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请某些人认真阅读，庞巴维克《资本实证论》第二章，然后再讨论价值问题。
主观价值的本质和起源
All goods without exception—indeed according to the very conception of them as "good"—possess a certain relation to human wellbeing. There are, however, two essentially distinct grades of this relation. A good belongs to the lower grade when it possesses the general capacity to subserve human weal. The higher grade, on the other hand, demands that a good should be more than merely a sufficient cause; it must be an indispensable condition of human wellbeing—a condition of such a kind that some gratification stands or falls with the having or wanting of the good. In the expressive vocabulary of everyday life we find a separate designation for these grades. The lower is called Usefulness, the higher Value. This distinction, already recognized in common speech, we must try to make as clear and well-marked as its fundamental importance for the whole theory of value deserves. 按照“物品(goods)”这个重要概念的真实意思，一切物品都与人的福利有一定关系。然而，这个关系有两个不同的等级。当一件物品具有增进人类福利的一般能力时，它属于较低的等级。另一方面，较高等级的关系不仅要求一件物品是满足人的需要的充分原因，它还必须是人的福利的一个不可缺少的条件，这件物品的有无决定了某个需要是否得到满足。在日常生活中的富于表现力的用语中，我们找到了这两个等级各自的名称：较低的等级称作有用(Usefulness)，较高的等级称作价值(Value)。日常用语中已经承认了这个区别。由于其在整个价值理论中应有的根本重要性，我们必须将其解释清楚。
A man dwells beside a bubbling spring of water. He has filled his cup, and the spring goes on pouring out enough to fill a hundred other cups every minute. Another man is travelling in the desert. A long day's journey over glowing sand still divides him from the nearest oasis, and he has come to his last cup of water. What is the relation in each case between the cup of water and the wellbeing of its owner? 一个人居住在潺潺流淌的泉水旁。他装满了自己的杯子，而泉水继续涌出，足以每分钟装满一百个杯子。另一个人正在沙漠中行走，已经在炽热的沙子上走了漫长的一天，离最近的绿洲还很远，而他只剩下最后一杯水。在这两个情况的每一个中，一杯水与其主人的福利之间的关系是什么呢？
A single glance shows us that the relation is very dissimilar; but wherein lies the difference? Simply that, in the former case, we have only the lower grade of the relation we call wellbeing, that of usefulness; in the latter case we have the higher grade as well. In the first case, just as in the second, the cup of water is useful, that is, capable of satisfying a want, and, moreover, in exactly the same degree; for evidently the refreshing qualities of the water—the qualities on which its capacity to quench thirst is based, such as coolness, taste, etc.—are not in the least degree weakened by the fact that other cups of water chance to possess similar properties; nor, in the second case, are these refreshing qualities in the least augmented by the accidental circumstance that there is no other water near. On the other hand, the two cases become essentially distinct when considered with reference to the second grade. Looking at the former case we must say that the possession of the cup of water does not provide the man with one single satisfaction more, nor its loss with one satisfaction less, than he could have obtained without it. If he has that particular cup of water he can quench his thirst with it; if he has not that cup—well, he can quench his thirst quite as well with one of the hundred others which the spring puts freely at his disposal every minute of the day. If he likes, therefore, he may make that one cup the cause of his satisfaction by quenching his thirst with it; an indispensable condition of his satisfaction it cannot be; for his wellbeing it is dispensable, unimportant, indifferent. 显然，两者十分不同。但是，差别在什么地方呢？在前一个情况中，我们只有称作福利的较低级关系，即有用；在后一个情况中，我们还有较高级的关系。在这两个情况中，一杯水都有用，即可以满足一个需要，而且可以按照相同的程度满足需要。这是因为，显而易见，一杯水让人清爽、解渴等的性质不会因为另一杯水也有类似性质而减弱。在后一个情况中，一杯水的这些对人有用的性质也不会因为在这个偶然的环境中没有其他的水有所增加。从另一个角度看，当我们考虑到第二级关系时，两种情况有着根本的不同。在前一个情况中，我们必须说，有了这杯水，这个人也没有得到更多满足，没有这杯水，他的满足也不会减少。有了这一杯水，他可以用来解渴；没有这一杯水，他可以从不停地迅速喷涌的泉水中再取一杯来解渴。因此，如果他喜欢的话，他可以用这杯水解渴，使其成为他的满足的原因。不过，这杯水不是他的满足的一个不可缺少的条件。这是因为，对于他的福利来说，这杯水可有可无、无足轻重和无所谓。
