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青木昌彦比较制度分析课程纲要

斯坦福大学

[Point=500]

ECONOMICS 292 "COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS" Autumn 2003 M.AOKI Office hour: Tuesday 14:00-16:00 or by appointment by e-mail (aoki@stanford.edu) In the following, "TCIA-chapter x" refers to chapter x of the textbook, M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, 2001. Articles indicated by [JS] are available through JSTOR on the web, and those by [EJ] are through Jackson Library E-journals. 1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE INSTITUTIONS? HOW SHOULD THEY BE APPROACHED? Topics: three views of institutions; a game-theoretic definition of institutions; game form; five basic types of domains of game; possibility of a trans-disciplinary approach to institutionsReading:-TCIA-chapter 1.-D. North (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press. -L. Hurwicz (1993), "Toward a Framework for Analyzing Institution and Institutional Change," in S. Bowles, H. Gintis and B. Gustafsson (eds.), Markets and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, pp.51-67.-A. Greif (1997), "Microtheory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions through Economic History," in D. Kreps and K. F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-113. [LINK]-[W. R. Scott (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Sage Publications.]-[Barkow, J. H., L.Cosmides and J.Tooby (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Oxford University Press.]-[Powell, W. W., and P. A. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, 1991.]

PART I. PROPTO-INSTITUTIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS

2. CUSTOMARY PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR Topics: customary property rights; two kinds of orders and law; private protection of property rightsReading:-TCIA-Chapter 2.1-H. P. Young (1993), "An Evolutionary Theory of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, 59, pp. 145-68. [EJ] -- (1998), Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions, Princeton University Press.-H. Demsetz (1967), "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review, 57, pp.347-59. [JS]-F. A. Hayek (1973), Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1, Rules and Order. University of Chicago Press-[R. C. Ellickson (1991), Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Harvard University Press.]-Ikeda, N. (2003). "The Spectrum as Commons:Digital Wireless Technologies and Radio Administration."[LINK]-[Gambetta, D. (1993), The Sicilian Mafia, Harvard University Press.]-Olson, M. (1993), "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", American Political Science Review, pp.567-576. [JS]

3. COMMUNITY NORMS: INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP SELECTIONTopics: free-riding in commons; linked games; social embeddedness; geography vs political factor in equilibrium selection;group vs.individual selectionReading-TCIA-Chapter 2.2-[D. B. Klein (1990), "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America," Economic Inquiry, 8, pp.788-812.]-[E. Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.]-M. Granovettor (1985), "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91, pp.480-510. [JS] -- (1992), "Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis," Acta Sociologica, 35: pp.3-11. -B. D. Bernheim and M. Whinston (1990), 'Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,' Rand Journal of Economics 21: pp.1-26. [JS]-M.Aoki and Y. Hayami (eds.)(2001), Communities and Markets: in Economic Development, Oxford University Press.]-Field, A. (2003) "Group Selection and Economic Theory," mimeo. -- (2001), Altruistically Inclined? Evolutionary Theory, the Behavioral Sciences, and the Origins of Reciprocity, University of Michigan Press.-Bergstrom, T. C. (2002), "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (Spring): pp.67-88.-D. Acemoglu, S.Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2002). "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.1231-129. [EJ]

4. MODES OF PRIVATE-ORDERED GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGESTopics: social norms, gift exchange; club norms, multiple equilibria in market reputations, cultural beliefs; bilateral commitment to relational contracting; private-ordered third-party enforcement (law merchant); moral sentiments; digital enforcements; complementarity and substitutability among various modes of governance.Reading:-TCIA-Chapter 3.-M. Kandori (1992). "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp.63-80. [JS]-L. Carmichael and W. B. MacLeod (1997), "Gift Exchange and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Economic Review, pp.485-509. [JS]-A. Greif (1994). "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, 102, pp.912-50. [JS]-W. B. MacLeod and J. M. Malcomson (1989), "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, 57 (March 1989), pp.447-480. [JS]-P. Milgrom, D. North and B.Weingast (1990). " The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, 2, pp.1-23.-J. P. Platteau (1994). "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Society Exist. Part 1: The Role of Public and Private Order Institutions". Journal of Development Studies, 30, pp.533-73; "Part II: The Role of Moral Norms," ibid., pp.753-817.-K. J. Arrow (1967), 'The Place of Moral Obligation in Preference Systems," reprinted in Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press.-Dixit, A. (2003), "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, 71: 449-481. -- (2004) , Lawlessness and Economics, Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 [LINK]-[Lessig, L. (1999), Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books.]

5. MODES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND GOVERNANCETopics: organizational architecture as an information system; information differentiation, assimilation, and encapsulation; property rights and other modes of organizational governance; modularity and option values; gains from organizational diversity.Reading:-TCIA-Chapters 4, 5, 10-12-J. Cremer (1990), "Common Knowledge and the Co-ordination of Economic Activities," in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson, and O. E. Williamson (eds.), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, Sage Publications, pp.53-76.-O. Hart and J. Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,' Journal of Political Economy 98: 1119-1158. [JS] O. Hart (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.-Langlois, R.N. and P. L. Robertson (1992), "Networks and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries, Research Policy, 21, pp.297-313.-Baldwin, C. Y. and K. B. Clark (1997), "Managing in an Age of Modularity," Harvard Business Review, Sept/Oct: 84-97. -- (2000), Design Rules: The Power of Modularity, Vol. 1, MIT Press.-Aoki, M. and H. Takizawa (2002), "Information, Incentives and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model," Journal of Comparative Economics, 30, pp.759-786. [LINK]-Tirole, J. (2001), "Corporate Governance," Econometrica 69:pp.1-35 forthcoming.-R. La Porta, R., F Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer and R. Vishny (1998), "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy 106: pp.1113-1155. [JS]-Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales (2000), "The Governance of the New Enterprises," in X.Vives (ed.), Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, pp.201-232.-M. Aoki (1998), "Organizational Conventions and the Gains from Diversity: an Evolutionary Game Approach", Industrial and Corporate Change, 7, pp.399-432.

