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[公告]《实验经济学高级研讨班》消息
《实验经济学高级研讨班》消息为了推动实验经济学等前沿理论和方法在我国经济管理研究中的应用，全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会和北京信息科技大学经济管理学院拟于2008年6月上旬在北京联合举办《实验经济学与当代经济管理前沿》高级研讨班。在相关方面的大力支持和协助下，经与诺贝尔经济学奖得主、实验经济学之父VernonSmith教授创办和领导的美国乔治·梅森大学（GeorgeMasonUniversity）经济学跨学科研究中心（ICES）多次沟通商定，我们特邀ICES的学术主任DanielHouser教授为主讲嘉宾，并请相关的专家学者作学术报告，以及共同交流探讨实验经济学研究和教学的经验体会。此次办班议题涉及：实验经济学方法的适应性，如何提炼出可用实验方法研究的经济管理问题；经济实验的设计、扩展和完善；实验经济学数据处理与相关软件应用；经济实验程序的编写、调试、运行和操控；实验经济学新进展与案例分析；如何推动实验经济学在我国的应用等领域和专题。会期约三天，工作语言为英文和中文，欢迎对实验经济学及经济管理前沿问题感兴趣的专家学者、青年教师和博士生参加。为了保证办班效果，需要适当控制规模，有意参加者请于2008年3月31日前预报名（详细写明个人基本信息和联系方式，提交给下列联系人），愿提供和交流相关研究成果者优先考虑。本次办班不收注册费、听课费等任何费用，但差旅费、食宿费等个人费用自理。正式通知预计5月上、中旬发出。联系人：刘伟：北京信息科技大学经济管理学院，北京海淀清河小营东路12号，邮编：100192，电话：010-82426905，13466579266，lwlsn@sohu.com何琼：北京信息科技大学经济管理学院，北京海淀清河小营东路12号，邮编：100192，电话：010-82427135，13810108750，19570308@163.com全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会（中国数量经济学会经济对策论专业委员会）北京信息科技大学经济管理学院2008年1月
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最新实验经济学working paper 2
NEP:NewEconomicsPapersExperimentalEconomicsEditedby:DanielHouserGeorgeMasonUniversityIssuedate:2012-03-08Papers:12Note:Accesstofullcontentsmayberestricted.NEPissponsoredbySUNYOswego.Tosubscribe/unsubscribefollowthislinkhttp://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-expInthisissuewehave:TowardanUnderstandingofWhyPeopleDiscriminate:EvidencefromaSeriesofNaturalFieldExperimentsUriGneezy;JohnList;MichaelK.PriceBubblesandExperience:AnExperimentwithaSteadyInflowofNewTradersHuanXie;JipengZhangDesertandinequityaversioninteamsDavid,Gill;Rebecca,StoneFromthelabtothefield:envelopes,dictatorsandmannersStoop,JanAThree-StageExperimentalTestofRevealedPreferenceHammond,Peter;Traub,StefanAgedifferencesinthereactiontoincentives–doolderpeopleavoidcompetition?Sproten,AlecN.;Schwieren,ChristianeDoReportedAttitudestowardsImmigrantsPredictEthnicDiscrimination?Carlsson,Magnus;Eriksson,StefanAgrowingpain:anexperimentalapproachtodiscoverthemostacceptablestrategyforliftingfuelsubsidyschemeinIndonesiaPradiptyo,Rimawan;Sahadewo,GumilangAryoYouCanPickYourFriends,ButYouNeedtoWatchThem:LoanScreeningandEnforcementinaReferralsFieldExperimentGharadT.Bryan;DeanKarlan;JonathanZinmanSelfCentredBeliefs:AnEmpircalApproachProto,Eugenio;Sgroi,DanielShouldAidRewardPerformance?EvidencefromaFieldExperimentonHealthandEducationinIndonesiaBenjaminA.Olken;JunkoOnishi;SusanWongCognitivehierarchiesinadaptiveplayKhanAbhimanyu;PeetersRonaldContents.TowardanUnderstandingofWhyPeopleDiscriminate:EvidencefromaSeriesofNaturalFieldExperimentsDate:2012-02By:UriGneezyJohnListMichaelK.PriceURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17855&r=expSocialscientistshavepresentedevidencethatsuggestsdiscriminationisubiquitous:women,nonwhites,andtheelderlyhavebeenfoundtobethetargetofdiscriminatorybehavioracrossseverallaborandproductmarkets.Scholarshavebeenlesssuccessfulatpinpointingtheunderlyingmotivesforsuchdiscriminatorypatterns.Weemployaseriesoffieldexperimentsacrossseveralmarketandagenttypestoexaminethenatureandextentofdiscrimination.Ourexplorationincludesexaminingdiscriminationbasedongender,age,sexualorientation,race,anddisability.Usingdatafrommorethan3000individualtransactions,wefindevidenceofdiscriminationineachmarket.Interestingly,wefindthatwhenthediscriminatorbelievestheobjectofdiscriminationiscontrollable,anyobserveddiscriminationismotivatedbyanimus.Whentheobjectofdiscriminationisnotduetochoice,theevidencesuggeststhatstatisticaldiscriminationistheunderlyingreasonforthedisparatebehavior.JEL:C93BubblesandExperience:AnExperimentwithaSteadyInflowofNewTradersDate:2012-01By:HuanXie(ConcordiaUniversity)JipengZhang(NanyangTechnologicalUniversity)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crd:wpaper:12001&r=expWerevisittheeffectoftraders'experienceonpricebubblesbyintroducingeitherone-thirdortwo-thirdssteadyinflowofnewtradersintherepeatedexperimentalassetmarkets.Wefindthatbubblesarenotsignificantlyabatedbythethirdrepetitionofthemarketwiththeinflowofnewtraders.Therelativeimportanceofexperiencetotheformationofbubblesdependsontheproportionofnewtradersinthemarket.Ourfindingsidentifyamarketenvironmentwhereincreasedexperienceisnotsufficienttoeliminatepricebubbles.Keywords:Bubbles;AssetMarkets;Experience;InflowofTradersJEL:C91DesertandinequityaversioninteamsDate:2012-02By:David,GillRebecca,StoneURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:36864&r=expTeamsarebecomingincreasinglyimportantinworksettings.Wedevelopaframeworktostudythestrategicimplicationsofameritocraticnotionofdesertunderwhichteammemberscareaboutreceivingwhattheyfeeltheydeserve.Teammembersfinditpainfultoreceivelessthantheirperceivedentitlement,whilereceivingmoremayinducepleasureorpaindependingonwhetherpreferencesexhibitdesertelationordesertguilt.Ournotionofdesertgeneralizesdistributionalconcernmodelstosituationsinwhicheffortchoicesaffectthedistributionperceivedtobefair;inparticular,desertnestsinequityaversionovermoneynetofeffortcostsasaspecialcase.Whenidenticalteammatesshareteamoutputequally,desertguiltgeneratesacontinuumofsymmetricequilibria.Equilibriumeffortcanlieaboveorbelowthelevelintheabsenceofdesert,sodesertguiltgeneratesbehaviorconsistentwithbothpositiveandnegativereciprocityandmayunderpinsocialnormsofcooperation.Keywords:Desert;Deservingness;Equity;Inequityaversion;Lossaversion;Reference-dependentpreferences;Guilt;Reciprocity;Socialnorms;TeamproductionJEL:D63Fromthelabtothefield:envelopes,dictatorsandmannersDate:2012-03-02By:Stoop,JanURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37048&r=expResultsarereportedofthefirstnaturalfieldexperimentonthedictatorgame,wheresubjectsareunawarethattheyparticipateinanexperiment.Incontrasttopredictionsofthestandardeconomicmodel,dictatorsshowalargedegreeofpro-socialbehavior.Thispaperbuildsabridgefromthelaboratorytothefieldtoexplorehowpredictivefindingsfromthelaboratoryareforthefield.Externalvalidityisremarkablyhigh.Inallexperiments,subjectsdisplayanequallyhighamountofpro-socialbehavior,whethertheyarestudentsornot,participateinalaboratoryornot,orareawarethattheyparticipateinanexperimentornot.Keywords:altruism;naturalfieldexperiment;externalvalidityJEL:D63AThree-StageExperimentalTestofRevealedPreferenceDate:2012By:Hammond,Peter(UniversityofWarwick)Traub,Stefan(UniversityofBremen)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:71&r=expApowerfultestofVarian's(1982)generalisedaxiomofrevealedpreference(GARP)withtwogoodsrequirestheconsumer'sbudgetlinetopassthroughtwodemandvectorsrevealedaschosengivenotherbudgetsets.Inanexperimentusingthisidea,eachof41studentsubjectsfacedaseriesof16successivegroupedportfolioselectionproblems.Eachgroupofselectionproblemshaduptothreestages,wherelaterbudgetsetsdependedonthatsubject'schoicesatearlierstagesinthesamegroup.Only49%ofsubjects'choiceswereobservedtosatisfyGARPexactly,evenbyourrelativelygenerousnonparametrictest.Keywords:Rationality,revealedpreference,uncertaintyAgedifferencesinthereactiontoincentives–doolderpeopleavoidcompetition?Date:2012-02-17By:Sproten,AlecN.Schwieren,ChristianeURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0522&r=expThe“agingemployee”hasrecentlybecomeahottopicinmanyfieldsofbehaviouralresearch.Withtheaimtodeterminetheeffectsofdifferentincentiveschemes(competition,socialorincreasedmonetaryincentives)onperformanceofyoungandoldersubjects,welookatbehaviourofagroupofyoungerandolderadultsonawell-establishedrealefforttask.Weshowthatolderadultsdifferfromyoungeradultsintheirperformanceinallconditions,butnotintheimprovementbetweenconditions.Theagedifferenceinperformanceishoweverdrivenbywomen.Whilewereplicatethegenderdifferenceincompetitivenessfoundintheliterature,wedonotfindasignificantagedifferenceincompetitiveness.Socialincentiveshaveanatleastasstrongorevenstrongereffectonperformancethanincreasedmonetaryincentives.Thiseffectisdrivenbymen;womendonotshowanincreaseinperformancewithsocialincentives.Keywords:aging;competition;socialproductionfunctions;experiment;incentivesJEL:C72DoReportedAttitudestowardsImmigrantsPredictEthnicDiscrimination?Date:2012-02-21By:Carlsson,Magnus(SchoolofBusinessandEconomics,LinnaeusUniversity)Eriksson,Stefan(DepartmentofEconomics)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2012_006&r=expReportedattitudestowardsimmigrantsaresometimesusedasaproxyforethnicdiscrimination.However,thereislittleempiricalevidenceofalinkbetweenattitudesanddiscrimination.Inthispaper,weusesurveydataonpeople’sattitudestowardsimmigrantscombinedwithdataonethnicdiscriminationfromafieldexperimentintheSwedishhousingmarkettore-examinethisissue.Wefindclearevidenceofalinkbetweenreportedattitudestowardsimmigrantsandtheextentofethnicdiscriminationatthemunicipalitylevel.Thus,incontrasttomostpriorstudies,ourresultssuggestthatreportedattitudesmaybeausefulproxyforethnicdiscrimination.Keywords:Attitudes;Ethnicdiscrimination;Fieldexperiments;HousingmarketJEL:C93Agrowingpain:anexperimentalapproachtodiscoverthemostacceptablestrategyforliftingfuelsubsidyschemeinIndonesiaDate:2012-03-03By:Pradiptyo,RimawanSahadewo,GumilangAryoURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37073&r=expFuelsubsidyhasbeenthebiggestquandariesinIndonesianeconomy,asithasbeencreatingahugeopportunitycoststotheeconomy.Thesubsidyisimplementedtoaconsumergood(i.e.fuels)asopposetotargetedrecipients,creatingdistortionintheefficientresourceallocation.Itwasestimatedabout70%ofthesubsidywerereceivedby40%oftopincomehouseholds(WorldBank,2007).Althoughthebudgetplanforthesubsidyin2011wasRp129.7trillionor10%oftheGoIannualbudget,theactualsubsidywasRp160.7trillion(13.3%oftheGoIannualbudget).Indeed,noindividualpreferstolosethesubsidythathasbeenreceivedformanyyears,howevertheGovernmentofIndonesia(GoI)cannotmaintainthesubsidypolicyonfuelpriceanylongerwithoutcreatingextrabudgetaryburden.ThisstudyuseexperimentalapproachtoseekthemostacceptableexitstrategyofeliminatingfuelsubsidyschemeinIndonesiabasedonhouseholds’perspective.335subjectsparticipatedintheexperiment,rangingfromthosewhodonotownmotorvehicle,thosewhohavemotorcycle(s)andthosewhohavecar(s).Duringtheexperiment,subjectsweregivenseveralpair-wisechoicesandchosethemostacceptablepolicyfromeachpair-wisepolicychoices.Theresultsshowthatthecombinationofgradualeliminationandearmarkedreallocationschemewerethemostdesirable.Subjectwithverylowandlow-incomebackgroundtendtobemorereceptiveforsuddeneliminationofthesubsidyincomparisontotheircounterpartfrommediumandhigh-incomebackgrounds.Keywords:Fuelsubsidy;experimentaleconomics;analyticalhierarchyprocess(AHP);preferencerelation;reallocationofresourcesJEL:D03YouCanPickYourFriends,ButYouNeedtoWatchThem:LoanScreeningandEnforcementinaReferralsFieldExperimentDate:2012-03By:GharadT.BryanDeanKarlanJonathanZinmanURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17883&r=expWeexaminearandomizedtrialthatallowsseparateidentificationofpeerscreeningandenforcementofcreditcontracts.ASouthAfricanmicrolenderofferedhalfitsclientsabonusforreferringafriendwhorepaidaloan.Fortheremainingclients,thebonuswasconditionalonloanapproval.Afterapproval,therepaymentincentivewasremovedfromhalfthereferrersinthefirstgroupandaddedforhalfthoseinthesecond.Wefindlargeenforcementeffects,a$12(100Rand)incentivereduceddefaultby10percentagepointsfromabaseof20%.Incontrast,wefindnoevidenceofscreening.JEL:C93SelfCentredBeliefs:AnEmpircalApproachDate:2012By:Proto,Eugenio(UniversityofWarwick)Sgroi,Daniel(UniversityofWarwick)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:74&r=expWeperformanexperimentdesignedtoassesstheaccuracyofbeliefsaboutdistributions.Thebeliefsrelatetobehavior(mobilephonepurchasingdecisions,hypotheticalrestaurantchoices),attitudes(happiness,politics)andobservablecharacteristics(height,weight)andaretypicallyformedthroughrealworldexperiences.Wendapowerfulandubiquitousbiasinperceptionsthatis\self-centered"inthesensethatanindividual'sbeliefsaboutthepopulationdistributionchangeswiththeirownpositioninthedistribution.Inparticular,thoseatextremestendtoperceivethemselvesasclosertothemiddleofthedistributionthanisthecase.WediscusspossibleexplanationsforthisbiasKeywords:subjectivebeliefs,attitudes,observablecharacteristics,self-centeredbiasShouldAidRewardPerformance?EvidencefromaFieldExperimentonHealthandEducationinIndonesiaDate:2012-03By:BenjaminA.OlkenJunkoOnishiSusanWongURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17892&r=expThispaperreportsanexperimentinover3,000Indonesianvillagesdesignedtotesttheroleofperformanceincentivesinimprovingtheefficacyofaidprograms.Villagesinarandomly-chosenone-thirdofsubdistrictsreceivedablockgranttoimprove12maternalandchildhealthandeducationindicators,withthesizeofthesubsequentyear’sblockgrantdependingonperformancerelativetoothervillagesinthesubdistrict.Villagesinremainingsubdistrictswererandomlyassignedtoeitheranotherwiseidenticalblockgrantprogramwithnofinanciallinktoperformance,ortoapurecontrolgroup.Wefindthattheincentivizedvillagesperformedbetteronhealththanthenon-incentivizedvillages,particularlyinlessdevelopedareas,butfoundnoimpactofincentivesoneducation.Wefindnoevidenceofnegativespilloversfromtheincentivestountargetedoutcomes,andnoevidencethatvillagersmanipulatedscores.Therelativeperformancedesignwascrucialinensuringthatincentivesdidnotresultinanettransferoffundstowardricherareas.Incentivesledtowhatappeartobemoreefficientspendingofblockgrants,andledtoanincreaseinlaborfromhealthproviders,whoarepartiallypaidfee-for-service,butnotteachers.Onnet,between50-75%ofthetotalimpactoftheblockgrantprogramonhealthindicatorscanbeattributedtotheperformanceincentives.JEL:I15CognitivehierarchiesinadaptiveplayDate:2012By:KhanAbhimanyuPeetersRonald(METEOR)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2012007&r=expInspiredbythebehaviorinrepeatedguessinggameexperiments,westudyadaptiveplaybypopulationscontainingindividualsthatreasonwithdifferentlevelsofcognition.Individualsplayahigherorderbestresponsetosamplesfromtheempiricaldataonthehistoryofplay,wheretheorderofbestresponseisdeterminedbytheirexogenouslygivenlevelofcognition.AsinYoung''smodelofadaptiveplay,(unperturbed)playstillconvergestoaminimalcurbset.However,withtherandomperturbationsofthis(higherorder)bestresponsedynamic,thestochasticallystablestatesobtainedmaynowbedifferent,butinadeterministicmanner.Perhapscounter-intuitively,highercognitionmayactuallybebadforboththeindividualwithhighercognitionandhisparentpopulation.Keywords:microeconomics;