It is quite otherwise in the second case. Here we must say that, if our traveller had not that one last cup, he could not quench his thirst; he must bear its pangs unassuaged, perhaps even succumb to them. In the cup of water then, in this case, we see not merely a sufficient cause, but the indispensable condition, the sine qua non of human wellbeing. Here it is of consequence, even of urgency; it possesses importance for his wellbeing. 在后一个情况中，事情则大不同。我们必须说，如果我们的旅行者没有最后那杯水，他就不能解渴，就必定忍受干渴的痛苦，甚至有可能渴死。因此，在这个情况中，我们在这杯水中看到的不仅仅有人的福利的一个充分原因，还有不可缺少的条件。在这里，这杯水是重要的，甚至是紧要的。对于他的福利来说，它具有重要性。
Now it is not too much to say that the distinction here drawn is one of the most fruitful and fundamental in the whole range of our science. It does not owe its existence to the microscope nor to any hair-splitting distinctions of the logician. It has its life in the world of men, who know it and use it and take it as guide for their common attitude towards the world of goods, not only as regards the intellectual estimate they apply to these goods, but as regards their actual business transactions. About goods which are only useful the practical business man is careless and indifferent. The academic knowledge that a good may be "of use" cannot evoke any efficient interest in the good, in face of the other knowledge that the same use may be obtained without it. Such goods are practically naught as regards our wellbeing, and we treat them as such; we are not put about when we lose them, and we make no effort to gain them. Who would fret at, or make an effort to prevent, the spilling of a cup of water at the spring, or the escape of a cubic foot of atmospheric air? Where, on the other hand, the sharpened glance of the economic man recognizes that some satisfaction, wellbeing, gratification, is connected with a particular good, there the effective interest which we take in our own wellbeing is transferred to the good which we recognize as its condition; we see and value our own welfare in it; we recognize its importance for us as value; and finally, we develop an anxiety, proportioned to the greatness of that importance, to acquire and hold the good. 可以不夸张地说，这里做出的这个区别，是我们在这门科学中做出的最富有成果和最基本的区别之一。这个区别的做出，既不是因为超常的观察能力，也不是因为逻辑学家的吹毛求疵。它存在于人的世界，人们懂得它，利用它，并用它指导他们对物的世界抱有的一般看法，不仅事关他们如何对这些物品做出有智慧的评价，而且事关他们的实际商业活动。务实的商人不会对仅仅有用的东西动心。如果知道一件物品也许“有用”，但同时也知道，如果没有它，同样的用途也可获得，那么，这样的知识并不能唤起人们对这件物品的兴趣。对于我们的福利来说，这样的东西没有丝毫价值，我们也正是这样来对待它们的。当我们失去它们的时候，我们不会烦恼，也不努力去取得它们。在泉水旁边，谁会关心或设法阻止一杯水的溢出呢？又有谁为一升空气的泄漏而烦恼呢？另一方面，在有些情况下，经济人锐敏的眼光认识到，某种满足、福利或满意联系着特定的物品。这时，他的真正兴趣就会转移到他认为是福利的条件的那件物品上去；我们在这件物品中看到了我们的福利，并赋予它相应价值。最后，一件物品越是重要，我们越是渴望获取和拥有这种物品。
Thus, formally defined, value is the importance which a good or complex of goods possesses with respect to the wellbeing of a subject. Any addition to this definition, regarding the kind and reason of the importance, is, strictly speaking, not necessary, since goods can only have an effective importance for human wellbeing in one way, viz. by being the indispensable condition, the sine qua non, of some one utility which subserves it. In view of the fact, however, that in other definitions of value it is very often translated as an "importance;" while the importance spoken of rests, erroneously, on a simple capability of utility, or, not less erroneously, on the necessity of expenditure of costs, or the like,4 we shall define it, unambiguously and exactly, as: That importance which goods or complexes of goods acquire, as the recognised condition of a utility which makes for the wellbeing of a subject, and would not be obtained without them. 因此，正式地定义的价值是一件物品或一组物品对于一个主体的福利来说所具有的重要性。严格地说，关于重要性的种类和理由，任何补充都是不必要的。这是因为，对于人的福利来说，物品只能以一种方式真正重要，即成为某个效用的必要条件，sine qua non。然而，在价值的其他定义中，这个词常被译成“重要性”，而谈到的重要性却又错误地依据提供效用的能力，或者同样错误地依据付出代价的必要性，等等。考虑这个事实，我们将毫不含糊和明确地把它定义为：一件物品或一组物品作为某个效用的公认条件而获得的重要性，这个效用有助于某个主体的福利，没有这些物品，就不能得到这个效用。