6. MODES OF STATES AS STABLE EQUILIBRIATopics: the state as an equilibrium of a polity game with the government as a player; liberal, collusive, predatory states and their variants; complementarity between the state and market/organizational governance; political accountability; comparative states and public finance.Reading:-TCIA-Chapter 6.-B. Weingast (1997), "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review, 91, 245-63. [JS] -- (1995), "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11, pp.1-31.-Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000), "Why Did West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1167-1199. [EJ]-Persson, T. , G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, 108, pp.1121-1161. [JS] -- (1997) "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.1163-1202. [JS]-Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2001) "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government", mimeo.

PART II. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

7. A GAME THEORETIC CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONSTopics: institutions as a summary representation of equilibrium or as a system of shared beliefs regarding how the game is being played; summary statistics of equilibrium; complementarity between classical and evolutionary gamer approachReading:-TCIA-Chapter 6.-A. Greif (1998), "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Methodology," Part I of Genoa and the Maghribi Traders: Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

8. SYNCHRONIC LINKAGES OF INSTITUTIONSTopics: embeddedness, bundling, institutional complementarities; super-modular gamesReading:-TCIA-Chapter 7, 11-P. Milgrom, and J. Roberts (1990), "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarityies," Econometrica, 58, 1255-77. [JS]

9. SUBJECTIVE GAME MODELS AND THE MECHANISM OF INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTIONTopics: mental models and subjective game models, inductive game; punctuated equilibrium; dynamic institutional complementarity, overlapping embeddedness, Schumpeterian dis-bundling and re-bundling; roles of policy and statutory law in institutional changeReading:-TCIA-Chapter 8.-A. T. Denzau, and D. North (1994). "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, pp.3-3.1 -[J. Holland et al (1989), Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery, MIT Press.]-M. Kaneko and A. Matsui (1999), "Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1, pp.1-37.-P. Milgrom, Y. Qian and J. Roberts (1991), "Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 81(2), pp.84-88. [JS]-Kawagoe, Y. and H. Takizawa (2003), "Instability of Babbling Equilibrium in Cheap Talk Game: Some Experimental Results," mimeo. Course RequirementResearch Paper (1) The approval of topic (by November 15) (2) The submission of the final draft (by February 15) A theme should be chosen from one of the above topics. [/Point]

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-11-8 10:39:03编辑过]

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关键词：制度经济学 制度经济 经济学 Institutions Organization 国外 教案 制度经济学 名校 选萃

格雷夫：比较历史制度分析短训课程

[Point=500]

Historical Institutional Analysis

Avner Greif

Five Lectures Prepared for: Summer School European Historical Economics Society Structural Change in Historical Perspective: The Role of Institutions 21 August - 25 August 2001, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

Numbers indicate the priority ranking for the readings

First Class: Three Generations of Institutional Analysis

Old Institutionalism Dugger, William M..1990. "The New Insitutionalism: New But Not Insitutionalist." Journal of Economic Issues. v24(2), pp. 423-31. New Institutionalism Transaction Cost Economics (2) Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (September): 595-613. Institutions as Rules (2) Weingast, Barry, R. 1996. "Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives," in A New Handbook of Political Science. Edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Oxford University Press. Preliminary to Self-enforcing Institutions (1)Greif , Avner. 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." American Economic Review 83(3), June, pp. 525-48. http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/contract-enforce.pdf (pdf)

Calvert, Randall L. 1995. "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions." In Explaining Social Institutions. Chapter 3, pp. 57-93. Edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sugden, Robert. 1989. "Spontaneous Order." Journal of Economic Perspective, 3(4), pp. 85-97.

Höllander, Heinz. 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation." American Economic Review, 80(5), December, pp. 1157-67.

Second Class: Interactive Analysis

On the Limitation of the Game Theoretic Conceptualization of Institutions. Kandori, Michihiro, George Mailath and R. Rob. 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games." Econometrica 61(1), January, pp. 29-56.

Kaneko, Mamoru and Akihiko Matsui. 1999. "Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory 1(1), pp 1-37.

Denzau A. and D.C. North. 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions." Kyklos, 47, pp. 3-30.

Interactive and Context Specific Analysis (1) Greif , Avner. 1998. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis." American Economic Review, (May, no. 2): 80-4. http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/hist-comparative.pdf (pdf)

(2) Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, 1: 1-23.

(1) Greif, Avner. Forthcoming, 2002. "Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility." Forthcoming in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 158(1). http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/Inst-Impersonal.pdf (pdf)

Third Class: Preliminary to Institutional Dynamics

Are Institutions the Carriers of History? (2) David, Paul A. 1994. "Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'?: Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5(2), pp. 205-20.

(1) North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), Winter, pp. 97-112.

Self-enforcing Institutions

Fourth Class: Endogenous Institutional Change

(1) Greif, Avner 2000. The Influence of Past Institution on its Rate of Change: Institutional Perpetuation and Endogenous Institutional Change. Chapter 7 in "Historical Institutional Analysis." Forthcoming, CUP. http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/influence-rateofchange.pdf (pdf)

Greif, Avner. Forthcoming, 2002. "Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility." Forthcoming in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 158(1). http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/Inst-Impersonal.pdf (pdf)

Fifth Class: The influence of Past Institutions on the Direction of Institutional Change

(1) "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, No. 5 (October 1994): pp. 912-50. http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/cultural-beliefs.pdf (pdf)

Optional Readings of Applied Works in the Spirit of HIA Regarding the Modern Economy:

Greif. A. 1997. Contracting, Enforcement, and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the Law. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Edited by Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic. Washington, D.C: The World Bank. http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/greif-Ireland/cont-enforc-effic.pdf (pdf)

Zucker, Lynne G. 1986. Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920. Research in Organizational Behavior 8: 53-111.

Koszner, Randall S. 1998. Derivatives Clearing Houses: Historical Development, Over-the-Counter Innovations, and Implications for Public versus Private Regulations of the Payment System. Working Paper. Chicago Business School.

Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer. 1995. Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence. American Economic Review 8(5):1047-64.

Ingram, Paul. 1996. Organizational Forms as a Solution to the Problem of Credible Commitment: The Evolution of Naming Strategies among U.S. Hotel Chains, 1896-1980. Strategic Management Journal 17: 85-98.

