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雷达卡
摘要翻译：
我们探索全薪拍卖在模型贸易战和领土吞并中的应用。具体地说，在模型中，我们认为预期资源、生产和侵略性（军事/关税）权力是公共信息，而实际资源水平是私人知识。我们考虑在这种竞争结束时的资源转移，它剥夺了弱国原有资源的一部分。特别地，我们推导了两国冲突在不同情景下的准均衡策略。这项工作与正在进行的俄中贸易战、美国最近占领克里米亚以及历史和未来冲突有关。
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英文标题：
《All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation》
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作者：
Benjamin Kang and James Unwin
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.03492
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