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2013厦门大学实验经济学国际研讨会征稿启事
厦门大学王亚南经济研究院（WISE）将于2013年12月14-16日举行“第四届实验经济学国际研讨会”。此次研讨会旨在促进国内外以实验方法进行研究的各领域学者间的交流。现竭诚向各界征集相关学术论文。论文可涵盖决策论、经济学、金融学、博弈论、管理科学、市场营销或政治学等多个研究领域，运用以人为受试对象的可控实验而进行的研究。本次会议的主题为“运用有形测度以更好地解释选择”。我们特别鼓励研究内容与本次会议主题密切相关的学者或学生踊跃投稿。今年我们很荣幸地邀请到以下著名学者作为特邀专家，与会作主题发言：DavidCesarini，纽约大学SooHongChew，新加坡国立大学MarieClaireVilleval，里昂大学法国科学研究中心BurkhardSchipper，加州大学戴维斯校区RobertoWeber，苏黎世大学l论文提交及登记有意在本次会议上展示研究成果的学者或学生请务必于2013年10月15日前向以下邮箱地址提交一份简短摘要（包含标题与合作者姓名，并且不超过250字）：experiment2013wise@gmail.com。请注意所有的提交内容应采用英文。此外，我们将视投稿情况而定开设中文专场。如需要用中文演讲，请在提交摘要时注明。每位演讲者仅限演讲一篇论文。论文录用通知将于2013年10月15日后公布。国内学者参会费用为800元人民币，国外学者参会费用为200美元。境内外在读学生均免参会费用。研讨会注册截止日期为2013年11月15日。若有计划参与会议但不作演讲的学者或学生，请于注册截止日期前向以下邮箱地址发送邮件进行说明：experiment2013wise@gmail.com。l最佳论文奖为鼓励实验经济学与金融学相关领域的研究，本次研讨会设立王亚南经济研究院实验经济学最佳论文奖。该奖项将颁发给在本次研讨会上作出演讲的最佳论文的作者（须为在2009年及之后获得博士学位的学者或在读学生）。如果您符合条件并希望参评该奖项，请于2013年11月30日前提交一份用英文撰写的完整版论文以PDF的格式发至以下邮件地址：experiment2013wise@gmail.com，请在邮件中注明您的参评意向。此外，我们很荣幸地得到JournalofNeuroscience,Psychology,andEconomics（JPNE）(http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/npe/index.aspx)的同意，为在本次会议中演讲的论文出版一本专题论文集。JPNE是全世界唯一一份致力于出版有关神经经济学相关研究的期刊。所有专题论文集的备选稿件将按照该期刊正式出版标准接受同行评审。l更多信息·会议相关咨询：JasonShachat教授（experiment2013wise@gmail.com）·后勤事务咨询：侯斯莹（Jenine）（syhou.wise@gmail.com）本次会议是王亚南经济研究院（WISE）致力于建设一流实验经济学与金融学研究中心的一项重要举措。2010年秋季，王亚南经济研究院“实验经济金融实验室”（FEEL）开始正式运作。如需了解更多信息，请访问我们实验室网站：http://feel.xmu.edu.cn。2010年，WISE设立了中国首个社会科学领域的教育部重点实验室——厦门大学“计量经济学”教育部重点实验室。作为该重点实验室的一个重要组成部分，实验经济金融实验室致力于成为一个在实验经济学和实验金融学领域具有国际领先水平的研究机构。厦门位于中国的东南沿海，气候温和，交通便捷，航班直飞亚洲各主要城市，享有度假胜地之美誉，以中国最宜居城市而著称。厦门附近的著名旅游景点包括被联合国教科文组织列入世界文化遗产名录的客家土楼、鼓浪屿（又称“钢琴之岛”）和武夷山。成立于2005年的厦门大学王亚南经济研究院（WISE）是厦门大学为建设国际一流的经济学研究机构、推动国内外学术研究和交流而成立的。更多关于WISE的详细信息，敬请关注http://wise.xmu.edu.cn/english/index.asp。l会议组织者JasonShachat，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院耿森，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院AnnikaMueller，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院王云，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院
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最新实验经济学3 working paper~
NEP:NewEconomicsPapersExperimentalEconomicsEditedby:DanielHouserGeorgeMasonUniversityIssuedate:2012-03-21Papers:22Note:Accesstofullcontentsmayberestricted.NEPissponsoredbySUNYOswego.Tosubscribe/unsubscribefollowthislinkhttp://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-expInthisissuewehave:Leverageandassetprices:anexperimentMarcoCipriani;AnaFostel;DanielHouserStatusQuoEffectsinFairnessGames:ReciprocalResponsestoActsofCommissionvs.ActsofOmissionJamesC.Cox;MaroÅ¡Servátka;RadovanVadovicHeyLookatMe:TheEffectofGivingCirclesonGivingDeanKarlan;MargaretA.McConnellInterpretingTimeHorizonEffectsinInter-TemporalChoiceDohmen,Thomas;Falk,Armin;Huffman,David;Sunde,UweExperimentalEvidenceofSelf-ImageConcernsasMotivationforGivingTonin,Mirco;Vlassopoulos,MichaelAnexperimentinvestigatingthespill-overeffectsofvoicingoutrageAnastasiosKoukoumelis;M.VittoriaLevatiCulturalDiversity,Cooperation,andAntisocialPunishmentMarcoFaillo;DanielaGrieco;LucaZarriPatientPreferencesandTreatmentThresholdsunderDiagnosticRisk–AnEconomicLaboratoryExperimentMiriamKrieger;ThomasMayrhoferFirst-andSecond-orderSubjectiveExpectationsinStrategicDecision-Making:ExperimentalEvidenceNeri,Claudia;Manski,CharlesTowardsanunderstandingoftheendogenousnatureofgroupidentificationingamesSmith,John;Bezrukova,KaterinaIPreferNottoKnow!AnalyzingtheDecisionofGettingInformationaboutyourAbilityPaulinaGranadosZambranoYouCanPickYourFriends,ButYouNeedtoWatchThem:LoanScreeningandEnforcementinaReferralsFieldExperimentGharadBryan;DeanKarlan;JonathanZinmanSalience,RiskyChoicesandGenderBooth,AlisonL.;Nolen,PatrickJ.EliminatingLaboratoryAssetBubblesbyPayingInterestonCashGiusti,Giovanni;Jiang,JanetHua;Xu,YipingTestingaforgottenaspectofAkerlof’sgiftexchangehypothesis:RelationalcontractswithindividualanduniformwagesMartinG.Kocher;WolfgangJ.Luhan;MatthiasSutterTestingaforgottenaspectofAkerlof’sgiftexchangehypothesis:RelationalcontractswithindividualanduniformwagesKocher,MartinG.;Luhan,WolfgangJ.;Sutter,MatthiasAssessingMultiplePriorModelsofBehaviourunderAmbiguityAnaConte;JohnD.HeyDoriskandtimepreferenceshavebiologicalroots?Drichoutis,Andreas;Nayga,RodolfoModelingInequityAversioninaDictatorGamewithProductionLuisJoséBlasMorenoGarrido;IsmaelRodríguezLaraThresholdpublicgoodgamesandimpulsebalancetheoryFedericaAlberti;EdwardJ.Cartwright;AnnaStepanovaThepriceisright:updatingofinflationexpectationsinarandomizedpriceinformationexperimentOlivierArmantier;ScottNelson;GiorgioTopa;WilbertvanderKlaauw;BasitZafarTheImpactofConsultingServicesonSmallandMediumEnterprises:EvidencefromaRandomizedTrialinMexicoMariamBruhn;DeanKarlan;AntoinetteSchoarContents.Leverageandassetprices:anexperimentDate:2012By:MarcoCiprianiAnaFostelDanielHouserURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:548&r=expThisisthefirstpapertotesttheassetpricingimplicationofleverageinalaboratory.Weshowthatastheorypredicts,leverageincreasesassetprices:Whenanassetcanbeusedascollateral(thatis,whentheassetcanbeboughtonmargin),itspricegoesup.Thisincreaseissignificant,andquantitativelyclosetowhattheorypredicts.However,importantdeviationsfromthetheoryariseinthelaboratory.First,thedemandfortheassetshiftswhenitcanbeusedasacollateral,eventhoughagentsdonotexhausttheirpurchasingpowerwhencollateralizedborrowingisnotallowed.Second,thespreadbetweencollateralizableandnoncollateralizableassetsdoesnotincreaseduringcrises,incontrasttowhattheorypredicts.Keywords:Assetpricing;FinancialleverageStatusQuoEffectsinFairnessGames:ReciprocalResponsestoActsofCommissionvs.ActsofOmissionDate:2012-02By:JamesC.CoxMaroÅ¡ServátkaRadovanVadovicURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2012-03&r=expBoththelawandculturemakeacentraldistinctionbetweenactsofcommissionthatoverturnthestatusquoandactsofomissionthatupholdit.Ineverydaylifeactsofcommissionoftenelicitstrongerreciprocalresponsesthandoactsofomission.Inthispaperwecomparereciprocalresponsestobothtypesofactsandaskwhetherbehaviorofsubjectsintwoexperimentsisconsistentwithexistingtheory.Thedesignoftheexperimentsfocusesontheaxiomsofrevealedaltruismtheory(Cox,Friedman,andSadiraj,2008)thatmakeitobservationallydistinctfromothertheories,AxiomR(forreciprocity)andAxiomS(forstatusquo).Wefindsupportforthistheoryinbothexperiments.HeyLookatMe:TheEffectofGivingCirclesonGivingDate:2012-01By:DeanKarlan(EconomicGrowthCenter,YaleUniversity)MargaretA.McConnell(HarvardSchoolofPublicHealth)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:1006&r=expTheoriesaboundforwhyindividualsgivetocharity.WeconductafieldexperimentwithdonorstoaYaleUniversityserviceclubtotesttheimpactofapromiseofpublicrecognitionongiving.Somemayclaimthattheyrespondtoanofferofpublicrecognitionnottoimprovetheirsocialstanding,butrathertomotivateotherstogive.Toteaseapartthesetwotheories,weconductalaboratoryexperimentwithundergraduates,andfoundnoevidencetosupportthealternative,altruisticmotivation.Weconcludethatcharitablegiftsincreaseinresponsetothepromiseofpublicrecognitionprimarilybecauseofindividuals'desiretoimprovetheirsocialimage.Keywords:endowments,prosocialbehavior,experiments,voluntarycontributions,socialimageJEL:D64InterpretingTimeHorizonEffectsinInter-TemporalChoiceDate:2012-02By:Dohmen,Thomas(ROA,MaastrichtUniversity)Falk,Armin(UniversityofBonn)Huffman,David(SwarthmoreCollege)Sunde,Uwe(UniversityofSt.Gallen)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6385&r=expWecomparedifferentdesignsthathavebeenusedtotestforanimpactoftimehorizonondiscounting,usingrealincentivesandtworepresentativedatasets.Withthemostcommonlyusedtypeofdesignwereplicatethetypicalfindingofdeclining(hyperbolic)discounting,butwithotherdesignsfindconstantorincreasingdiscounting.Asawhole,thedataarenotconsistentwithanyoftheseusualcandidatediscountingassumptions,andtheyalsoimplyaviolationoftransitivity.Theresultshaveimplicationsforinterpretingpreviousevidence,andposeanimportantpuzzleforunderstandinginter-temporalchoice.Keywords:timepreference,hyperbolicdiscounting,self-control,dynamicinconsistency,intransitivityJEL:D01ExperimentalEvidenceofSelf-ImageConcernsasMotivationforGivingDate:2012-02By:Tonin,Mirco(UniversityofSouthampton)Vlassopoulos,Michael(UniversityofSouthampton)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6388&r=expWeconductanexperimentinwhichsubjectsmakeaseriesofdecisionsofallocatinganendowmentof￡10betweenthemselvesandapassiverecipientthatiseitheracharityortheexperimenter.Whenmakingthesedecisionssubjectsareinformedthatoneofthemwillbechosenrandomlyattheendtodeterminepayoffs.Afteralldecisionshavebeenmadeandithasbeenrevealedwhichdecisionwilldeterminepayoffsweoffersubjectsanopportunitytooptoutfromtheirinitialdecisionandreceive￡10instead.Wefindthataroundonethirdofsubjectschoosetooptout.Thefactthatasubjectdecidestoreviseadecisiontogiveandchoosesinsteadtoexitandkeepthewholeamount–anoptionthatwasavailablewhenshemadethefirstdecisionandwasnotexercised–indicatesthatgivinginthefirstinstancewasnotmotivatedsolelybyaltruismtowardtherecipient.Wearguethatoptingoutindicatesthatgivingisalsomotivatedbyself-imageconcerns.Keywords:dictatorgame,charitablegiving,opting-out,self-imageJEL:C91Anexperimentinvestigatingthespill-overeffectsofvoicingoutrageDate:2012-03-07By:AnastasiosKoukoumelis(MaxPlanckInstituteofEconomics,Jena)M.VittoriaLevati(MaxPlanckInstituteofEconomics,Jena,andDepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofVerona)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-007&r=expWereportonanexperimentdesignedtoexplorewhetherandhowangeraffectsfuturelevelsofcooperation.Participantsplaythreeconsecutiveone-shotgames.Inbetweentwoidenticaltwo-personpublicgoodsgamesthereisaminidictatorgamethat,dependingonthetreatment,eithergivesordoesnotgivetherecipienttheopportunitytoscoldthedictatorviaatextmessage.Wefindthattherecipientsthatreceiveanunfairoffercontributesignificantlylessinthesecondpublicgoodsgame.Yet,suchcontributioncutsarelessfrequentandnotablysmallerwhenmessagingisallowedfor.Weconcludethatalthoughangerhasalastingnegativeeffectoncooperation,givingvoicetoithelpstocurtailselfishness.Keywords:Dictatorminigame,Publicgoodsgame,Emotions,CooperationJEL:C72CulturalDiversity,Cooperation,andAntisocialPunishmentDate:2012-03By:MarcoFaillo(DepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofTrento)DanielaGrieco(DepartmentofEconomics(UniversityofVerona))LucaZarri(DepartmentofEconomics(UniversityofVerona))URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2012&r=expIscultureanimportantvariabletoexplainwhethergroupscansuccessfullyprovidepublicgoods?Awealthofempiricalevidenceonbothindustrializedanddevelopingcountriesshowsthatcooperationlevelsdecreaseinthepresenceofethnicdivisions.Althoughseverallaboratoryworksdealwithculturaldifferences,sofarmoststudiesrestricttheirattentiontocross-culturalcomparisonsamonginternallyhomogeneoussocieties.WedepartfromthesecontributionsandconductaninterculturalpublicgoodsgamewithpunishmentexperimentinItaly,acountrywhereimmigrationisaquiterecent,butpoliticallyhotphenomenon.Weinvestigatetheeffectsofintroducingavaryingnumberofforeignparticipantswithinahomogeneouspoolofnativesubjects.Ourresultsindicatethatforeignerscontributesignificantlylessthannatives,nativesreactloweringtheirowncontributionlevels,and,consequently,thedegreeofculturaldiversitynegativelyaffectstheoveralllevelofcooperation.Intermsofsanctioning,weobservenodifferenceintheoverallamountofassignedandreceivedpunishmentpoints;however,behavingmostlyasfree-riders,foreignersaremorelikelytouseanti-socialpunishment.Intheabsenceofinstitutionalrestrictionsrulingoutanti-socialpunishment,thismightamplifythedocumenteddetrimentaleffectoncooperation.Keywords:ExperimentalEconomics;PublicGoodGames;Cooperation;CulturalDiversity;Anti-socialPunishment.JEL:C72PatientPreferencesandTreatmentThresholdsunderDiagnosticRisk–AnEconomicLaboratoryExperimentDate:2012-03By:MiriamKriegerThomasMayrhoferURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0321&r=expWestudyriskaversionandprudenceinmedicaltreatmentdecisions.Inalaboratoryexperiment,weinvestigatethefrequencyandintensityofsecond-andthird-orderriskpreferences,aswellastheeffectofthemedicaldecisioncontext.Riskpreferencesareassessedthroughtreatmentthresholds(theindifferencepointbetweennottreatingandtreating).Underdiagnosticrisk,medicaldecisiontheorypredictslowerthresholdsforrisk-aversethanrisk-neutraldecisionmakers.Givenacomorbidityrisk,prudentindividualshaveanevenlowerthreshold.Ourresultsdemonstraterisk-averseandprudentbehaviorinmedicaldecisions,whichreducethe(average)treatmentthresholdby41%relativetoriskneutrality(from50.0%to29.3%prevalencerate).Riskaversionaccountsfor3/4ofthiseffect,prudencefor1/4.Themedicaldecisionframingdoesnotaffectriskaversion,butisassociatedwithmoreandstrongerprudentbehavior.Thesefindingshaveconsequencesfortreatmentthresholds,diagnostics,andQALYs,andthusforclinicalguidelines.Keywords:Medicaldecisionmaking;treatmentthresholds;riskaversion;prudence;laboratoryexperimentJEL:I10First-andSecond-orderSubjectiveExpectationsinStrategicDecision-Making:ExperimentalEvidenceDate:2012-03By:Neri,ClaudiaManski,CharlesURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2012:06&r=expWestudyfirst-andsecond-ordersubjectiveexpectations(beliefs)instrategicdecisionmaking.Weproposeamethodtoelicitprobabilisticallybothfirst-andsecond-orderbeliefsandapplythemethodtoaHide-and-Seekexperiment.Westudytherelationshipbetweenchoiceandbeliefsintermsofwhetherobservedchoicecoincideswiththeoptimalactiongivenelicitedbeliefs.Westudytherelationshipbetweenfirst-andsecond-orderbeliefsunderacoherencecriterion.Weakcoherencerequiresthatifaneventisassigned,accordingtofirst-orderbeliefs,aprobabilityhigher/lower/equaltotheoneassignedtoanotherevent,thenthesameholdsaccordingtosecond-orderbeliefs.Strongcoherencerequirestheprobabilityassignedaccordingtofirst-andsecond-orderbeliefstocoincide.Evidenceofheterogeneityacrossparticipantsisreported.Verbalcommentscollectedattheendoftheexperimentshedlightonhowsubjectsthinkanddecideinacomplexenvironmentthatisstrategic,dynamicandpopulatedbypotentiallyheterogeneousindividuals.Keywords:Decision-making,beliefs,subjectiveexpectations,experimentsJEL:D81TowardsanunderstandingoftheendogenousnatureofgroupidentificationingamesDate:2012-03-14By:Smith,JohnBezrukova,KaterinaURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37356&r=expItiscommonlyassumedthatidentificationwithasocialgroupisconstantthroughouttheplayofaone-shotgameintheabsenceoffeedback.Weprovideevidencewhichchallengesthisassumption.Wedirectsubjectstoplayoneoftwoversionsoftheprisoner'sdilemmagame.Theseversionsaredistinguishedbytherelativeattractivenessoftheuncooperativeaction.WerefertotheversionwitharelativelyattractiveuncooperativeactionastheEasyGameandtheotherastheDifficultGame.WefindthatforthesubjectswhoplaytheDifficultGame,theirchangeingroupidentificationissignificantlyrelatedtotheiractionselected.NosuchrelationshipexistswithintheEasyGame.Additionally,wefindthatthechangeprimarilyoccursaftertheactionisselectedratherthanuponinspectionofthegame.Wediscusstheimplicationsofourfindingstosettingsbothinsideandoutsideofthelaboratory.Keywords:GroupIdentification;ExperimentalGameTheory;EndogenousPreferences;SocialIdentity;DecisionDifficultyJEL:Z10IPreferNottoKnow!AnalyzingtheDecisionofGettingInformationaboutyourAbilityDate:2012By:PaulinaGranadosZambranoURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2012/04&r=expTherecognitionthatinformationis,mostofthetime,incompleteandimperfectisessentialinunderstandingthenatureoftheformationofbeliefs.Tounderstandhumanbehaviorintheareaof(academic)performance,thebeliefsindividualssustainabouttheirabilitybecomecrucial.Beforeperformingacertaintask,theagentneverknowshis/hertrueability.He/sheonlyhasanex-antenotionofhis/herbelievedabilityandthetruthisonlyrevealedex-post.Oncethetrueabilityisknownandthepayoffsrealized,weobservedifferentreactionsthatrangefromdisappointmenttohappiness.Thelogicalquestionisthen,whowouldhavepreferrednottoknowthetruth?Thispaperdealswiththeinformationacquisitiondecisionsofindividualswhofaceuncertaintyabouttheirownability.Atatheoreticallevel(BénabouandTirole,2002),ithasbeenshownthatoverconfidentindividuals(peoplewithbeliefsaboutthemselveshigherthanreality)withtimeinconsistentpreferenceshavemoreatstakewhentheyfacethedecisionoflearningthetruthaboutthemselvesthanmorepessimisticagents.Totestthisprediction,afieldexperimentisdesignedandimplemented,wherestudentsfacethedecisionoflearning,ornot,theirtrueabilitybeforeperformingatest.Itwillbeshownthatoverconfidentstudentsindeedmoreoftendecidenottolearntheirtrueability.Keywords:overconfidence;beliefs;ability;informationacquisition;fieldexperimentYouCanPickYourFriends,ButYouNeedtoWatchThem:LoanScreeningandEnforcementinaReferralsFieldExperimentDate:2012-01By:GharadBryan(LondonSchoolofEconomics)DeanKarlan(EconomicGrowthCenter,YaleUniversity)JonathanZinman(DartmouthCollege)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:1009&r=expWeexaminearandomizedtrialthatallowsseparateidentificationofpeerscreeningandenforcementofcreditcontracts.ASouthAfricanmicrolenderofferedhalfitsclientsabonusforreferringafriendwhorepaidaloan.Fortheremainingclients,thebonuswasconditionalonloanapproval.Afterapproval,therepaymentincentivewasremovedfromhalfthereferrersinthefirstgroupandaddedforhalfthoseinthesecond.Wefindlargeenforcementeffects,a$12(100Rand)incentivereduceddefaultby10percentagepointsfromabaseof20%.Incontrast,wefindnoevidenceofscreening.Keywords:Informationasymmetries;creditmarketfailures;peernetworks;socialcapital;socialnetworksJEL:C93Salience,RiskyChoicesandGenderDate:2012-02By:Booth,AlisonL.(AustralianNationalUniversity)Nolen,PatrickJ.(UniversityofEssex)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6400&r=expRisktheoriestypicallyassumeindividualsmakeriskychoicesusingprobabilityweightsthatdifferfromobjectiveprobabilities.Recenttheoriessuggestthatprobabilityweightsvarydependingonwhichportionofariskyenvironmentismadesalient.Usingexperimentaldataweshowthatsalienceaffectsyoungmenandwomendifferently,evenaftercontrollingforcognitiveandnon-cognitiveskills.Menaresignificantlymorelikelythanwomentoswitchfromacertaintoariskychoiceoncetheupsideofwinningismadesalient,eventhoughtheexpectedvalueofthechoiceremainsthesame.Keywords:gender,salience,risk-aversion,probabilityweights,cognitiveabilityJEL:D8EliminatingLaboratoryAssetBubblesbyPayingInterestonCashDate:2012-03-12By:Giusti,GiovanniJiang,JanetHuaXu,YipingURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37321&r=expTheseminalworkofSmithSuchanekandWilliams(1988)findspricebubblesarefrequentlyobservedinanexperimentalassetmarketwhereasingleassetwithafinitelifetimeistraded.Eversince,manystudieshavebeencarriedouttounderstandthereasonwhybubblesoccurinsuchanenvironmentandtofindmechanismstoeliminatebubbles.Inthispaper,weintroduceaninterest-bearingsavingsaccounttotheexperimentalassetmarket.Wefindbubblesdisappearwithhighinterestrates.Theeffectoftheinterestratepotentiallyworksintwoways.First,thesavingsaccountincreasestheopportunitycostofbuyingshares,whichinturn,reducestheincentivetospeculateandalleviatesthe“activeparticipation”problemasraisedinLei,NoussairandPlott(2001).Second,fixingthedividendprocessandterminalvalueoftheasset,thetimetrendofthefundamentalvalueoftheassetbecomespositivewithahighinterestrate.Anincreasingfundamentalvalueismorecompatiblewithsubjects’perceptionthatassetpricestendtobeflatorincreasinginthelongrun.Therefore,subjectsaremorelikelytofollowthefundamentalvaluewhentheytradeandover-pricingislessened.Todisentangletheeffectsthroughthetwochannels,werunasecondsetofexperimentswithhighinterestratebutalowerterminalvaluetoinducethefundamentalvalueoftheassettodecreaseovertime.Bubblesreappearinthesesessions,whichsuggeststhetimepathofthefundamentalvalueismoreimportantforreducingbubbles.Keywords:AssetBubbles;ExperimentalEconomicsJEL:C90TestingaforgottenaspectofAkerlof’sgiftexchangehypothesis:RelationalcontractswithindividualanduniformwagesDate:2012-03By:MartinG.KocherWolfgangJ.LuhanMatthiasSutterURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-02&r=expEmpiricalworkonAkerlof’stheoryofgiftexchangeinlabormarketshasconcentratedonthefairwage-efforthypothesis.Infact,however,thetheoryalsocontainsasocialcomponentthatstipulatesthathomogenousagentsthatareemployedforthesamewagelevelwillexertmoreeffort,resultinginhigherrentsandhighermarketefficiency,thanagentsthatreceivedifferentwages.Wepresentthefirsttestofthiscomponent,whichwecallthefairuniform-wagehypothesis.Inourlaboratoryexperiment,weestablishtheexistenceofasignificantefficiencypremiumofuniformwages.However,itisnottheconsequenceofastrongerlevelofreciprocitybyagents,butoftheretrenchmentofsanctioningoptionsonthesideofprincipalswithuniformwages.Hence,implementinglimitationstocontractualfreedomcanhaveefficiency-enhancingeffects.Keywords:giftexchange,multipleagents,uniformcontracts,collectivewage,experimentJEL:C72TestingaforgottenaspectofAkerlof’sgiftexchangehypothesis:RelationalcontractswithindividualanduniformwagesDate:2012-03By:Kocher,MartinG.Luhan,WolfgangJ.Sutter,MatthiasURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:12816&r=expEmpiricalworkonAkerlof’stheoryofgiftexchangeinlabormarketshasconcentratedonthefairwage-efforthypothesis.Infact,however,thetheoryalsocontainsasocialcomponentthatstipulatesthathomogenousagentsthatareemployedforthesamewagelevelwillexertmoreeffort,resultinginhigherrentsandhighermarketefficiency,thanagentsthatreceivedifferentwages.Wepresentthefirsttestofthiscomponent,whichwecallthefairuniform-wagehypothesis.Inourlaboratoryexperiment,weestablishtheexistenceofasignificantefficiencypremiumofuniformwages.However,itisnottheconsequenceofastrongerlevelofreciprocitybyagents,butoftheretrenchmentofsanctioningoptionsonthesideofprincipalswithuniformwages.Hence,implementinglimitationstocontractualfreedomcanhaveefficiency-enhancingeffects.Keywords:giftexchange;multipleagents;uniformcontracts;collectivewage;experimentJEL:C72AssessingMultiplePriorModelsofBehaviourunderAmbiguityDate:2012-01-13By:AnaConte(UniversityofWestminster,London,UK,andMax-Planck-InstituteofEconomics,Jena)JohnD.Hey(UniversityofYork,UK)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-068&r=expTherecentspateoftheoreticalmodelsofbehaviourunderambiguitycanbepartitionedintotwosets:thoseinvolvingmultiplepriors(inwhichtheprobabilitiesofthevariouseventsarenotknownbutprobabilitiescanbeattachedtothevariouspossiblevaluesfortheprobabilities)andthosenotinvolvingmultiplepriors.Thispaperconcentratesonthefirstsetandprovidesanexperimentalinvestigationintorecentlyproposedtheories.Usinganappropriateexperimentalinterface,inwhichtheprobabilitiesonthevariouspossibilitiesareexplicitlystated,weexaminethefittedandpredictivepowerofthevarioustheories.Wefirstestimatesubject-by-subject,andthenweestimateandpredictusingamixturemodeloverthecontendingtheories.Theindividualestimatessuggestthat25%ofour149subjectshavebehaviourconsistentwithExpectedUtility,54%withtheSmoothModel(ofKlibanoffetal,2005),12%withRankDependentExpectedUtilityand9%withtheAlphaModel(ofGhirardatoetal2004);thesefiguresareveryclosetothemixingproportionsobtainedfromthemixtureestimates.However,ifweclassifyoursubjectsthroughtheposteriorprobabilities(givenalltheevidence)ofeachofthembeingofthevarioustypes:usingtheestimatesweget36%,19%,28%and11%(forEU,Smooth,RankDependentandAlpha);whileusingthepredictions36%,19%,33%and16%.Interestinglytheoldermodels(EUandRD)seemtofarerelativelybetter,suggestingthatrepresentingambiguitythroughmultiplepriorsisnotperceivedasthecorrectrepresentationbysubjects.Keywords:AlphaModel,Ambiguity,ExpectedUtility,MixtureModels,RankDependentExpectedUtility,SmoothModelJEL:D81Doriskandtimepreferenceshavebiologicalroots?Date:2012-03-12By:Drichoutis,AndreasNayga,RodolfoURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37320&r=expWerevisittheclaimsaboutthebiologicalunderpinningsofeconomicbehaviorbyspecificallyexploringifobservedgenderdifferencesinrisk/timepreferencescanbeexplainedbynaturalfluctuationsinprogesterone/estradiollevelsduringthemenstrualcycleandbyprenatalexposuretotestosteronelevels.Resultssuggestthatnaturalfluctuationsinprogesteronelevelshaveadirecteffectondiscountratesandthatestradiol/progesteronelevelscanindirectlyaffecttimepreferencesbychangingthecurvatureoftheutilityfunction.UsingmeasuredD2:D4digitratio,resultsimplythatsubjectswithlowdigitratioexhibithigherdiscountratesandrisklovingpreferences.Keywords:discountrates;riskaversion;labexperiment;menstrualcycle;D2:D4ratio;hormones;estradiol;progesterone;testosteroneJEL:D81ModelingInequityAversioninaDictatorGamewithProductionDate:2012-02By:LuisJoséBlasMorenoGarrido(Dpto.FundamentosdelAnálisisEconómico)IsmaelRodríguezLara(UniversidaddeAlicante)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2012-04&r=expWeexpanduponthepreviousmodelsofinequityaversionofFehrandSchmidt(1999)andFrohlich,OppenheimerandKurki(2004),whichassumethatdictatorsgetdisutilityifthefinalallocationofthesurplusdeviatesfromtheequalsplit(egalitarianprinciple)orfromthesubjects’production(libertarianprinciple).Inourmodel,dictatorsmayalsoaccountforthewayinwhichthesurpluswasgenerated.Moreprecisely,ourmodelincorporatestheideaoftheliberalegalitarianethicsintotheanalysis,makingitpossiblefordictatorstodividethesurplusaccordingtotheaccountabilityprinciple,whichstatesthatsubjectsshouldonlyberewardedforfactorsundertheircontrol.Thisfairnessidealdoesnotholdsubjectsresponsibleforfactorsbeyondtheircontrolintheproductionofthesurplus,anideathatisabsentinthemodelsofinequityaversioncitedabove.Keywords:socialpreferences,inequityaversion,inequalityaversion,egalitarianprinciple,libertarianprinciple,accountabilityprinciple.JEL:D3ThresholdpublicgoodgamesandimpulsebalancetheoryDate:2012-01-06By:FedericaAlberti(MaxPlanckInstituteofEconomics,StrategicInteractionGroup,Jena)EdwardJ.Cartwright(SchoolofEconomics,UniversityofKent,Canterbury)AnnaStepanova(SchoolofEconomics,UniversityofKent,Canterbury)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-062&r=expWeproposeanddevelopamodelofbehaviorinthresholdpublicgoodgames.Themodeldrawsonlearningdirectiontheoryandimpulsebalancetheory.Wefindgoodsupportforthemodelanddemonstratethatitcanexplainthesuccessratesobservedinthresholdpublicgoodexperiments.Themodelisappliedinavarietyofdierentsettings:wecomparegameswithafullrefundtothosewithnorefund,considerchangesinrelativeendowment,andconsiderchangesinthestepreturnandnetreward.Keywords:Publicgood,threshold,learningdirectiontheory,impulsebalancetheory,counterfactualthinkingJEL:C72Thepriceisright:updatingofinflationexpectationsinarandomizedpriceinformationexperimentDate:2012By:OlivierArmantierScottNelsonGiorgioTopaWilbertvanderKlaauwBasitZafarURL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:543&r=expUnderstandingtheformationofconsumerinflationexpectationsisconsideredcrucialformanagingmonetarypolicy.Thispaperinvestigateshowconsumersformandupdatetheirinflationexpectationsusingaunique“information”experimentembeddedinasurvey.Wefirstelicitrespondents’expectationsforfutureinflationeitherintheirownconsumptionbasketorfortheeconomyoverall.Wethenrandomlyprovideasubsetofrespondentswithinflation-relevantinformation:eitherpast-yearfoodpriceinflation,oramedianprofessionalforecastofnext-yearoverallinflation.Finally,inflationexpectationsarere-elicitedfromallrespondents.Thisdesigncreatesuniquepaneldatathatallowustoidentifytheeffectsofnewinformationonrespondents’inflationexpectations.Wefindthatrespondentsrevisetheirinflationexpectationsinresponsetoinformation,anddosomeaningfully:revisionsareproportionaltothestrengthoftheinformationsignal,andinverselyproportionaltotheprecisionofpriorinflationexpectations.Wealsofindsystematicdifferencesinupdatingacrossdemographicgroupsandbyquestionwording,underscoringhowdifferenttypesofinformationmaybemoreorlessrelevantfordifferentgroups,andhowtheobservedimpactofinformationmaydependonmethodsusedtoelicitinflationexpectations.Keywords:Inflation(Finance);Consumerbehavior;Informationtheory;ConsumersurveysTheImpactofConsultingServicesonSmallandMediumEnterprises:EvidencefromaRandomizedTrialinMexicoDate:2012-02By:MariamBruhn(WorldBank)DeanKarlan(EconomicGrowthCenter,YaleUniversity)AntoinetteSchoar(MIT)URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:10010&r=expWetestwhethermanagerialhumancapitalhasafirstordereffectontheperformanceandgrowthofsmallenterpriseinemergingmarkets.InarandomizedcontroltrialinPuebla,Mexico,werandomlyassigned150outof432smallandmediumsizeenterprisestoreceivesubsidizedconsultingservices,whiletheremaining267enterprisesservedasacontrolgroupthatdidnotreceiveanysubsidizedtraining.Treatmententerpriseswerematchedwithoneofninelocalconsultingfirmsandmetwiththeirconsultantsonceaweekforfourhoursoveraoneyearperiod.Resultsfromafollow-upsurvey,conductedaftertheintervention,showthattheconsultingserviceshadalargeimpactontheperformanceoftheenterprisesinthetreatmentgroup:monthlysaleswentupbyabout80percent;similarly,profitsandproductivityincreasedby120percentcomparedtothecontrolgroup.Wealsoseeasignificantincreaseintheentrepreneurialspiritindexforthetreatmentgroup,asetofquestionsdesignedtoillicittheSMEowners’confidenceintheirabilitytomanagetheirbusinessanddealwithanyfuturedifficulties.However,wedonotfindanysignificantincreaseinthenumberofworkersemployedinthetreatmentgroup.Keywords:enterprisegrowth,entrepreneurship,managerialcapitalJEL:D21
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全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会2013年理事会暨大学生就业模拟大赛
为了推动全国博弈论与实验经济学学科发展，完善博弈论与实验经济学研究会运作机制，以便更好的为促进大学生就业服务，11月30日上午8:30，由中华人民共和国人力资源与社会保障部、国务院发展研究中心、重庆市教委指导，全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会主办，重庆理工大学管理学院、科研处、工程训练与经管实验中心和北京信息科技大学承办的“全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会2013年理事会暨大学生就业模拟大赛”开幕式及专家论坛在我校博园二教国际学术报告厅举行。中国社会科学院学部委员、数量经济与技术经济研究所前所长汪同三，国务院政策研究室综合司司长刘应杰，中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所研究员、全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会理事长王国成，北京信息科技大学经济管理学院院长、北京交通大学博士生导师葛新权，清华大学公共管理学院教授李保明，中国科学院心理研究所发展与教育心理研究室副主任、中国心理学会发展心理专业委员会副主任朱莉琪，重庆理工大学校长石晓辉，副校长何建国，以及来自中国社科院、清华大学、南开大学、北京师范大学、四川大学、东北大学、北京交通大学、华中师大、华南师大、南京航空航天大学、湖南师大等知名高校科研院所的近百名专家齐聚重庆理工大学，围绕“实验方法探索经济管理复杂之谜——大学生就业发展与行为博弈”这一主题展开了深入的交流研讨。本次大会由重庆理工大学何建国副校长主持。在开幕式上，何建国副校长首先介绍了与会的各位专家学者。石晓辉校长代表重庆理工大学对各位领导嘉宾的到来表示热烈的欢迎，并介绍了近年来重庆理工大在学科建设、人才培养、科学研究和社会服务领域取得的显著成果，以及我校在博弈论与实验经济学领域取得的突出成就。国务院政策研究室综合司司长刘应杰应邀做了《当前我国经济形势与就业结构转型》的主题发言。刘司长通过分析对比我国与世界其他发达国家的就业形势，针对我国就业人口结构不合理、总量过剩的现状，提出了加快推动我国就业转型升级，通过科技进步，提升劳动者素质提升的应对策略。开幕式结束后，与会的嘉宾们还在中山图书馆前合影留念。在专家论坛阶段，中国社会科学院学部委员、数量经济与技术经济研究所前所长汪同三教授，重庆理工大学管理学院李军锋博士，中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所研究员、全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会理事长王国成教授分别作了题为《学习党的十八届三中全会《决定》，探索经济管理中实验经济方法》、《实验方法在管理学研究中的应用：案例与思考》、《实验方法与当代经济理论的行为聚焦与走向》的报告。特别值得一提的是，我校管理学院李军锋博士的报告《实验方法在管理学研究中的应用：案例与思考》，以其内容的丰富性、研究假设的可行性、实验实施的严谨性和研究视角的独特性，获得了与会专家的一致好评。下午13:30，由全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会主办、北京信息科技大学和重庆理工大学承办的第五届“大学生就业模拟大赛决赛”在博园二教国际学术报告厅进行。来自东北大学、河北工业大学、重庆理工大学、北京信息科技大学、华北水利水电大学等高校的30多名选手从全国20余所高校的1000多名参赛者中脱颖而出，经过三轮激烈的角逐，最后产生一等奖7名，二等奖9名，三等奖15名。我校代表队杨小辉等6名同学获得了3个二等奖和3个三等奖的优异成绩。重庆理工大学等5所院校荣获“优秀组织奖”。在闭幕式上，全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会对本次会务的承办方重庆理工大学表示了由衷的感谢，并为我校颁发了“特别突出贡献奖”。与此同时，来自中国社科院、清华大学、南开大学、四川大学、东北大学、武钢集团等高校科研院所企业的近50余名专家学者围绕“实验平台、大数据与社会经济”这一主题，在博园第六会议室举行2013全国博弈论与实验经济学学术交流研讨会。研讨会由我校管理学院院长徐刚主持。来自湖南师范大学的唐邵玲教授、重庆理工大学工程训练与经管实验中心的施於人老师、武钢集团鄂钢有限责任公司工程部的胡勤丰等分别从合谋环境下多单位物拍卖竞价策略研究、实验及实验数据的行为模式分析、经济知识历史发展及博弈性等角度做了主题发言。与会专家围绕这些主题，对实验平台的可操作性、大数据归纳方法的可依赖性、实验经济学对社会经济的影响展开了激烈的讨论，这些为进一步探讨博弈论和实验经济学学科发展奠定了坚实的思想基础。全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会2013年理事会暨大学生就业模拟大赛在我校举行，是继2012年我校与全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会签署战略合作协议以来，我校与全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会进行的又一次密切合作。它增进了我校与全国其他知名高校在博弈论与实验经济学领域的合作，进一步提升了我校管理学科的社会知名度和影响力。（管理学院供稿并提供图片责编/钟世潋）http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093503_2013q%E5%85%A8%E5%9B%BD%E5%8D%9A%E5%BC%88%E8%AE%BA%E4%B8%8E%E5%AE%9E%E9%AA%8C%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%AD%A6%E5%AD%A6%E6%9C%AF%E4%BA%A4%E6%B5%81%E7%A0%94%E8%AE%A8%E4%BC%9A_thumb_3.jpg2013全国博弈论与实验经济学学术交流研讨会在我校举行http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093558_%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2%E5%AD%A6%E9%83%A8%E5%A7%94%E5%91%98%E6%B1%AA%E5%90%8C%E5%B1%B1%E6%95%99%E6%8E%88%E5%9C%A8%E5%81%9A%E4%B8%BB%E9%A2%98%E5%8F%91%E8%A8%80_thumb_3.jpg中国社会科学院学部委员汪同三教授作主题发言http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093552_%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2%E6%95%B0%E9%87%8F%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E4%B8%8E%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E5%91%98%E3%80%81%E5%85%A8%E5%9B%BD%E5%8D%9A%E5%BC%88%E8%AE%BA%E4%B8%8E%E5%AE%9E%E9%AA%8C%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%AD%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E4%BC%9A%E7%90%86%E4%BA%8B%E9%95%BF%E7%8E%8B%E5%9B%BD%E6%88%90%E5%9C%A8%E5%81%9A%E4%B8%BB%E9%A2%98%E5%8F%91%E8%A8%80_thumb_3.jpg中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究研究员、全国博弈论与实验经济学研究会理事长王国成作主题发言http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093527_%E6%88%91%E6%A0%A1%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2%E6%9D%8E%E5%86%9B%E9%94%8B%E5%8D%9A%E5%A3%AB%E5%9C%A8%E5%81%9A%E4%B8%BB%E9%A2%98%E5%8F%91%E8%A8%80_thumb_3.jpg我校管理学院李军锋博士作主题发言http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093516_IMG_2231_thumb_3.jpg2013大学生就业模拟大赛颁奖典礼举行http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093544_%E4%B8%8E%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%93%E5%AE%B6%E5%9C%A8%E5%8F%82%E8%A7%82%E6%88%91%E6%A0%A1%E6%A0%A1%E5%8F%B2%E9%A6%86_thumb_3.jpg与会专家在参观我校校史馆http://news.cqut.edu.cn/attachment/201312/03093537_%E4%B8%8E%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%93%E5%AE%B6%E5%AD%A6%E8%80%85%E5%9C%A8%E4%B8%AD%E5%B1%B1%E5%9B%BE%E4%B9%A6%E9%A6%86%E5%89%8D%E5%90%88%E5%BD%B1%E7%95%99%E5%BF%B5_thumb_3.jpg与会专家学者在中山图书馆前合影留念