Bernstein, Lisa. 1996. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144(5).

Banner, Stuart. 1998. The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860: A Study in Self-Regulation. Journal of Legal Studies XXVII(January): 113-40.

Hall, Peter and David Soskice. 2000. An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage." Forthcoming book edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Preface (pdf), Introduction (pdf), Bibliography (pdf)

Chiaki Moriguchi. 2000. "The Evolution of Employment Relations in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Firms, 1900-1960: A Comparative Historical and Institutional Analysis." NBER working paper # W7939. http://papers.nber.org/papers/W7939[/Point]

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-11-8 10:46:12编辑过]

Tadelis 契约与组织理论教程（详细版）

[Point=500] Stanford University Steve Tadelis Dept. of Economics Landau 241 Winter 2003  723-3544  stadelis@ Economics 282/291: Contracts and Organizations

Description This is focused on the foundations and recent developments in contract theory (also known as incentive theory) and related topics. Part I of the course carefully analyzes the hidden information (adverse selection) principal-agent model and its application to contracts. It covers the simple one agent model, and the multi-agent model using the set-up of mechanism design. Part II is devoted to the theory of Moral Hazard and its applications. Time permitting, part III concentrates on the Theory of the Firm and Incomplete Contracts.

Prerequisites Economics 202 and 203. Working knowledge of game theory ( the level of Economics 286 is not required). Requirements & Grades Problem Sets: During the quarter students will be required to hand in 4 problem sets. The problem sets will be distributed on Tuesdays, every 2 weeks, starting on 1/14/03, and will be due IN CLASS 9 days later on Wednesdays. You are strongly encouraged to work in teams, but the product you turn in must be individual work Final exam: A final take-home exam will be distributed at the end of the semester which will be due in 24 hours. These should not be done in teams but rather individual work is required. Final grade: The final grade will consist of 75% problem sets and 25% final exam.

Readings A set of detailed notes will be made available on the web. There is also a list of articles, those marked with an asterisk are highly recommended, and other articles are supplemental to the material. Most articles are available through JSTOR on the web, or can be found in the library.

2 Syllabus

I. Hidden Information (Adverse Selection) I.1 Static Models. (*) Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1990) Game Theory, MIT Press (henceforth FT), ch. 7 (*) Baron, D. and R. Myerson (1982), "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost," Econometrica 50:911-930 (*) Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics 15:171-196 (*) Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978) "Monopoly and Product Quality," Journal of Economic Theory 18:301-317 Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1986), "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, 94:614-641 Mirrlees, J. (1971), "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, 38:175-208 Maskin E. and J. Tirole (1990), "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, I: Private Values," Econometrica 58:379-410 Maskin E. and J. Tirole (1992), "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica 58:379-410 Mathews, S. and J. Moore (1987), "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica 52:441-468 (especially Section 2)

I.2 Mechanism Design and Multiple Agents The General Mechanism Design Problem: The Revelation Principle (*) Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press (henceforth MWG), Ch. 23 section B Dominant Strategy Implementation: The Groves-Clarke mechanism 3 (*) MWG Ch.23 section C Groves, T. (1973), "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41:617-631 Laffont, J.J., and E. Maskin (1980), "A Differentiable Approach to Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms", Econometrica 48:1507-1520 Bayesian Implementation: The Expected Externality (AGV) mechanism (*) MWG Ch.23 section D D’Aspermont, C. and L.A. Gerard-Varet (1979), "Incentives and Incomplete Information," Journal of Public Economics 11:25-45 Bayesian Implementation: The Linear Utility Case with Participation Constraints (*) MWG Ch.23 sections D & E Myerson, R. and M. Satterthwaite (1983), "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade," Journal of Economic Theory 29:265-281

I.3 Dynamic Models and Renegotiation (*) Dewatripont, M. (1989), "Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," QJE, 104:589-619 Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin (1990), "Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information," European Economic Review, 34:589-619 Freixas, X., R. Guesnerie and J. Tirole (1985), "Planning Under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, 52:173-191 (*) Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, 59:1735-1754 Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1990), "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, 57:597-625 (*) Hart, O., and J. Tirole (1988), "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, 55:509-540

III. Moral Hazard (Hidden Action) III.1 Static One-Agent Models 4 (*) Grossman, S., and O. Hart (1983) "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, 51:7-45 (*) Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10:74-91 (*) Holmstrom, B. and O. Hart (1987), "The Theory of Contracts," Part I, in T. Bewley, Ed., Advances in Economic Theory, fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shavell, S. (1979), "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, 10:55-73 MWG Ch. 14 section B (*) Rogerson, W. (1985), "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, 53:1357-1367 Jewitt, I. (1988) "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, 56:1177-1190 Innes, R. (1990) "Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante Action Choices," Journal of Economic Theory 52:45-67 III.2 Static Multi-Agent Models (*) Holmstrom, B. (1982) "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13:324-340 Lazear, E. and S. Rosen (1981), "Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, 89:841-864 Mookherjee, D. (1984), "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, 51:433-446 Ma, C.A., (1988), "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, 55:555-571 Legros, P. and S. Matthews (1993), "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, 68:599-611

III.3 Dynamic Models and Renegotiation (*) Fudenberg, D., B. Holmstrom, and P. Milgrom (1990) "Short-term Contracts and Long-term Agency Relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, 51:1-31 5 Rogerson, W. (1985), "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, 53:69-76 (*) Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom (1987), "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica , 55:597-619 (*) Atekeson, A. and R.E.Lucas (1992) "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information" Review of Economic Studies, 59:427-453 Spear, S., and S. Srivastava (1987) “Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting,” Review of Economic Studies, 54:599-617. Radner, R. (1981), "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in Repeated Princial Agent Relationships," Econometrica, 49:1127-1148 Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1990), "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica 58:1279-1320 Hermalin, B., and M. Katz (1991) "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency", Econometrica 59:1735-1753 Ma, C.A., (1991), "Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106:255-275 Matthews, S. (1995), "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica 63:567-589 Segal, I., and S. Tadelis (1995), "Renegotiation in Agency Contracts: The Value of Information," mimeo

III.4 Multi-Task Analysis (*) Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom (1991) "Mutlitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 57:25-52

