as an externally imposed setting for economic activity. By means of a radical extension of economic micro theory, Ronald Coase succeeded in specifying principles for explaining the institutional structure of the economy, thereby also making new contributions to our understanding of the way the economy functions. His achievements have provided legal science, economic history and organization theory with powerful impulses and are therefore also highly significant in an interdisciplinary context. Coase's contributions are the result of methodical research work, where each segment was gradually added to the next over a period of many years. It took a long time for his approach to gain a foothold. When the breakthrough finally occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, it was all the more emphatic. Today Coase's theories are among the most dynamic forces behind research in economic science and jurisprudence. Coase showed that traditional basic microeconomic theory was incomplete because it only included production and transport costs, whereas it neglected the costs of entering into and executing contracts and managing organizations. Such costs are commonly known as transaction costs and they account for a considerable share of the total use of resources in the economy. Thus, traditional theory had not embodied all of the restrictions which bind the allocations of economic agents. When transaction costs are taken into account, it turns out that the existence of firms, different corporate forms, variations in contract arrangements, the structure of the financial system and even fundamental features of the legal system can be given relatively simple explanations. By incorporating different types of transaction costs, Coase paved the way for a systematic analysis of institutions in the economic system and their significance. Coase also demonstrated that the power and precision of analysis may be enhanced if it is carried out in terms of rights to use goods and factors of production instead of the goods and factors themselves. These rights, which came to be called "property rights" in economic analysis, may be comprised of full ownership, different kinds of usership rights or specific and limited decision and disposal rights, defined by clauses in contracts or by internal rules in organizations. The definition of property rights and their distribution among individuals by law, contract clauses and other rules determine economic decisions and their outcome. Coase showed that every given distribution of property rights among individuals tends to be reallocated through contracts if it is to the mutual advantage of the parties and not prevented by transaction costs, and that institutional arrangements other than contracts emerge if they imply lower transaction costs. Modifications of legal rules by courts and legislators are also encompassed by these arrangements. Property rights thus constitute a basic component in analyses of the institutional structure of the economy. In perhaps somewhat pretentious terminology, Coase may be said to have identified a new set of "elementary particles" in the economic system. Other researchers, to some extent under the influence of Coase, have also made pioneering contributions to the study of property rights. Coase's Contributions: First Stage In his first major study entitled, The Nature of the Firm, Coase posed two questions which had seldom been the objects of strict economic analysis and, prior to Coase, lacked robust and valid solutions, i.e. , why are there organizations of the type represented by firms and why is each firm of a certain size? A key result in traditional theory was to show the ability of the price system (or the market mechanism) to coordinate the use of resources. The applicability of this theory was diminished by the fact that a large proportion of total use of resources was deliberately withheld from the price mechanism in order to be coordinated administratively within firms. This is the point at which Coase introduced transaction costs and illustrated their crucial importance. Alongside production costs, there are costs for preparing, entering into and monitoring the execution of all kinds of contracts, as well as costs for implementing allocative measures within firms in a corresponding way. If these circumstances are taken into account, it may be concluded that a firm originates when allocative measures are carried out at lower total production, contract and administrative costs within the firm than by means of purchases and sales on the market. Similarly, a firm expands to the point where an additional allocative measure costs more internally than it would through a contract on markets. If transaction costs were zero, no firms would arise. All allocation would take place through simple contracts between individuals. An important element in the model is that there are two types of contracts: those which stipulate the parties' total obligations (or, the reverse, rights) and those which are deliberately made incomplete by not specifying all obligations, but intentionally allow a free margin for unilateral decisions by one of the parties. Such "open" agreements may be exemplified by employment contracts, which usually leave room for direction and giving orders. According to Coase's theory, the firm is characterized by the latitude for decision created by a particular cluster of such open contracts. The firm in fact consists of this array of contracts and is related to the rest of the world by other fully specified contracts regarding purchases of inputs, sales of products, and loans