发帖
雷达卡
Summary
To say that the Asian economies are weak would be something of
an understatement. On some measures, the downturn is already as
bad as the 1998 crisis, while 1Q09 GDP is unlikely to provide much
respite. All is not lost, however: the various stimulus measures,
commodity price collapse, historical experience, longer lead
indicators, and China’s pick-up all offer grounds for hope. The
prospect of rapidly rising unemployment and the return of deflation
are the largest domestic risks to a strong second-half recovery, but
they should not be overplayed at this stage
Do not despair
With memories of 1997 looming larger and larger, it is very easy to be despondent. Indeed many seem to
suggest that if there was any light at the end of the tunnel it has now been switched off! We disagree.
While the region is not quite out of the woods yet, and downside risks remain, there are several reasons
for optimism.
First, the region is relatively well placed to benefit from the huge and synchronised easing of fiscal and
monetary conditions, as well as the biggest ever commodity price decline. Second, every time Asian
growth has suffered a serious setback in the past it has come back with a vengeance and not because the
region has been bailed out by improving demand from the developed world. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, Asia’s post-crisis recovery was led by consumer demand which then triggered an improvement
in the regional trade cycle. Third, longer lead indicators, which have proved useful in predicting turning
points, have been improving for months now, accompanied by a modest rise in some of the shorter lead
indicators as well. Fourth, there is increasingly clear evidence that, once again, China’s domestic demand
is breaking away from exports: recent months have seen improvements in bank lending, business
confidence, motor vehicle sales, electricity usage, infrastructure investment and commodity imports.
In this report we have developed a model of Asian GDP growth as a means of judging the impact of the
various drivers to activity. This suggests that lower commodity prices and the fiscal and monetary easing
measures will boost growth by at least 2ppt from 3Q09 to 3Q10. The results are, of course, based on
historical experience and can therefore be criticised on the ground that “this time is different”. It is,
however, hard to dispute the size of the fiscal action that has been taken in Asia, and financial confidence
may be gradually returning.
Timing the turn
In practice, pinpointing the turning point in Asian growth is not exactly easy. The only thing we can say
with confidence at this stage is that it did not begin in the first quarter of 2009. The monthly industrial
and export data have generally been very poor and our coincident indicator of activity is consistent with a
further drop in growth. Indeed, we expect many to be surprised by just how weak things were in the first
quarter, probably leading to a further round of downward revisions to the consensus view; our 2009 year
average numbers are generally below the market median.
Thereafter things become a little hazier, although we would be very surprised if the green shoots were not
in abundance by the middle of this year. We expect the recovery to be sharper than most, which in turn
explains why our 2010 growth numbers are generally above consensus.
Risks remain
There are, as always, several risks that surround our central view. Apart from the obvious dangers of a
further external shock, we have considered two domestic risks in some detail. The first relates to the
labour market. Sadly, economic growth has already fallen to levels consistent with a meaningful
reduction in jobs in Asia, which in turn could provide a significant dampener on consumer spending. The
extent to which it will, however, depends on how real wages develop and the ability and willingness of
households to reduce their savings. It is worth noting that the rise in unemployment in the late-1990s did
not prevent a consumer recovery in 1998-99 and we expect the jobless figures to be lower this time.
The second risk concerns the emergence of deflation in the region. By this we do not mean temporary
price falls relating mainly to the collapse in commodity prices (which is already apparent in some
countries and is actually good news for growth), but a persistent drop in the price level resulting from
excess capacity and/or prolonged weakness in domestic demand. The risks are bigger in some sectors and
countries than others. An overhang of capacity is most evident in electronics, for example, while this is
unlikely to be the case in infrastructure related sectors where fiscal pump-priming has come to the rescue.
Not surprisingly, Japan and Taiwan are the countries we are most concerned about in Asia, while the risk
looks to be small and manageable for most other countries in the region. Of course, if we are right about
the prospects for Asian domestic demand, then the chances of “bad” deflation will be much reduced.
What happened 4
Where it’s going 5
Key forecast 6
Monetary & fiscal policy
assumptions 7
Why Asia can do better 8
Bad is not the word… 8
…but do not despair 10
Quantifying the fundamentals 13
Forecasts 17
Where the risks lie 19
One side and the other 19
Those dreaded memories 19
A different hit 20
Putting numbers to it 22
Another way to look at it 23
When prices tumble 24
What to do about it 27
GDP 30
Inflation 31
Industrial production &
unemployment 32
Consumption & saving 33
Investment 34
Trade 35
Exchange rates & interest
rates 36
Country profiles 37
China 38
Hong Kong SAR 40
India 42
Indonesia 44
Japan 46
Korea 48
Malaysia 50
Pakistan 52
Philippines 54
Singapore 56
Sri Lanka 58
Taiwan 60
Thailand 62
Vietnam 64
Disclosure appendix 67
Disclaimer 68
Contents
314858.pdf
(1.6 MB, 需要: 500 个论坛币)
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
京公网安备 11010802022788号