IV. Theory of the Firm IV.1 Established Views of the Firm Alchian, A., and H. Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62:777-795 Coase, R. (1937), "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, 4: 386-405, reprinted in 6 O. Williamson and S. Winter (1993), eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. (*) Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press, chapter 1 Simon, H. "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship," Econometrica 19:293-305 Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press,

IV.2 Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (*) Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and P. Rey (1994) "Renegotiation Design and Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, 62:257-282 Grossman, S., and O. Hart (1986) "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719 (*) Edlin, A., and S. Reichelstein, (1996) "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review 86(3):478-501 (*) Hart, O. (1995) "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," Oxford University Press, chapters 2-3 Hart, O., and J. Moore (1988) "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, 56:755-785 (*) Hart, O., and J. Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, 98:1119-1158 IV.3 Foundations of Incomplete Contracts Hart, O. (1995) "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," Oxford University Press, chapter 4 Segal, I. (1995) "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," mimeo

7 Maskin E. and J. Tirole (1997), "Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts," mimeo (*) Tirole, J. (1995) "Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?," mimeo IV.4 Alternative approaches Aoki, M. (1990) "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm," Journal of Economic Literature, 28:1-27 (*) Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, (1994) "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review 84(4):972-991 Riordan, M. (1990) "What is Vertical Integration?"in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O. Williamson, Eds. The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts, Sage Publications. IV.5 The Firm as a Bearer of Reputation (*) Kreps, D. (1990) "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press Tadelis, S. (1999) "What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, 89(3):548-563 Tadelis, S. (2002) "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882

[/Point]

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-11-8 11:09:02编辑过]

霍姆斯特朗 契约理论教案 MIT

[Point=500]

14.129 Contract Theory, Spring 2003

T/Th 10-30 - 12:00

E51-361

Instructors:

Bengt Holmstrom E52-271d, 3-0506 bengt@mit.edu

Mathias Dewatripont E52-391b, 8-9651 mathias@mit.edu

TA: Kenichi Amaya E51-090, 8-5630 kamaya@mit.edu

Reading List

^ = on reserve at Dewey Library * = required reading; in JSTOR or on the Web ** = required reading; in reading packet

General References

Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (1998), Introduction to Contract Theory, book manuscript.

^Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

^Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge: MIT Press.

^Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

^Salanie, B. (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. MIT Press.

Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.

1. Mechanism design and adverse selection (Holmstrom)

1.1 Static adverse selection

*Baron, D. and R. Myerson (1982), "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, 50(4): 911-30.

**Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2001), "Introduction to Contract Theory," book manuscript, chapter 2: Adverse selection: screening.

*Laffont, J-J and J. Tirole (1986), "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, 94(3).

Laffont, J-J and J. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Procurement and Incentives in Regulation, Chapter 2.

*Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics, 15: 171-96.

Mirrlees, J. (1971), "An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation," Review of Economic Studies 38: 175-208.

Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978), "Monopoly and Product Quality," Journal of Economic Theory, 18: 301-317.

1.2 Mechanism design

**Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2001), "Introduction to Contract Theory," book manuscript, chapter 8: Multiagent adverse selection.

Cremer, J. and R. McLean (1988), "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica 56, 1247-1258.

**d'Aspremont, C. and L. Gerard-Varet (1979), "Incentives and Incomplete Information," Journal of Public Economics, 11: 24-45.

Holmstrom, B. and R. Myerson (1983), "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 51(6): 1799-1820.

**Myerson, Roger and M. Satterthwaite (1983) , "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, 29: 265-281.

2. Dynamic agency (Holmstrom)

2.1 Dynamic moral hazard

Chiappori, P.A., I. Macho, P.Rey and B. Salanie (1994), "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment and the Access to Credit Markets," European Economic Review 38(8), 1527-53.

Clementi G. L. and H. Hopenhayn, (2002), "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," University of Rochester, Rochester Center for Economic Research, WP 492.

*Dewatripont, M., P. Legros and S. Mathews (2002), "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," mimeo, ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

**Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1990), "Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1): 1-31.

Hellwig, M. and K. Schmidt (2002), "Discrete-time approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision," Econometrica, 70 (6): 2225-64.

*Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1987), "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, 55(2) p 303-328.

Malcomson , J. and F. Spinnewyn (1988), "The Multi-Period Principal-Agent Problem," Review of Economic Studies, 55(3): 391-407.

Radner, R. (1981), "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, 49(5): 1127-48.

Rogerson, W. (1985), "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, 53: 69-76.

*Spear, S. and S. Srivastava (1987), "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, 54: 599-617.

*Werning, I. (2001), "Repeated Moral Hazard with Unmonitored Wealth: A Recursive First-Order Approach," mimeo, University of Chicago.

2.2 Dynamic adverse selection

**Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2001), "Introduction to Contract Theory," book manuscript, chapter 10: Dynamic Adverse Selection.

Dewatripont, M. (1989), "Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 589-619.

**Dewatripont, M. and Maskin, E. (1990), "Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information," European Economic Review, 34(2-3): 311-321.

Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1990). "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica 58(6): 1279-1319.

Hart, O. and J. Tirole (1988), "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, 55: 509-540.

2.3 Self-enforcing agreements and learning

*Abreu, D., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1990), "Towards a Theory of Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, 58 (5): 1041-1063.

Bergemann, D. and U. Hege (2000), "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," mimeo, Yale University.

Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), 828-62.

*Ely, J. and J. Valimaki (2001), "Bad Reputation," mimeo, Northwestern University.

Green, E. J. (1987), "Lending and Smoothing of Uninsurable Income" in Prescott, E. and Wallace, N. (eds), Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade , University of Minnesota Press.

Levin, J. (2002), "Relational Incentive Contracts," mimeo, Stanford University (also a link for an appendix).

Mailath, G. & L. Samuelson (2001), "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Review of Economic Studies, 68(2), 415-41.

Ray, D. (2002), "The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica, 70 (2): 547-582.

*Tirole, J. (1996), "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, 63(1), 1-22.

*Townsend, R. (1982), "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, 90, 1166-86.