under prescribed terms. Coase's formulation has proved to be exceedingly practicable and has given rise to intensive examination of the contract relations which characterize firms. It is now clear that every type of firm is comprised of a distinctive contract structure and thereby a specific distribution of rights and obligations (property rights). Coase's work on the firm has become the basis for rapidly expanding research on principal-agent relations. It has also influenced vital aspects of financial economics, such as the lively research devoted to explaining the pattern of financial intermediaries. Coase's Contributions: Second Stage In retrospect, it is easy to realize that these examinations of firms' basic characteristics would provide a basis for more general conclusions regarding the institutional structure of the economic system. Coase himself laid the groundwork in a subsequent stage. In another major study entitled, The Problem of Social Cost , Coase introduced the set-up in terms of rights or property rights. He postulated that if a property right is well defined, if it can be transferred, and if the transaction costs in an agreement which transfers the right from one holder to another are zero, then the use of resources does not depend on whether the right was initially allotted to one party or the other (except for the difference which can arise if the distribution of wealth between the two parties is affected). If the initial holding entailed an unfavorable total result, the better result would be brought about spontaneously through a voluntary contract, as it can be executed at no cost and both parties gain from it. In other words, all legislation which deals with granting rights to individuals would be meaningless in terms of the use of resources; parties would "agree themselves around" every given distribution of rights if it is to their mutual advantage. Thus, a large amount of legislation would serve no material purpose if transaction costs are zero. This thesis is a direct parallel to the conclusion in The Nature of the Firm that firms under the same conditions are superfluous. All allocations could be effectuated through simple, uncomplicated agreements without administrative features, i.e. , through frictionless markets. This led Coase to conclude that it is the fact that transaction costs are never zero which indeed explains the institutional structure of the economy, including variations in contract forms and many kinds of legislation. Or, more exactly, the institutional structure of the economy may be explained by the relative costs of different institutional arrangements, combined with parties' efforts to keep total costs at a minimum. Alongside price formation, the formation of the institutional structure is regarded as an integral step in the process of resource distribution. Hence, economic institutions do not require a "separate" theory. It is sufficient to render existing theory complete and formulate it in terms of the primary components, i.e., property rights. These conclusions concerning the radical effects of ever prevalent transaction costs are thus the main result of Coase's analysis. Somewhat paradoxically, circumstances have ordained that it is the preceding conclusion about the consequences of overlooking transaction costs which has come to be called the "Coase Theorem". Of course, the situation without transaction costs is only a hypothetical norm of comparison. However, it can facilitate the analysis of real-world conditions. It may also inspire studies of contracting which can actually be observed, in areas where earlier theory prematurely took it for granted that transaction costs are so high that contracts are inconceivable. Further examinations by Coase himself or students and others inspired by him have shown that in some such cases, transaction costs are not so high as to preclude a contract. Such contracts are found to have strong peculiarities, created by the parties in order to alleviate the drawbacks of high transaction costs. These observations are wholly in line with Coase's main conclusion. In cases where transaction costs absolutely prevent a contract, there is - as inferred by the theorem - a tendency for other institutional arrangements to arise, for example a firm or amended legislation. The circle is closed; this is exactly the message conveyed by The Nature of the Firm.

As regards legislation, in The Problem of Social Cost , Coase developed a hypothesis concerning the behavior of courts in rather frequent cases where two (or more) parties dispute rights and where agreements are impossible or extremely difficult because of high transaction costs. Coase found that courts probably try to distribute the rights among the parties so as to realize the solution which would have been the outcome of an agreement, if such an agreement had been possible. The underlying idea is that this is a natural and rational way for a court to reason if it is more intent on setting a precedent to generate expedient incentives for the future than solving a particular dispute. This means that common pleas courts serve as an extension of the market mechanism to areas where it cannot function due to transaction costs. This hypothesis has become immensely important because, along with the general formulation in terms of rights or property rights, it has become the impetus for developing the new discipline of "law and economics" and, in prolongation, for renewal of many aspects of legal science.

The Master said, Even when walking in a party of no more than three I

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