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建议人大经济论坛金融实验，建立网币金融市场！
建议人大经济论坛金融实验，原因如下：1.人大经济论坛藏龙卧虎！2.人大经济论坛论坛币多多，应该像现实经济一样，实现多渠道流通，资本自由流动中增值！3.论坛币的实质就是货币，已经有了马克思意义上的货币的几大功能；4.人大经济论坛的“货币”流通可以作为现实金融的翻版：比如，没钱的人可以借款，与出借人签署借款合约，约定期限和利率；5.有币的人可以出借论坛币，与借币人自主商谈金额、期限、利率甚至“资金专款专用”等条款；有币的人可以可以对某些主题投资，对某些“人”投资，投资条款可以自治商议。需要融币的人可以巧立名目，发行股票，到有钱人那里筹集网币，来做一项研究事业等等。通过这种方式，人大论坛将打造成为“网币”的金融市场，包括货币市场和股票市场。这将是一场声势浩大、影响深远（影响整个互联网产业虚实互动发展）的金融实验！为此，抛一个枕头，请人大经济论坛的专家们思考思考，这从IT技术上容易实行！如果这里不愿意做先行者，我下一步就到百度和腾讯那里去帮他们将这个真正“虚拟”的金融市场建立起来！不过版权所有，是第一次在人大经济论坛上写出来的，还是希望在这里先做！人大论坛应该真正金融起来，充分发挥现实金融的模式，允许借贷，允许投资和分红！当然这所有分红等指令来往一些是“假/币”流通！本文来自:人大经济论坛考研与考博版，详细出处参考：http://www.pinggu.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=898388&page=1&fromuid=1170440本文来自:人大经济论坛考研与考博版，详细出处参考：http://www.pinggu.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=898388&page=1&fromuid=1170440
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2013厦门大学实验经济学国际研讨会征稿启事
厦门大学王亚南经济研究院（WISE）将于2013年12月14-16日举行“第四届实验经济学国际研讨会”。此次研讨会旨在促进国内外以实验方法进行研究的各领域学者间的交流。现竭诚向各界征集相关学术论文。论文可涵盖决策论、经济学、金融学、博弈论、管理科学、市场营销或政治学等多个研究领域，运用以人为受试对象的可控实验而进行的研究。本次会议的主题为“运用有形测度以更好地解释选择”。我们特别鼓励研究内容与本次会议主题密切相关的学者或学生踊跃投稿。今年我们很荣幸地邀请到以下著名学者作为特邀专家，与会作主题发言：DavidCesarini，纽约大学SooHongChew，新加坡国立大学MarieClaireVilleval，里昂大学法国科学研究中心BurkhardSchipper，加州大学戴维斯校区RobertoWeber，苏黎世大学l论文提交及登记有意在本次会议上展示研究成果的学者或学生请务必于2013年10月15日前向以下邮箱地址提交一份简短摘要（包含标题与合作者姓名，并且不超过250字）：experiment2013wise@gmail.com。请注意所有的提交内容应采用英文。此外，我们将视投稿情况而定开设中文专场。如需要用中文演讲，请在提交摘要时注明。每位演讲者仅限演讲一篇论文。论文录用通知将于2013年10月15日后公布。国内学者参会费用为800元人民币，国外学者参会费用为200美元。境内外在读学生均免参会费用。研讨会注册截止日期为2013年11月15日。若有计划参与会议但不作演讲的学者或学生，请于注册截止日期前向以下邮箱地址发送邮件进行说明：experiment2013wise@gmail.com。l最佳论文奖为鼓励实验经济学与金融学相关领域的研究，本次研讨会设立王亚南经济研究院实验经济学最佳论文奖。该奖项将颁发给在本次研讨会上作出演讲的最佳论文的作者（须为在2009年及之后获得博士学位的学者或在读学生）。如果您符合条件并希望参评该奖项，请于2013年11月30日前提交一份用英文撰写的完整版论文以PDF的格式发至以下邮件地址：experiment2013wise@gmail.com，请在邮件中注明您的参评意向。此外，我们很荣幸地得到JournalofNeuroscience,Psychology,andEconomics（JPNE）(http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/npe/index.aspx)的同意，为在本次会议中演讲的论文出版一本专题论文集。JPNE是全世界唯一一份致力于出版有关神经经济学相关研究的期刊。所有专题论文集的备选稿件将按照该期刊正式出版标准接受同行评审。l更多信息·会议相关咨询：JasonShachat教授（experiment2013wise@gmail.com）·后勤事务咨询：侯斯莹（Jenine）（syhou.wise@gmail.com）本次会议是王亚南经济研究院（WISE）致力于建设一流实验经济学与金融学研究中心的一项重要举措。2010年秋季，王亚南经济研究院“实验经济金融实验室”（FEEL）开始正式运作。如需了解更多信息，请访问我们实验室网站：http://feel.xmu.edu.cn。2010年，WISE设立了中国首个社会科学领域的教育部重点实验室——厦门大学“计量经济学”教育部重点实验室。作为该重点实验室的一个重要组成部分，实验经济金融实验室致力于成为一个在实验经济学和实验金融学领域具有国际领先水平的研究机构。厦门位于中国的东南沿海，气候温和，交通便捷，航班直飞亚洲各主要城市，享有度假胜地之美誉，以中国最宜居城市而著称。厦门附近的著名旅游景点包括被联合国教科文组织列入世界文化遗产名录的客家土楼、鼓浪屿（又称“钢琴之岛”）和武夷山。成立于2005年的厦门大学王亚南经济研究院（WISE）是厦门大学为建设国际一流的经济学研究机构、推动国内外学术研究和交流而成立的。更多关于WISE的详细信息，敬请关注http://wise.xmu.edu.cn/english/index.asp。l会议组织者JasonShachat，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院耿森，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院AnnikaMueller，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院王云，厦门大学王亚南经济研究院[tr=rgb(255,252,247)][/tr]
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【实验经济学】Social identity and inequality:The impact of China's Hukou syste
1论文标题Socialidentityandinequality:TheimpactofChina'sHukousystem2作者信息FarzanaAfridiSherryXinLiYufeiRen3出处和链接（比如，NBERworkingpaperNo.11000）IZADPNo.6417，March20124摘要Weconductanexperimentalstudytoinvestigatethecausalimpactofsocialidentityonindividuals’responsetoeconomicincentives.WefocusonChina’shouseholdregistration(hukou)systemwhichfavorsurbanresidentsanddiscriminatesagainstruralresidentsinresourceallocation.Ourresultsindicatethatmakingindividuals’hukoustatussalientandpublicsignificantlyreducestheperformanceofruralmigrantstudentsonanincentivizedcognitivetaskby10percent,whichleadstoasignificantleftwardshiftoftheirearningsdistribution.Theresultsdemonstratetheimpactofinstitutionallyimposedsocialidentityonindividuals’intrinsicresponsetoincentives,andconsequentlyonwideningincomeinequality.如果下载不了，可以试下http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work190.pdf或者：http://ftp.iza.org/dp6417.pdf或者：再不行，我也没办法了
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行为经济学与实验经济学板 jsg999000实习报告与转正申请
感谢十步天下版主的大力推荐和论坛各位老版主的赏识，给你机会担任行为经济学和实验经济学板块的实习版主，从8月6日上任以来，一晃两个多月就过去了，汗颜尚未对板块和论坛做出什么突出贡献，在此通过总结工作，望再接再厉，为论坛和板块加油工作。请各位前辈检阅，并恳请得到各位前辈的支持顺利转正。一、准备工作任职之初，在星野和十步天下版主的指导下，我认真学习了《用户手册》和《版主管理条例》，对版主职能与约束有了较清晰的认识。尝试对一些帖子进行管理操作以掌握各种版面操作规则和技能，其中应用较多的是已阅、评分功能。认真翻阅了上任前两个月的发帖与回复记录，总结了本版的常见问题与参与度较高的网友，为推荐热心会员与明星会员做准备。二、版务分析行为经济学与实验经济学板块的学术性较强，目前发帖话题以上传相关资料为主，从我对以往帖子的观察来看，上传资料的质量普遍较高，定价合理，还是有不少相关领域的学者在此活动。作为一个以提供资料交流为主的平台显然是做的比较好的。但是个人认为板块还应该经历承担这样一个责任，那就是在会员中推动行为和实验经济学的普及，让跟多的人可以从行为的视角分析经济问题，所以在上任之初就着手了开展话题讨论，并自己动手撰写了一些文章。由于国内目前从事这块的人确实不多，板块还是比较难以活跃起来。这需要不断的创新工作，开辟板块的发展前景。三、工作不足之处与感想担任版主的任务艰巨，着实是不曾初想到的，第一周就因为管理操作不足而被扣金币，才意识到身为版主身上的责任。由于个人平时也比较忙，所以对论坛操作不是很多，还仰仗了各位前辈版主的帮忙支持。板块人气较冷，虽力争打开局面尚成果不足，需要后期多多努力。感觉来说论坛风气略有浮躁，跟帖以灌水居多，而实质性展开学术问题讨论甚至争论的不多。还需与各位版主多多协商如何激励论坛的学术风气。本着务实不务虚的原则，先写这么多，请各位前辈多多指点！行为经济学与实验经济学实习版主jsg9990002012年10月10日
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实验经济学研究揭示独生子女问题多
【核心提示】独生子女比非独生子女往往表现出更多地以自我为中心、更少的合作行为，且不擅长与同龄人之间的交往。此外，独生子女与非独生子女在其他个体性格特征上（自控能力、情绪化、性格开朗程度、风险意识等）的差异，也有很多相关的讨论。 自20世纪70年代我国实施计划生育政策以来，独生子女家庭大量出现，社会也越来越关注独生子女问题。通过日常的观察，人们发现独生子女比非独生子女往往表现出更多地以自我为中心、更少的合作行为，且不擅长与同龄人之间的交往。此外，独生子女与非独生子女在其他个体性格特征上（自控能力、情绪化、性格开朗程度、风险意识等）的差异，也有很多相关的讨论。 但是，以往的这些讨论和研究大多以经验观察和问卷调查为基础，所能得到的关于独生子女与非独生子女两个群体之间是否存在差别的结论，多为研究者或被调查者的主观判断，且不能回答导致这一可能差别的具体原因；而要对是什么因素导致了现有结果这一问题进行科学解答，需要能对变量之间因果关系做出定量检验的研究方法。 实验经济学的研究思路是通过实验被试的招募、实验过程的设计、实验数据的处理，在控制其他相关变量的条件下，来研究某一变量对个体行为决策的影响。此外，实验中被试的行为决策将直接与其最后所获得的实验收入相关，这一设计也更能诱导出个体的真实偏好。2013年2月，LisaCameron等人发表在《科学》（Science）杂志上的论文，便通过开展一系列行为实验研究，分离出了没有其他兄弟姐妹一起成长对于独生子女的性格和行为所造成的内在影响。 研究组以1979年（我国计划生育政策开始实施）为节点，招募了分别在1975、1978、1980、1983年四个年份出生的被试，各占1/4，根据被试在独裁者博弈、信任博弈、风险博弈、竞争博弈等经典行为博弈实验中的决策选择，可以看出被试在真实物质诱导下的利他行为、信任行为、可信任行为（Trustworthiness）、风险意识和竞争性等行为偏好，进而得到在计划生育政策实施前后出生的两组被试之间在实验数据上表现出的差异。这里需要指出的是，实验中特殊年份出生的被试选取，避免了其他相关变量对实验结果的混淆，如四个出生年份被试之间的年龄差别不大，且均已成年，因此，年龄并不能解释计划生育政策实施前后两组被试实验数据的差异。尤其是1978、1980年两个年份出生的被试之间几乎没有社会经历上的差别，市场化改革、高校扩招等国家重大政策造成社会外部环境的改变，也不会对这两个群体造成有差别的影响。 由相关性分析可知，计划生育政策实施前后两组被试行为数据的差异，实际上与独生子女和非独生子女之间的行为数据差异存在显著相关性。据此，作者进一步将计划生育政策的实施（前、后）作为独生子女（或非独生子女）这一内生性变量的工具变量，如此可排除家庭背景因素的干扰（选择独生子女模式的家庭背景与选择非独生子女模式的家庭背景本身可能会存在一些内在差别），从而赋予两个群体子女各自不同的外部影响。作者通过相应的计量统计方法，利用得到的计划生育政策实施前后两组被试的实验数据，在控制其他个体社会特征变量的情况下，最终衡量了从小没有兄弟姐妹一起成长对于独生子女日后行为养成的影响，即独生子女与非独生子女之间的所谓内在差别。 数据分析表明，计划生育政策下出生的独生子女相较于非独生子女，确实表现出更少的信任行为和可信任行为，且更不愿意冒风险，更缺乏竞争意识。研究组还组织被试在实验完成后填写相关的调查问卷，以全面考察被试的性格特征、父母对子女性格及行为的影响。结果发现，独生子女群体相比非独生子女群体往往更加悲观、更没有责任心、更加情绪化。独生子女的父母相较于非独生子女的父母，较少向子女灌输亲社会的价值观，如相互信任和利他行为，但常教导子女要节省。这一研究的重要性，不仅在于它科学回答了独生子女与非独生子女是否存在内在差异的问题，还为如何利用实验方法剔除其他相关变量的作用、研究以往国家重大社会政策（如市场化改革、高校扩招等）对利益相关人的行为偏好是否造成影响，提供了可资借鉴的有益思路。 （作者单位：浙江大学经济学院、浙江大学跨学科社会科学研究中心）