3. Politics: representation, accountability and bureaucracy (Holmstrom)

Acemoglu, D, M. Kremer and A. Mian (2002), "Markets, Firms, and Governments," mimeo, MIT.

*Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (2002), "Incomplete Social Contracts," mimeo, Princeton University.

Ashworth, Scott (1999), "Reputation Effects in Electoral Competition," mimeo, MIT.

Blanes-I-Vidal, J. (2001), "Authority and Career Concerns," mimeo, London School of Economics.

Banerjee, A. (1997), "A Theory of Misgovernance", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1289-1332.

*Caillaud B. and J. Tirole (2002), "Parties as Political Intermediaries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4): 1453-1490.

Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt and J. Tirole (1999), "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1):199-217.

*Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1999), "Advocates," Journal of Political Economy, 107(1): 1-39.

Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (1998), "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, 88 (1): 96-118.

Lohmann, Susanne (1998), "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests," The American Political Science Review, 92(4): 809-827.

*Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2001), "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," mimeo, Princeton University.

*Milgrom P. and J. Roberts (1986), "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Rand Journal of Economics, 17(1): 18-32..

Persson T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

Prendergast, C. (2001), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency," mimeo, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

4. Internal vs. external capital markets (Holmstrom)

*Amador, M. and A. Landier (2002), "Entrepreneurial Pressure, Innovation and Rent Cannibalization," mimeo, MIT.

Berger, A., N. Miller, M. Petersen, R. Rajan, and J. Stein (2001), "Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," mimeo, Harvard University.

*Gromb, D. and D. Scharfstein (2001), "Entrepreneurial Activity in Equilibrium," draft, Sloan School of Management.

Holmstrom, B. and S. Kaplan (2001), "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and the 1990s," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2): 121-44.

*Inderst, R. and H. Mueller (2002), "Internal vs. External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach", working paper, University College London.

Stein, J.C. (1997), "Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources," Journal of Finance, 52, 111-122.

* Stein, J.C. (2002), "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, 57(5): 1891-1921.

5. Behavioral models of contracting (Holmstrom)

*Bernardo, A. and I. Welch (2001), "On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10 (3): 301-330.

Englmaier, F. and A. Wambach (2002), "Contracts and Inequity Aversion," mimeo, University of Munich.

*Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999), "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (3): 817-868.

Gervais, S. and T. Odean (2001), "Learning to be Overconfident," Review of Financial Studies, 14 (1): 1-27.

*Rob, R. and P. Zemsky (2002), "Social Capital, Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity," Rand Journal of Economics, 33 (2), 243-257.

Van den Steen, E. (2002), "On the Origin and Evolution of Corporate Culture," mimeo, MIT.

6. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (Dewatripont)

**^Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2003), Contract Theory, book manuscript, Chapter 13: Foundations of contracting with unverifiable information

Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (2002), "On Partial Contracting," European Economic Review, forthcoming.

Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (2002), "Transferable Control," mimeo.

Dewatripont, M. (2001), "Authority," Walras-Bowley Lecture presented at the 2001 North-American Meeting of the Econometric Society.

* Hart, O. and J. Moore (1999), "Foundations of Incomplete contracts," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 115-38.

* Maskin, E. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, 66, 23-38 (1999).

Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999), "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies.

Maskin, E. and J. Moore (1999), "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies.

Moore, J. (1992), "Implementation in Environments with Complete Information," in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, J.J. Laffont, ed., Cambridge University Press, p.182-282.

Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988) "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, 56: 1191-1220.

* Segal, I. (1999), "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies.

Segal, I. And M. Whinston (2002), "The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk-Sharing)," Econometrica 70: 1-45.

**^ Tirole, J. (1999), "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?" Econometrica, 67(4): 741-81

7. Internal Organization and Authority (Dewatripont)

7.1. Incentive approaches

* Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29.

Baron, D. and D. Besanko (1998), "Shared Incentive Authority and the Organization of the Firm," mimeo, Stanford.

**^ Dessein, W. (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, 69, 811-38.

Dessein, W. (2002), "Information and Control in Alliances & Ventures", mimeo.

Dessein, W. (2002), "Coordination through Authority versus Consensus", mimeo.

Dewatripont, M. (2001), "Authority," Walras-Bowley Lecture presented at the 2001 North-American Meeting of the Econometric Society.

Garicano, L. and T. Santos (2001), "Referrals", mimeo.

**^ Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom (2002), "A Theory of Firm Scope," mimeo.

Levin J. and S. Tadelis (2001), "A Theory of Partnerships," draft, Stanford University.

Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998), "Power in a Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 387-432.

Rey, P. and J. Tirole (2001), "Alignment of Interests and the Governance of Joint Ventures", mimeo.

Rotemberg, J. and G. Saloner (1994), "Benefits of Narrow Business Strategies," American Economic Review, 84(5), 1330-49.

Rotemberg, J. and G. Saloner (2000), "Visionaries, Managers and Strategic Direction," Rand Journal of Economics, 31(4), 693-716.

Van den Steen, E. (2001), "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," mimeo Sloan School of Management.

Segal, I. (1996), "Modeling the Managerial Task: A Synthetic Approach," mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.

Zabojnik, J. (2001), "Centralized and Decentralized Decision-Making in Organizations", Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.

7.2. Other approaches

* Bolton P. & M. Dewatripont (1994), "The Firm as a Communication Network", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 809-839.

Bolton P. & M. Dewatripont (1995), "The Time and Budget Constraints of the Firm", European Economic Review.

**^ Dessein, W. And T. Santos (2002), "Adaptive organizations", mimeo.

Dewatripont, M. (2002), "Theories of Delegation: Communication Costs versus Incentive Approaches," Review of Economic Studies Lecture presented at the 2002 Royal Economic Society Conference, and Invited Presentation at the 2002 European Meeting of the Econometric Society.

Dewatripont M. & G. Roland (1997), "Transition as A Process of Large-Scale Institutional Change", in D. Kreps and K. Wallis (eds), Advances in Economic Theory, the Seventh World Congress, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, vol. II, 240-278 (reprinted in Economics of Transition).