All goods have usefulness, but all goods have not value. For the emergence of value there must be scarcity as well as usefulness—not absolute scarcity, but scarcity relative to the demand for the particular class of goods. To put it more exactly: goods acquire value when the whole available stock of them is not sufficient to cover the wants depending on them for satisfaction, or when the stock would not be sufficient without these particular goods. On the other hand, those goods remain valueless which are offered in such superfluity that all the wants which they are fitted to satisfy are completely supplied, and when, beyond that, there is a surplus which can find no further employment in the satisfaction of want, and which, at the same time, is large enough to spare the goods or quantities of goods that we are valuing without imperilling the satisfaction of any one want. 所有的物品都有用，但并非所有的物品都有价值。一件物品要有价值，必须既有用，又稀缺——不是绝对稀缺，而是相对于对这种物品需求来说稀缺。更确切地说：当一种物品的现有存量不足以满足靠有赖于它的全部需要时，或者当没有某些物品，整个存量就不充分的时候，这些物品才有价值。另一方面，有些物品会因为供给过于丰富而没有价值，即一种物品的供给十分丰富，满足了适合于由它来满足的一切需要，还有剩余，这些剩余的物品找不到用途，而且这种物品的数量如此之大，以至于没有我们面前的这几件物品，也不会危及任何一个需要的满足。
After what has been said as to the nature of value, it should not be very difficult to prove these propositions. When the supply of goods is not sufficient, and some of the wants which they are adapted to satisfy must remain unsatisfied, it is clear that the loss of even a single good involves the loss of a possible satisfaction, while the addition of a single good involves the acquisition of a satisfaction otherwise impossible; and it is clear, consequently, that some gratification or form of wellbeing depends on the existence of that good. Conversely, it is quite as clear that, if goods of any class are to be had in superfluity, there is no harm done if one of the goods be lost—since it can be immediately replaced from the superfluous stock; nor any utility got if another such good be added—since it cannot be employed in any useful way. Suppose, for instance, that a peasant requires ten gallons of water per day, and no more, for general purposes—say, for his own drinking, for that of his family and servants, for watering his cattle, for cleansing, flushing, etc.—and suppose that the only spring within reach supplies no more than eight gallons a day. It is quite evident that he cannot spare one single gallon from his water-supply without suffering, to a more or less sensible extent, as regards the wants and aims of his economy. Every gallon in this case is the condition of a definite sphere of usefulness. Even if the spring supplied just ten gallons this would still be true. But if the spring supplied twenty gallons per day, it is just as obvious that the loss of one gallon would not do the slightest injury to our peasant. He can only employ ten gallons usefully, and he must let the other ten gallons flow away unused. If one gallon is spilled it is replaced from the overflow, and the only effect is that now the unusable surplus is reduced from ten gallons to nine. 有了关于价值的性质的这些说明，应该不难证明如下一些命题：当物品供给不充分时，有些需要必然得不到满足，哪怕失去一件物品，就会有一个需要得不到满足，而增加一件物品，就会有一个以前不能满足的需要得到满足。所以，十分明显，某个满足或某种福利依赖于那件物品的存在。反过来，同样明显的是，如果一类物品有多余，那么，失去一件也不会造成危害，因为它可以立即被多余的物品替代；增加一件此类物品也不增加任何效用，因为无法为它找到用途。例如，假定一个农民每天恰好需要10加仑水，满足的一般需要是，他本人和家属仆役饮用、洗衣、清洁和冲洗等，再假定附近唯一的水源每天仅能供应8加仑水。显而易见，要从他的水的供给中减去一加仑，他的经济中的需要和目的就会遭受或多或少的损失。在这种情况下，每一加仑水就成为某个用途的条件。即使水源正好能供应10加仑，上述说法仍然正确。但是，如果水源每天提供20加仑水，那么，损失一加仑水不会给农民造成任何损害。他只能给10加仑水找到有利的用途，从而只能让其余10加仑水白白流掉。如果一加仑水撒掉了，它可以用剩余的水代替它，结果只是剩余的无用水从10加仑减为9加仑罢了。
Now as it is the insufficient, or the barely sufficient, goods that are the objects of economical care—the goods we "economize" or endeavour to acquire and keep,—while such goods as are to be had in superfluity are free to everybody, we may express the above propositions shortly in the following form: All economical goods have value; all free goods are valueless.5 In any case it must steadily be borne in mind that it is only relations of quantity that decide whether any particular good is merely capable of use, or is also the condition of a utility for us.6
不足或刚好够用的物品才是经济上要考虑的物品，即我们要“节约利用”或设法取得和保有的物品，而那些供给过多的物品对于每个人来说都是免费或自由的。我们可以把上述命题简述如下：所有的经济物品都有价值，所有的自由物品都没有价值。无论如何必须牢牢记，某种物品是否仅仅有用，或同时又是某个效用的条件，完全取决于数量关系。
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