**^ Garicano L. (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", Journal of Political Economy 108: 874-904.

**^ Hart, O. and J. Moore (2001), "On the design of hierarchies: coordination versus specialization," mimeo.

Meagher K., H. Orbay and T. Van Zandt (1999), "Firm Information Processing Structure and Environmental Uncertainty".

Qian Y., G. Roland & C. Xu (2000), "Coordinating Changes in M-Form and U-Form Organizations".

Radner R. (1992), "The Economics of Managing", Journal of Economic Literature.

* Radner R. (1992), "The Organization of Decentralized Information processing", Econometrica 62: 1109-46.

Van Zandt T. (1997), "Organisations with an Endogenous Number of Information Processing Agents", in M. Majumdar (ed), Organizations with Incomplete Information, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Zandt T. (1999), "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents, Review of Economic Studies 66: 633-658.

Vayanos D. (1999), "Optimal Decentralization of Information Processing in the Presence of Synergies", mimeo, MIT.

8. Topics in adverse selection: multidimensional screening and competitive screening (Dewatripont)

Adams, W. and J. Yellen (1976), "Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 475-498.

Akerlof, G. (1970), "The Market for 'lemons': quality uncertainty and the market mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500.

Armstrong, M. (1996), "Multiproduct nonlinear pricing," Econometrica 64: 51-75.

Armstrong, M. (1999), "Price discrimination by a many-product firm," Review of Economic Studies 66: 151-168.

* Armstrong, M. and J. C. Rochet (1999), "Multidimensional Screening: a User's Guide," European Economic Review 43: 959-79.

Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (2001), "Competitive price discrimination," Rand Journal of Economics 32: 579-605.

Biais, B., D. Martimort and J.C. Rochet (2000), "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica 68: 799-838.

**^ Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2003), Contract Theory, book manuscript, chapter 6: Multidimensional incentive problems.

Dessein, W. (2002), "Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," Rand Journal of Economics forthcoming.

Jehiel, P., B. Moldovanu and E. Stacchetti (1999), "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities", Journal of Economic Theory 85: 258-93.

Jullien, B. (2000), "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory 93: 1-47.

**^ Laffont, J.J., P. Rey and J. Tirole (1998), "Network Competition I and II," Rand Journal of Economics 29: 1-37 and 38-56.

Lewis, T. and D. Sappington (1989), "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory 66: 238-63.

McAfee, R.P., J. McMillan and M. Whinston (1989), "Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling and the correlation of values," Quarterly Journal of Economics 103: 371-383.

Rochet, J.C. and P. Choné (1998), "Ironing, sweeping and multidimensional screening," Econometrica 66: 783-826.

Rochet, J.C. and L. Stole (1999), "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," mimeo.

**^ Rochet, J.C. and L. Stole (2000), "The Economics of Multidimensional Screening," Econometric Society World Congress Invited Paper, Seattle 2000.

Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay in the economics of imperfect information," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90: 629-649.

Wilson, R. (1993), Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.

9. Collusion, Cooperation and Hierarchies (Dewatripont)

**^ Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2003), Contract Theory, book manuscript, chapter 8: Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion.

Calvo, G. and S. Wellisz (1978), "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy 75: 123-38.

**^ Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1990), "Regulating Trade Among Agents," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1): 85-105.

Itoh, H. (1991), "Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations," Econometrica, 59(3): 611-636.

Kofman, A. and J. Lawarrée (1993), "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica 61, 629-56.

*Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (1997), "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, 65(4), 875-911.

**^ Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (1998), "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, 68(2), 309-342.

Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (1998), "Collusion and Delegation," Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 280-305.

McAfee, R. P. and J. McMillan (1995), "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 4: 399-426.

Qian, Y. (1994), "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy", Review of Economic Studies 61: 527-44.

Maskin, E., Qian Y. & C. Xu (2000), "Incentives, Information and Organizational Form", Review of Economic Studies 67: 359-78.

Rotemberg, J. (1999), "Process- versus Function-Based Hierarchies," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8: 453-87.

Tirole, J. (1986), "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations" Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, II(2):181-214.

**^ Tirole, J. (1992), "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," in J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Volume 2, Econometric Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 151-206.

[/Point]

威廉姆森 制度经济学

[Point=500]

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Department of Economics Course Outline Haas School of Business Spring 2003 Econ 224 – The Economics of Institutions Oliver Williamson

Office Hours: Thursday 3:00-4:00 p.m. 595 Evans Hall By appointment The goals of this course are to (1) deepen your understanding of economic institutions, (2) provide you with additional conceptual and theoretical apparatus that have wide application, (3) suggest theoretical, public policy, and empirical research projects to which you can productively relate, and (4) engage your curiosity about “What’s going on here?” Text: Putterman, Louis, and Randall Kroszner (1996). The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press): ENF (paperback).

I. Institutional Economics *North, Douglass. 1991. “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (Winter): 97-112. Williamson, Oliver. 2000. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (September): 595-613. Posner-Coase-Williamson exchange in the March 1993 issue of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149: 73-87, 96-98, 99-118.

II. Lens of Contract Hayek, ENF, Chap. 4 Coase, ENF, Chap. 7 *Chandler, ENF, Chap. 6 Chapter 1: “What’s Going On Here?” (TBD) Chapter 2: “The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering” (TBD) Westgren e-mail (TBD) *denotes background (TBD) denotes to be distributed

2 III. Organizations Matter *March, James, and Herbert Simon. 1993. “Organizations Revisited,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 2 (No. 3): 299-316. Simon, Herbert. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 156 (December): 467-482. *Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology, 91 (November): 481-501. *Podolny, Joel, and Karen Page. 1998. “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 57-76. Chapter 3: “Organization Theory: The Rudiments” (TBD) Chapter 4: “Organization Theory: Through the Lens of Contract and Beyond” (TBD) Carroll, Glen, David Teece, and Pablo Spiller. 1999. “Transaction Cost Economics: Its Influence on Organization Theory,” in Carroll and Teece, eds., Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies. New York: Oxford, 60-77. McGuire, Patrick, Mark Granovetter, and Michael Schwartz. 1993. “Thomas Edison and the Social Construction of the Early Electricity Industry in America,” in Richard Swedberg (ed.), Explorations in Economic Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 213-246. Gibbons, Robert. 1998. “Game Theory and Garbage Cans: An Introduction to the Economics of Internal Organization,” in Jennifer Halpern and Robert Stern, eds., Debating Rationality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 36-52. *Cherry, Todd, Peter Frykblom, and Jason Shogren. 2002. “Hardnose the Dictator,” American Economic Review, 92 (September): 1218-1221.

IV. Bureaucracy Camerer, Colin. 1999. “Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 96 (September): 10575-10577. Williamson, Oliver, ENF, Chap. 11 Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts, ENF, Chap. 12 Selznick, Philip. 1950. “The Iron Law of Bureaucracy,” Modern Review, 3: 157-165.

V. Heuristic Models *Williamson, Oliver, ENF, Chap. 9 Williamson, Oliver, 1991. “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (June): 269-296. Williamson, Oliver. 2002. “The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (Summer): 171-195.

3 VI. Credible Contracting Williamson, Oliver. 1983. “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,” American Economic Review, 73 (September): 519-540. *Klein, Benjamin, and Keith Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, 89 (August): 615-641. Gertner, Robert. 2002. “Explaining Vertical Integration,” unpublished manuscript. Kreps, David. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 90-143.

VII. Formal Models (1) Hart, Oliver. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 29-55. Hart, Oliver, ENF, Chap. 26 Aoki, Masahiko. 2002. “T-Forms of Organization Revisited and a Trans-disciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis,” unpublished manuscript. Kreps, David. 1999. “Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory,” in Glenn Carroll and David Teece, eds., Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies. New York: Oxford University Press, 121-155. *Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom, ENF, Chap. 17 Appendix, “The Even Playing Field” (TBD).

VIII. Formal Models (2) Bajari, Patrick, and Steven Tadelis. 2001. “Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,” Rand Journal of Economics, 32 (Autumn): 387-407. Tadelis, Steven. 2002. “Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision,” American Economic Review, 92 (May): 433-437. Gibbons, Robert. 1999. “Taking Coase Seriously,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 145-157.

IX. Exam, March 20

X. Public Policy Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, Chap. 14. Williamson, Oliver. 1976. “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly—in General and with Respect to CATV,” Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (Spring): 73-104. 4 *Levy, Brian, and Pablo Spiller. 1994. ”The Institutional Foundations for Regulatory Commitment,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (Fall): 201-246. *Littlechild, Stephen. 2002. “Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract,” Review of Network Economics, 1 (March): 1-39. *Troesken, Werner, and Rick Geddes. 2002. “Municipalizing American Waterworks, 1897-1915,” unpublished manuscript.

XI. Empirical McMillan, John. 2002. Reinventing the Bazaar. New York: W. W. Norton, 1-14, 224-229. Bewley, Truman. 2002. “Interviews as a Valid Empirical Tool in Economics,” Journal of Socio- Economics, 31: 343-353. Whinston, Michael. 2002. “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration,” unpublished manuscript. Masten, Scott, and Stephane Saussier. 2000. “Econometrics of Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting,” Revue D’Economie Industrielle, No. 92, 215-236. Simester, Duncan, and Marc Knez. 2002. “Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm,” Journal of Business, 75: 283-303. *Bajari, Patrick, and Steven Tadelis. 2002. “Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis,” unpublished manuscript.

XII. Trust Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” American Economic Review, 53 (December): 941-973. Williamson, Oliver E. 1993. “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 36 (April): 453-486. Lembsdorff, Johann. 2002. “Making Corrupt Deals,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48: 221-241.

XIII. Strategy and the New Economy Teece, David, and Gary Pisano. 1994. “The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(3): 537-556. Williamson, Oliver. 1999. “Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives,” Strategic Management Journal, 20: 1087-1108. Foss, Nicolai. 2000. “Strategy, Bargaining, and Economic Organization,” unpublished manuscript.

5a XIV. Student Presentations XV. Student Presentations

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钱颖一 转型经济学教程

[Point=500]

Economics of Transition II: Governance and Institutions

While Economics of Transition I focuses on the issues of the political economy of reform and allocative changes during the transition from plan to market, Economics of Transition II studies the issues of governance and institutions underlying transition and development. The transition experience in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia has raised many new questions for economics, in particular, for the economics of organization and institution. This course is organized around the three categories of institutions: firms, markets, and the state. It investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how different organizations work and how alternative institutional arrangements hinder, support, or help efficiency improvement in transition economies. One of the course requirements is a research paper on a selected topic covered in the course. Students should decide on their own research project and submit the paper by May 17, 2004 (Monday) by email.

I. Issues, Perspectives, and Tools

A. The Nature of the Socialist System Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton and Oxford University Press, 1992. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 15. Ericson, Richard, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications For Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer, 1991. B. Fundamental Ideas about the Market System Hayek, Friedrich A., "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, 35:519-30, 1945. Coase, Ronald, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1-44, October, 1960. C. The New Institutional Economics Coase, Ronald. "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 140(1), 229-231, 1984. 2 Williamson, Oliver. "Reflections on the New Institutional Economics," Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 141(1), 187-195, 1985. North, Douglass. "The New Institutional Economics," Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 142(1), 230-237, 1986 Williamson, Oliver. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Williamson, Oliver. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press, 1985. North, Douglass. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Djankov, Simeon, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Flerencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. “The New Comparative Economics.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003.

II. Markets A. Reputation Mechanisms and Private Contract Enforcement Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Game Theory, chapters 5 and 9, MIT Press, 1991. Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 54, 533-554, 1986. Kandori, Michihiro, "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59:63- 80, 1992. Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, 2:1-23. B. Contract Enforcement in Transition Economies McMillan, John, "Contracts without Law," Section 9 in "Markets in Transition," in David Kreps and Kenneth Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, “Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999. McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, “Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001. McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, “Private Order under Dysfunctional Public Order,” 3 Michigan Law Review, 98:8, pp. 2421-58, 2000. Johnson, Simon; John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, "Courts and Relational Contracts,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001. Hendley, Kathryn, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "Law, Relationship, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises," University of Maryland, mimeo, 1998. C. Regulation of Markets De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row, 1989. Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “The Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1-37, 2002. Botero, Juan, Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “The Regulation of Labor,” mimeo, 2003. Glaezer, Edward; Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer. “Coase vs. the Coasian.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000.

II. Firms A. Dynamic Incentives: The Ratchet Effect and Soft Budget Constraint Weitzman, Martin, "The Ratchet Principle and Performance Incentives," Bell Journal of Economics, 1980. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, 57, 579-625, 1990. Kornai, Janos, "The Soft Budget Constraint," KYKLOS, 39(1):3-30, 1986. Dewatripont, Mathias, and Eric Maskin, "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, October, 1995. Maskin, Eric, "Theories of the Soft Budget Constraint," Japan and the World Economy, 8, 1996. Li, David D., "Causes of the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence on Three Explanations," Journal of Comparative Economics, March, 1998. 4 B. Theory of Government Ownership and Privatization Sappington, David, and Joseph Stiglitz, "Privatization, Information, and Incentives," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6:567-582, 1987. Schmidt, Klaus, "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12(1):1-24, 1996. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, "Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX:995-1025, November, 1994. Li, David D. "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, 23:1-19, 1996. Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian, "Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, April 1998, 14(1), pp. 1-23. Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1998, 113(2), pp. 467-496. C. Corporate Governance Berle, Adolf A. and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: MacMillan, Co. 1933. Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 1976. Jensen, Michael, and Eugene Fama, "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 1983. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, 93(6):1155-77, 1985. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 1986. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, 52(2):737-83, June, 1997. D. Empirical Evidence on Enterprise Reform Pinto, Brian, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski, "Transforming State Enterprises: Evidence on Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993. 5 Earle, John, and Saul Estrin, "Employee Ownership in Transition," in R. Frydman, C. Gray, and A. Rapaczynski (eds.), Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Central European University Press, 1996. Barberis, N., Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and N. Tsukanova, "How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops," Journal of Political Economy, 1996. Frydman, Roman; Cheryl Gray; Marek Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, "When does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999. Groves, Theodore, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton, "Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(1), 1994. Li, Wei. "The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Enterprises, 1980- 1989." Journal of Political Economy, October 1997, 105(5), pp. 1081-1106. Xu, Xiaonian, and Yan Wang, "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance," China Economic Review, 1999. E. Entrepreneurs and New Firms McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, "Entrepreneurs in Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Perspective, 2001. Johnson, Simon; John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, "Entrepreneur and the Ordering of Institutional Reform," Economics of Transition, 2000. Jin, Hehui, and Yingyi Qian, "Public vs. Private Ownership of Firms: Evidence from Rural China," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1998, 113(3), pp. 773-808. Johnson, Simon; John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, "Property Rights and Finance," mimeo, UC San Diego, 1999. Besley, Timothy. “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana.” Journal of Political Economy. 103(5), 903-37, 1995.

IV. The State A. The Problem of Credible Commitment by the State North, Douglass, and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge University Press, 1973. 6 North, Douglass. Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton, 1981. Shleifer, Andrei; and Robert Vishny. "Perspectives on Government," chapter 1 in Shleifer and Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures, Harvard University Press, 1998. Frye, Timothy; and Andrei Shleifer, "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, May, 1997. Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast, "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), 745-776, 1994. Bai, Chong-En, David D. Li, Yingyi Qian, and Yijiang Wang, "Commitment, Incentives, and Information: The Case of Anonymous Banking," Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley, 2003. B. The Rule of Law North, Douglass and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History, December, 1989. Litwack, John, "Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5:77-90, 1991. Weingast, Barry, "Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review, 91:245-63, 1997. Hay, Jonathan, and Andrei Shleifer, "Toward a Theory of Legal Reform," European Economic Review, April, 559-67, April, 1996. Clarke, Donald, "The Creation of a Legal Structure for Market Institutions in China," in John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, University of Michigan Press, 1996. C. Decentralization and Federalism Weingast, Barry R., "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11:1-31, 1995. Qian, Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism as a Commitment to Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4):83-92, Fall, 1997. Qian, Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast, "China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style," Journal of Policy Reform, 1:149-185, 1996. Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 7 Federalism, Chinese Style," Mimeo, Research Center for Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University, 1999. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style," Harvard University, mimeo, 1998. Qian, Yingyi, and Gerard Roland, "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, December, 1998. Qian, Yingyi, Gerard Roland, and Chenggang Xu, "Coordinating Tasks in M-form and U-form Organizations," University of California, Berkeley, 2003. Maskin, Eric, Yingyi Qian, and Chenggang Xu, "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, 1999. Berkowitz, Daniel, and Wei Li, "Decentralization in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?" Journal of Public Economics, 2000. D. Corruption Bardhan, Pranab. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." Journal of Economic Literature, September 1997, XXXV, pp. 1320-46. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1993. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "Pervasive Shortages under Socialism," RAND Journal of Economics, 1992.

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巴泽尔 华盛顿大学

产权经济学

The Economics of Property Rights

First (optional) assignment is due Wed. Jan. 14th.

Second assignment is due Wed. jan 21st.

Additions to reading list (i do not know yet how to access the sylabus).

1. Yoram Barzel: A theory of rationing by waiting, JLE, April 1974.

2. Steven Cheung: A theory of price control, JLE, April 1974.

Introduction to Class

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Application of standard economic theory to analyze various forms of property rights as constraints of competition; the costs associated with delineation and enforcement of rights; the costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts for right transfers; resource allocation and income distribution implied by different property right and transaction cost constraints. Prerequisite: 500 and 501, or permission of instructor.

Files for Download 下载地址http://www.econ.washington.edu/instruction/courses/classpage.asp?class=2059

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Allen: Homesteading

Allen: Homesteading

Coase: Problem of Social Cost

Coase: The Nature of the Firm

Lueck: Wildlife Law

Umbeck: Might Makes Rights

Demsetz: Property Rights

Demsetz: Property Rights

Transaction Costs

Transaction Costs (12/27/02)

Coase: Problem of Social Cost

Coase: The Nature of the Firm

Lueck: Wildlife Law

Umbeck: Might Makes Rights

Measurement Theory of the Firm

Measurement Theory of the Firm